Devastating effect of floods on rice production and commercialisation in the Fogera plain


In September 2020, the northern Amhara region of Ethiopia was hit hard again by floods, already displacing 300,000 people, according to the UN. APRA researchers Dawit Alemu and Abebaw Assaye assess the extent of the damage on rice production and commercialisation in the Fogera plain, government measures to counter the floods, and the impacts on the livelihoods of farming households.


Written by Dawit Alemu and Abebaw Assaye

Introduction

Ethiopia is facing diverse climate related challenges in 2020. The main challenges are related with the desert locust invasions in the Northeast (Tigray, Wollo and Afar areas) and South-eastern (Dire Dawa and Hararghe) areas of the country and floods linked with continuous heavy rains that has affected the Fogera plain and the lowland areas of Afar region.

The Fogera plain, known for rice production, was severely affected by heavy rains from June to September 2020 that caused flooding due to the overflow of the Rib, Gumara, and other tributary rivers of Lake Tana and Abay (Blue Nile). In addition, the flooding in the Fogera plain was aggravated by (i) the poor management of irrigation channels of the uncompleted rib river irrigation scheme, which has been under construction  since 2008, (ii) lack of flood management structures in the districts of the Fogera plain, and (iii) the absence of proper and coordinated watershed management practices (e.g. afforestation, terracing and other flood controlling practices) on the upper catchment areas (upland areas) of the Fogera plain, and a lack of flood-risk mitigation and analysis for a fast response.

We present the extent of flood damage in the Fogera plain based on (i) direct observations and discussion with flood affected rice farmers, and (ii) data collected from the district and kebele[1] offices of Agriculture and Early Warning and Risk Management offices. In addition to the extent of damage, we discuss the on-going efforts put in place to address challenges along with expected impacts on rice commercialisation and the livelihoods of farmers in the Fogera plain.

Libokemkem Woreda, Teza Amba kebele. Credit: Abebaw Assaye

Extent of flood damage in Fogera plain

In general, flooding is normally expected in major lowland rice producing areas of South Gondar zone, around Lake Tana of the Fogera plain. Most rice farmers depend on flooding if the level of flooding is below the height of rice plant. Rice grows well when under water, but if the flood levels are high and submerge the whole field, then the rice plant will be ruined. This is what happened in the recent flooding in many parts of the Fogera plain.

Extent of flood damage in the Fogera plain by number of households and area affected. Source: respective district offices of agriculture and early warning and risk management offices

More than 16,000 farm households covering about 9,000 ha of land have been affected by the flood. The discussion with officials, from the district office of Agriculture and Early Warning and Risk Management office, indicate that the affected households are of two types. The first are those who lost their houses along with rice and other crop fields. The second are those only affected by the loss of farm fields (Table 1). Of the total affected households, about 12% of them are female-headed households.

Dera Woreda, Jigena kebele, Gumara river. Credit: Abebaw Assaye

Measures underway to address the affected households

Following the floods, those badly affected have received humanitarian support to, such as provision of temporary shelter (house, blankets, tarpaulins, sleeping mats) and relief assistance (provision of food and water). The humanitarian assistance was provided by governmental and non-governmental organisations.

In terms of rehabilitation, there is a plan to ensure availability of seeds from crops that can be grown when the floodwater subsides, mainly related to short maturing crops like pulses and crops that can be grown with supplementary irrigation. As reported by respondents, the expected challenges will be (i) ensuring the supply of quality seed of preferred varieties of short maturing crops, (ii) labour shortage, as all affected farmers need to plant at the same time, (iii) the possible communicable disease pandemic following the flood (e.g. typhoid, cholera and Malaria), and (iv) persistent food insecurity aggravated by both the flood and COVID-19 related food price surge.

Fogera Woreda, Wagetera Kebele. Credit: Abebaw Assaye

Expected impact of the flood on rice commercialisation and farmers’ livelihood

The responses of affected farmers and experts in the respective district office of agriculture and Early Warning and Risk Management offices indicate the following short and long-term impacts related to rice commercialisation and farmers’ livelihoods:

  1. The need to ensure food security for the affected farm households through humanitarian assistance, which also demands redirection of agriculture development efforts;
  2. Availability of paddy rice from the current main production will be considerably reduced resulting in higher prices of both paddy and milled rice. This will further aggravate the observed increase in both paddy and milled rice due to COVID 19 pandemic;
  3. The food security status of farm householders in rural areas and households in urban areas will be considerably reduced as food prices will be very high;
  4. The planned crop production on the residual moisture in the soil after the floods will contribute to improvement in the availability of food for farm households. However, the extent of production is expected to be affected by shortage of labour, as all affected farmers will start farm activities at the same time.
  5. Given the exacerbation of damage was mainly due to the inefficiency in the construction and lack of timely completion of rib irrigation scheme, policy makers are expected to improve production systems with better access to irrigation, and the possibility of off-season production of different crops including high value crops (vegetables). Rib irrigation is one of the major investments in the Fogera plain expected to transform the whole crop production system covering 20,000 ha of land and reaching 40,000 farmers.

The construction of Rib irrigation dam started in 2008 by a local contractor, Ethiopian Construction Works Corporation with the financial support of World Bank as part of the Bank’s Ethiopian Nile Irrigation and Drainage Project (ENIDP) with initial estimated budget of 1.3 billion birr and was supposed to be completed in 2012. It was officially inaugurated in 2018 after 10 years at an expense of 3.8 billion birr. However, the scheme is still not completed, with the regional government planning to do so in the first half of 2021. The main reasons for delay are (i) design changes, (ii) inefficiency of the contractor and public supervision, and (iii) reported delays and corruption in compensating for farmland and communal land.

Fogera, Shaga Kebele. Credit: Abebaw Assaye

Way forward

Considering the importance of rice in ensuring food security, in expanding livelihood options, enhancing national self-sufficiency and reducing the burden on the low foreign currency reserves, it will be important to provide due attention at policy and development levels and take adequate short and long-term measures to address the challenges related with floods.


[1] In each district there are a number of Kebeles, and a Kebele is the lowest administrative unit where there are different offices including the Kebele office of Agriculture


Feature photo: Fogera, Shaga Kebele. Credit: Abebaw Assaye


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Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Women and young people in Zimbabwe’s COVID-19 economy


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

I had another catch-up with colleagues in Zimbabwe recently, reflecting on the COVID-19 situation and its consequences across our sites in Masvingo, Gutu, Mwenezi, Matobo and Mvurwi. This is now the fifth update since March/April (see summary so far here).

The pandemic has not proceeded as some feared in Zimbabwe, and recorded case numbers (at 8471 on November 6) and deaths (at 250) are still low. There is much speculation about how and why the pandemic took a different course across Africa, and in future blogs we will explore some of these hypotheses in relation to the Zimbabwe setting.

As colleagues mentioned during the call, “We really don’t know any cases where we live, even in the hospitals and clinics. We don’t see people sick with the virus so far”. What is feared is the return of migrants from South Africa plus visitors from Europe and the UK during the holiday season. “We hope the government will be strict. There are requirements for test certificates, but you know they can always be cheated.” The importance of flows of people from outside the country is certainly central to the COVID-19 story in Zimbabwe, as we have discussed in previous blogs.

Zimbabwe is still under partial lockdown, with road blocks and movement restrictions in place, even though curfews and business opening hour regulations have been relaxed. The police are very present, and particularly engaged in checking permits especially of cross-border traffic in towns like Masvingo. With the weather being very hot last week before the rains, it was commented that “many had given up wearing masks, and relied on the heat as a ‘natural sanitiser’”. As one colleague observed, “It’s difficult to continue protecting ourselves when we don’t see the impacts of the virus”.

Diversified livelihoods

This blog focuses on the situation in the period since the last update on September 27, with a particular focus on the livelihood impacts of lockdown on women and young people. The standard approaches to raising funds to support families by women and young people have been insufficient, as COVID-19 restrictions have hit hard. Diversification beyond agriculture is key, offering new livelihood options. Below are some examples of occupations taken up during the pandemic in our sites, especially by women and young people, to support their livelihoods.

Fruit and veg. Diversification of livelihoods has been vital, since traditional occupations for women and young people have been constrained during lockdown. For example, while vending remains important for women, cross-border trade that used to be a mainstay in the border areas such as Mwenezi and Matobo is no longer feasible. Some have diversified, so for example dry season sales of wild fruits has expanded along the roads near Gutu, as women and children harvest matamba and mushuku, both selling for a US dollar for a handful of fruit.

Similarly, gardening continues as a vital source of self-provisioning with major nutritional benefits. As we have reported before, nearly everyone is a gardener now, whether in town or the rural areas, although women and youth are the dominant gardeners it seems. However, the expansion of gardening, combined with restrictions on market (again discussed in earlier blogs) has resulted in local gluts, particularly during the recent dry season – which is the traditional focus for gardening activities. The result is that women in particular have had to innovate, and develop new ways of processing and storing vegetables and fruits to sustain income over a longer period across seasons, and through variable market conditions.

Gold and amethyst. Small-scale mining is an essential activity for young people, mostly men. However, over the past few months a surprising development has been the movement of women into mining activities. Our colleague in Matobo reckons perhaps a fifth of miners are now women. While the mining claim owners of course are by-and-large well-connected older men, who manage the claim through a system of sharing with a group of contractors, women and young people join syndicates and provide labour. Most mining is of gold and in these cases half is shared with the owner, while the rest is divided amongst the group who did the mining.

Gold mining has expanded massively in all sites, including a recent huge expansion around Masvingo town. One young man, RB, relayed his story:

“I had been a driver for three years, but I lost my job because of lockdown. The transport businesses just collapsed. My wife and kids went back to the rural home as I could not support them in town. But in the last six months I have started mining outside town. I work with a group of five and we share the ore, milling it locally. If you work hard you can earn US$1400 per month, even when giving half to the claim owner. I have bought a car and I have plans to buy a stand. My family came back two weeks ago and are with me now. Life is now good!”

In Chikombedzi area in Mwenezi there has been a massive rush to mining sites where purple amethyst deposits have been found. Around a thousand people are living there, with markets developing for food, as well as services including transport, machinery hire and sex work. With amethyst quartz rocks being sold for about R1800 per kg, it has become a lucrative business.

Brick-making and building. With the flood of migrants coming back from South Africa and neighbouring countries, as well as from urban areas across Zimbabwe, during the pandemic due to the loss of jobs, the demand for building in the rural areas has sky-rocketed. These dispersed COVID-19 ‘refugees’ have returned home, but need somewhere to live. This, in turn, has generated a big demand for local ‘farm bricks’, which are cured and sold on to builders. In Wondedzo, a thousand bricks were being sold for around US$25. Brick-making has become an important source of income during this past dry season for both women and youth, who take on different roles between digging, moulding and firing in kilns, with each kiln producing 5-10,000 bricks each time.

Chickens and pigs. Poultry is another area where women and youth have invested considerably in recent months as there has been a growth in demand for local supplies of poultry. In part this is because of the closure of butcheries and the difficulty of getting to town, and in part because local sources of meat have been hit hard by the mass mortalities of cattle due to ‘January disease’ during the past wet season. The abbatoirs are also closed too; indeed one near Masvingo has been converted into a gold milling plant reflecting the switch in livelihood activities.

Mrs C. based in Masvingo explains how she moved from having under 30 chickens to over 300:

“I am a teacher, but my salary doesn’t pay. My husband who used to work on cross-border buses also lost his job due to COVID. I decided to expand my flock, buying up ‘road-runner’ indigenous chickens. I now have three breeds, two from a supplier of day-old chicks in Bulawayo and one from Mr M who supplies from a nearby growth point. I buy these for between 55 and 80 US cents per chick, along with some feed. These breeds though don’t need expensive feed and medicine, so I don’t have to go to town. I now make US$200 per month and am planning to expand further. I have already started a small piggery project to complement.  I am thinking of quitting teaching, as this really pays”.  

Bread and buns. With access to town restricted and movement difficult, baking has become another big cottage industry in rural areas and urban locations, and an important income source for women. In Chatsworth in Gutu for example a government training course encouraged women to take this up, and baking at home of bread and buns has expanded massively since. Across our sites you can buy bread, buns and cakes from people’s homes, as local people have taken on the supply.

Piece-work employment. While conventional jobs are scarce, there have been other sources of employment emerging, even in the dry season when agricultural piece-work options are generally limited. In particular, hiring of labour for digging holes for the Pfumvudza programme (a major government-led initiative with donor support on conservation agriculture – watch out for blogs on the experience of this in the coming weeks) has become important in all our sites.

Young people in particular have been able to benefit, with digging pits in one plot (39m x 16m) being charged at between US$5 at US$20 depending on the soil type and location, with payment in cash or kind (mostly soap and sugar). It is young men in particular who are benefiting from this, as older people often prefer to pay for the labour in order to get the free seeds and fertilisers.

Money matters

Saving and circulating money is a big challenges, as access to towns has reduced. There has therefore been a big growth in various forms of ‘savings clubs’ in the past months across all sites, which particularly involve women. For example in Wondedzo area near Masvingo, 20 women pooled cash and members draw funds to finance projects, paying interest on the amount of around 20%. In Masvingo town meanwhile there are lots of such clubs, some church-based, some just amongst a group of individuals. One group involves six female civil servants, mostly teachers, who save 150 Rand every two weeks, and one member takes out the full amount each fortnight to fund activities.

Money for new activities is crucial; without employment and with banks closed or difficult to get to from rural areas or townships, then new forms of managing money becomes important. New regulations that restrict the amount of phone lines for mobile ecocash money transactions and the electronic transfer tax also dissuades people from using electronic means. Instead very localised systems for saving and circulating cash – all in foreign exchange, either Rands or US dollars depending on the location – is the alternative.

And it’s women in particular who are the key players in this new savings and credit economy, as they in particular need funds for new projects to enhance their livelihoods.

Lockdown challenges

As we have discussed in earlier blogs, lockdown has not all been plain-sailing. Not everyone is able to innovate, earn money and do better than before, as with RM the young miner and Mrs C the poultry producer introduced above.

Our colleagues report in particular the many tensions that have arisen within families. With relatives coming back from South Africa and elsewhere they have to be accommodated and supported. Extra mouths to feed and people to house in a time a crisis. While the COVID-19 migrant-return situation has not been widely reported, as people have dispersed to multiple homes across many locations, the absorption of many thousands of people into a poor, local, mostly rural economy has had a big impact economically and socially.

Those returning, used to working in big cities south of the Limpopo may not be happy with a new rural existence, something they escaped before. Among (mostly male) youth, both returnees and local residents, our colleagues reported a rise in drug taking, drinking and general depression. This has led to arguments and sometimes violence. A rise in pregnancies among young women and teenage marriages have also been reported. Boredom and lack of opportunity, along with an inability to travel, even move to the local town, play into a negative, potentially destructive, social dynamic affecting many young people.

Not all migrants have been able to return, however, and some have been trapped in South Africa, unable to move. In our study areas near the borders – Matobo and Mwenezi – in the past men would move back and forth between often temporary jobs in farms and mines in South Africa, or to Mozambique or Botswana. Today this flexible movement is no longer feasible. Men are locked in South Africa in particular, while women are locked down at home. Adulterous affairs among both men and women have expanded, resulting in arguments, occasional violence and many reported divorces.  

Unlocking opportunities during lockdown

Despite the very clear lockdown challenges, the pattern seen across sites is one of innovative survival, and sometimes more. As one informant from Masvingo explained: “Lockdown has unlocked the entrepreneurial spirit! We can now earn good cash. I am not looking back!”

The transformations precipitated by COVID-19 lockdown have therefore not all been negative. As people have innovated to survive, new options have emerged, focused on new markets – whether building for returning migrants, supplying chickens or vegetables in the rural areas. With a shift to local production, short market/value chains and extending the range of activities – from mining to baking – the rural economy, and its connections to urban areas, has shifted significantly over the past seven months.

There is therefore a new COVID economy – and with this new social relations, with both opportunities and challenges. We will keep an eye on these developments over the coming months as the dry season moves (hopefully) into a rainy agricultural season, exploring whether these changes are temporary – a response to a crisis – or more long-term, shifting the terms, roles and incentives in economic activities over time, with new opportunities, especially for women and young people.


Thanks to the team in Matobo, Mwenezi, Mvurwi, Gutu, Wondedzo and Masvingo for contributing insights to the blog.


Credit for all photos: Ian Scoones.

What is the future for rice as a strategic crop in Ethiopia?


In our latest blog, APRA academics Dawit Alemu and John Thompson summarise their latest working paper to look at the future of rice in Ethiopia. They look at the economic importance of the crop and examine the trends in production, imports and domestic consumption. Finally, they list the challenges that hold back development in the country, and what can be done to address them.

This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 44. Access it, for free, here.


Written by Dawit Alemu and John Thompson

Introduction

In line with the increased importance in Africa, rice has become one of the most important agricultural commodities in Ethiopia though it is a relatively recent introduction to Ethiopia. Its introduction was firmly linked with the quest for addressing various challenges of different public interventions during the Derge regime, which were mainly related with settlement and food security. The first areas of rice introduction were Gambella (1973 – 1982), Pawe (1985 – 1988), and Fogera Plain (early 1980s). However, of these areas, Fogera remained one of the major rice production areas that has experienced huge changes in agrarian relations and social dynamics associated with the introduction of rice and its subsequent commercialisation.

In this belong, we document the trends of the importance of rice covering the domestic production, imports, and extent of self-sufficiency and associated efforts along with the challenges and opportunities in rice cultivation, processing and marketing in Ethiopia. Specifically, it deals with: (i) the growing importance of rice in the country; (ii) the trends in rice production, imports and domestic consumption; (iii) the general research and development efforts made to catalyse the opportunities rice offers to the country; and (iv) the key challenges and opportunities for the future development of the rice sector in Ethiopia.

The importance of rice in Ethiopia

Several factors have influenced the emergence of rice as an important food security crop and strategic commodity in Ethiopia over the past three decades.  These are related to: (i) the trend in the expansion of rice production linked with agro-ecological suitability and existing potential estimated at 30 million hectares of land, of which 5.6 million hectares are categorised as highly suitable; (ii) the compatibility of rice in local farming systems and traditional foods; (iii) the economic incentives of rice production (comparative advantage) related with higher productivity and higher product unit price; (iv) the rapid increase in domestic rice consumption and the associated burden on foreign currency due to rice imports estimated at more than 300 thousand tons and costing the country close to USD 200 million in 2018; and (v) the favourable public policy environment and  support of development partners including the continental  initiative of the coalition for African Rice Development.

Distribution of the national rice hubs in Ethiopia, 2018. Source: Authors’ own

Trends in rice production, imports and domestic consumption

Considering domestic consumption as the sum of domestic production and imports, the total consumption of rice in Ethiopia has grown considerably. This is in line with the trend in consumption observed in all African countries (Van Oort, 2015; Seck et al., 2013; Wopereis et al., 2013). The trend in domestic production and imports indicate that the rate of increase was considerably higher for rice imports compared to domestic production, which has results in considerable decline of the rate of self-sufficiency in rice consumption. The estimated rate indicates that rice self-sufficiency in Ethiopia has decreased from about 76% in 2008 to 24% in 2019 (Figure 2).

Trends in rice production, imports, consumption and level of self–sufficiency (2008 – 2019). Source: based on data from CSA and Ethiopian Ministry of Revenue

Key challenges

Ethiopia faces a number of major challenges that are constraining the development of its rice sector. Among the major ones identified are (i) poor performance of the rice seed sector and other inputs, (ii) limited contribution of large-scale commercial rice production despite a special incentive for access to land, (iii) the considerable competition of imported rice with local production on both quality and quantity, (iv) lack of skilled human resources and research facilities for improving rice productivity and production, (v) Inadequate infrastructure for commercialisation of rice production, (vi) poor marketing system for domestic production compared to imported rice, and (vii) recently, the impact of Covid-19 on the rice system. Given the increased importance of rice and challenges facing the rice sector, the government of Ethiopia has considered  rice recently as one of the priority commodities of public attention along with wheat and oil crops.

Water-logged field in Fogera, Ethiopia. Credit: Elias Damtew/ILRI

Conclusion and recommendations

In order to address these challenges, the country needs (i) to strengthen the investment in domestic rice research and development capacity to improve the overall competitiveness of the sector, (ii) to make the most of memberships with CARD, AfricaRice and IRRI to gain access to new technologies, partnerships and knowledge exchange, (iii) to strengthen the governance of the rice value chain and linkages of the different actors; (iv) to enhance rice processing and value addition by providing formal training for the operation and maintenance of rice-processing facilities, standardising the key requirements for licensing rice mills, and incentivising processors’ fulfilment of quality standard requirements through investment in key facilities, and (v) to recognise and hedge against systemic shocks such as COVID-19 and climate change that are likely to disrupt global rice supply chains and increase the volatility of world market prices in future by improving domestic productivity and production and improving quality and consistency of supply through enhanced value addition, and strengthened trade relations with regional partners through existing frameworks


References

Seck, P.A., Touré, A.A., Coulibaly, J., Diagne, A., and Wopereis, M.C.S. (2013). Africa’s Rice Economy Before and After the 2008 Rice Crisis. In: M.C.S. Wopereis, et al. (eds.), Realizing Africa’s Rice Promise. Wallingford, UK: CAB International; pp 24 – 34.

Van Oort P.A.J., Saito K., Tanaka A., Amovin-Assagba E., Van Bussel L.G.J., Van Wart J., De Groot H. and, Wopereis M.C.S. (2015). Assessment of Rice Self-Sufficiency in 2025 in Eight African Countries. Global Food Security 5: 39-49.

Wopereis, M.C.S., Diagne, A., Johnson, D.E. and Seck, P.A. (2013). Realizing Africa’s Rice Promise: Priorities for Action. In: M.C.S. Wopereis, et al. (eds.), Realizing Africa’s Rice Promise. Wallingford, UK: CAB International; pp 424 -436.


Feature photo: Rice fields in Fogera, Ethiopia. Credit: Abebaw Assaye


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Journal Article: The Agrarian Question in Contemporary Zimbabwe. Africanus: Journal of Development Studies, Vol 49 No 1 (2019)

Toendepi Shonhe. 2019

The reinvestment of rural agrarian surplus is driving capital accumulation in Zimbabwe’s countryside, providing a scope to foster national (re-) industrialisation and job creation. Contrary to Bernstein’s view, the Agrarian Question on capital remains unresolved in Southern Africa. Even though export finance, accessed through contract farming, provides an impetus for export cash crop production, and the government-mediated command agriculture supports food crop production, the reinvestment of proceeds from the sale of agricultural commodities is now driving capital accumulation. Drawing from empirical data, gathered through surveys and in-depth interviews from Hwedza district and Mvurwi farming area in Mazowe district in Zimbabwe, the findings of this study revealed the pre-eminence of the Agrarian Question, linked to an ongoing agrarian transition in Zimbabwe. This agrarian capital elaborates rural-urban interconnections and economic development, following two decades of de-industrialisation in Zimbabwe. 

APRA Tanzania present findings to media

After the successful high profile media coverage by the APRA Malawi team, the Tanzania team have followed suit by presenting a selection of their research findings to 23 different media houses during a special event held at the Sokoine Agricultural University (SUA) on 21 October 2020. Media organisations that attended included BBC Swahili, Tanzania Daily News, Deutsche Welle and many others (see below for full list).

The research outcomes on rice and sunflower commercialisation in Morogoro and Singida regions in Tanzania, presented by APRA researchers including Aida Isinika Ntengua Mdoe and Devotha Kilave, focused on three areas: Youth benefits in agriculture, advice to stakeholders to invest in agribusiness, and recommending a nationwide training on System of Rice Intensification (SRI) farming.

Youth are benefiting

The research, based on youth participation in commercial rice farming in the Kilombero basin, found that young people between the ages of 15 – 35 (35.5% of the population) are the main beneficiaries of commercial rice farming, despite the challenges of raising capital and difficulties in accessing agricultural land. It also found that the main beneficiaries are predominantly young males.

Ntengua Mdoe speaking to workshop participants. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI

According to Ntengua Mdoe, this clearly shows that young people are involved in agricultural activities, and therefore challenges the view that youth show little interest in farming.  

Aida Isinika added that, while youth participation in agriculture in the region was high, they tended to focus on crops that yielded fast results such as rice, onions and tomatoes.

“They need short-term results that is why you see many are rushing to those crops that spend short time in the field in order to get money faster”

Prof. Isinika

The researchers urged local governments to allocate land for youth to commit to agriculture, and to provide loans through a youth development fund. They also advised District Councils to collaborate with other agricultural stakeholders to enable young people to improve training and enable farmers to increase productivity and income.

APRA reseacher Chris Magomba talks to journalists. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI

Invest in agribusiness

With young farmers focusing on these fast-growing crops, the APRA team urged the government and other stakeholders to place more emphasis on agribusiness, particularly on these short-term crops, as a way of creating more jobs for young people in the country.

Moreover, they stressed the importance of agribusiness as a tool of poverty alleviation through improving the livelihoods of farmers and their families.

The research results also demonstrated significant benefits for smallholder farmers and surrounding communities by engaging in direct farming or by engaging in other stages of the value chain as service providers for example. In particular, this helps young people and mothers to become self-employed and earn a guaranteed income, says Ntengua Mdoe.

APRA researcher Gideon Boniface talks to participants. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI

Training on SRI practices

The researchers recommended that the Ministry of Agriculture organise nationwide training on SRI farming practice in order to increase productivity and improve the livelihoods of farmers.

A rice farming method that uses less water and fewer seeds, SRI follows best practices such as timely ploughing and planting seedlings within 7 to 10 days from the nursery, which enables farmers to obtain a higher yield than via traditional methods.

Devotha Kilave addresses participants. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI

Devotha Kilave, a researcher from Sokoine University of Agriculture, said that their study had shown that training has a great contribution to increase productivity in agriculture, for example, farmers with SRI training had higher yield per plot than farmers with no SRI training.

Aida Isinika emphasised that if used properly, SRI it will prevent water loss and protect the environment, which is important as a substantial quantity of water from the Kilombero basin is used to generate electricity in the Julias Nyerere hydro-power station under construction downstream within Rufiji basin.

Group photo of workshop participants. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI

For a full report on the media workshop, click here

The full list of media outlets attending were:

1. The Guardian  2. Business times 3. Daily news 4. SUAMEDIA 5. Michuzi Blogs 6. Full Shangwe blog 7 .Channel 10 Tv  8. Azam Tv  9. Majira 10. Mtanzania 11. TBC  12. Clouds Media 13. Star Tv  14. Abood Media 15.Habari leo  16. Nipashe  17. ITV  18. Radio One 19. BBC  20. DW 21. AYO TV  22. The CITIZEN  23. Mwananchi  


For related APRA Tanzania research, follow the links below:

APRA Working Paper 30: Does rice commercialisation impact on livelihood? Experience fromMngeta in Kilombero district, Tanzania

Blog: How SRI technology and irrigation has transformed Anita’s life


Cover photo: Devotha Kilave addresses members of the press. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI

Dilemmas of smallholder oil palm farmers in south-western Ghana


This blog utilises the latest research to look at the different choices and outcomes facing small-scale oil palm farmers in south-western Ghana. The authors then examine household participation, transactions and trust, the welfare effects, and the implications of their research on oil palm commercialisation.

This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 43. Access it, for free, here.


Written by Louis Hodey, Kofi Asante and Fred Dzanku

Introduction

Are there welfare consequences for the choice of oil palm commercialisation models in south-western Ghana? What has material welfare got to do with (the breakdown of) trust in contractual relations between farmers and oil palm companies? To what extent do these factors shape participation at the higher end of the oil palm value chain? We used a cross-sectional household survey and qualitative data from 20 communities in two districts (Ahanta West and Mpohor) of the Western Region of Ghana to answer these questions. The study districts are known for their high concentration of oil palm production activities involving smallholder farmers and the presence of two of Ghana’s ‘big four’ oil palm companies (Norpalm Ghana Ltd and Benso Oil Palm Plantation Ltd). The two districts also fall within the operational area of Building Business on Values, Integrity and Dignity (B-BOVID); a medium-scale oil palm processing company.

Four main oil palm market participation channels were identified in the two districts:

  • Selling directly to oil palm buying companies
  • Selling indirectly to oil palm buying companies through intermediaries known as buying agents.
  • Selling on the local open market (i.e. to market women, food vendors and artisanal and small-scale processors).
  • Avoiding selling altogether and instead processing the fruits into palm oil or, less frequently, alcoholic beverages or soap.
Distribution of households by their oil palm commercialisation channels

What determines households’ participation in the oil palm commercialisation channels?

Key household and community-level factors influence participation in oil palm commercialisation channels in south-western Ghana. At the household level, being a female-headed household, being a couple household, size of land holding, and distance to an oil palm company are significantly linked to the likelihood of own-processing. At community level, the availability of agro-services and a processing mill significantly raises the likelihood of own-processing. The likelihood of selling directly to a company, which is also welfare-enhancing relative to the remaining two options, is positively correlated with the availability of working capital, level of palm fruit output and access to a paved road; but negatively associated with age of farmer, distance to a company and the presence of a processing mill in the community.

Transactions and Trust in Ghana’s Oil Palm Economy

Although the literature suggests there are benefits of farmer participation in global value chains through various contractual arrangements between smallholders and agribusiness companies (Bellemare and Bloem 2018; Wang, Wang and Delgado 2014), our results show that such arrangements have all but disappeared in the oil palm belt of south-western Ghana where two of the four largest oil palm companies operate. This, we found, is because of dissatisfaction with contractual arrangements and a general breakdown of trust between companies, agents, and farmers. While about 60 percent of producers still sell their output to oil palm companies directly or indirectly through agents without formal contracts, the lack of trust in the new relationships as well as the absence of vibrant farmer cooperatives have generated resentment among farmers arising from the belief that they are being exploited by companies and their agents. This is particularly true for those using the services of agents. While the processing of palm fruits into palm oil has been prevalent in most oil palm producing areas of Ghana for several decades, we find that dissatisfaction with selling fresh fruit bunches (FFBs) has led to an increase in own-processing where possible.

Oil palm trees growing on a farmer’s compound. Credit: Louis Hodey

Welfare effects of the oil palm commercialisation channels

Our study finds that household welfare outcomes differ for the various oil palm commercialisation channels identified. Indeed, using objective and subjective measures of welfare, it is evident that households engaged in own-processing have the highest objective welfare outcome, while in terms of subjective welfare, those who engage the services of agents are the unhappiest and most discontented. Overall, households selling directly to the oil palm companies and those who process their own output mostly have identical welfare, although there is some evidence that own-processing could be more welfare increasing in ‘objective’ terms. Indeed, while selling directly to a company or doing so through an agent seems to yield identical per capita income, the former channel is associated with significantly higher composite and subjective welfare than the latter. Additionally, although selling through an agent yields higher per capita income than selling to traders, the former group are not better off when multidimensional and subjective welfare is considered.

Oil palm bunches being weighed. Credit: Louis Hodey

Way forward for oil palm commercialisation in Ghana

The implications of our results for agricultural commercialisation policy and practice in Ghana are as follows. First, given that own-processing and direct sales to oil palm companies are the most significant welfare-increasing options, these channels could be the target of interventions. Since the presence of a processing facility is the strongest predictor of own-processing, a public-private partnership (PPP) arrangement that provides incentives for modern community-based mechanised processing facilities could boost oil palm processing and possibly enhance household welfare. Second, for those who prefer dealing directly with the oil palm companies, infrastructure development, particularly improved roads, could make this possible and more beneficial as it reduces the cost of transactions. Finally, the formation of strong oil palm-based farmer associations, which we found to be missing in the study areas, could boost the bargaining power of oil palm farmers, and help lower the unit cost required for engaging directly with the companies.


References

Bellemare, M.F. and Bloem, J.R. (2018) ‘Does contract farming improve welfare? A review’, World Development, 112: 259–271

Dzanku, F.M.; Asante, K.T. Quarmine, W. and Hodey, L.S. (2020) ‘Smallholder Farmers’ Choice of Oil Palm Commercialisation Model and Household Welfare in South-Western Ghana’, APRA Working Paper WS43, Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium.

Wang, H.H.; Wang, Y. and Delgado, M.S. (2014) ‘The transition to modern agriculture: Contract farming in developing economies’, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 96: 1257–1271


Cover photo: Oil palm trees overshadowing the landscape behind the Great Hall of the University of Ghana. Credit: Louis Hodey


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Working Paper 45: Role of resilience factors in mitigating the negative effects of conflict on land expansion

Written by, Adesoji Adelaja, Justin George, Thomas Jayne, Milu Muyanga, Titus Awokuse, Lenis Saweda O. Liverpool-Tasie and Adebayo B. Aromolaran.

Shocks and stresses from natural disasters, climate change, economic volatility, armed conflicts and political instability could hinder expansion efforts by smallholder farms (SHFs). The application of the resilience concept as a mitigator of the impacts of such shocks on land expansion by farmers is an important developmental challenge. In this paper, we hypothesise that the resilience capacity of SHFs mitigate the adverse effects of conflict shocks and examine how assets, off-farm income, access to social safety nets, and education level of the household lead contribute to household-level resilience to armed conflicts.

Working Paper 44: The Emerging Importance of Rice as a Strategic Crop in Ethiopia

Written by, Dawit Alemu and John Thompson.

Rice has become one of the most important agricultural commodities in Ethiopia in line with its increased importance throughout Africa. This paper examines the trends of the importance of rice in the country – covering the domestic production, imports, the extent of self-sufficiency and associated efforts. Specifically, the paper presents the challenges and opportunities surrounding rice cultivation, processing and marketing, as well as for the future development of the rice sector in Ethiopia.

4th eDialogue on transition pathways and strategies

‘Transition Pathways and Strategies’, was the fourth part of the eDialogue series: ‘What Future for Small-Scale Farming?’ on Tuesday, November 10, 12:00 – 13:30 UTC/GMT

Transition pathways and strategies for small-scale farming households was explored in this session, with a particular focus on the role and intersection of commercialisation, food production for self-consumption and social protection.  The diversity of small-scale farming, and the need for different combinations of strategies to help tackle the economic challenges and poor nutrition still faced by many of these farming households, was also highlighted

This fourth e-dialogue follows from the previous session on ‘Regional Perspectives’ held on October 21 and 22, which involved Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) researchers and other experts (see below for a summary of the session on African perspectives).

For more detail on this session, click here.

Contributors to the session included:

Mario Herrero, Chief Research Scientist of Agriculture and Food, Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO).

Fábio Veras, Communications, Publication and Research Coordinator, International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, Brazil.

Dr Namukolo Covic, Senior Research Coordinator of the Agriculture for Nutrition and Health division, IFPRI based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Dr Felix Kwame Yeboah, Assistant Professor in the Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics, Michigan State University.

Iris van der Velden, Director of Learning & Innovation, IDH, The Sustainable Trade Initiative.


Listen to the whole session, here:


Watch the session, here:


For a more detailed analysis of all of the sessions from the last eDialogue, visit the Foresight4Food summary page, here

For more information on all upcoming e-Dialogues, please visit our events page.


Feature photo credit: Melissa Cooperman/IFPRI

Do those not enrolled in Fairtrade arrangements in Malawi still benefit? (2)


In the second of a two-part blog series, APRA researcher Stevier Kaiyatsa examines the Fairtrade groundnut arrangement in Mchinji, Malawi, and asks whether farmers not enrolled it still benefit?

For part one on whether smallholder farmers in Malawi benefit from selling their goods small-scale traders in rural markets, click here.

This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 40. Access it, for free, here.


Written by Stevier Kaiyatsa

Government-led or development partners-led input support programs (i.e. programs that improve smallholder farmers’ access to productivity enhancing inputs such as improved seeds and inorganic fertilisers, promote private delivery of inputs, increase crop production and improve farm incomes and food security) have recently become popular in many developing countries to increase farmers’ access to modern inputs and permit them to produce market surpluses. Usually, government-led input support programs target the production of staple crops such as maize and rice while development partners-led programs target the production of high valued crops such as root tubers, legumes, and horticultural crops. Some of the programs that development partners support also link farmers to the export markets.

Maize grain at Kasonga market in Ntchisi district Malawi. Credit: Masautso Chimombo

Fairtrade arrangement

In Malawi, the Fairtrade Labelling Organisation International (now Fairtrade International) certified one of the National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi’s (NASFAM) farmer association, the Mchinji Area Small Farmers Association (MASFA) in Mchinji district, as a Fairtrade groundnuts producer to sell its groundnuts to the premium export market in 2004. This arrangement involved three key partner organisations, namely; NASFAM (Fairtrade International certified exporter), Twin Trading (Fairtrade International certified buyer), and Liberation Foods Community Interest Company (owned producer organisation). MASFA sold its groundnuts through NASFAM, which exported the groundnuts to Twin Trading in the UK and then Liberation Foods coordinated the retail of groundnuts in the UK and European markets.

During implementation of the Fairtrade arrangement, MASFA received support that is not limited to capacity building, improved seed varieties (CG7), extension services, and introduced to cheaper ways of detecting and controlling the problem of aflatoxin (a toxin found on crops such as maize). Fairtrade has a set of standards, allowing consumers to pay a premium price the same or higher than the usual product price. The farmer organisations decide democratically on how to utilise the premiums for community projects. Traceability of products along the supply chain ensures that producers are compliant with economic, social and environmental standards for Fairtrade. Products are retuned if farmer organisations do not comply with economic, social and environmental standards for Fairtrade. MASFA sold its groundnuts through the Fairtrade arrangement to United Kingdom (UK) from 2007 to 2011.

Spillover effects

Kaiyatsa, Matita, Chirwa, and Mazalale (2020) assessed whether the groundnuts Fairtrade arrangement in Mchinji district has spillover effects on commercialisation intensity for smallholder farmers that were not part of the arrangement. The authors hypothesised that geographic or social interactions might have facilitated the spread of extension messages and improved seed varieties from farmers that participated in the groundnuts Fairtrade (i.e. MASFA members) to farmers that were not part of the arrangement in Mchinji district. As a result, farmers that were not part of the arrangement might have improved their farming practices in a way that enabled them to produce market surpluses. Studies (Rogers, 1963; Carter et al., 2014; Aramburu et al., 2019; Varshney et al., 2019) have established that social network (i.e. farmer relationships or farmer interactions) leads to transfer of technology among program non-participants.

As the market channel for farmers not part of the arrangement were small-scale traders, and that farmers do not know the prices offered by traders before cultivating, the authors anticipated a farmer to cultivate a particular crop, or more than one crop, based on their access to inputs, agronomic technical expertise, and expected output prices. Thus, the spillover benefits from the groundnuts Fairtrade arrangement are expected to improve the human capital of smallholder farmers that were not part of the arrangement, which allowed them to increase their market surpluses for crops that were produced

Research data and estimation strategy

The authors use two waves of panel data from Malawi’s central districts of Mchinji and Ntchisi where groundnut production is concentrated. The first wave of the data is from a study conducted by School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in collaboration with the National Statistical Office (NSO) to evaluate the 2006/07 Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in Malawi. The second wave was collected as part of longitudinal tracker study for the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) research project that explores pathways to agricultural commercialisation and livelihood trajectories. The authors estimate a difference-in-differences (DD) model to explicitly test whether the groundnuts Fairtrade arrangement has spillover effects on commercialisation intensity for smallholder farmers that were not part of the program in Mchinji district versus those in Ntchisi district. The study uses the 2006/07 data as a baseline (i.e. the year before MASFA started selling its groundnuts through NASFAM to UK) and the 2017/18 data as a post treatment year (i.e. the year after Twin Trading stopped importing MASFA’s groundnuts into UK). A household commercialisation index (HCI) that Strasberg et al. (1999) was also used by the paper, developed as a measure of household commercialisation intensity, given that some farmers produced and sold more than one crop such as groundnuts, beans, maize, soya beans, and tobacco.

Small-scale trader buying maize grain at Kasonga market in Ntchisi district Malawi. Credit: Masautso Chimombo

Findings and conclusion

The authors find that the groundnut Fairtrade arrangement has a spillover effect of 30% for smallholder farmers that were not part of the arrangement in Mchinji district. The study provides useful information to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that enhance participation of smallholder farmers in the output market. However, not all smallholder farmers can participate in programs that enhance their access to international markets; the study demonstrated that such programs have spillover benefits to other smallholder farmers that are not targeted. Extension messages and technology can reach non-targeted smallholder farmers and motivate them to change their farming practices in a way that allows them to produce market surpluses.


Feature photo credit: ICRISAT
Unmarked photo credit: Masautso Chimombo


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Land reform in Matabeleland: the challenges of living in a harsh, variable environment


This blog was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

The land reform story in Matabeleland has been under-researched, but now there are some new findings being published. This blog profiles two papers focusing on Matobo district, also one of our study areas.

The first by Adrian Nel and Clifford Mabhena traces the historical ‘echoes’ of the land reform experience. The paper focuses on research in wards 23 and 24, where both A1 and A2 farms were established after land reform. Most new settlers were from nearby communal areas and towns, but around 40% were from further afield, including Bulawayo town, Insiza district and even Masvingo and beyond. The initial lower uptake of land reform sites in this area compared to other parts of the country can be explained by people’s need for grazing not land for cropping, combined with reticence about joining a land reform programme with unknown outcomes, especially in areas where the opposition was strong. Land reform has been more protracted in these areas, with some only signing up much later as the political temperature dropped. Quite a few white farmers held on to their land for a long time, and there have been some high-profile attempted grabs of these farms, some resisted by local people.

Historical echoes: living with variability

The title of the paper plays on Terry Ranger’s classic book ‘Voices from the Rocks’ on the history of the area. As the paper shows, the struggles to set up farms echoes the experience of earlier settlers in the area in the colonial era. Afrikaaner farmers for example were criticised by the authorities as long ago as 1939 for failing to establish farm and managing cattle and cropping in a haphazard and informal manner. The new settlers have been similarly-accused, but just as in 1939 getting farms going in a very dry area with limited resources is exceptionally difficult. Diversification is imperative, and the data from A1 farms today show how livestock, and especially cattle, become the mainstay of a stable income stream. Although there are episodic die offs due to drought or disease on average households in the A1 farms had around nine beasts, rising to 13 among the richer wealth categories.

Livestock are combined with opportunistic cropping. In most years, crops produce little, sometimes failing completely; but once in a while there is a bumper crop, and grain is stored for years and investments are made. In the five years for which cropping data is reported in this paper there was one year where farmers produced on average around two tonnes of grain per household. In most years, the total was below what is sufficient to provide for a family, and farming had to be complemented with off-farm income. Again, the experiences from past years echo through the years. Ranger comments on the importance of vleis (wetlands) and riverbanks as the source of food security in the early twentieth century in the hilly areas nearby.

In the past, the white farmers who made use of this land largely concentrated on ranching, with limited arable plots, fruit orchards and irrigated gardens near homesteads. They too had to respond to the high variability of rainfall and the sudden lack of grazing during droughts provoking high mortalities. The historical record is replete with examples of such events, with farmers going bust, moving off to do other things, and coming back as herds built up.

The same type of strategy has to be followed by the new A2 farmers on the same land. They have been allocated much smaller farm sizes making managing herds in a confined space even more challenging. This means a variety of strategies for extending feed provisioning in drought periods, including deals with neighbours, including A1 and communal farmers, and buying feed, as many A2 farmers continue with jobs elsewhere. With many farms many of which have seen significant herd growth since land reform, there are now stock numbers comparable to the pre-land reform period. This is a far-cry from the complaints of earlier periods, when officials complained that ranches were understocked.  

The movement of animals across multiple properties and land use types requires a particular type of negotiation, but is essential for maintaining herds in such a ‘non-equilibrium’ landscape. For both A1 and A2 farmers there are reinventions of past arrangements for stock sharing and movement, such as lagisa and miraka. Compared to the classic land reform areas in wetter areas focused on fixed plots and farms, the arrangements in Matobo have to be more flexible and informal, allowing movement and combining income streams from multiple sources, both local and agrarian and off-farm, including of course cross-border migration, which is a major historical feature of this area.

Conciliatory strategies: white farmers in Matobo

In another paper, also based on research from Matobo, Adrian Nel explores what white farmers have done since land reform. Compared to other parts of the country during the land invasions there were more ‘protected’ farms, with farmers being allowed to stay. This emerged because such farmers had good relationships with local communities through on-going projects and being members or leaders of the same Christian church communities.

This again is different to some other parts of the country where white farming was often very separated, geographically, economically and politically. The greater integration in Matabeleland reflects the struggles for establishing livelihoods in a harsh environment and the need for collaboration and alliance making. As the paper explores, these forms of accommodation have persisted since land reform among some farms. As in the past, there were others who dropped out as the economics of farming post 2000 became too challenging and others. Also some have pushed back against the land reform, pursuing various legal cases as part of the more militant section of commercial farmers.

The paper concentrates on those who have adapted, accommodated and developed conciliatory approaches. Some label them as ‘sell-outs’ or ‘enablers’, but they are seen to be pragmatic, committed to farming and the communities they live with. When one farm was targeted for grabbing by a security official from outside the area, the locals resisted and in the end the white farmer, who had a large Christian led community project on his farm, combined with outreach activities and a huge contract broiler project, was allowed to stay thanks to interventions from the highest level.

Others have abandoned their farms (some with great relief given the travails) and taken up new business activities linked to local farming activities, very often moving up the value chain to set up abattoirs, butcheries, feedlots and other wildlife/hunting businesses. As one large operator explained he continues to run some animals through rental agreements, but mostly sources from local producers and fattens animals in a large feedlot for his abattoir and butchery, which is much easier and more profitable he explains than producing yourself.

With Andrew HartnackRory Pilosoff and others, the paper argues for the need to go beyond a simplistic ‘homogenising’ view of whiteness. Those who remained distance themselves from other whites, and need to build new local alliances to survive. This results in new ‘becomings’ linked to diverse subjectivities, reconstituting the imaginary of whiteness as collaborative and conciliatory. Like their black neighbours, their identity is centrally-focused on making a living in a harsh environment, sometimes reinforced by strong and shared Christian religious values.

Living with and from uncertainty

The agrarian landscape of Matabeleland has changed massively since 2000. But there are important continuities with the past. Making a living in this area is tough, and requires flexibility, innovation, movement and diversification. As in the past, this requires collaboration and alliance-building in ways that allow all people – whether small-scale A1 plot owners, A2 medium-scale farmers or remaining white farmers – to live with and from uncertainty.


All photo credit: Ian Scoones

Do farmers benefit when they sell to small-scale traders in the rural market in Malawi? (1)


In the first of a two-part blog series, APRA researcher Stevier Kaiyatsa examines new APRA research and determines whether smallholder farmers in Malawi that operate in isolation benefit from selling their agricultural produce to the small-scale traders in rural markets.

Part two looks at the effects of the Fairtrade arrangement on program non-beneficiaries in Malawi

This blog is linked to APRA Working Paper 40. Access it, for free, here.


Written by Stevier Kaiyatsa

It is widely recognised that promoting smallholder agricultural commercialisation is key to reduce rural poverty in Sub-Saharan African countries. However, low yields emanating from limited use of modern inputs such as improved seeds and inorganic fertilisers prevent most smallholder farmers from participating in the output markets. In a liberalised market environment, smallholder farmers have several market options to sell their agricultural outputs. They may sell to the National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM), small-scale or large-scale traders, processors, or enter into contract farming arrangements with seed growers. Smallholder farmers that are part of a producer  organisations,  such as a farmers’ club, association, and cooperative may have access to stable markets and better prices because they stock substantial quantities of farm commodities that may attract large-scale traders, processors, NASFAM, and seed growers. The stable markets and better prices may strengthen farmer organisationsis and improve the living standards of its members. Conversely, smallholder farmers that operate in isolation produce smaller quantities that may be geographically dispersed and attract operations of small-scale traders that penetrate the rural remote areas.

Transaction at Mgona market in Lilongwe district. Credit: Stevier Kaiyatsa

Farm gate prices

The Government of Malawi through the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Water Development (MoAIWD) sets minimum farm gate prices for major agricultural commodities such as beans, cassava, groundnuts, maize and rice at the onset of each season to regulate grain prices and protect farmers from exploitation by traders. The MoAIWD base the minimum prices on historical monthly prices that are collected across the country in 72 markets. The traders are supposed to purchase agricultural commodities from smallholder farmers at or above the set minimum farm gate prices. However, the government does not enforce the minimum farm gate prices; as such, most traders do not comply. Evidence indicates that the purchasing prices that traders use are below the official farm gate prices by about two-thirds. Further, most traders use unstandardised equipment (i.e. weighing scales) to purchase from smallholder farmers, which rips off farmers’ income.         

Although the farm gate prices are lower than the government minimum prices in general, the small-scale traders also purchase smaller quantities from smallholder farmers at very low prices compared to what the large-scale traders purchase. These small-scale traders aggregate the quantities and re-sell to large-scale traders who usually operate in well-established markets such as the district capital market (locally known as boma market). The lower prices that small-scale traders use may be justified given that transaction costs of operating in the remote rural areas may be high.

Transaction at Mgona market in Lilongwe district: Stevier Kaiyatsa

Panel data and estimation strategy data

Kaiyatsa, Matita, Chirwa, and Mazalale (2020) assessed whether smallholder farmers that operate in isolation benefit from selling their agricultural produce to the small-scale traders in rural markets. The authors use two waves of panel data from Malawi’s central districts of Mchinji and Ntchisi where groundnut production is concentrated. The first wave of the data comes from the study that the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in collaboration with the National Statistical Office (NSO) conducted to evaluate the 2006/07 Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in Malawi. The second wave was collected as part of longitudinal tracker study for the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) research project that explores pathways to agricultural commercialisation and livelihood trajectories. The authors apply a fixed effects regression model (where model parameters are fixed or non-random quantities) to test whether agricultural commercialisation intensity improve household welfare for smallholder farmers comparing Mchinji and Ntchisi districts. The authors use crop income and value of household assets as measures of welfare.

Results and Conclusion

The authors find that within a span of 10 years crop income for smallholder farmers that sell to small-scale traders marginally improved by MK11 917 (US$16.41), on average. However, there was no improvement in their value of assets. The authors attributed the marginal improvement in crop income, and not in the value of assets, to poor prices that small-scale traders use to purchase agricultural commodities from smallholder farmers that produce smaller quantities in isolation. Based on these findings, the authors recommended promotion of collective marketing among smallholder farmers to improve their bargaining power and attract penetration of large-scale traders that buy in large quantities and offer better prices in the rural areas. Further, linking smallholder farmers to financial and credit institutions would enhance their access and use of improved farm inputs, which will allow them to produce greater market surpluses.


Cover photo credit: Melissa Cooperman/IFPRI


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Can medium scale farms contribute to smallholder commercialisation and welfare in Nigeria?


APRA researchers Lenis Saweda O. Liverpool-Tasie and Salim Nuhu summarise their team’s effort to explore the beneficial relationship between small-scale and medium-scale farms in Nigeria, where frequent interactions between the two are boosting the productivity and welfare of small scale farmers. They then look at policy implications, and how the government can help support this partnership.

This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 38. Access it, for free, here.


Written by Lenis Saweda O. Liverpool-Tasie and Salim Nuhu

The share of farmland under “medium-scale” farms (5-50 hectares) is on the rise in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. These medium-scale farms (MSFs) co-exist with small-scale farmers (operating on less than 5 hectares), who still constitute the majority of households in rural areas of Africa. Compared to large-scale plantation farms (LSFs), MSFs tend to be more socio-culturally similar to small-scale farms (SSFs) in the communities where they are located (Wineman et al., 2020; Houssou et al. 2016). Due to their smaller size, MSFs are also more likely (than LSFs) to be interested in coordinating input purchase or output sales with SSFs. Despite the increasing recognition of these potentially stronger spillover effects of MSFs on SSFs, the majority of existing empirical literature has focused on spillover effects of LSFs (Ali et al., 2019, Burke et al., 2019, Xia and Deininger, 2019, Glover and Jones, 2019, Herrmann, 2017, Lay et al., 2018) and that evidence is mixed. Thus, the Nigeria work stream 1 team explored the extent to which SSFs interact with MSFs around them and whether those interactions affect their modern input use, productivity, commercialisation, and welfare. We empirically test for these effects with data from Kaduna and Ogun in Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy and most populous nation. 

Findings from study

First, we find that many small-scale farmers in Nigeria interact with the medium-scale farms (MSFs) around them. About 30% of SSFs either received training from, sold output to, or purchased inputs from an MSF around them.

Second, we find that receiving training and purchasing inputs from an MSF is associated with higher yields and improved welfare via increased incomes and lower poverty incidence and severity of poverty.  While receiving training increases the likelihood and intensity of improved seed use, it has no effect on the use of fertiliser or crop protectants (such as herbicides and pesticides). Surprisingly, purchasing inputs from an MSF has no positive impact on any modern input use. This implies that the increased productivity observed from farmers who purchased inputs from MSFs is likely driven by improved access to higher quality inputs; a big challenge in sub-Saharan Africa (Poku et al., 2018) or the provision of other complementary services alongside the sale of inputs such as training or credit or logistics services.  This is consistent with Liverpool-Tasie et al (2020) who find that value chain actors in the midstream and downstream of food value chains across Africa address idiosyncratic market failures of SSFs by providing them with complementary services such as credit, logistics, training and physical inputs that improve SSF productivity and welfare.

Cassava farmer in Nigeria. Credit: IFPRI

We find that the opportunity to sell through MSFs has strong welfare effects. It enables SSFs to receive a higher price; thereby boosting their crop production and total income. This reduces their probability of being in poverty as well as the extent and severity of poverty they experience. Higher yields associated with sales coordination could occur through investments made in agricultural production to take advantage of improved access to a more guaranteed market and/or training offered to support the coordination activities of medium-scale farms.[1] On exploring this further, we confirm that SSF productivity and welfare are significantly enhanced by more intense interactions with medium-scale farmers. This means that the provision of multiple complementary services and opportunities by MSFs is significantly driving improved SSF productivity and welfare.

Policy implications

We believe that our findings have important implications for policy makers and development practitioners across Africa. Currently, African governments are striving to improve SSF welfare while creating an environment for expanded food production to meet the demands of a rapidly growing populations and changing dietary patterns.

Our findings suggest gains from policies and programs that encourage the beneficial co-existence of medium and small-scale farms. MSFs in our study sample are supporting SSF productivity and welfare via improved management practices and the opportunity they provide for SSFs to sell their output at more competitive prices. Government and donor programs should support these interactions and ensure that they are inclusive of typically disadvantaged groups such as women, youth and marginalised SSFs.

We also find that multiple interactions, such as market access alongside training, are important for these positive productivity and welfare effects. Thus, in addition to supporting the beneficial co-existence of MSFs and SSFs, incentives/support to MSFs (and other market actors) to boost the provision of multiple and complementary services (access to input, training and output market) should be encouraged.


[1] Because our input use  and crop yield determination occurs before our sales outcome (though through the effect of the number of MS farms  in a farmers vicinity in the previous farming year) it is also possible that farmers who use higher inputs and have higher yields sold to MS farms we focus more on the welfare effects of  sales coordination.


The team behind this research consists of Lenis Saweda O. Liverpool-Tasie, Ahmed Salim Nuhu, Titus Awokuse, Thomas Jayne, Milu Muyanga, Adebayo Aromolaran and Adesoji Adelaja.


Cover photo credit: Student Media Grant winner Immanuel Afolabi


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

APRA hit national news again with Malawi COVID19 report

Three weeks since the Malawian government was brought to task by the national press following an APRA brief on agricultural policy, the APRA Malawi team has featured in The Nation Paper once again.

Appearing under the headline “Covid-19 chokes food Systems, livelihoods” both in the newspaper edition and on their website, the news article highlighted a new APRA report on Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Malawi. Written by APRA Malawi researchers Mirriam Matita and Masautso Chimombo, the report estimates the likely impact of the pandemic on food systems and livelihoods in Malawi.

The two-page report, is based on a random selection of 114 household heads involved in groundnut production in Mchinji and Ntchisi districts and other key informant interviews. The authors indicate that about 60 percent of farmers reported a decline in business activities, which means they could not raise enough income for their livelihoods.

The newspaper article, published on 20 October 2020, highlights from the report that there has been an increase in transport costs  as well as decline in number of traders coming to villages for farm produce purchases affecting incomes.

The article also emphasised that the significant decline in the availability of extension services that was show in the report, with 70 percent of respondents mentioning a lack of credit facilities, which could affect the outcome of the upcoming 2020/21 farming season.

APRA researchers Mirriam Matita (L), Blessings Chinsinga and Masautso Chimombo (R). Credit: Mirriam Matita

Both researchers responded to the media attention:

“… the Nation newspaper has for 5 consecutive years been winning print media house of the year in Malawi. It enjoys massive readership by both ordinary people, policy makers and politicians. It feels good to have our research product covered by them. This means we are building our name as emerging researchers, and this will open up more opportunities for us …”

Masautso Chimombo

‘… I am excited our work is finding space in local media and I hope it reaches those that need to make decisions to ease COVID impacts on small farmers…’ 

Mirriam Matita

The report was released alongside several other short APRA studies on how COVID19 is affecting food systems in different APRA countries. To access these reports, click here.


Access the new APRA COVID Malawi report, here


Cover photo credit: IFPRI

Women empowerment, agriculture commercialisation and gender relations in Mvurwi, Zimbabwe

In this blog, APRA researcher Hazel M. Kwaramba looks at the different areas in which women in Mvurwi, Zimbabwe seek to construct livelihood – particularly strawberries, poultry and sweet potatoes – to examine pathways towards women empowerment, including policy recommendations.

This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 42. Access it, for free, here.


Written by Hazel M. Kwaramba

In 2000 Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) gave rise to A1 farmers (less than 10 hectares of land) that have received various government support. Two decades on some interesting observations raise key questions. Are women A1 farmers commercially productive? What are the barriers to commercialisation? Within commercialisation hotspots, what are the key value chains that have been most effective in empowering women, and why? What are the gender relational dynamics and how do they impact women along the value chain? What are the opportunities and challenges faced by women?

To answer we consider the current status and future potential of multiple pathways to commercialising agriculture for sweet potatoes, strawberries and poultry in Mvurwi farming area.

Emerging commodity web           

In Mvurwi, A1 farmers started with growing tobacco independently as the main cash crop. Although the income returns were high, it comes with intensive labour requirements, strict regulations, high input costs and set market prices. In the first decade of FTLRP, local tobacco companies maintained historical farmer arrangements. Foreign tobacco companies started targeting A1 farmers. The proliferation of tobacco contract farming arrangements gave A1 farmers choices of contracting companies as well as self-financing part of their crop. This led to market price variations and decline in income and returns realised by A1 farmers from the contract crop, resulting in an increased inclination towards crops or off-farm activities that provide more frequent returns than provided by annual tobacco. Increasingly, A1 farmers are using proceeds from tobacco to diversify.

Strawberry farm in Malawi. Credit: Levison Zimori

The preferred commodities that farmers diversify to include poultry and sweet potatoes as they have strong local market linkages. Off-farm operations include grocery shops, passenger cars for commuter transport, cross border trading and sale of second hand clothes with earnings from tobacco. The off-farm operations tend to be informal as they are not registered with the authorities. Formalisation of is expensive, hence activities are chosen precisely for their informality. As farmers access resources (land, equipment, inputs), they gravitate towards crops with higher margins, high input costs and competitive markets.

Increase in resilience from shocks (death of male head of household, land lease and productive assets loss such as draught animals and macro-economic) leads to diversification of crops and livelihood options. Increasing adaptive capacity in the absence of structural support (such as social safety nets and equitable access to financial markets), women farmers move outwards in the commodity web as they embrace more informal, low risk, low return, local markets and low input options. This diversified livelihood scenario has the characteristics of subsistence farming with significant traditional crops and off-farm activities.

Value chains most effective in empowering women

From the web of commodities, women have higher involvement, control and ownership of sweet potato, poultry and strawberry production. Women’s visibility along the value chains of these commodities was observed to be higher compared to their male counterparts.

Sweet potato value chain: Women farm on land owned by their husbands. Lack of control over land is a barrier to women’s access lines of credit. There are shortcomings relating to access to working capital, market information and agriculture extension services – generally there is technical support. In addition, good farm management practices, post-harvest handling, market institutions, and value chain coordination remain curbed with the net effect of limited income.

Poultry value chain: There is limited use of techno-expertise and value addition in chicken production, resulting in losses along the value chain. Markets for the by-products, eggs and day-old chicks are sourced within the local communities, institutions and growth points.

Strawberry value chain: There are challenges in the strawberry value chain relating to access to working capital, agriculture extension services and market information. Strawberry farmers lack necessary equipment and reliable energy. The absence of cold storage facilities further reduces revenue due to high post-harvest losses given the high perishability.

Labourer at strawberry farm in Malawi. Credit: Levison Zimori

One of the wives from a strawberry farm in the APRA study indicated that they had been encouraged to make jams from the strawberries as a form of value addition.

“We received jam making training. However, we have not been able to do it because we do not have electricity.”

Farmer on strawberry farm in Mvurwi, Zimbabwe

For the three value chains, there is no value addition and vertical integration with private sector companies. Involvement of such companies through the out-grower model would likely bring financing, technical expertise and value addition.

Future policies

Agricultural commercialisation involving women is essential for economic empowerment. This requires public support for investments into energy, irrigation and marketing infrastructure, plus social services in rural areas. The policy environment for women’s economic empowerment is supportive and encouraging but implementation remains weak. Progressive women participation across value chains for the future will be achievable when gender relations within family and society are equitable. Since land has productive and reproductive functions, access to finance and the control of agricultural resources need to be equitable. Increasing women farmers’ access to finance – independent of their spouses – will strengthen their production capacities.

There is need for policy reform that will allow joint land allocation to ensure continuity in the event of a spouse dying. Currently, only women stand to lose their livelihoods in the case of bereavement of their husbands and the reverse does not impact men in the same way. Emphasis should be on building knowledge and capabilities of women and girls to manage various agriculture commercialisation pathways.


Cover photo credit: Leeds CDKN team


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe – Round 1 Report

Written by, Vine Mutyasira.

COVID-19 has undoubtedly affected lives and livelihoods across the globe. In Zimbabwe, preliminary indications point to a worsening economic situation in a country already facing macroeconomic challenges, particularly in rural communities where most households depend on agriculture. National lockdown and movement restrictions have affected agricultural activities as well as access to markets and farming inputs.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania – Round 1 Report

Written by, Gideon Boniface and C.G. Magomba.

The first case of COVID-19 in Tanzania was confirmed in March 2020. The government immediately imposed restrictions on mass gatherings, suspended international flights and established special medical camps for COVID-19 patients. They also published guidelines and health measures to be followed by citizens and emphasised these through media and physically through local government officials located across the country.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Malawi – Round 1 Report

Written by, Mirriam Matita and Masautso Chimombo.

Given the ravaging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide, this study seeks to estimate its likely impact on food systems and livelihoods in Malawi. This briefing note is based on our stratified random sample of 114 household heads (32 female and 82 male) drawn from an APRA household survey of groundnut producers in Mchinji and Ntchisi districts, Central Region, as well as seven key informant interviews from those areas. The APRA COVID-19 data collection will be carried out over three rounds. This report presents insights obtained from the first round of research conducted during June/July 2020.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Kenya – Round 1 Report

Written by, John Olwande.

Kenya confirmed its first case of COVID-19 on 12 March 2020. Since then, the government has been providing daily updates on the number of new COVID-19 infections, recoveries and deaths in the country, as well as implementing several interventions to manage the disease. The cumulative numbers as of 12 August 2020 were 27,425 new infections, 13,867 recoveries and 438 deaths, and rising. The objective of this assessment was to understand the effects of COVID-19 on the food system and the sub-set of the population largely dependent on agriculture. The findings were intended to inform actions to assure protection of rural livelihoods and
the continued supply of adequate and affordable food of acceptable quality to the population.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Ghana -Round 1 Report

Written by, Louis Hodey and Fred Dzanku.

Given the ravaging effects of the COVID-19 pandemic worldwide, this study seeks to estimate its likely impact on food systems and livelihoods in south-western Ghana. Our sample consisted of 110 female and male respondents drawn randomly from an APRA household survey of oil palm producers in the Mpohor and Ahanta West Districts in the Western region, as well as a set of five key informant interviews. Data collection for this study will be carried out over three rounds. This report presents insights obtained from the first round conducted during June/July 2020.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Fogera Plain, Ethiopia – Round 1 Report

Written by, Abebaw Assaye and Dawit Alemu

This report presents an early assessment of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, labour and employment, and poverty and well-being in rural Ethiopia. Data was collected from a stratified random sample of 107 households (23 female- and 84 male-headed). Respondents were drawn from a subset of households interviewed in a 2018 APRA survey of smallholder rice farmers in five kebeles (villages) in the Fogera Plain area of Amhara Region. The COVID-19 household survey data is complemented by data from 23 key informant interviews conducted in the kebeles. The data collection for this COVID-19 study will be carried out over three rounds. This report presents insights obtained from the first round conducted during late June/early July 2020.

3rd eDialogue on ‘Africa Regional Perspectives’

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The sessions on ‘Regional Perspectives’, explored the dynamics of small-scale agriculture and food system change across Africa, Asia and South America.

The African session observed the trends affecting small-scale farming households across Africa, and included Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) researchers, including Adebayo Aromoloran, Dean of Faculty of Agriculture at the Adekunle Ajasin University in Nigeria and Aida Isinika, Associate Professor at Sokoine University.

Other experts who participated included Cyriaque Hakizimana, Researcher at Institute of Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, South Africa;  Abdelbagi M. Ismail, Principal Scientist and IRRI Representative for Africa; Martin T Muchero, International Consultant; and Jemimah Njuki, Senior Programme Specialist at IDRC.

Adebayo Aromoloran emphasised that small-scale farms provide the means of livelihood for over 85 per cent of people living in Africa’s rural areas, and are key for food security, poverty reduction and employment. He said that decades of investment failed to enable structural change and tackle the existing challenges, and that a move towards medium-scale farms is crucial. He also observed that an increasing market orientation has helped to increase income and reduce poverty, whereas increasing farm sizes has expanded crop output, leading to some increases in crop productivity.

Aida Isinika highlighted thatAfrica’s ecological diversity causes varying opportunities and constraints and thus, results in a diversity of farmers. Farmers mostly prefer to stay in agriculture and apply various strategies to reduce poverty. She also noted that more than half of agricultural products are cash crops, and that farmers diversify by combining off-farm and on-farm activities. Farmers produce high–value crops in areas of land limitations and extend farm sizes when land is available.

Cyriaque Hakizimana stated that many aspiring young farmers face challenges to access the government’s incentives in the form of access to productive land, natural resources, inputs, productive tools, extension, advisory, and financial services, education, training, markets, information, and inclusion in decision-making. He emphasised that countries need an efficient and coherent agricultural finance policy framework to enable and facilitate the entry of Africa’s rural youth into farming production.

Abdelbagi Ismail said that reducing poverty and hunger in sub-Saharan Africa largely depends on the growth of this sector by improving and sustaining productivity, increasing quality and competitiveness of farm products and sustaining access to markets. To move from subsistence to commercial farming, he stated that small-scale farmers must transition from traditional to modern production systems, have better access to inputs including fertilisers and seed, appropriate postharvest handling, and better infrastructure (e.g. roads and electricity). 

Martin Muchero highlighted the impact of COVID-19 on traders and small-scale farmers. Job losses mean reduced income sources and fewer means for accessing food, threatening the food security of households. Price inflation will also increase the prices of commodities, particularly imports. He emphasised that policies should support the development of robust rural non-farm enterprise systems and support the development of agro-processing in rural areas.

Jemimah Njuki observed that securing sustainable food systems hinges on gender equality, which is possible if women, youth and indigenous people everywhere are empowered, and their rights recognised and respected. She pointed out that the discriminatory systems that cause inequality must be fixed, instead of constantly trying to fix women and youth, as though they are the issue. In addition, she said that women and youth need to be embraced as leaders in smallholder agriculture to ensure they are involved in decision-making at all levels.


Listen to the whole session, here:


For a more detailed analysis of all of the sessions from the last eDialogue, visit the Foresight4Food summary page, here

For more information on all upcoming e-Dialogues, please visit our events page.


Feature photo credit: Arne Hoel / World Bank

Working Paper 43: Smallholder farmers’ choice of oil palm commercialisation model and household welfare in south-western Ghana

Written by, Fred M. Dzanku, Kofi Takyi Asante, William Quarmine and Louis S. Hodey.

This paper studies smallholder farmers’ choice of oil palm commercialisation channels and implications for household welfare. The study explores which factors have contributed to the breakdown of trust in contractual arrangements between farmers, oil palm companies and intermediaries. Additionally, the report explores which factors encourage or exclude households when it comes to participating in higher return oil palm commercialisation arrangements and the welfare differences associated with engagement in the observed channels of oil palm commercialisation.

Working Paper 42: Women empowerment, agriculture commercialisation and gender relations: A value chain analysis, Mvurwi, Zimbabwe

Written by, Hazel Mutsa Kwaramba, Easther Chigumira and Levison Zimori.

This paper aims to develop a better understanding of the pathways women seek to construct livelihoods in or around existing commercialisation hotspots and along the value chain and the outcomes associated with these efforts. The objective of the paper is to provide evidence of the current status and future potential of multiple pathways to commercialising agriculture using selected value chains with a view to strengthening food and nutrition security and empowering women and girls. The study uses sweet potato, strawberry and poultry (including meat and egg production) value chains to examine the pathways to women empowerment and to make policy recommendations for future improvements.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Nigeria – Round 1 Report

Written by, Adebayo B. Aromolaran and Milu Muyanga.

This report presents an early assessment of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, labour and employment, and poverty and well-being in rural Nigeria. Data was collected from a stratified random sample of 110 respondent households drawn from five Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Ogun (Ijebu East, Obafemi Owode, and Imeko Afon) and Kaduna (Chikun and Soba) States. At the time of the survey, these LGAs had reported a small number of COVID-19 cases. The survey data is complemented by insights from five in-depth key informant interviews conducted in the LGAs. The APRA COVID-19 data collection will be carried out over three rounds. This report presents insights obtained from the first round implemented during mid-July 2020.

Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Covid-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa – Synthesis Report 1

Written by, Marco Carreras, Amrita Saha and John Thompson

To gain a better understanding of the impact that COVID-19 is having on food systems and rural livelihoods in the region, researchers in the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) are conducting a rolling series of telephone-based household surveys and key informant interviews in selected study locations across multiple countries. This report presents results from the first round of that research in seven countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe – from interviews conducted in June-July 2020.1 APRA will monitor the situation as the pandemic unfolds through further rounds of data collection and analysis in late 2020 and early 2021.

Policy options for expanding land under commercial tree crops cultivation in Nigeria


Tree crops are key to Nigeria’s economy, yet the production yield of crops such as cocoa is falls well below the demand. In our latest blog, APRA researcher Adebayo B. Aromolaran and his colleagues examine the different options available to policymakers to bolster production, and that can make long-standing difference to the sector.

This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 41. Access it, for free, here.


By Adebayo B. Aromolaran, Abiodun E. Obayelu, Milu Muyanga, Thomas Jayne and Olatokunbo H. Osinowo

Introduction    

In Nigeria, tree crops such as cocoa, cashew, oil palm and rubber play an important role in rural livelihoods, not only as a source of income (Kalaba et al., 2010), but as a major source of foreign exchange earnings.  Tree crops cultivation also contribute to improving livelihood outcomes among farm households by providing additional incomes for seasonal gap filling. Anecdotal evidence shows that tree crops tend to provide a buffer during times of poor annual crop harvests caused by unfavourable climatic conditions.

The problem

In Nigeria, tree crops are the second largest foreign exchange earner after crude oil and the most important agricultural export subsector. In the first half of 2019, tree crops such as cocoa and cashew contributed 90 billion naira (USD 230 million )out of the total of 152 billion naira (USD 392 million) earned from the top 10 agricultural exports in Nigeria (over 53%). Global demand for cocoa is projected to be 4.5 million tonnes in 2020 and to reach 6 million tonnes by 2025. Yet production by Nigeria, the 4th largest producer globally, is below 0.25 million tonnes 2019. A major reason for this low yield is the aging of the current stock cocoa trees. For production to increase substantially, more land must be brought under new cocoa plantations.

Total supply by all major producers of cocoa put together is projected to be less than 50% of the projected demand for 2025. Consequently, increasing hectarage under tree crops such as cocoa could contribute substantially to increased foreign exchange earnings for the nation, increased household income and reduced poverty status.

The way forward

To better understand how to benefit from the significant foreign exchange earnings and poverty reduction opportunities of commercial tree crops production in Nigeria, researchers from Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) recently carried out a study to investigate how land under commercial tree crops plantations in Nigeria can be expanded through government policies and programs.  Data for the study was obtained through a sample survey of 1000 medium and small-scale farm households in Ogun state Nigeria, conducted in April/May 2018 (see Aromolaran et al 2020) . The results of the study provided some useful insights into policy options that might motivate farm households to bring more land under commercial tree crop cultivation. 

The APRA study also revealed a few strategies that could help drive expansion of land under tree crop cultivation in Nigeria. These strategies can be classified under 4 broad policy options namely: land use policy, agro-input policy, transportation policy, infrastructure policy and youth employment policy.

Land use policy

Increasing both access to land and security of tenure of the farmers are strategies that could positively impact land allocation to tree crops, especially among medium-scale farm households. In the current situation, where less than 1% of small-scale Farmers and 6% of medium-scale farmers possess titles to their farmland, farmers must be motivated to invest in long gestation tree crop enterprises,  so long as they are assured that the land is secure and not taken against their will in the future. Hence, policies that enhance easy access to formal farmland titles could facilitate increased planting of commercial tree crops, thereby enhancing the export potentials of Nigeria. 

Agro-input policy

Second, increasing access to agro-dealer services as a policy strategy could lead a growth of commercial tree crop plantations, especially among medium-scale farm households. Currently, less than 28% of farm households in Ogun state have access to suppliers of agro-chemicals (Aromolaran et al 2020). There is therefore a need for policy that would focus on improving the distribution network of agro-chemical products among existing and potential tree crop farmers.

Drying of cocoa seed at Ijebu East LGA. Credit: Olatokunbo Osinowo

Transportation Policy

Cultivation of tree crops can be enhanced among small-scale farm households if policy is directed at improving access to farms. The fact that most tree crops growing in Nigeria are in rainforest habitat also makes transport more challenging, particularly during the rainy season. Poor roads make many farms inaccessible and restricts access for many large haulage vehicles, and farmers must rely on motorcycles (okadas), tricycles and other small vehicles to deliver their goods to market. These also increase the unit cost of transportation, adding more financial pressure on farmers.  

Youth Employment Policy

Encouraging youth engagement in commercial tree crop production could increase land use for tree crop farming. This can be done by tapping into the massive pool of unemployed or underemployed graduates of agriculture who have graduated from Nigerian universities over the past three decades. Anecdotal evidence suggests that youths are discouraged by the longer gestation period of tree crops (such as cocoa) which may take up to five-seven years to break even in net income. This is compounded by the difficulty in sourcing credit facilities for the initial capital/investment outlay. Thus, to encourage young Nigerians to invest in tree crop enterprises, appropriate credit policies and programs will need to be implemented to absorb the burden of the initial cost of investment of tree crop plantations.


References

Aromolaran, A.B., Obayelu, A.E., Muyanga Milu, Jayne Thomas, Adelaja Adesoji, Awokuse Titus, Ogunmola, O.O. and Osinowo, O.H. 2020.“Expanding Land Area Under Tree Crop Plantations in Nigeria” Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Working Paper Series (in press)

Kalaba, K. F., Chirwa, P., Syampungani, S., Ajayi, C.O., 2010. Contribution of agroforestry to biodiversity and livelihoods improvement in rural communities of Southern African regions, in: Tscharntke, T., Leuschner, C., Veldkamp, E., Faust, H., Guhardja, E., Bidin, A. (Eds.), Tropical Rainforests and Agroforests Under Global Change: Ecological and Socio-economic Valuations. Springer, Berlin, pp. 461-476.


Feature photo: Land Clearing at Itoro, Yewa South LGA. Credit: Olatokunbo Osinowo.

Second photo: Cocoa Plantation at Obafemi Owode LGA. Credit: Olatokunbo Osinowo.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

The return of fortress conservation: why excluding people means biodiversity conservation will fail


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

The recent UN biodiversity summit reported disappointing results. Not one of the 20 indicators set a decade before were met. In many quarters, there is a growing cry for more assertive measures to protect and extend biodiverse rich areas; a return to ‘fortress conservation’ where an increasingly militarised approach is recommended. This is a big mistake and will undermine local people’s commitments to conservation.

The privatisation and securitisation of national assets: conservation grabbing

Unfortunately, Zimbabwe, a pioneer in community-based conservation through the CAMPFIRE programme, is returning to a fortress conservation approach, enlisting foreign, private-sector partners to re-fence parks and keep people out, if necessary through lethal force. A number of deals have been struck, including with African Parks, supported by (ex-)British royalty, in Matusadona National Park and with Frankfurt Zoo in Gonarezhou National Park in the south (since 2017 under the Gonarezhou Conservation Trust).  There are plans afoot for other joint ventures in park areas in Zimbabwe, with external support providing a much-needed boost to the National Parks and Wildlife Management Authority’s (Zimparks) depleted coffers.

In parallel to this expansion of parks areas, international donors have sponsored the training of game rangers, via the International Anti-Poaching Foundation, including of the now-famous group of heavily armed female game guards, trained by a (white, Australian) special forces soldier who had served in Iraq. As women conserving nature and battling crime, the group, dubbed ‘the brave ones’, have been widely celebrated (and ruthlessly stereotyped) in the media (also see this BBC video to get a flavour and more here).

The effective privatisation (under 20 year leases) of the conservation estate and the taking over of huge areas of the country by foreign organisations (Gonarezhou alone covers 5,053 km², while Matusadona covers 1,407 km2) has not had the sort of scrutiny that higher profile ‘land grabs’ have had. In fact, outside the particular areas, most people don’t even know this is happening. In many respects the deals make sense. The state is broke, there is a need to protect such national assets, and a partnership with outsiders allows for the rehabilitation of infrastructure, paying of staff and continuing the conservation work on behalf of the government (which still holds a majority stake).

However, what happens with such partnerships is that it’s not only the money that is on the table, but a very different way of thinking about conservation. Despite the rhetoric (and conservation organisations are good at this) about community consultation and involvement the experience of these efforts has largely been one of rewinding to an older era of colonial-style exclusionary conservation.

This is a wider trend, as documented by the excellent BIOSEC research programme  (video here) and shared most recently at a great POLLEN conference plenary session. Militarised conservation efforts to tackle ‘wildlife crime’ deploy technologies – from drones to military hardware to surveillance systems – which are used to assert an increasingly security-led style of conservation, casting locals as poachers and game wardens (now armed to the teeth) as saviours. This of course plays into a wider Western racialised narrative about conservation being about protecting wildlife and excluding and removing local (usually black) people.

The lessons of the community-based conservation era from the 1980s, where Zimbabwe was probably the world leader in both ideas and practice – are fast being lost. Yes of course CAMPFIRE and similar programmes had their problems. Questions were raised about who got the benefits, what a ‘community’ really was and whether this relied too much on conservation through iconic species that had a hunting value. But the basic principles that conservation gets nowhere unless local people are on board are as valid as ever.

Fortress conservation in Gonarezhou

A recent extended phone conversation with a colleague living near Gonarezhou park highlighted that the new Frankfurt Zoo led initiative is certainly more fortress than community conservation, with the effort focusing especially on species conservation (elephants and wild dogs are heavily profiled, as is the reintroduction of black rhinos). For sure, there are a variety of community support initiatives in the surrounding areas and there are ‘community liaison’ and extension officers employed. Around 300 game rangers have been employed by the park, many from the local area, and others are employed in building projects in new tourist facilities. This provides local benefits, but also provokes tensions. There have been some education programmes (the Chilojo Club), although framed in ways distant to local vernacular understandings. And there were extended, largely performative, consultations in the local area explaining the project, with multiple consultants employed.

But the complaints are multiple. The new electric fencing – which is expected to surround the park and stretch as far as Save Valley Conservancy – has prevented cattle grazing in the park, especially in drought periods. Animals are impounded and fines to reclaim them are high, and in many cases they are never returned. While there are periods when groups of villagers can come and cut grass, this is expensive if transport is hired but insufficient for fodder supplies, although good for thatching. People are having to reduce their cattle numbers due to lack of grazing, which is causing serious hardships. The fences were supposed to keep elephants out, but they continue to cause crop damage, even death in the area, as their numbers continue to expand and the electric fence is either destroyed or becomes non-functional when the solar panels are not working. The lack of compensation payments for elephant damage is a long-running complaint. The argument is that CAMPFIRE should pay, but this produces very little revenue and much of it is not distributed to the wider community. And the long-promised community projects have failed to materialise beyond a few school projects and savings clubs, adding to disgruntlement and rumours that others have pocketed the cash.

The strict, armed policing of the park boundaries causes friction with the local communities as boundaries used to be flexible and more negotiated (indeed some, such as by the Chitsa people in Sangwe, highly disputed). In the past, rangers would turn a blind-eye to those who came and hunted small animals as a source of livelihood, using only dogs, spears and snares. Many have returned from South Africa having lost jobs during the COVID-19 pandemic and are having to survive off substance hunting. Locals complain that they are treated just the same as the organised hunting syndicates who run from Mozambique and are involved in heavily-armed poaching, using AK47s and cyanide poisoning. This they argue is completely different, and deserves policing, but it is local people who seem to be arrested and jailed most. The conflicts between the park and the local communities are increasing, as park rangers clamp down and the challenges of the COVID-19 period increase. This is creating tensions and threats of violence in the community, as local people employed as rangers arrest locals. Despite the ‘out-reach’ activities and commitments to ‘community’ development, trust it seems is at a low ebb; as my colleague put it “there is a war between the park and the locals”.   

As with all fortress conservation approaches, the conservation area is separated from people. Low intensity hunting and grazing uses are banned and resentments rise. Militarised security operations signal that this is not your land, and the only people who now use the park and its surrounding hunting areas are extremely rich outsiders, who are mostly white; many of whom are investing seriously in tourist facilities with external capital in Gonarezhou. The park thus becomes a place of privilege not a national asset, and biodiversity conservation becomes dissociated from people’s practices – and something to resent not participate in.

From protecting areas to supporting people

The obsessive targets of the conservation lobbies to expand conservation areas – from a current global 15% of land area to 30%, and for some even 50% – miss the point. Expanding these areas through massive conservation led ‘land grabs’ in places where people are poor and landscapes are made us of – and the biodiversity within them – will fail. They have before, which is why a rethinking of colonial conservation models took place 30 years or more ago.

Instead, the targets should not focus on areas or in most cases even species, but on people. How about a 100% target for incorporating local people into biodiversity management practices by 2030 instead? Many of the villagers surrounding Gonarezhou already do this to far a greater extent than most of those who arrive on planes or live in towns who visit the now highly protected island of biodiversity.

As in the important debates about ‘convivial conservation’, perhaps local people and vernacular conceptions of conversation should have a greater say and more substantial involvement in the futures of such shared assets. Without this, the biodiversity and conservation targets for the next decade will certainly be missed too.  


Photo credit: J. Chikombedzi 

Working Paper 41: Expanding Land Area Under Commercial Tree Crop Plantation in Nigeria

Written by, Adebayo B. Aromolaran, Abiodun E. Obayelu, Milu Muyanga, Thomas Jayne, Adesoji Adelaja, Titus Awokuse, Omotoso O. Ogunmola and Olatokunbo H, Osinowo.

As the second-largest foreign exchange earner (after crude oil), and the most important agricultural subsector, tree crops are key to Nigeria’s economy. This paper investigates the key factors behind land allocation decisions, intending to yield useful policy insights into how to boost tree crop cultivation and, as a result, agricultural commercialisation. The study concludes by emphasising the significance of tangible land markets, critical rural infrastructure, agro-services, improved land tenure security and increased youth and female engagement in efforts to promote economic diversification in Nigeria through commercial tree crop farming.

Reflections on the winners and losers in livestock commercialisation in northern Kenya


In this blog, researcher, pastoral development and dryland management specialist Guyo Roba reflects upon and summarises his recent working paper on how livestock commercialisation has impacted different actors and different wealth groups in Isiolo and Marsabit counties. He then provides recommendations for the government and donor agencies how to improve the livelihoods of pastoralists and local traders.

Access Working Paper 39 here.


Written by Guyo Roba

In Kenya, pastoralism accounts for up to 80% of household income in arid and semi-arid areas, for approximately 8 million people that depend on pastoral production for their livelihood.  

The centrality of livestock production to the well-being of pastoralists has attracted considerable investments and transformation in livestock marketing in northern Kenya, with greatly increased levels of trade, partly pushed by the sustained efforts of the government and donors through increased investments as a potential pathway to reduce poverty and promote development in the region.

Value chain actors: winners and losers

Although different facets of livestock commercialisation have received attention in both research and development, relatively little consideration is given to the consequences of changing livestock market for different actors along the value chains in northern Kenya. While the expansion of the road infrastructure, mobile networks and arrangement of coordinated market days have accelerated  livestock commercialisation in both Marsabit and Isiolo, a lack of contractual relations with the clients at the terminal markets has shifted the power from pastoralists, local traders and other locally-based actors to better-positioned actors in the terminal markets, such as brokers. In long-distance sheep and goat chains in northern Kenya, trade networks are traditionally constructed around ethnic ties but this gradually diminishes as trade becomes increasingly multi-ethnic downstream at trade hubs. Here, pastoralists and local traders are exposed to the precarious relations and exploitation by powerful brokers and other buyers, and therefore have to accept prevailing market prices. This highlights the challenge to governance and control of the chain, and by extension, defines the winners and losers from increased livestock commercialisation.

Marsabit town. Credit: Kandukuru Nagarjun

Geography, working capital and the poverty levels of the actors distinguishes the winners and losers. In relatively more integrated short chains, it is possible to estimate the potential for a profitable sale by local traders and pastoralists because of the geographical and operational connections between actors, combined with a strong bond based on common ethnicity. This facilitates the ease of transaction and provide more benefits to women and poor households who are the predominant actors in sheep and goat trade. As such, commercialisation outcomes along short supply chains benefit, to a certain extent, poor households and women groups in sheep and goat trade networks.

In contrast, actors along long-distance chains are less socially embedded, dominated by male traders, who are mostly from outside the area. They are engaged in remote “faceless” exchanges in bigger towns that occasionally earn them some profits, but the precarious relationships simultaneously limit their margins due to absence of fixed contracts that define the prices, supply specifications and time. In situations where linkages to the terminal market are undefined and uncoordinated, neither the local traders or livestock producers in northern Kenya are able to exactly target their sales, select the best stock for the market or position themselves to profit from the trade.

Certain attributes define the winners in these chains – they are slightly better organised, better informed about markets, have access to working capital and transport, have bargaining skills, and in the case of local traders, are fairly well-networked and work in collaboration, which enables them to share market information and working capital.

Modest dwelling in Marsabit County. Credit: Kandukuru Nagarjun

Poorest households

Although I observed that greater livestock commercialisation offer various benefits for different groups, it is not clear whether it will help the poorest households, particularly those distant from improved road and market infrastructure. To date, there are large areas of Isiolo and Marsabit counties that are isolated and have very poor market access. Infrastructure, such as mobile phones and tarmacked roads, helped some groups to address remoteness and geographical isolation, and simultaneously lowered prices for some goods in places like Illaut’s “Nairobi 1-day market”, where sellers of diverse foodstuff and household items converge on market day, which to some extent has benefited everyone. 

Way forward

To extend the benefits more widely, particular measures should be taken by the government and donor projects, such as strengthening linkages (through local traders) to clients at the end markets, preferably by contractually linking buyers and sellers and making the demand specifications of diverse clients, especially bulk buyers like supermarkets, meat exporters, large-scale butchers etc. This would compel pastoralists to produce and offer different stock for different markets, and support them to respond in a timely and profitable way to market needs. This will enable the sellers (either pastoralists or local traders) to supply the required size and type of stock, and time their sales advantageously.

Marsabit pastoralist. Credit: Kandukuru Nagarjun

Better relations at this level will improve: i) prices for different ranges of animals; ii) the diversity of clients with their quality/quantity specifications; and iii) access to alternative markets for pastoralists and local traders. County governments and national road agencies should also extend rural road networks to improve access and reduce the costs of trucking livestock to markets in and beyond county boundaries. However, while small adjustments through locally appropriate investments in Marsabit and Isiolo counties can benefit both pastoralists (through more choices of local markets, improved local prices and sales) and local traders (lowered costs, ease of aggregation and quicker purchases), the control and governance of long-distance trade, to date, remain the real blockage and defines the level of benefit or loss.

Strengthening connections between livestock marketing groups, traders and the clients will improve coordination of activities, reduce operating costs and improve information flow to the advantage of the local actors so that they can make better and more informed decisions to improve their profit margins. In so doing, the situation of the pastoralists and local traders will become less risky, the chain will be more efficient and they may have opportunities for improved sales and ultimate income.


Feature photo: Habiba Jatani one tends her herd of cattle at Kambi Garba in Isiolo County, on Flickr. Credit: Fredrick Omondi, Marsabit County, Kenya


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Journal Article: Young People and Land in Zimbabwe: Livelihood Challenges After Land Reform

Ian Scoones, Blasio Mavedzenge, Felix Murimbarimba. 2019.

This article explores the livelihood challenges and opportunities of young people following Zimbabwe’s land reform in 2000. The article explores the life courses of a cohort of men and women, all children of land reform settlers, in two contrasting smallholder land reform sites. Major challenges to social reproduction are highlighted, reflected in an extended ‘waithood’, while some opportunities for accumulation are observed, notably in intensive agricultural production and agriculture-linked business enterprises. In conclusion, the implications of generational transfer of land, assets and livelihood opportunities are discussed in the context of Zimbabwe’s agrarian reform.

Agricultural-based livelihood implications of COVID-19 in Ghana (2)


In the second of a two-part blog series, APRA researchers Louis Hodey, Kofi Asante & Fred Dzanku look at the responses of agribusinesses and farm households to the pandemic, how the Ghanaian government has responded, and offer policy recommendations for the way forward.

For part one on the impact on food prices, agribusinesses and household incomes, and food and nutrition security, click here.

This blog is linked to APRA Round One and Round Two country reports on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Ghana.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Written by Louis Hodey, Kofi Asante & Fred Dzanku

What has been the response of agribusinesses and farm households?

As expected, decline in sales and general agribusiness activities have had huge implications for employment and the mode of operation of these businesses. According to the Ghana Statistical Service  (GSS), wage cuts, laying off workers, adoption of digital solutions for sales, and the use of mobile money services have been some survival strategies adopted by firms (including agribusinesses) in response to the threats from the COVID-19 pandemic. An APRA-CASA (Commercial Agriculture for Smallholders and Agribusiness) rapid market survey conducted in May also found that a few agribusinesses took advantage of the pandemic to boost their incomes by diversifying production. For instance, some artisanal oil palm processors started producing soap to tap into demand which had remained unmet because of the disruption in supply of consumer necessities. However, such opportunities were only available to agribusinesses with sufficient ready capital for a new production line or the technological capabilities for online marketing or sales. These differences in the ability of farmers and agribusinesses to quickly respond to the impact of the pandemic is like to widen inequality in the short to medium term.

According to the Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana (CAG), critical coping strategies adopted by agribusinesses include direct delivery of products and services to customers via courier services, e-commerce platforms, as well as price reductions and discount sales in some cases. For farm households, a key response strategy to the livelihood challenges imposed by the COVID-19 crises has been a reduction in food consumption. According to the GSS, more than a half (52.1%) of households reduced their consumption in order to cope with the effects of COVID-19. Other key coping mechanisms adopted by households (according to the GSS) include reduced non-food consumption, reliance on savings, assistance from family / friends, borrowing from family / friends, credit purchases, engagement in additional income generating activities, delayed payment obligations and sale of assets.   

Palm oil ready for market at Ahountemo in the Western region. Credit: Louis Hodey

What has been government’s response so far?

Government policy is critical to tackle the threats to livelihood caused by the pandemic. In addition to substantial health spending to contain the coronavirus in Ghana, the government has so far implemented key relief programmes to mitigate the severe impact on everyday living. These include electricity subsidies, free water, soft loans for small and medium scale businesses through the Coronavirus Alleviation Programme (CAP), free hot meals for the most vulnerable during the partial lockdown, free hot meals for final year basic school students and their teachers, tax holidays for frontline health workers, among others. It is expected that these policy interventions will cushion households and businesses to mitigate the economic hardships imposed by the COVID-19 crisis. But how much of this is enough and how many citizens can it cover? In fact, according to the GSS, only 3.5%[1] of firms surveyed reported receiving some support from government.

Oil palm bunches ready for milling. Credit: Louis Hodey

What is the way forward?

Given that almost a half (45.6%) of Ghana’s population are multidimensionally poor, the severe economic hardship imposed by the COVID-19 is expected to further worsen this already dire situation. The World Bank estimates that worldwide, about 100 million people are expected to fall into poverty as a direct impact of the COVID-19 crisis. This suggests that the estimated global poverty would jump from 8.23% in 2019 to 9.18% in 2020. Further, according to the World Bank, though the SSA appears to have weathered the health impact of the pandemic fairly well, it is projected to be the region hit hardest in terms of increase in extreme poverty. In Ghana, the nationwide COVID-19 business tracker survey report by the GSS suggests that some firms (including agribusinesses) are laying-off workers while others are offering pay cuts in order to survive the consequences of the pandemic. With a generally weak social protection system in Ghana, this may lead to increasing poverty levels and worse living conditions for the affected households. In addition, the falling income levels and worsening food and nutrition insecurity situation widely associated with the COVID-19 crises is worrying.

It is rather unfortunate that though farm households toil to feed the country’s population, their living incomes are unable to push them out of poverty. It is important that as the pandemic spreads, institutions of state work to ensure a continued functioning of the country’s food supply chains to avert a possible food crisis in the future. This requires sustained coordinated policy responses to support agribusinesses and livelihoods of farm households. To ensure effective and efficient livelihood supports, government’s relief policies should be inclusive and aim at boosting both demand (consumption) and supply (production) sectors of the economy. Though the government have made efforts to alleviate the adverse livelihood impacts of the pandemic, there are concerns about the ability of these interventions to truly assist the most vulnerable. Critically, policies targeted at improving the capacity of agribusinesses and farm households to boost productivity should be core to the government’s policy agenda.


[1] The Government of Ghana later implemented the Coronavirus Alleviation Programme (CAP) which was still in its initial launching stage at the time of the GSS survey, so this figure might have improved after the CAP implementation.


Feature image credit: Louis Hodey


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Malawi press tasks government on policy following APRA brief


APRA policy research has recently been featured in Malawi’s The Nation newspaper, as well as on the publication’s website.  “Inducing agribusiness investment in Malawi: Insights from investors,” written by APRA researchers Henry Chingaipe, Joseph Thombozi and Horace Chingaipe, investigate the flaws in Malawi’s investment model in agribusiness and provides several policy recommendations on how to encourage business investment in agricultural commercialisation.

The authors emphasise that, with more than 80 per cent of the workforce employed in the sector, agriculture is key to Malawi’s development strategy. Yet, government investment in agricultural commercialisation has been low, national financial institutions lack agribusiness-friendly policies, and access to land necessary for commercial agriculture has been a challenge.

The government should undertake reforms to increase certainty and predictability in the administration of business incentives by reducing the latitude of discretion of bureaucratic and political executives in the granting of incentives, state the brief authors.

The newspaper article, published on Tuesday, 22 September, highlights the key policy recommendations to the Malawi Government that are featured in the brief. These include advice that in order to spearhead transformational agricultural commercialisation, the Malawi Government should streamline its business incentives. More specifically, these incentives should encourage private sector enterprises to adopt inclusive business models that connect a large number of smallholder farmers to reliable markets that pay decent prices.

Henry Chingaipe

“APRA has…urged the government to support the creation of a tailor-made financial institution…that would ease access to business finance for investments in agriculture and agribusiness”

The Nation, Malawi

Responding to the article, APRA researcher Henry Chingaipe said:

“The article has helped the dissemination of our research work to policymakers and development actors. The National Planning Commission has described the findings and recommendations as ‘insightful’ for their planning work on increasing agricultural productivity and commercialisation while GIZ, the German donor agency, prompted by the newspaper article, reached out to us to ask for a copy of the policy brief to inform their own programming on agribusiness initiatives.”

Henry Chingaipe

APRA Malawi is part of the wider APRA consortium that focuses on which ‘pathways’ to agricultural commercialisation are the most effective in empowering women, reducing rural poverty and improving food and nutrition security in sub-Saharan Africa. The suggestions made by the authors in this brief could be key in achieving these goals.

Questions addressed by the Malawi study include: ‘Which investment policies and incentive structures successfully influence business investment in African agriculture?’, and ‘Which commercialisation pathways have emerged as a result of the investment incentivised by policy?’ It is through effectively addressing these questions that agribusiness in Malawi will grow, benefiting its people in the process.


Access Brief 26 for free, here.


Feature photo credit: Melissa Cooperman/IFPRI

Working Paper 40: The groundnuts fairtrade arrangement and its spillover effects on agricultural commercialisation and household welfare outcomes: Empirical evidence from central Malawi

Written by, Stevier Kaiyatsa, Mirriam Matita, Ephraim Chirwa and Jacob Mazalale.

This working paper examines the Fairtrade groundnut arrangement – when the Mchinji Area Small Farmers Association (MASFA) sold its groundnuts through the National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM) from 2007 to 2011. The authors test a unique panel data set of smallholder farmers to determine whether there are any spillover effects on small-scale agricultural commercialisation and its impact on household welfare for smallholder farmers that were not part of the Fairtrade arrangement in Mchinji District.

Working Paper 39: Winners and Losers in Livestock Commercialisation in Northern Kenya

Written by, Guyo Malicha Roba.

This paper examines how livestock commercialisation has impacted different actors and different wealth groups in Isiolo and Marsabit counties. Although livestock commercialisation has received global research and development attention, relatively little is known about its implications for different actors along value chains in northern Kenya. With large-scale investments in infrastructure and government plans to more closely incorporate the region into Kenya’s wider domestic livestock markets in the central highlands and Nairobi, this study uses a combination of research methods to provide key insights.

Working Paper 38: Spillover Effects of Medium-Scale Farms on Smallholder Behaviour and Welfare: Evidence from Nigeria

Written by, Lenis Saweda O. Liverpool-Tasie, Ahmed Salim Nuhu, Titus Awokuse, Thomas Jayne, Milu Muyanga, Adebayo Aromolaran and Adesoji Adelaja.

As rapid changes occur in farm size distribution in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly among medium-scale farms (MSFs), this paper addresses the gap in the empirical literature on the strong spillover effects of medium-scale farms (MSFs) towards small-scale farms (SSFs). This includes effects of the rise in MSFs on the incomes, productivity and degree of farm commercialisation of neighbouring SSFs. Using evidence from Nigeria, this study examines the important role of MSFs in improving SSF productivity and welfare. It then looks at the implications for policymakers across Africa as they strive to improve the welfare of SSFs while expanding food production to meet the needs of growing populations.

Working Paper 37: Effect of Choice of Tillage Technology on Commercialisation and Livelihood of Smallholder Farmers in Mngeta Division, Kilombero District, Tanzania

Written by, Ntengua Mdoe, Gilead Mlay, Aida Isinika, Gideon Boniface and Christopher Magomba.

This working paper studies the effect of four tillage technology options on rice, commercialisation, yield, and livelihood of smallholder rice farmers in Mngeta Division, Kilombero District, Tanzania. The four combinations include the hand hoe, the hand hoe and ox plough; the hand hoe and tractor; and the hand hoe, ox plough, and tractor. The latter three were found to have a significant and positive effect on rice commercialisation, as well as on the rice yield. The paper also determines that factors such as marshes also play a role in determining the most effective implements for rice farmers in the region.

Agricultural-based livelihood implications of COVID-19 in Ghana (1)


In the latest of a series of COVID19-related blogs, APRA Ghana researchers Louis Hodey, Kofi Asante & Fred Dzanku examine the implications of the pandemic on agriculture-based livelihoods in the first of a two-part blog series, including the impact on food prices, the impact on agribusinesses, household incomes, and food and nutrition security.

For part two on the responses of agribusinesses and farm households to the pandemic, how the Ghanaian government has responded, and policy recommendations, click here

This blog is linked to APRA Round One and Round Two country reports on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Ghana.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Written by Louis Hodey, Kofi Asante & Fred Dzanku

Background and overview

The devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has affected all aspects of life in Ghana as in other countries. After confirming its first two positive cases in March 2020, the government quickly introduced measures to contain the virus, including a three-week partial lockdown of Accra and Kumasi (the country’s two major cities which emerged as epicentres for the virus), including:

  • Restrictions on movement;
  • ban on all public gatherings (e.g. political rallies, funerals, schools and religious meetings);
  • closure of schools;
  • closure of borders / travel bans;
  • strict social distancing, contact tracing and mandatory quarantine of all travellers into Ghana and infected persons;
  • compulsory wearing of face masks in public places, and;
  • enforcement of strict hygiene protocols such as regular washing of hands and the use of hand sanitisers.

The economic impact of these restrictions has been devastating. On 27th August 2020, Ghana’s case count stood at 43,841. In spite of these numbers, the government has already eased a lot of restrictions (for instance, partial reopening of schools for final year students, permission of public gatherings under restricted conditions etc.) and is in consultation with stakeholders to ease the restrictions further down the line.

Impact of the COVID-19 on agricultural-based livelihoods in Ghana

Household Incomes

Household incomes in Ghana have been severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence from the Ghana Statistical Service[1] (GSS) suggests that 77.4% of households (approximately 22 million people) in Ghana have experienced declines in income since the COVID-19 restrictions were introduced in March 2020. Given existing high levels of income poverty in Ghana, especially among rural populations dependent on agriculture, these declines in household incomes will further deepen the prevailing precarious living conditions of poor rural farm households. With increasing costs of living associated with the COVID-19, livelihoods of poor households are severely threatened.

Oil palm bunches ready for milling. Credit: Louis Hodey
Food and nutrition security

In Ghana, there are fears of worsening food and nutrition insecurity situation due to rising food prices and declines in household incomes. For instance, a study conducted by the Agriculture Policy Research in Africa (APRA) in south-western Ghana, an area with comparatively better food and nutrition situation, revealed worsening food and nutrition insecurity concerns. More than a half (58.2%) of respondents in the APRA study indicated that cost of living in the area has increased as a result of the COVID-19 crises, thereby imposing substantial food and nutrition insecurity threats. Further evidence provided by the GSS Household and Jobs Tracker survey points to an impending moderate-to-severe food and nutrition insecurities in Ghana as a result of the pandemic. For instance, the household food insecurity experiences reported by the GSS indicates that almost a half (45.4%) of households ate a few kinds of food, 44.6% were worried about not having enough food to eat, 42.8% ate less than they thought they should, 41.4% were unable to eat healthy and nutritious/preferred foods, 39.1 had to skip a meal, 31.3 ran out of food, 26.8% were hungry but did not eat, and 8.9% went without food for a whole day.

Impact on food prices

Food price spikes followed the announcement of a partial lockdown of Accra and Kumasi, Ghana’s two major cities in March 2020. These increased food prices have been sustained over the past six (6) months. Indeed, the country’s average monthly food inflation experienced a sustained increase from 8.4% in March 2020 to 13.7% in July 2020. Evidence form the GSS Household and Jobs Tracker survey suggests that 77.4% of households were severely affected by increases in food prices.

Impact on agribusinesses

Four out of five agribusinesses surveyed by the Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana[2] (CAG) reported having their usual business operations affected by the pandemic. Why? Though Ghana’s COVID-19 movement restrictions exempted food supply, operations of non-food agribusinesses were severely affected. This potentially had a substantial knock-on effect on food supply system. Further, restrictions on key food demand sectors such as restaurants, hotels, public events and educational institutions had significant impacts on the country’s food supply network. Initially, these disruptions resulted in price hikes due to panic buying and food hoarding fuelled uncertainties regarding food availability (as was the case in Accra and Kumasi following the announcement of a partial lockdown.)

The disruptions to the food supply chains is expected to cause increases in business operating costs (due to compliance with COVID-19 protocols), revenue shortfalls, wage cuts, lay-offs, among others.  According to the CAG, the average monthly revenue of agribusiness firms decreased by 61.2%, with small scale agribusinesses reporting average monthly revenue shortfalls amounting to 77.4%. These revenue losses may be due to restrictions on food demand sectors (such as restaurants, hotels and educational institutions) and disruptions in general agribusiness operations due to the COVID-19 crises.


[1] With support from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the World Bank, the COVID-19 Households and Jobs Tracker Survey by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) involves 3,265 households and was conducted over the period June 10–25, 2020. This survey was nationally representative, covering all 16 regions of the country.

[2] The Chamber of Agribusiness Ghana (CAG) conducted a nationwide survey of 110 agribusinesses in Ghana following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.


Part two of this blog looks at the response of agribusinesses and farm households, the response of government and the way forward.


Feature image credit: Louis Hodey


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

“Know your epidemic”: Reflections from Zimbabwe


This blog was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

“Know your epidemic, act on its politics” was a lesson learned in the HIV/AIDS pandemic. As Alex De Waal argued back in March, it’s just as important for COVID-19. The pandemic is playing out in very different ways in different places, yet the public health responses tend to be standardised and not adapted to context. What needs to be understood are both local responses and their politics.

Since the end of March (when the lockdown was first imposed in Zimbabwe), we have been tracking the coronavirus pandemic’s impact on diverse rural areas and linked small towns across the country (see our first blog (Surviving COVID-19 in a fragile state: why social resilience is essential) for early reflections from March 27. Since then, and based on reports from colleagues from Chikombedi in Mwenezi district; Matobo district in Matabeleland; Masvingo and Gutu districts and from Mvurwi in Mashonaland Central, we have produced so far four extended blogs based on compilations of field reports.

Through some reflections on the past four blogs (links included below), this piece asks how can we get to ‘know the epidemic’ in Zimbabwe, exploring the implications for the response and wider politics?

April 27 (COVID-19 lockdown in Zimbabwe: a disaster for farmers): Three weeks into the lockdown and the effects on rural livelihoods were already being felt. Movement restrictions and the closing of markets were causing havoc. A heavy-handed response was being led by the police who ‘were everywhere’, stopping people moving. Rumours abounded about the origins of the virus and who it was affecting, and people feared going to health centres. The fear was tangible and the unknown nature of the virus (compared to say HIV) was causing major anxiety. Many had seen on the TV or heard about from relatives the devastating consequences elsewhere, including in the UK and South Africa. The expectation was that this was going to happen in Zimbabwe, in a situation with far fewer resources and an extremely under-resourced health service. The fear galvanised a collective response, and at this stage collaboration between people, the state, churches and others was growing. There was a sense that this was something that had to be addressed together, and for Zimbabwe there was an unusual politics of unity and collaboration.

June 15 (COVID-19 lockdown in Zimbabwe: ‘we are good at surviving, but things are really tough’): By mid-June the lockdown had been in place for about 10 weeks, and people were having to find ways to cope. Things were getting very difficult and consumer products and even food was scarce. By this stage transport of imported goods from South Africa was being facilitated (mostly illegally) by truckers. Traders of all sorts had emerged to supply both rural areas and townships; as someone put it, “we are all vendors now”. Agricultural production had spread – “everyone is a gardener” – including in town. Avoiding reliance on wider value chains had become essential and production, trade and consumption links were increasingly localised across our study sites. With the drying up of remittance flows (as diaspora populations were also affected by COVID-19 job losses and economic contraction), a sense of self-reliance emerged. The large number or returnees from South Africa (who had lost jobs and had been denied social assistance) was by this stage putting a strain on local communities. They also brought the virus and it was from this stage that cases were not just imports from outside but began to be based on local community transmission, although still at a very low rate. Community tensions rose in this period, as concerns over livelihoods and infection increased, with new arrivals from South Africa often shunned and stigmatised. Political scandals around procurement of PPE and equipment reinforced the sense that people were on their own.

July 27 (Viral politics and economics in Zimbabwe): By the end of July, the informal economy – including a substantial growth of smuggling – had expanded further to provide alternatives. A new economy had emerged in order for people to survive. While really tough, people had begun to find ways around restrictions. In this period there had been an growth of movement of people – first back from South Africa and neighbouring countries as people lost their jobs and had no other forms of support, and then from urban areas within Zimbabwe back to the rural areas. The extreme challenges of living in town had hit hard and many felt that the only way to survive was to go ‘home’ to the rural areas, where at least there were family members to offer support, and the opportunity of a small plot of land to do gardening. This pattern continued through August into September, likely resulting in a massive flow of people (and viruses). Meanwhile, the wider political context shifted. With the prospects of opposition protests scheduled for the end of the month, the state and security forces were clamping down, using the COVID-19 regulations to restrict movements and gatherings. Some high-profile arrests had changed the political mood. While at the beginning of the pandemic, everyone was pulling together and the joint COVID committees involved all political parties, the churches, businesses and others, tensions were rising.

September 7 (Innovation in the pandemic: an update from Zimbabwe): The most recent update again showed a shift in responses. The restrictions had relaxed a bit and the political tensions had eased somewhat. Although lockdowns were still being imposed along with movement restrictions, the way local economies had adapted over the previous months had meant that new supply chains had emerged. The shift from formal to informal marketing was complete and mobile shops from cars had become the dominant approach to retail selling. By this stage, people had given up on expectations that the state was going to provide, and many had turned to traditional healers, herbalists and prophets offering health care and support. While cases had not expanded massively, the threat of COVID-19 remained real, but new ways of coping had to be found. The failure of state provision, combined with the series of corruption scandals allegedly linked to those at the top, fed into a disappointment with political leadership and process. People were again on their own having to cope with the virus – and in particular the harsh lockdown measures that had been imposed. Many argued that it was not the virus that was killing them but the lockdown. There were of course always ways around the restrictions as life had to go on, whether involving selling things at night, moving through new routes or paying off police or security forces at road blocks. A sense of disconnection and disillusionment reigned, with a feeling that no-one else – and particularly the state – cared. This has generated a spirit of innovation however, as people have found new ways to get products to market, provide goods and get round the restrictions.

The COVID-19 pandemic – and in particular the lockdown control measures – has resulted in changing economic responses, huge transformations of market arrangements and value chains, there have been large movements of people, and with the rapid expansion of informal economic activity there has been innovation on all fronts. At the same time, politics has shifted from a politics of collaboration to a politics of conflict and dissent to a politics of disillusionment. With the economic struggles for livelihoods deeply entwined with politics, we can expect further changes as the pandemic unfolds. We are continuing our informal monitoring – getting to ‘know the epidemic’ – across the sites, so look out for further updates in the coming weeks.


Many thanks to all the research team from across Zimbabwe for continuing interviews and collecting local information on the COVID-19 situation (and for the photos from different sites).


All photo credit: Ian Scoones

Future Agricultures Twitter reaches 20,000 follower milestone


Written by Toby Penrhys-Evans, APRA ICE Team

After almost 10 years on Twitter and posting over 3,000 Tweets, the Future Agricultures Consortium account, @FutureAgrics, has hit the significant milestone of 20,000 followers. The ever-increasing follower numbers highlights the relevance of the content promoted through this channel through working papers, blogs, briefs and many other kinds of publications. These include pertinent topics such as food security, the role of gender, climate change and, more recently, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on food systems.

This content would not be possible without a dedicated team of academics and researchers – experts in their own fields – who have provided us with top quality blogs and academic papers to promote on Twitter and Facebook.

Twitter beginnings

The Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) was founded in 2003 as an Africa-based alliance of research organisations seeking to provide timely, high-quality and independent information and advice to improve agricultural policy and practice in Africa. Through a network of over 90 researchers across the region and around the world, its goal was to show how agricultural policy in Africa could help to reduce poverty and strengthen agricultural growth.

The FAC Twitter account was created in May 2011. As the first @futureagrics tweet below shows, opening pleasantries were skipped to go straight the point and promote a discussion paper on the challenges of integrating gender research in FAC work (access original link here). Twitter continued to be used as the core platform to publicise timely and important Africa-based agriculture research over until the FAC programme ended in 2014.

In mid-2015, the FAC Twitter account had over 9,000 followers, highlighting the significant impact and popularity of FAC work promoted through Twitter, and building an impressive legacy for the future.

APRA

In 2016, the newly formed Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) consortium built on over a decade of research and policy engagement work by FAC, and capitalised on the already well-followed Twitter platform.

With headquarters at the Institute of Development Studies, APRA is funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). The APRA programme continues to contribute valuable content, such as working papers, policy briefs and blogs, to publicise on Twitter, drawing on a number of experts in agriculture research from universities across Africa and the world. The programme focuses on which ‘pathways’ (i.e. a specific route to commercialisation, such as a food-based pathway) to agricultural commercialisation are the most effective in empowering women, reducing rural poverty and improving food and nutrition security in sub-Saharan Africa.

Championing African research

As many of the promoted blogs and publications come from African researchers and academics, the Twitter content often focuses on research that highlights critical current issues that need urgent policy intervention. For example, a topic covered by research could be how poor roads in Tanzania are undermining rice farmers (see below), or how illegal logging in Nigeria is causing problems for cocoa farmers.

A typical month

Each month, around 30 Tweets are posted from the FAC Twitter account to promote the APRA blogs and news items, as well as sharing (and re-tweeting) important news and developments from other organisations in agriculture research.

This activity usually leads to around 60,000-70,000 impressions (the number of times a Tweet has been seen) and between 150-250 new followers every month. The image below is a snapshot of the monthly FAC Twitter activity on 20 September 2020, showing the popularity of a recent tweet on an upcoming APRA Working Paper on farming implements in Tanzania. Although APRA work is important, FAC Twitter also shares information and engages with the wider community on related topics. The hashtags #SouthSouthCooperation and #COVID19 shown in ‘top mention’ are examples of what is currently trending on Twitter.

A typical month on FAC Twitter

Looking ahead

In 2020, much of APRA’s work has been affected in recent months by uncertainties caused by COVID-19. For example, planned field work in APRA countries has had to be postponed or adapted to comply with their respective COVID-19 restrictions. However, it has also allowed FAC Twitter to highlight new research on how the pandemic is affecting agricultural commercialisation and other issues (e.g. food value chains). Through Twitter, a voice can be given to those adversely affected by the pandemic, and whose stories may not otherwise be covered in the mainstream media.

Whatever challenges the future brings, we look forward to continuing to promote key academic research and engaging with our valued followers.


Feature photo credit: ©IFPRI/Milo Mitchell

To farm or not to farm? That’s NOT the question


Written by James Sumberg and first appeared on the Institute of Development Studies website.

This blog features a short film – including a new French language version – that explores how young people engage with the rural economy in sub-Saharan Africa.


It is often said that young, rural Africans aren’t interested in farming. Rather, they want to relocate to urban areas where there is a wider array of social, educational and employment opportunities.

The suggestion is that widespread migration from rural areas is bad for agriculture and the rural economy, bad for rural communities, bad for social stability, and bad for the young people themselves. It is said that many young people who migrate to urban areas struggle with the harsh realities of city life, and end up working in low wage, informal jobs or engaging in risky or illegal activities.

The problem with narratives like these is that they feed an ongoing moral panic around youth migration that plays out at both national and international levels. They also define migration from rural areas as the key problem, and focus research and policy attention on rural youth who, it is assumed, will be migrating as soon as they have the opportunity.

Interrogating the narrative

The reality looks very different. Many millions of rural young people throughout Africa remain in rural areas and build agriculture-inclusive livelihoods.

The Challenges and Opportunities for Rural Youth Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa study, led by IDS and funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), put these young people who remain in rural areas at centre stage. Specifically, it examines how rural young people in Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tanzania and Côte d’Ivoire engage with the rural economy, and how they imagine their futures.


Building on the research this short film explores how young people engage with the rural economy in sub-Saharan Africa.

S’appuyant sur les recherches, ce court métrage explore la manière dont les jeunes s’engagent dans l’économie rurale en Afrique subsaharienne.


A key insight from the research is that events (for example, the death of a parent, family breakdown, being sent to live with a relative, leaving school early because of the family’s inability to pay school fees, exploitation, getting caught up in war) and the fundamental elements of the human condition (love, commitment, loyalty, kindness, friendship, hard work, resilience, struggle, luck, faith, charity, desperation, jealousy) are extremely important in shaping how young people engage with the rural economy.

Another insight is that one way or another, most young men and women in rural areas engage in agriculture and/or livestock production, as a primary, secondary or tertiary activity. These production activities may be primarily for consumption or primarily for sale, and on their own account or working with or for someone else. However, the field research revealed few examples of youth involvement that aligned with the policy imaginaries of “farming as a business”, engagement with value chains, or innovation-driven farming.

In many situations gaining access to land is not a major hurdle. Young people farm land they access through family and rental markets in quantities sufficient at least to allow them to get started. Family and wider social networks help many gain access to the small amounts of capital required.

Engaging in agriculture (or not) is rarely a once-and-for all, all-or-nothing choice. Rather for many people engagement comes and goes in different forms at different points in the life cycle. For example, many rural children and adolescents, while in school, will help on the family farm and/or engage in small-scale own-account farming in order to help pay school fees. As they get older and move away for school, or for those whose primary work is outside agriculture, many will nevertheless keep a hand in farming. Many will at some point re-engage with agriculture or live in a rural area again.

Another key finding is that in the right setting, and with good luck, hard work and persistence, engagement with the rural economy can allow at least some young people to build a livelihood and begin to accumulate some assets (a house, bicycle, motorcycle, a shop etc). For many, this accumulation is however vulnerable to “hazard” like sickness, accidents, drought and theft.

Finally, there are many rural young people for whom migration is not a central part of their imagined future, although having a foothold (e.g. a house, shop or rental building) in a local town may well be.

Implications

It is now time to move beyond the narratives that have over the last decade driven so much policy and public discourse about Africa’s youth. Millions of young people are actively building livelihoods in rural areas. But while many engage with agriculture, they are not necessarily doing this “as a business”.

Starting with these young people, their current activities and the futures they imagine for themselves is an important first step to improving the effectiveness of both youth-focused and more general rural development policy and programmes.


Photo Credit: Mitchell Maher / International Food Policy Institute

How is COVID-19 shaping agricultural production and commodity marketing among smallholders in Zimbabwe?


In this blog, APRA researcher Vine Mutyasira examines the impact of lockdown measures on smallholder farmers in Mvurwi and Concession, Zimbabwe. He examines how these restrictions have hit agricultural production and commodity marketing, and gives recommendations on how to combat problems, such as the decline in extension services to farmers.

This blog is linked to APRA Round One and Round Two country reports on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Written by Vine Mutyasira

Several articles have been written about the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on global economic systems and the agricultural sector in particular. Clearly, it has caused disruptions in global food supply chains and has taken a significant toll on local food systems and rural livelihoods, especially among rural farming communities where livelihoods are anchored on agricultural production. Agricultural activities in Zimbabwe have been affected by the national lockdown. The policy was first implemented on the 30th of March, slightly eased and then extended indefinitely on the 16th of May. The government has, however, been gradually eased the lockdown restrictions, announcing that supermarkets, restaurants and vegetables markets, among other essential services, were allowed to reopen but only operate from 8am to 3pm daily starting 21st of July.

The lockdown measures generally restricted movement of people across communities and hence access to markets for produce such as vegetables and auction floors for tobacco sales, as well as access to farming inputs. APRA interviewed over 100 households in Mvurwi and Concession, as well as key informants representing community leaders, farmer representatives and extension officers, to get a picture of the effects of the pandemic food systems and livelihoods in rural communities.

Agricultural production and food supply chains have felt the negative impacts of the coronavirus, particularly as a result of the restrictions imposed by the national lockdown. The lockdown restrictions accentuated the availability of labour for farming activities. About 45% of the farmers interviewed reported that they were unable to hire labour services for their farming activities, while 48% said that the cost of hiring day or casual labour had gone up during the COVID-19 crisis. An extension officer reported a situation unfolding at Montgomery Farm in Ward 24 of Concession. The farm produces horticultural crops such as cherry pepper and peas on over 30 hectares of land all year round. However, due to restrictions on the movement of people, they have been having challenges securing the required labour for the farm activities. As a result, they were forced to downsize their operation.

Impact on agricultural markets

Marketing of agricultural produce has also been affected in many ways. First, the lockdown restrictions made it difficult for farmers to access distant and often lucrative markets such as the Mbare Musika in Harare. There are incidences where farmers with a truckload of cabbages would be turned back at police roadblocks while on their way to the market. About 81% of interviewed farmers reported a significant drop in sales through district and regional markets. This was further compounded by the rising cost of transportation, as service providers demanded payment in US dollars. Secondly, lockdown restrictions severely affected the ability of buyers and brokers to visit communities and purchase produce directly from farmers. As a result, farmers reported a significant drop in farmgate sales for agricultural produce. Thirdly, closures of restaurants and other local informal food outlets decimated the local market for agricultural produce, especially horticulture, poultry and dairy products. An extension officer in Mvurwi reported of cases where farmers were forced to slaughter their flocks of layers chickens because of failure to access poultry feeds and also being unable to sell the eggs on the local markets.

Shopping in Bulawayo post- COVID19. Credit: International Labor Organization

Impact on inputs and support services

Detrimental impacts to agriculture have also been felt through disruptions in the supply and availability of critical farm inputs and support services, which potentially affects households’ ability to produce for themselves. Due to general restrictions on inter-city and international travelling, local input suppliers have not been able to restock their inputs and agrochemicals. As a result, local Agro-dealership shops have been running low and some of them have closed shop due to lack of business. As a result, 88% of the farmers we interviewed reported that prices of farm inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, agrochemicals and veterinary drugs had gone up following the COVID-19 crisis. The cost of tillage services has also increased as fewer people were offering the service due to the shortage of fuel. Another crippling factor is the unavailability of extension services. About 70% of the farmers reported that access to essential extension services was reduced during the pandemic, probably as extension officers were reluctant to offer face to face trainings without the necessary personal protective equipment.

Way forward

Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic has created massive disruptions in agricultural production and marketing activities. Across agriculture, impacts have ranged from the disruption in the marketing activities, limited access to hired labour services and production inputs, increasing cost of transportation, as well as availability and cost of tillage services. As a result, the livelihoods and general food security situation of the rural communities have been negatively affected. Measures to strengthen food systems, through increasing the availability farm inputs and technical services, will be crucial especially as the farming season is fast approaching. Interventions such as supporting agro-dealership programs should enable farmers to readily access critical inputs, while adopting innovative extension approaches such as mobile agri-advisory service extension model should help provide timely and relevant advice to farmers.


Feature photo credit: International Labour Organization


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

The unintended consequences of COVID19 lockdown in Nigeria


Although the COVID19 pandemic has not yet affected Nigeria to the same extent as some countries, the Nigerian Government introduced strict lockdown measures across the country to restrict the spread of the virus. In our latest blog, APRA researchers Adebayo B Aromolaran, Fadlulah O Issa and Milu Muyanga examine what the impact has been the food-value chain, and on the general attitude of Nigerians towards the pandemic.

Read more on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Nigeria in the Round One and Round Two APRA country reports.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


By Adebayo B Aromolaran, Fadlulah O Issa and Milu Muyanga


Introduction

The first case of COVID19 in Nigeria was reported on February 28, 2020. Six months after, only 53477 cases and 1011 deaths related to COVID 19 have been reported, compared to countries such as USA (6,096,235 cases), Brazil (3,812,605 cases), India (3,461,240 cases) and South Africa (620,132 cases). The Nigerian Government implemented several measures to contain the spread of the disease, some of which negatively impacted the livelihoods of many low-income households. This blog makes an early assessment of the impacts of lockdown on the agri-food system and livelihoods in rural and low-income urban Nigeria.

Government response to COVID19

To control the spread of the COVID19 pandemic, the government imposed total or partial lockdowns on human activities from March 25. The nature and intensity of these lockdowns varied by state and over the first three months. Many states had lockdowns for three-four days a week. In some others, the lockdowns restricted of movements at night. Most states also complied with Federal Government directives which included:

  • Imposition of curfew from 8pm (later from 10pm) to 4am;
  • Closure of schools at all levels from primary to tertiary;
  • Suspension of all religious gatherings and meetings;
  • Closure of international and domestic airports;
  • Limitation of any form of gathering including burials, birthday parties and weddings to a maximum of 20 persons;
  • Reduction of market days to a few days in a week;
  • Reduction in public transportation carrying capacity to a maximum of 70%;
  • Closure of  state borders to reduce inter-state transmission and;
  • Reduction in weekly working hours in the public service.

Impact of COVID19 lockdowns on farm labour availability

The restrictions on movement of people reduced availability of hired labour on farms. For example, many hired workers during the planting season in Ogun State (located in southern Nigeria) often came from other states, and the lockdowns were implemented at the start of the planting season in southern Nigeria. Consequently, land preparation activities were severely affected by a shortage of hired labour.  This disruption also resulted in drastic reduction in area cultivated to crops in southern Nigeria.

Impact of COVID19 lockdowns on agro-input availability

The lockdowns have also negatively impacted agro-input and credit accessibility. For example, poultry feed millers in southern Nigeria experienced reduced access to maize, a very important input to poultry feeds, that is sourced from the northern part of the country. In addition, a smaller area cultivated to maize in southern Nigeria due to labour shortage further reduced the availability of maize for poultry feed production. This led to a spike in the price of maize from ₦90/kg in March to ₦172/kg in the middle of August 2020. Consequently, many feed millers had to either shut down their operations or are operating below capacity. Furthermore, reduced working hours, number of customers attended to per day, and selective branch closures by banks negatively impacted credit accessibility. Exceptionally long queues were noticed at bank entrances.  

Market selling cassava in Abuja (pre-lockdown). Credit: IFPRI

Impact of COVID19 lockdowns on marketing of farm produce

Farm gate prices of produce went down because of the market shutdowns, and reduced movements, especially interstate, by traders. For the same reasons, prices of food items in regional markets increased substantially. So, farmers were making reduced profits by selling in local markets while urban consumers were paying higher prices because of low supplies in the regional markets. In Ogun State, a ton of cassava which was ₦10,000 ($26) before the lockdown rose to ₦38,000 ($99) within 3 months. The price hike in regional markets was partly due to hoarding by traders since new supplies were not coming in as expected. This behaviour might require some form of Government intervention if the COVID 19 crisis continues.

Impact of COVID19 lockdowns on food and nutrition

In the short term, reduced income from both farm and off farm activities could negatively impact food intake and nutrition through reduced households’ disposable incomes. In the longer term, this may lead to poorer household food and nutrition by reducing farm input purchasing power and land area cultivated.

Among low income urban households, food and nutrition is negatively impacted by the substantial reduction in income flow due to reduced economic activity levels, resulting from the lockdowns and restrictions. In addition, high prices in urban markets caused by restrictions to the movement of traders to and from the farm gate has further compounded food security concerns among low income urban households.

Attitude of Nigerians to Government response to COVID19

The general feeling among low resource rural and urban Nigerians is that the intensity and duration of the lockdown is unnecessary and has brought about severe hardship in terms of decreased food availability, reduced incomes, as well as increased disease and mortality rates. 

Guests at a marriage ceremony in Ondo State Nigeria in August 2020. Credit: Omotola Ilemobayo

The ordinary Nigerian would choose to go to earn his/her daily living over the fear of getting infected with COVID 19. Many believe that COVID 19 is a disease of the wealthy and privileged class, and that most of the actions by government agencies are efforts by politicians to amass personal wealth. These partly account for why regulations such as social distancing, wearing a mask, and hand sanitising are not taken very seriously by many people. Even though Nigerians do not expect a future increase in COVID 19 cases, this attitude could put the larger population at risk from future outbreaks.

Government sources attribute the low COVID 19 infection and death rates in Nigeria to its proactive lockdown actions, but many Nigerians view their own resilience in terms of natural immunity, God’s protection and the intake of juices form local herbs and medicinal plants as key. Anecdotal evidence shows that many Nigerians who had symptoms like COVID 19 hardly call government agencies to request a test or even go to the hospital to be treated. Rather, they resort to self-medication or visit local chemists.


Feature image: Queue at a bank entrance in Ogun State, Nigeria. Credit: Omotola Ilemobayo.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Innovation in the pandemic: an update from Zimbabwe


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

I had the latest long discussion on responses to COVID-19 in our rural study areas across the country on 5 September. Check out the earlier updates from 27 July, 15 June and 27 April The pandemic continues to take a hold in Zimbabwe, and the case numbers are rising (total 6837 reported cases and 206 deaths on September 4), although the rapidity and extent of spread is not as feared – so far at least. As one of my colleagues put it, “we are still the survivors of COVID-19”. That said, the impact of the lockdown measures is far-reaching, but since it’s now gone on for so long, people are (by necessity) adapting, and finding new ways of responding. What was striking about this conversation was the array of innovations happening.

Rural and urban connections

The relationship between town and countryside has been transformed by the lockdown measures. In the past there were frequent visits between rural and urban homes, with people being able to respond immediately to a crisis or just go and visit for a weekend. Now movement requires an exemption letter issued by the police. “You very frequently have to lie”, one of our colleagues noted, “saying you have a sick relative or that there is a funeral; otherwise permission is not granted”. The comedian VaMayaya captured it well in a recent video. The inconvenience and hassle is evident, as villagers try and bluff their way past the police officer.

The restrictions have a big impact when flows of agricultural labour are curtailed. For example, in our sugar-growing site in Hippo Valley, it’s cane cutting season and usually migrant labourers come for short periods, but this year they either haven’t come or they are failing to get back home, causing tensions and family disputes. The lack of labour is also pushing up hiring costs for producers and the resettled farmers are now competing with the estate. Fortunately more resettlement A2 farmers are on their farms these days, especially since lockdown, as the management of labour is increasingly demanding.

The importance of ‘home’

There are large numbers of people who have moved from towns in Zimbabwe back to their rural homes. Some have been away for years and have to find new places to stay. But town has become difficult to live in – there are few jobs and many have lost them since lockdown, prices are high, rents are prohibitive and the lockdown restrictions are harsh. Many are finding sourcing food difficult. Drivers, company workers, civil servants, vendors, sex workers and others who have lost the means to make a livelihood have moved in droves to the rural areas. In all our sites, the population of villages has expanded massively. Added to these local migrations, there are those who have come from abroad, as we have commented on before. ‘Home’ in the rural areas is the social safety net that the state is unable to provide.

Those coming back have to make a living of course, and there has been an expansion of agricultural projects (poultry, horticulture etc.) as well as other farming activities, as land has been subdivided by relatives. In our Mvurwi site some of the returnees have signed up for tobacco contracts for the coming season, acquiring grower numbers through relatives. Teachers no longer working in schools have set up private tuition arrangements in their homes, while mechanics and others are providing services once offered in urban areas. Vending has exploded, as former civil servants and others try and raise money through new businesses and, in some areas such as Matobo and Mvurwi, small-scale artisanal mining provides sources of income for those who once populated offices and factories in town.

Food flows

The last few seasons have been poor in Zimbabwe and there are many areas this year in food deficit. Getting food to the right place when movement is restricted is a challenge. Responding to this has been a massive growth in private transport networks that facilitate the flow of food. There are food relief efforts by government and NGOs, but this is far more significant overall. Relatives with surplus in A1 resettlement farms will often take food to their kin in town in cars, where food is expensive and scarce. Those with significant volumes will sell on maize to traders who will take it to sell to traders in town markets. In local areas where there are patchy food deficits, people must scout around to check out which areas have food so links can be made, and food moved. It’s not like the past when people were always moving; in the COVID time people must actively seek out food and organise to get hold of it.

Some food is transported in larger quantities, with large 20 tonne trucks moving from Gokwe and northern Zimbabwe, for example, where food is plentiful to markets in the south of the country. The larger operations are well capitalised and organised, with ways of dealing with the movement restrictions through connections and payment to officials. Some operators control the whole supply chain, and move food to stores in urban areas where grinding mills are installed and direct sales organised. Other, more informal arrangements must deal with permits and road blocks, often having to pay off the police. Just as with the transport of groceries on trucks from South Africa discussed in an earlier blog, even though there are challenges, food does get through.

Despite the restrictions, the movement back-and-forth between town and the rural areas continues, and is essential for assuring food security and providing much needed goods. Much exchange is in the form of barter, as groceries (cooking oil, sugar, rice) and clothes are brought by people from town are exchanged with maize and other crops. Urban markets for food and other agricultural products are complemented by a huge growth of urban farming and gardening. As noted in a previous blog, nearly everyone is a gardener now.

Within rural areas such as our food insecure sites in the lowveld and Matabeleland South, some can exchange dried mopane worms, for example, with those who have grain nearby. It as a mostly informal system, but complemented increasingly by larger operations. It is far more effective than the cumbersome and politicised food relief systems of government, UN agencies and NGOs. As ever with food supply, even in a drought year like now, it’s about timely supply and access rather than overall availability, as is too often assumed in the ‘food crisis’ narratives about Zimbabwe.

Localising value chains: cars are the new mini-markets

Our team has been visiting local shops and supermarkets from Chikombedzi to Masvingo, Mvurwi and Kezi-Maphisa, and a common pattern is emerging. Retailers are increasingly sourcing locally. They complain that volumes are insufficient, quality is variable and the range of products is limited, but with restrictions on supply, including from South Africa, supermarket buyers are making use of local production. This is good news for horticulture, poultry and other suppliers in the rural areas who are receiving a COVID-19 dividend, despite the other travails.

This applies to other shops too. As stock cannot be sourced, local suppliers are turned to. The trend of South African ‘supermarketisation’ is being reversed due to an informal import substitution policy enforced by a virus. Of course not all products can be substituted and there are shortages of key elements for manufacturing processes. This is having knock-on effects for example in feed supplies, fertiliser manufacture, herbicide provision and spare parts of different sorts. This has definitely having a negative impact on farmers, as prices hike with increasing scarcity.

Shops in town are shifting their focus too. One hardware store in Masvingo, for example, was failing to stock goods and applied for a grocery trading license and is now shifted to supplying locally sourced groceries. But commerce is now not just through shops, as their opening hours are restricted by lockdown measures. The provision of groceries, grain, vegetables and a whole host of products is increasingly being done by local, mobile traders, frequently operating out of their own cars.

Mrs V. lives in Mucheke, a high-density suburb in Masvingo, she formerly has a stand at the KuTrain market in town. But this was closed for renovation due to lockdown and she instead took up trading from her car. “I don’t dream of going back to the kuTrain market”, she says, “I start at 3pm when shops are closing down and park at strategic points in the location and sell until the evening. It’s good business. I source products from local farmers, including those who have plots near Great Zimbabwe, and get groceries from truckers who come from South Africa”. Cars are the new ‘mini-markets’ and business is booming. All this is restructuring the economy towards more localised value chains that a greater diversity of people can benefit from, including farmers.

Working from home

Many formal places of work have closed and to make a living people must now work from home. It’s impossible to travel to work due to movement restrictions and those who are self-employed have shut up shop as rents and rates are high. Moving businesses to home during lockdown made total sense, and they are thriving. There are welding operations happening in living rooms, tailoring businesses in garages, bakeries in people’s kitchens, beer brewing in yards… along with hair salons, photocopy/printing businesses, brick-making and so on. The list is endless.

Working from home takes on a different meaning in Zimbabwe, whether in the townships or in the rural areas. Of course much of this activity is illegal, flouting health and safety rules and avoiding taxes, but as one person running a home business argued, “What can I do? I have to survive! We are learning new skills for survival!”

Finance in the COVID economy

With Zimbabwe’s economy in a mess, and currency swings a daily occurrence, navigating finance in business and agriculture is a challenge. The new Reserve Bank auction system, and the control measures that have limited exchanges, agents and cahs withdrawals has, it seems, brought some more stability of late. The official and parallel exchange rate is now closer, and the queues at shops, fuel stations and so on have reduced, as the opportunity for hoarding and speculation, and gaming the system has reduced. More commodities are now available in large part due to the new supply systems that have evolved in recent months. Instead, as one of my colleagues observed, “the queues you see today are waiting for sanitiser and temperature checks at shops”.

With inflation high and the local currency weak, the economy has by default re-dollarised, but the underlying fragility remains. All this is good for producers and consumers, but not everyone. Our team interviewed a money changer in Mvurwi, once a sight on every street corner: “I used to make US$500 per month, but now I am lucky to get US$80. I used to enjoy good living, drinking every day. Now it’s tough”. As our colleague put it, “rather than see the well- known money changers in the bars braaiing meat, they now go home with a bundle of vegetables like everyone else!”

Alternative health systems

With the near-collapse of the Zimbabwean public health system, and a series of rolling strikes by nurses and doctors who are poorly paid and badly treated, people are more and more reliant on alternative sources of health provision.

Sometimes this is through the family, with particular family members having knowledge about herbal remedies. There is a huge demand for particular herbs, tree roots as well as onions, ginger and lemons, which are seen as important in remedies. Not all of this is directed to COVID-19, but people are very aware of the need to boost immunity, stay healthy and have remedies at hand in case the virus strikes. Those supplying herbs or other agricultural products used as treatments have been experiencing a roaring trade in recent months.

The same is the case for prophets and other religious figures offering spiritual healing of different sorts, through banishing evil spirits and other causes of ailment. Large gatherings led by prophets from a variety of churches have attracted the attention of the authorities and some have been dispersed by the police. These days most are more organised, with effective distancing and requirements to wear masks. COVID-19 has definitely boosted the popularity of particular prophets across our study sites, who now have big followings.

Professional herbalists have also become massively popular. These range from the informal n’anga living in the village to Chinese/Indian herbalists to those African, traditional herbalists who have surgeries and clinics that spread between Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi. One such surgery is in Masvingo. One of the herbalists explained: “We have 300-400 customers a day, and sell herbs as far afield as the UK. There is huge demand. The clinics and hospitals don’t look after their patients, but we can – whether you are young or old. We can visit people at home or they come here. For COVID you must build strength to fight it and our herbs really can help”.

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As elsewhere in the world, Zimbabwe’s pandemic experience continues to evolve, reflecting the very particular context of the country. Innovation, adaptation and learning to cope with a fast-changing, challenging setting are all important. We continue to monitor the situation across our sites from all corners of the country, so look out for another update in October.


Many thanks to all the research team from across Zimbabwe for continuing interviews and collecting local information on the COVID-19 situation (and for the photos from different sites).


All photo credit: Ian Scoones

Local perspectives: Second e-Dialogue held on the future of small-scale farming

‘Local perspectives’ was the subject of the second e-Dialogue held on August 27, 2020. In a continuation of the new virtual series, ‘What future for small-scale farming? Inclusive transformation in challenging times’.

The session looked at the challenges smallholders face and opportunities for improvement in yields and standards of living at the local level, from the viewpoint of experts working on the front line.  Small-scale farmers are key to food systems across the world, but the sector is vulnerable and in need of urgent transformation, particularly with the impacts of COVID-19 and climate change.

Four of the expert panelists were linked to Agriculture Research Programme Africa APRA, including Hannington Odame, APRA East Africa Regional Hub Coordinator and Executive Director, Centre for African Bio-Entrepreneurship; Kofi Takyi Asante, APRA researcher and Research Fellow at the University of Ghana; Audax Rukonge, Executive Director of Agricultural Non State Actors Forum and; Steve Wiggins, Principal Research Fellow at the Overseas Development Institute.

In his opening remarks, Hannington Odame stressed the need for a comprehensive policy that addresses different climates and production systems, cash crops and subsistence crops. Agri-food systems need to be connected with other rapidly growing sectors (e.g. tourism and hospitality industries) to transform smallholder agriculture, which have potential to generate huge national incomes and employment opportunities. He also noted that Inter-generational partnerships should be created by connecting technologically minded and innovation-led younger people with experienced older farmers.

“Leveraging technology and innovation requires linking scientific knowledge to practices of smallholder farmers.”

APRA researcher Hannington Odame

Kofi Takyi Asante, APRA researcher and Research Fellow at the University of Ghana, recommended improving the material conditions for farmers, such as roads, integration to markets, etc. Once these condition improve, there is strong evidence that farmers can rapidly respond to incentives. Farmers are also investing in simple processing systems to increase the storage time of the oil so they can sell later at higher prices.

However, Infrastructure (such as roads) of food producing areas in Ghana still remain in a poor state, and farmers’ produce goes to waste and they are forced to sell at a very low rate. There is also inadequate access to extension services partly due to a government hiring freeze. Corruption and smuggling prevents subsidised inputs from reaching the poorest farmers, while supply chain and transport issues cause problems when delivering inputs to farmers to apply on their fields.

Audax Rukonge, described several emerging opportunities, such as unemployed college graduates who could be employed in agriculture as business developers, entrepreneurs, and service providers. He also called for women and youth to be seen as the core area to invest in. In his final remarks, he said that interventions should be based on evidence, and interventions need to be tailored to specific groups (women, youth, etc.). He also recommended effective monitoring and evaluation of success to take good projects to scale.

Steve Wiggins noted that there is a lot to learn in Africa from the example of East Asia. Small, incremental improvements over a couple decades led to a transformation, dramatically reducing hunger and poverty, and raising productivity.  There are some studies on remarkable progress in Tanzania recently, supported by a lot of actors investing in agriculture. He predicted that Tanzania will be seen as equally as successful as Vietnam and China in 15 years.

View their full contributions below:

Key points from other panellists:

Theresa Ampadu-Boakye, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist at the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nairobi. She discussed gender disparities, prevalent in ownership of assets, like mobile phones, and access to markets. Her research found that women sell for low prices in local markets compared to men.

Regis Chikowo, Professor at the University of Zimbabwe and Associate Professor at Michigan State University. He sees an opportunity with energetic young people returning to the villages from towns to farm. Not only can they help an ageing farming population, but they could revolutionise smallholder agriculture in Africa.

Ajay Vir Jakhar, citrus farmer based in Punjab, India, and Chairman of the Bharat Krishak Samaj Farmers’ Forum. He described how small-scale farmers today are increasingly dependent on market forces to put food on the table, and that farmers are ever more food insecure.

For a full summary of the second eDialogue, click here.

Watch the eDialogue in full, below:

See below for full contributions to the eDialogue from the APRA team:


Click here for a summary of the first e-Dialogue session, ‘Setting the Scene’.

Further sessions to be held as part of the e-Dialogue include:

  • Regional Realities (Oct 22);
  • Transition Pathways and Strategies (TBA) and;
  • Wrap-up and Policy Implications (TBA). 

Findings will feed into the 4th International Conference on Global Food Security in December, the IFAD Rural Development Report 2021, and the 2021 Food Systems Summit.

To register for the upcoming events and to join the discussion, click here.


Other APRA content from the eDialogue:

APRA researcher Gideon Boniface interviews a small-scale maize farmer in Tanzania:


Feature photo credit: Andrew Moore.

When global capital met pastoralism: learning from a decade of large-scale investment in dryland Africa


By Jeremy Lind, Doris Okenwa and Ian Scoones

In recent years, the gaze of global investment has been directed to Africa’s land and resources. Over the past decade, global capital from Europe, the Near East, China and elsewhere poured into land-based investments in industrialised agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa alongside green energy projects, oil exploration and other large-scale infrastructural developments.

While many critique widespread ‘land grabbing’, it is often overlooked that many investment projects are in the drylands. These are home to a patchwork of pastoral and agro-pastoral societies, many of which were marginalised by centralised state power and maligned as backwards by earlier ‘modernisation’ efforts to create sedentary (and compliant) governable subjects. Violence and the destruction of livelihoods was the experience for many.

Set against such legacies of contestation and underdevelopment, global investors, project developers and national governments herald new large-scale investment as transformational, ushering in new-found prosperity and secure livelihoods.

Now, more than a decade since the investment spike began in the pastoral drylands of Eastern Africa, it is possible to see how a new generation of projects are reconfiguring power, livelihoods and conflict. What do investments look like in Eastern Africa’s drylands? Do the diverse inhabitants of these lands benefit, or is this a new type of territorialisation? And what types of resistance, mobilisation and activism are evident?

These questions are explored across thirteen different contexts of largescale investment in our new book, Land, Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring Eastern Africa’s Pastoral Drylands. Focusing on local cases, stretching from the Gulf of Aden ports on Somaliland’s coast in the north to the Kilombero rice developments in southern Tanzania, the book highlights diverse experiences and perspectives of investment from the bottom up.

When largescale investments encounter local economies, the social and spatial outcomes do not reflect merely the state’s aspirations of ‘development’ or the interests of large global capital. The outcomes also intersect with local realities and aspirations. Seen from the dryland margins, struggles around the framing and meanings given to investments in oil, wind, livestock, land and water are the crux of many tensions.

Even the most elaborate plans of financiers, contractors and national governments come unstuck and are re-made in the likeness of not only states’ visions of modernity and ‘progress’, but also those of herders and small-town entrepreneurs in the pastoral drylands.

‘Seeing’ and responding to investments

Ports, pipelines, roads, wind farms and plantations are part of development visions of state actors at the centre as well as private capital across Eastern Africa. National development plans emphasise the presumed benefits of large outside investment for expanding markets and economic activities in marginal rural areas. Actors in national governments become gatekeepers to foreign investment and are well-positioned to benefit personally from deals.

Investors promote the benefits of project activity to residents of nearby communities, through the construction of new infrastructure, easing transport difficulties and promoting marketing activity, providing opportunities for work and creating corporate social investments in bursaries, classrooms and the provision of water, for example. Yet, these efforts at corporate social responsibility have ignited debates around belonging, entitlements and inclusion. In Turkana in northern Kenya, tensions cropped up around the efforts of oil investors to curry favour with communities and stem any potential resistance through ‘participatory’ and ‘consultative’ processes, inadvertently creating asymmetric power relations.

State actors at the sub-national level may not see investments in the same way, however. The position of sub-national political administrations can waiver between embrace and hostility. Mixed views of large-scale investments often hold among local business elites, as well. Ultimately, investment is something to be welcomed, but the terms of inclusion in land deals, compensation and contract and tendering opportunities dictate the nature of politics. For example, around new geothermal developments in Baringo in Kenya’s northern Rift Valley, Pokot elites are at the forefront of land privatisation, fencing the most valuable plots along new roads that connect geothermal sites with national infrastructure.

The views of other dryland residents – small-scale pastoralists and dryland farmers – cover a spectrum, from opposition and resistance to the perceived loss of key grazing resources and farmland, to accommodation in anticipation of deriving personal benefit, to simple antipathy. For example, residents of small settlements near the Lake Turkana Wind Power site, also in northern Kenya, blockaded roads to protest their alleged exclusion from investment benefits – including compensation for the extraction of sand and the felling of trees, as well as access to jobs. Even so, at the local level, there is no uniform opinion or interest: while young people seek an economic foothold, elders agitate to uphold precedence for grazing rights and women seek to safeguard cultural rights as well as work opportunities as cleaners and cooks for contractors.

Ambiguous outcomes, unclear ‘winners’

Exploring ways that largescale investments are ‘seen’ by stakeholders at various levels of project design, finance and implementation brings into frame the questions: investments for whom? In whose interests? And with what consequences?

The reconfiguration of land ownership and use, while perhaps not as dramatic as earlier ‘land grabbing’ debates feared, has been profound, creating new politics of land and investment in the pastoral regions. Simple narratives of the ‘state’ and/or ‘investor’ versus ‘local people’ do not relay the more complex dynamics and assemblages of interests that mobilise behind, anticipate and pursue large-scale investments. In Ethiopia’s Awash Valley, local Afar elites have become complicit in seeking personal advantage from the state’s investments in sugar estates, which have dispossessed livestock-keepers from prime grazing areas.

Infrastructure and investments have ignited intense competition for land, as well as its revaluation, as local elites, and other domestic and foreign investors, jostle to claim tracts of land. Far from resisting and obstructing investment, many have sought to position themselves to benefit from it. In Somaliland, intense competition to command a favourable position in wider trade networks are evident in struggles to capture the expected windfall of the Berbera corridor development. A common saying in Somaliland – He who sits close to the cooking pot gets a good bone – is invoked by some far from infrastructure who worry they will miss out the benefits.

Inequality and mobilisation from below

So, how do communities around the edges of big projects gain more than arbitrary compensation? Local governments and leadership need to be more creative in negotiating investments beyond the national government agreements with developers. It is crucial to demand clear terms of engagement and more long-term benefits for differentiated local stakeholders – not just one-off disbursements or short-term work.

While national governments often side with investment, citizens and civil society alike can press for accountability – through statutory human rights instruments, the implementation of land reforms to guard against grabbing, the enforcement of environmental regulations and scrutiny of contracts by anti-corruption agencies, to name a few.  

Meanwhile, as the book argues, the more imperceptible influences of investments on territory, as well as economy, politics, and citizenship, will accentuate inequalities and social difference that increasingly characterise dryland margins. While there is no simple view ‘from below’, resistance, mobilisation and subversion are something to anticipate as part of the ongoing development of infrastructure, land and resources across Africa’s drylands.


Publication information:

Lind, Jeremy, Okenwa, Doris, and Scoones, Ian. 2020. Land, Investment and Politics: Reconfiguring Eastern Africa’s Pastoral Drylands. Woodbridge: James Currey.

Link to open access introductory chapter:

https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/15458

Purchase information:                                                                                          

https://boydellandbrewer.com/land-investment-politics.html (discount code – BB135)


Feature image credit: ICARDA on Flickr.

Still debating land tenure reform in Zimbabwe


This blog was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland

As part of the on-going discussions about Zimbabwe’s new land policy, land tenure is a central concern. Zimbabwe has a multi-form land tenure system, involving different legal arrangements and different forms of authority. This suits a complex land system with multiple users wanting different things out of holding land. This has been acknowledged time and time again, most prominently by the Presidential Commission on Land led by Mandi Rukuni way back in 1994.

Each time there is a policy review, consultants and commentators line up to make arguments for regularising what is seen as a messy, complex system. Drawing on ideology more than evidence, they argue for a standardised, ordered system based on a singular form of titled private property. There are many examples of this position – and alarmingly I heard them in a number of aid agencies in Harare recently. Eddie Cross is the most consistent and articulate proponent, seemingly having persuaded large sections of the opposition movement and many donors too.

In order to justify an overhaul, a whole series of simplistic narratives are deployed. The most persistent of which is the assumption that freehold private tenure is the desired gold standard, and all reforms should aim to create cadastral uniformity with private, individual plots registered. This is assumed to result in the release of land value as land becomes ‘bankable’, able to be used as collateral for investment credit.

Titling is not always the answer

As so many have shown – and has been discussed on this blog manymany times – this narrative is deeply problematic. I apologise for coming back to this subject yet again, but the argument needs repeating, as it’s vitally important. For a refresher, see the short note (replicated in this blog) I produced with the late, great Sam Moyo years ago in an earlier attempt to address these misplaced arguments.

Bottom-line, there are other routes to delivering security of tenure, facilitating investment and financing of land-based activities than freehold tenure. Leases and permits with the right wording are perfectly good bases for collateral, and mortgaging land is not the only solution to agricultural financing anyway. And of course private titling land is not always a route to tenure security and sustainable management of resources. It depends on the political and institutional context. Just ask any white farmer around 2000 about the limits of security on private titled property. And consult the vast research resources compiled by Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom on the security of forms of common property.

Yet, it’s only particular forms of individualised, private property rights are seen as sacrosanct by right-wing, libertarian think-tanks like the Cato Institute – and their dubious followers in southern Africa. But, we must always remember the aim is not to generate one type of legal property arrangement, but security of tenure on any sort of land through diverse ownership arrangements.

Security emerges from different sources. These are political, social, cultural as well as through formal legal allocations of rights. These sources of authority have to emerge together. Traditional systems of communal land tenure, overseen by chiefs and headman and governed by culturally-accepted rules, can offer tenure security, just as can a piece of paper allocating a title. But this depends on whether the authority overseeing such tenure regimes is legitimate, trusted, transparent and accountable; and this depends on politics. It is the political settlement pertaining to land that provides security – or the opposite.

A political settlement over land

The problem in Zimbabwe is that, despite the repeated proclamations, there remains no finalised political settlement over land, even after 20 long years. This lack of settlement is what produces insecurity, and in its wake the on-going process of politically-motivated land grabbing that continues to plague the sector, especially around elections. Building a political settlement around land is not just high-sounding proclamations from the top, and some performative interventions to show willing, but also it means investing in the administrative and bureaucratic system that offers security and clarity. This may seem tedious – centred on recording, auditing, registering and documenting – and centred on the bureaucratic domain of surveyors and lands offices. But this demanding, long-term building of bureaucratic capacity is essential.

The fact that there are (finally) moves towards agreed compensation settlements with farmers whose land was acquired for land reform is very good news. It appears agreements are close on valuation measures, even if the mechanics over how compensation will be paid are as yet unclear. This is important, as the impasse that has lasted now nearly 20 years has been debilitating. Agreement on this will mean that the land reform areas, now settled for years, can no longer be deemed ‘contested’ by international donors and investors.

This means that donor and private support and investment can flow, without ‘restrictive measures’ (aka ‘sanctions’) getting in the way. With compensation processes agreed, then investment in land administration systems can follow; perhaps with some district level pilots, as I recommended a while back. In any area, this will allow for clarity on who owns what, and in turn audit systems can evaluate how land is used, and whether land is being held outside agreed laws, and with this clear, local negotiations over land use ownership can follow.

Getting an effective land administration system functioning is central to providing tenure security. Under such a such a system a multi-form tenure system is possible. It doesn’t have to be a one-size-fits-all solution. Donors endlessly push supposedly successful land titling projects, whether in Rwanda or Ethiopia, but rarely mention the pitfalls, or the historical failures such as Kenya, where the consequences – sometimes bloody and violent – are still being felt.

A land tenure system in a multi-form setting just has to accept different approaches for different areas: leases for larger A2 farms, registered permits for new A1 farms, and selective registration for some parts of communal areas, as required (such as protection of village land against aggressive land acquisition by mining concerns or, in peri-urban areas, housing developers). Overall the aim is the same: enhancing tenure security where it’s needed (more in A2, less in communal areas), but not assuming that there is one (legal/administrative) solution. Such a system needn’t be complex and expensive, and the use of satellite technology certainly speeds things up.

Despite the persistent, ideologically-driven arguments, the ideal for Zimbabwe must not be a fully titled private land tenure system with every parcel registered in a deeds office. This would take decades to complete and would not take account of the flexible arrangements required, particularly in smallholder and communal settings. I wonder sometimes whether those who push such a line have worked on the ground in such settings where overlapping systems and complex negotiations are the norm, and required. A simplistic form of land titling would also create conflict of massive proportions with boundary disputes endlessly clogging up administrative courts.

The best solution is to go for a parsimonious approach, maintain the multiform tenure system, and enhance tenure security through improving land administration – and avoid an apparently neat titling option that will not work.


Cover photo credit: Ian Scoones

What role does the hand hoe have in rice production in Morogoro, Tanzania?

Basic hand hoes have always played a key part in rice production in Morogoro, Tanzania – but as ox-ploughs and tractors become more widely used, is there still a place for the traditional farm implement? Using information from a recent study, APRA Tanzania researchers discover that factors such as geography play a role in determining the most effective implements for rice farmers.


Prepared by Ntengua Mdoe, Gilead  Mlay, Aida Isinika, Gideon Boniface and Christopher Magomba

The national rice development strategy in Tanzania recognises that the use of improved farm implements above the traditional hand hoe is crucial in expanding areas under rice production and increasing productivity. It seeks to promote agricultural mechanisation in the form of animal traction involving ox-plough and mechanical power with tractors through increased participation of the private sector and supporting research and development of simple and affordable farm implements.

An example of a hand hoe. Credit: CC BY-SA 4.0

In Kilombero valley – Kilombero district, the use of ox-plough was introduced by agro-pastoralists who have been emigrating from various agro-pastoral area such as Sukuma land into Kilombero valley since 2000, while tractors were introduced by large scale rice farmers in the 1980s. The use of ox-plough increased after 2012, following purchase of livestock by indigenous people from the agro-pastoralists who were evicted by the government from the Kilombero valley to avoid environmental degradation resulting from increased livestock numbers. The introduction of ox-plough and tractor increased the number of tillage implement options for farmers to choose from depending on their financial resources available and perceived incomes from using these implements.  This blog uses first round data collected in October 2017 for the rice commercialisation study supported by the Agricultural Policy Research for Africa (APRA) programme to provide evidence on the extent of use of these farm implements and their benefits to rice farmers.

A rice farmer clearing weeds in his rice farm using a hand hoe, Mngeta-Kilombero district. Credit: APRA Tanzania

Extent of use of ox-ploughs and tractors

Although the use of ox-plough and tractors among rice farmers in Kilombero has increased since their introduction, the hand hoe is still being used as a farm implement either alone or in combination with ox-plough and/or tractor.  A number of factors have inhibited farmers from completely replacing the hand hoe with ox-plough and tractors irrespective the scale of their rice farms. Consequently, most rice farmers are using a combination of hand hoe and ox-plough, hand hoe and tractors or hand hoe, ox-plough and tractors. The reasons for a complete replacement of hand hoe are:

  • Small size of rice farm meaning that ownership and hiring of ox-plough or tractor service is not cost effective;
  • Some rice farm operations such as weeding and fertiliser application cannot be done using ox-plough or tractor and;
  • Ineffectiveness or difficulty using ox-plough and/tractor in some parts of the rice farm. For example, rice farmers using tractors are compelled to use ox-plough in swampy areas of the Kilombero valley where tractors cannot be used effectively. Also, users of ox-plough and/or tractors are compelled to use hand hoe to clear remaining weeds after using these implements.
Pair of oxen with ox-plough cultivating rice in Morogoro. Credit: APRA Tanzania

With the exception of the hand hoe – owned by all sampled rice farmers because of the aforementioned limitations, ownership of ox-plough and tractor varied by farmer category. The percentages of medium scale farmers (MSF) owning ox-plough and tractor were higher than those of small scale farmers (SSF), while the percentage of male headed households (MHH) owning ox-plough was higher than that of female headed households (FHH). None of the FHH owned tractors.  Irrespective of farmer category, the percentage of rice farmers who owned ox-plough was higher than the percentage of farmers who owned tractors (Table 1).  Overall, only three of the sampled farmers owned tractors while 95 of the sample rice farmers owned ox-ploughs. This is largely due to relatively high cost of acquiring tractors compared to the cost of a pair of oxen and an ox-plough, and therefore most users depended on hire services.  

Different combinations of implements used:

  • Percentage of SSF using hand hoe alone was higher than that of MSF while the percentage of FHH using hand hoe alone was higher than percentage of MHH;
  • Percentage of MSF using hand hoe and ox-plough  was higher than SSF while the percentage of MHH using hand hoe and ox-plough  was higher than FHH;
  • Unlike the use of hand hoe and ox-plough , the percentage SHF using hand hoe and tractors was higher that of MSF while the percentage of FHH using hand hoe and tractors was higher than that of MHH;
  • Percentage of MSF using hand hoe, ox-plough and tractors was higher than that of SSF while the percentage of MHH using hand hoe, ox-plough and tractors was higher than that of FHH.
Table 1: Percentage of households owning and using different types of farm implements by farmer category
Mngeta, Kilombero: Oxen being taken to rice farm and a farmer ploughing using ox-plough. Credit: APRA Tanzania

Benefits of using combinations of hand hoe and the improved farm implements (ox-plough, tractor or ox-plough and tractor) compared to using hand hoe alone:

  • Cultivation of larger land area for rice production than when only hand hoe is used;
  • Higher productivity because of timeliness in farm operations;
  • Higher rice output;
  • Higher rice income.

Conclusion

Although the use of ox-plough and tractor are promoted because of their benefits including cultivating large land areas, enhancing productivity, achieving larger rice outputs and incomes from rice farming, the use of hand hoe in combination with the other farm implements is inevitable because of limitations of using ox-plough and tractors in certain farm operations and some parts of rice farms. As far as policy intervention is concerned, emphasis should be placed on the promotion of the use of hand hoe and ox-plough, not only because it is more widely used in rice farming but also because it can be used in swampy areas where tractors are unable to operate.


Feature image: Mngeta, Kilombero: A farmer with his tractor stuck on the way to his rice farm. Credit: APRA Tanzania.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the #COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

e-Dialogue: What future for small-scale farming? Inclusive transformation in challenging times

Join the next session of the e-Dialogue: What Future for Small-Scale Farming? on Thursday, August 27th, from 1:00 pm to 2:30 pm (GMT). More information on the e-dialogue series can be found here.

The session will look at Local Perspectives, translating the overview from Session 1 to local realities, and is supported by a number of Vlogs (video blogs) submitted by young professionals in the field, which you can view on YouTube.

The session will feature a panel discussion with Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) researchers and other experts: 

  • Theresa Ampadu-Boakye, N2Africa Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, IITA
  • Regis Chikowo, University of Zimbabwe and Michigan State University
  • Hannington Odame, Executive Director, Centre for African Bio-Entrepreneurship, APRA Regional Hub Coordinator
  • Audax Rukonge, Executive Director, ANSAF
  • Kofi Takyi Asante, Research Fellow, University of Ghana, APRA researcher
  • Steve Wiggins Principal Research Fellow, ODI

To register to attend, or for further information, please visit the dialogue website; additional sessions are planned for September 24, October 22, and November 26. 

How COVID-19 has affected Liliyan’s Catering Services in Morogoro, Tanzania

In our latest blog, APRA researchers Ntengua Mdoe, Gilead Mlay and Gideon Boniface examine the negative effect of the pandemic on Liliyan’s Catering Services Enterprise, and how it is bouncing back and coping with the financial hit. The researchers then provide recommendations to policy makers on how they can ensure that small businesses like this can survive the crisis.

Read more on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania in the Round One and Round Two APRA country reports.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Written by Ntengua Mdoe, Gilead Mlay and Gideon Boniface

Hotels, restaurants and other eateries account for a significant proportion of rice consumption in Tanzania. These businesses have experienced a decline in clients from fear of the COVID-19 pandemic, suspension of international flights, suspension of social and other gatherings in mid-March 2020 when the government announced measures to prevent the spread of the pandemic. This blog highlights the effect of the pandemic on Liliyan’s Catering Services enterprise (LCSE) as one of the providers of food service away from home in Morogoro municipality. 

Background of Liliyan’s catering services enterprise (LCSE)  

LCSE is owned by Ms. Liliyan Munisi, a very experienced small businesses operator with many years of experience:

  • 2002 – started a small business buying ladies’ clothes from Dar-es salaam for sale in Morogoro municipality;
  • 2006 – given a tender of supplying workers uniforms by a tobacco company in Morogoro municipality until 2008;
  • 2009 – opened a small restaurant;
  • 2011 –  LCSE  was established;
  • 2012 – LCSE was officially registered.
LCSE employees at a wedding party. Credit: LCSE

Size of LCSE      

According to International Labour Organization’s definition of SME, LCSE is a small-sized enterprise as it has 16 permanent employees, the majority being young women and men. It is an important outlet of raw rice in Morogoro municipality, purchasing approximately 4.0 tonnes of raw rice per month under normal business environment

Services provided by LCSE      

LCSE provides catering services to educational institutions, social gatherings (weddings, funerals) and other events such as workshops and seminars in Morogoro municipality. Rice is a major component of the foods served by LCSE, and often comprises of plain rice served with meat or beans and/or vegetables or cooked with meat and spices and served with vegetables (Pilau in Swahili).

LCSE employees serving rice with various food items at a wedding party. Credit: LCSE

Effect of COVID-19 on LCSE’s business services

COVID-19 has negatively affected LCSE after the government announcement to close educational institutions and suspend big social and other gatherings on 17th March 2020, including:

  • Complete loss in revenue from food services to educational institutions;
  • Substantial decline in revenue from provision of food services to seminars and workshops as the measures to control the spread of COVID-19 pandemic limited services to offer to gatherings with a maximum of 15 people;
  • Incurred costs associated with provision and washing facilities for clients in accordance with the WHO health standards despite limited number of clients;
  • Compensating laid-off workers  in kind with food items such as rice and beans and;
  • Experiencing difficulties in loan repayment as a result of a decline in cash flow.

Overall LCSE’s estimate of loss in gross revenue over the period of 3.5 months before resumption of the catering services was about TZS 94.5 million ($40,767.9).

Top Star School’s pupils being served plain rice with beans and vegetables. Credit: Top Star School’s Manager

Back to business

Most actors in the rice value chain have continued business after the government’s decision to remove most of the restrictive measures taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19, effective from 29th June 2020, except the enforcement of the WHO health standards. Two weeks after the government decision, Ms. Liliyan Munisi said that she has been experiencing a slow recovery of catering services to social gatherings such as weddings and funerals because some people still fear that the pandemic is dangerous. Nevertheless, catering services to educational institutions and gatherings such as seminars and workshops have returned to normal. Consequently, the company is gradually recovering the revenue lost during the 3.5 months of business decline and has reinstated all of the employees laid off in March 2020. In addition, the company has resumed orders of raw rice from its suppliers, benefiting various actors higher up the rice value chain such as processors, traders of paddy and rice farmers.

Coping with the negative impact of COVID-19  

The decline in catering business activities and the uncertainty of when catering services would return to normal compelled LCSE to do the following:

  • Lay off some employees: 12 out of the 16 permanent employees were laid off (as mentioned above, these were later re-hired when the situation normalised);
  • Re-investing in livestock production, specifically poultry, dairy and pig production as a long-term coping strategy.

Way forward

Evidence from this case study shows that food outlets have experienced significant loss in revenue as a result of decline in the number of clients since 17 March 2020 following measures announced by the government to control the spread of COVID-19. Although businesses are gradually returning back to normal after the decision to remove most of the control measures from 29th June 2020, it is difficult to predict how long the consumption of food away from home will return to normal, as some consumers believe that the pandemic is still prevailing in urban areas.

To survive the crisis, these business entities need urgent liquidity support in terms of accessing and making good use of any government established survival fund for small businesses. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved debt service relief of US $14.3 million to help Tanzania address social-economic effects of COVID-19. Among other support to COVID-19 affected businesses, the fund can partly be used to support these small businesses.  This should be complemented by revision of the repayment terms of the funds borrowed by the businesses before the COVID-19 pandemic as directed by the Bank of Tanzania.


Owner of LCSE, Ms. Liliyan Munisi, standing close to her business truck. Credit: LCSE


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the #COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected in coming weeks but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.