Conservation and Land Grabbing in Tanzania

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Abstract

The discussion of global ‘land grabbing’ has mainly focused on large-scale land deals and direct foreign investments in food and biofuel production in developing countries. The land grabbing effect of conservation projects is, however, rarely heeded in these debates. In Tanzania, conservation areas have steadily increased since colonial times leading to loss of land and resource access for small-scale farmers, pastoralists and fisherfolk. Today, around 40 % of the land area of the country is under some form of environmental protection. This includes more recent areas under so-called ‘community-based conservation’, which in practice proves to be business-as-usual in terms of conservation taking
priority over local rights and livelihoods. This paper provides examples of how community-based conservation in wildlife, forests and coastal areas in Tanzania leads to local people’s loss of access to land and natural resources. The increasing commodification of biodiversity and natural resources driven by the boom in safari tourism as well as new climate mitigation initiatives such as REDD is accelerating this process. The main actors are big international conservation groups, foreign donors, and state agencies focused on recentralizing control over resources in order to capitalize on the increasing land rent.

**Introduction**

‘Land grabbing’ is a politically charged and deliberately chosen term used in order to draw attention to processes whereby smallholders are dispossessed of their land through interventions by outside actors. Colonialism obviously represents the classic and ultimate example of land grabbing through its combination of laws and policies paving the way for foreign intervention and local dispossession in sectors such as mining, agriculture, and environmental conservation. Later, under the postcolonial African state, ‘land grabbing’ was often cited by activist groups to depict various forms of elite capture of land and natural resources.

The more recent burst of international attention to ‘global land grabbing’, on the other hand, has mostly focused on large-scale land deals and direct foreign investments in food and biofuel production. African countries are, in particular, targeted by these investments, due to the fact that large parts of the continent are still relatively land-abundant\(^1\), which implies that land is cheap. In these areas, labour (in addition to capital) constitutes a limiting factor for agricultural development. With population growth and different processes of dispossession, pressure on land in many parts of rural Africa is, however, rising and leading land to increasingly become a limiting factor (Bassett 1993, Peters 2004).

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\(^1\) It is, however, interesting to note that African land in policy debates is generally either said to be ‘overpopulated’ or ‘abundant’ depending on the agenda that is being promoted.
The frontrunners in the foreign investments in African farmland seem to be food-importing countries with land and water constraints, such as the Gulf states, and countries with large populations and food security concerns, such as China, South Korea, and India (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). In addition, as fuel prices increase, a number of European biofuel producers have shown an interest in leasing African land to grow for instance sugar cane or *Jatropha* to produce biodiesel.

There are, however, also other processes driving the current global land rush. Zoomers (2010) points at seven processes contributing to what she calls ‘the foreignisation of space’. In this paper we will discuss how one of these processes, environmental conservation, leads to various forms of land grabbing in Tanzania. In ‘conservation’, we include classic biodiversity protection, ‘community-based’ conservation projects, afforestation and reforestation projects, as well as other forest protection projects driven by needs to mitigate global climate change (e.g. REDD+ and carbon sequestration through large-scale tree planting). Our argument is in line with recent critical scholarship on African nature conservation arguing that practices labeled ‘win–win’ rarely involve real devolution of authority, but on the contrary lead to political and economic marginalization, that local rights to land and natural resources are at best ambiguous within community-based conservation projects, which easily leads to local communities being overrun by the state or international organizations, and that the financial benefits of local communities living adjacent to conservation areas tend to be modest compared to the costs born by the same people. Conservation critics also point out that protection of biodiversity tends to receive priority over poverty alleviation if these two processes are seen to be in conflict with each other (e.g. Neumann 1998, Dzingirai 2003, Chapin 2004, Kepe 2004, Sullivan 2006, Igoe and Croucher 2007, Benjaminsen et al. 2008, Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010).

According to the Tanzanian government, around 36 per cent of the country’s total area was protected in various ways in 2007 (United Republic of Tanzania 2007). In addition, new protected areas are being created, where forest and wildlife are conserved in what is termed ‘community-based conservation’. In
2011, at least 40 percent of Tanzania’s total land area is conserved in one way or another, depending on what one includes as ‘conservation’. In addition to this come possible new extensions of forest conservation under REDD+. This means that a substantial and increasing part of rural Tanzania is not available to poor smallholders for productive activities.

In this paper, we discuss wildlife management, carbon forestry, and marine conservation in Tanzania in relation to the issue of land grabbing.

**Wildlife**

After a steady process of centralizing control over wildlife during the colonial period and the first decades of independence, there was a short spell of a more development-friendly approach to wildlife management in Tanzania in the 1980s and 1990s.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, there had been some attempts at establishing community-based wildlife management projects in the country. These were small donor-driven projects that introduced incentives to reduce poaching in communities close to protected areas (Formo 2010). Due to a strong international interest in conserving Tanzania’s rich biodiversity and the emerging acknowledgment among conservationists that successful conservation depended on the involvement of local communities and the distribution of benefits to these communities, the needed change from fortress to community-based conservation was, as an idea, introduced already in the 1980s in Tanzania.

This later led the Tanzanian Government to launch a new Wildlife Policy in 1998, which included a focus on the rights of local people to wildlife and the role wildlife management may play for rural development. The policy also stressed how important it is that people in rural areas receive a fair share of the large revenues from safari tourism and sport hunting (URT 1998). Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) were the main tool proposed to implement this new more development-friendly approach. In WMAs, local communities would have ‘full mandate of managing and benefiting from their conservation efforts, through community-based conservation programmes’ (URT 1998: 31).
WMAs are established on village land and are situated close to existing protected areas such as national parks, and they often represent corridors between various protected areas. Since Tanzanian wildlife generally migrate over long distances, and since much of it is found outside protected areas, the idea is that one must conserve large ecosystems if one is to succeed with conservation. To conserve areas as large as those in question, it is also necessary to introduce conservation of land belonging to farmers and pastoralists. The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) refers to this large-scale conservation as ‘heartlands’, while World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) uses the term ‘ecoregions’. Hence, introducing ‘community-based’ approaches seems to be driven by the idea of ‘signing communities on to conservation projects primarily as a means to protect the integrity of the national park system’ (Goldman 2003: 838).

Many donors had been involved in the wildlife sector during the 1990s (e.g. GTZ, NORAD, USAID, DANIDA), and the new policy was to a large extent a consequence of influence from these donors who subscribed to the win-win discourse. In 2007, however, the policy was revised and its tone changed (URT 2007). The focus is now on state management of wildlife, and little is mentioned about participation, development, and benefits for local communities. In the period between the publications of these two policy documents, discoveries of extensive corruption in the wildlife sector (Nshala 1999, Sachedina 2008, Nelson 2009 and 2010) and the failure of the government to implement the 1998 policy led most donors to withdraw from directly supporting the sector. USAID is the main donor currently remaining. It funnels its support mainly through WWF and AWF to implement the establishment of WMAs on village land. The idea with WMAs is that several villages come together and give up land for conservation. In return, the villages shall receive a certain proportion of the tourism revenues from these areas.

In 2009, the new Wildlife Act was passed in the National Assembly. This law strengthens central control of wildlife and provides the Wildlife Division more authority to intervene in the management of village land.

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2 There are currently 21 WMAs in Tanzania in various stages towards formal establishment. The number of villages in each WMA varies from 2 to 30.
This on-going recentralization in Tanzanian wildlife management is played out in the control of the two main income-generating activities in this sector; photo safaris and sport hunting. The process implies transferring resources and the control over these resources from local (village) level to central authorities, international conservation groups, and the tourist business.

The recent developments in the village of Sinya in Western Kilimanjaro may illustrate this process of recentralization and how a village with abundant wildlife on its land has lost control over this land and its resources.

The village area of Sinya borders Kenya and has a central location between Amboseli National Park and conservation areas in Tanzania (Figure 1). Here, a number of species such as elephants, zebras, wildebeest, and various antelopes migrate. In addition, these migrations are followed by different predators. This means that Sinya is located in an attractive area for both photographic safaris and sport hunting.

In the 1990s, Tanzania’s tourism industry grew by over 10 per cent per year (World Bank/MIGA 2002). A consequence of this growth was that safari companies developed individual agreements with villages that had abundant wildlife on their land. In 2001, Sinya made a formal agreement with Kibo Tours Safaris through its branch Tanganyika Wilderness Camps. This deal gave the safari company the right to establish a tented camp on village land and it meant that the village for instance during 2002-04 earned nearly USD 30,000 per year in direct revenue from safari tourism (Trench et al. 2009). The village, which has around 2000 inhabitants, spent this income on shared development projects such as school buildings, dormitories for school pupils, and school grants for children from the village \(^3\) (Nelson 2004, Honey 2008, Trench et al. 2009, Minwary 2009).

At the same time, the Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism allocated a hunting block also covering Sinya’s village land to the company Northern Hunting. While Sinya, according to the Village Land Act of

\(^3\) There are also stories circulating about elite capture of these revenues, but most villagers seem to welcome safari tourism (Trench et al. 2009), probably because, after all, it meant a substantial amount of revenue, which also benefitted ordinary people through various shared development projects.
2001, holds land rights to its village land, all wildlife is formally the property of the state in Tanzania. This means that the fees paid by the hunting company for hunting on village land go directly to the central government.

This overlap between hunting and photographic tourism was the source of a major conflict that emerged in Sinya, and which became a legal battle in court in 2005. The court sided with the hunting company and the decision forced Tanganyika Wilderness Camps to relocate to the neighbouring village of Elerai. The company continues to pay 20 USD per tourist for game drives to Sinya, but the bed-night fees where henceforth paid to Elerai, which meant a huge loss of revenue to Sinya.

The court’s decision was based on the Wildlife Conservation (Tourist Hunting) Regulations of 2000, which prohibits game viewing within a hunting block without the written permission of the Director of Wildlife. Furthermore, the Regulations give the Director the authority to withdraw or revoke investment agreements on village land (Minwary 2009). This is one example of the recentralization that has taken place in the wildlife sector during the last decade or so.

Trophy hunting in Tanzania is based on a system of ‘hunting blocks’. Hunting blocks are hired out to hunting companies for a period of three years by the Wildlife Division. Among observers of this sector in Tanzania, there is general agreement that the hunting business is marked by extensive corruption (Nshala 1999, Sachedina 2008, Jansen 2009, Nelson 2009 and 2010). Tanzania is also the only country in eastern and southern Africa that does not have bidding rounds for hunting block allocation. The process lacks openness and the prices are estimated to be well below the market level (World Bank 2008, Nelson 2009). This under-pricing creates opportunities for personal rent seeking for key officials who control the allocation of hunting blocks and the collection of hunting fees.

When the WMAs were introduced around 2003-4, villagers were promised hunting quotas and that state-controlled sport hunting would be phased out at the advantage of local control. But devolving control over hunting to the local
level is not on the agenda anymore. The hunting industry simply seems too lucrative for decentralization. Of the hunting fees collected by the Wildlife Division, 25% is supposed to go back to the local level. This includes the Districts as well as the WMAs. But it is not clear how much should go to the WMAs, and, here again, there is lack of transparency.

Much evidence suggests that the sector is controlled by a network of central bureaucrats and politicians, as well as Tanzanian and foreign business people (Nshala 1999, Nelson 2009). We have directly attempted to acquire turnover figures from hunting companies as well as from the Wildlife Division, without success. There is great resistance to disclosing information despite the fact that in any democratic society it should be publically accessible. Key actors have also resisted efforts to introduce more transparent and thereby more democratic processes around the allocation and monitoring of hunting blocks. These blocks are hired out to hunting companies for a period of three years.

Central management authorities are currently putting pressure on villages to establish WMAs. This is particularly true for villages located in or around wildlife migration routes. In Enduimet WMA, Sinya village resisted for several years to be included in the WMA, but after long-standing pressure from the government and the AWF, the village elected a new leadership in late 2009 that accepts this inclusion. Sinya earlier refused to be part of the WMA, because the villagers did not understand why they should share the tourism revenue with eight other villages since Sinya is clearly the village with most wildlife within its area. In addition, the people of Sinya were afraid of losing control over their own natural resources, especially their own grazing land, if they joined Enduimet WMA. It is common in a WMA to have zones within which there are restrictions on grazing.

With the new Wildlife Utilization Regulations of 2008, the Wildlife Division also tries to appropriate a large part of the revenue from photographic safaris. The regulations state that income from tourism in the WMAs shall be collected by the regional offices under the Wildlife Division. The reasoning behind this is that there is allegedly not enough capacity or knowledge of financial management in
the community-based organisations (CBOs) that are in charge of running the WMAs.

The CBOs shall now receive 65 per cent of the tourist revenues from non-consumptive use (photo safaris). For the villages that previously had individual deals with safari companies, such as Sinya and Elerai, this is obviously a considerable decline in income; also because they have to share this income with several other villages. In addition, since there is no open, accessible information about the total revenue, it is difficult to verify whether the correct amounts are actually transferred to the CBOs in practice. The CBO office receiving the checks have no way of knowing what the total revenue from tourism is in the area they are supposed to manage.

An additional example of the recentralization process is the fact that according to the Wildlife Act of 2009, pastoralists now risk being required to seek permission from the Director of the Wildlife Division to graze their livestock in what are called Game Controlled Areas. Many Maasai villages are located in such areas. This is the case, for instance, for the entire Longido District⁴, where Sinya village and Enduimet WMA are located. If this law is enforced, it could be a disaster for the Maasai of Longido.

**Forests**

The main approaches for implementing Participative Forest Management (PFM) in Tanzania are Joint Forest Management (JFM) and Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) (Blomley & Ramadhani 2006). JFM is a collaborative management approach, which divides forest management responsibility and returns between government (either central or local) and forest adjacent communities. It takes place on land reserved for forest management such as National Forest Reserves and Local Government Forest Reserves. CBFM, on the other hand, takes place in forests on ‘village land’. This is land, which has been surveyed and registered under the provisions of the Village Land Act (1999) and managed by the village council.

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⁴ The District has almost 100 000 inhabitants according to its own records.
PFM has been facilitated by the enactment of a range of laws and policies, which provide an enabling legal environment. The relevant policies include the Land Policy (1995) and the Forest Policy (1998), while the relevant laws include the Forest Act (2002), the Land Act (1999) and the Village Land Act (1999). Some observers have applauded these policies and laws, arguing that mainland Tanzania has one of the most advanced community forestry jurisdictions in Africa (Wily 2002).

A national survey undertaken in 2008 established that over 2.2 million hectares were under CBFM and that over 1440 villages were participating (URT 2008). As a result of the progress made under these projects, Tanzania is considered by many to be a leader in Africa in PFM implementation (Blomley & Iddi 2010, Blomley & Ramadhani 2006, Sjöholm & Luono 2002, Wily 2002, Wily & Dewees 2001). However, some observers have pointed out a number of challenges in PFM related for instance to communication of the new policies to communities (Robinson & Maganga 2009), lack of community benefits (Vihemäki 2005, Lund & Treue 2008), and problems of mis-management and corruption (Brockington 2007).

**CBFM and REDD**

The experience of Suledo community forest reserve illustrates how difficult it may be for central and local authorities to agree to devolve authority to communities when valuable resources are involved. Conservation efforts in Suledo began in 1993, when the Arusha regional forest administration planned to gazette this large forest as a central government forest reserve, because of widespread logging leading to a high rate of deforestation. The establishment of a forest reserve would also have made grazing illegal, thereby threatening the livelihoods of local Maasai pastoralists. In 1995, after heavy lobbying by communities (assisted by an external CBFM expert) the government agreed to allow the villages to manage the forest by themselves. By 2007 Suledo was officially gazetted as a Village Land Forest Reserve (VLFR). Swedish assistance through the Land Management Programme (LAMP) was instrumental in achieving this result.
By winning the 2002 UNDP Equator Prize, Suledo is often cited as a successful example of PFM in Tanzania (Sjöholm & Luono 2002). Here, a group of ten villages have successfully managed to grow back a large forest of 167,400 ha. Through planned timber harvesting, the forest today represents a high potential annual revenue for the villagers owning it. The sale of charcoal from remnants of harvested timber is also expected to bring in considerable income to the villagers (Maluenda 2010).

Suledo is one of four CBFM areas where villagers have been promised that they will benefit from commercial timber harvesting and sale of charcoal from leftovers of harvested timber trees. According to Nelson & Blomley (2010), the potential annual revenue from timber in Suledo is USD 213,000, which translates into USD 23,700 for each village. Sjöholm and Luono (2002) calculate that the Suledo villages comprise a total population of 54,000 people, while Kistler (2009) estimates the population to be between 50,000 and 100,000. This means that the forest would represent a substantial contribution to livelihoods.

After years of successful conservation and management of the forest, it was agreed that selected harvesting could be carried out. During 2008 and 2009 preparations for harvesting were made, including identification of a pilot area, carrying out of an inventory, and marking of the trees to be harvested. All legal steps, such as revision of the management plan and its submission to the Forest and Beekeeping Division (FBD), preparation of model by-laws and their adoption at village level, authorisation to harvest from FBD of the Zonal Environmental Committee (the elected body formed to manage the forest on behalf of the ten villages), and obtaining a FBD hammer were completed. A tender and selection process was also carried out in 2009. A contract with the selected company was signed in December 2009, stipulating the agreed harvesting plan. The villagers are, however, not happy with the slow pace of harvesting. By the end of 2010 very little had been achieved, with the harvester raising a number of excuses. However, it seems the company has limited capital and the community is presently looking for ways to terminate the contract.
In addition to income from timber, the villagers were expected to receive about 30,000 USD from selling charcoal from the pilot harvest area. However, the FBD has decided that earnings from the sale of charcoal should just be shared between the central government and the District Council.

Disagreements in Suledo emerged already with the first plans to harvest the forest (Mellenthien 2005). The District administration, in particular, resisted the apportioning of roles and benefits between the communities and the district and national forest authorities. Major differences emerged between the District Commissioners’ Office, the District Council and the LAMP Support Office. Assisted by the LAMP project, the villagers by-passed the District Council and finalised ‘model’ by-laws with the Ministry in 2009 after more than two years of foot-dragging by different authorities (Havnevik 2007, Kistler 2009).

One factor that could further impede the willingness of the central state to devolve authority to the local level is the expected windfall from REDD+. A complementary Forest Investment Programme has increased the expected global funding, from which Tanzania will eventually be able to apply for funds. By the beginning of 2010 a total of 558 million USD had been pledged to the Forest Investment Programme by six donors.

Although the National Framework for REDD in Tanzania has noted the significance of PFM and how access to REDD funding may enhance the implementation of PFM projects, there is a difference between managing a forest only to maintain it as a standing ‘carbon forest’ and the more multi-purpose and flexible CBFM arrangements of allowing activities such as grazing and fuelwood collection. Allowing these uses is crucial in getting the villagers to support conservation. One aim of the National REDD Strategy is, however, to help people diversify into income generating activities, which do not include forest use (URT 2010). Hence, grazing and other local uses in REDD-managed forests will most likely not be allowed in forest management under REDD+.

The negative attitude of authorities and influential foresters to local use has already been indicated in the National Strategy for REDD+ (URT 2010) and in a study by the Tanzanian Forest Research Institute (TAFORI) on the impact of
grazing in the Suledo Forest (Isango, 2007). According to the REDD+ strategy, direct causes of uncontrolled deforestation and degradation in the forests include overgrazing, although the spectacular regrowth of the Suledo forest since the early 1990s illustrates how pastoralism, as practiced by the local Masaa, does not seem to threaten forest regeneration.

**Tree planting for carbon sequestration**

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, efforts were made to develop mechanisms that could mitigate global climate change. Several mechanisms and instruments were proposed, and one of the most favoured in the early 1990s was direct regulation and taxation. These proposals, however, were met with strong oppositions from those who believed that such a system would hurt the industries and who therefore pushed in favour for more market-based instruments (Spash 2009).

With deforestation accounting for about 20 % of global CO₂ emissions, afforestation and reforestation⁵ soon became popular measures to mitigate climate change. The idea was that by establishing new forests the trees would sequester CO₂ from the atmosphere, which in turn could be estimated and translated into carbon credits that could be traded on the market. Naturally, developing countries were soon targeted as the perfect places to develop such projects, due to high deforestation rates and cheap and available land.

The Kyoto Protocol from 1997 introduced three market-based mechanisms to encourage green investments and to help the countries in meeting their emission targets in a cost-effective way (UNFCCC 1998).

One of these mechanisms, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), was developed in an effort to ensure the participation of developing countries that are not committed by the first period of the Protocol. The CDM allows developed countries to implement energy- or forest projects in developing countries that

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⁵ Reforestation is the establishment of forest on land that had recent tree cover, whereas afforestation refers to land that has been without forest for a much longer time period. (Bolin et al. 2000)
mitigate CO$_2$ from the atmosphere, and that contribute to sustainable development in the project country. Thus, the CDM is seen as the optimal win-win solution, both stimulating sustainable development and reducing emissions.

As Tanzania is often seen by potential investors as having abundant cheap land, the country has become target for several green investments in recent years. However, with more than 40% of the country being under some form of environmental protection, the assumption may need to be altered due to this new rush for land. This commodification of natural resources, alongside other environmental conservation initiatives, has added to the already increasing demands for land in Tanzania and is risking future generation’s access to land and their possibilities of providing for themselves. An example from the investments of the Norwegian company Green Resources in the Southern Highlands may illustrate how this new climate mitigation mechanism is accelerating the process of land grabbing in Tanzania.

Green Resources is a company based on plantations, carbon offsetting, forest products and renewable energy with operations in Mozambique, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. The company started its operations in the mid-1990s, and has since grown into Africa’s leading forestation company. In total, it has more than 200,000 ha of land at hand in these countries available for planting, but also for conservation, making their projects eligible for both CDM projects as well as a future REDD+ projects (Green Resources 2009).

Situated in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania are three of their oldest and biggest plantations. Operations started in 1996/97 and in total the plantations cover an area of more than 100,000 ha, and the ambition all the way from start has been to develop forest plantations that could sequester carbon and generate credits. All three of the plantations have applied for CDM certification. Two of them, however, were not approved due to the establishment of forest before 2000, but these are now registered under the voluntary carbon standard (VCS) selling credits on the voluntary market. The third, where establishment of forest started in 2001, is pending approval by the UNFCCC, and the company expects to achieve full certification soon.
Still, using approved CDM methodology as a baseline for developing these projects, contributing to sustainable development is an important feature for these projects. Each country decides the key criteria for what is considered sustainable development under the CDM, and Tanzania has amongst others identified poverty alleviation by generating additional employment as one of them (for more criterias see URT 2007a and URT 2007b). The company has also decided to adhere to other standards such as the ones from the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA).

In total, land has been allocated from six different villages, two villages for each plantation. The villages have unfortunately not had much to say in this process, as most of the land was negotiated before the Village Land Act from 1999, which means that at the time the government and not the village council managed the land. This has led to some of the villages losing more than 33 % of their land, which is the limit for how much a village can give away according to the Village Land Act (URT 1999). For example one of the villages, Uchindile, that has lost almost 60 % of its land to Green Resources is already using 20% leaving them with 20 % for future needs (Refseth 2010).

The company has received titles for the land for 99 years, which are renewable, and therefore basically means that the land is lost for all foreseeable future. When a private investor seeks to acquire village land, that the land is converted into general land, which is managed by the government. This means that when the period for the titles are out the land is returned to the government and not to the village (Wily 2003). In return the villages receive employment, development of infrastructure and support to community projects. In addition, Green Resources has promised 10 % of the total revenue from selling carbon credits to the villages.

Nevertheless, recent and earlier reports have shown that the benefits from Green Resources projects to the local communities have not been fulfilled as promised and that employment standards are low (e.g. Karumbidza & Menne 2011, Point Carbon & Perspectives 2008, Refseth 2010, Stave 2000). Few workers are for
instance employed full-time. At the same time, most workers are paid below the Tanzanian minimum wage⁶, and their work clothes are not sufficient and not compensated for. The only roads that have been constructed are roads in the plantation itself, which are not directly benefiting the villages. Despite promises of access to safe water, no efforts to supply water to the villages have been made. Lastly, support to community projects have been slow and are barley existing.

When it comes to the revenues from the sale of carbon credits, it was only in 2011 that four of the villages received their first share (Guardian reporter 2011). However, it is unknown how the money will be divided between the villages, and whether they will be received in cash or in the form of community support. Either way, the money cannot make up the loss of land and the possible income this could have generated.

The lack of progress in meeting sustainable development goals for these villages is not the only concern regarding these projects. In addition to the loss of land rights and access to land and natural resources it may also have consequences for local and global food supply. UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, has recognised this and has published a set of minimum principles and measures to address human right’s challenges in large-scale land acquisitions and leases in developing countries (De Schutter 2009). However, in a recent Op-Ed, De Schutter also stresses that for addressing this new rush for land in the developing countries it is not enough to provide ‘policymakers with a check list of how to destroy global peasantry responsibly’ (De Schutter 2011). The investments really have to benefit the poor in the South rather than just transferring resources to the North.

**Marine Conservation**

Tanzania has a coastline of over 800 km with many islands (including Zanzibar (Unguja), Pemba, Mafia and numerous smaller ones) with biologically diverse marine and coastal resources that provide the livelihood basis for the incomes of fishers and their dependents in coastal villages and towns. Small-scale fisheries

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⁶ They are paid 2500 tzs per day, whilst the minimum wage for this type of work is 3000 tzs per day.
also provide important protein-rich food to coastal populations, and account for 95% of the fish catches. Industrial fisheries and offshore fishing fleets principally focus on export markets and luxury food items. Coastal tourist facilities are occupying increasingly extensive stretches of the most attractive shorelines.

The Tanzanian coastal environment is characterised by a wide range of biotopes (coral reefs, mangrove forests, estuaries, seagrasses, sandy-muddy flats, intertidal rocky shores, cliffs, beaches, etc.) that contain important natural resources and also provide habitats supporting the highest marine biodiversity in eastern Africa.

Initial proposals for marine conservation areas were proposed by Carlton Ray (1968), which was followed by the passing of the Fisheries Act of 1970 by the Tanzanian Parliament, and with the promulgation of seven small marine reserves near Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mafia. However, the regulations and the enactment of these reserves were not actually translated into practice for more than 25 years, ostensibly due to lack of funds and qualified personnel. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, community leaders in Mafia Island complained vociferously of destructive fishing practices (through the use of dynamite explosives) perpetrated by outsiders from urban centres, and this catalysed governmental agencies, donors and conservationists to respond.

In 1988 the Institute of Marine Sciences of the University of Dar es Salaam initiated studies in Mafia Island supported by Frontier-Tanzania (Horrill & Ngoile, 1989), and participatory approaches were employed. In 1991 a workshop was held for various interested actors in Dar es Salaam that mapped out ideas for the establishment of a steering committee who could advise the Government about the formation of a marine park (Mayers et al., 1992). In 1993, a draft General Management Plan was formulated. The "Marine Parks and Reserves Act" was passed in November 1994 and the Park was gazetted in April 1995. In 1994 the Fisheries Division received funding from Norad, and WWF simultaneously showed a keen interest in playing a role as technical adviser towards the establishment and implementation of Mafia Island Marine Park.
(MIMP) off the coast of Tanzania (Andrews, 1998; Walley, 2004). Amendments were published in the Marine Parks and Reserves (Declaration) Regulations of 1999 and subsequently the Tanzanian Parliament passed the Fisheries Act of 2003, which is now in effect.

The Minister of Natural Resources and Tourism appointed a Board of Trustees and they approved the implementation of the General Management Plan for the development of MIMP (Francis et al., 2002). The overall goal of MIMP was defined as ensuring that "The ecological and economic sustainability of Tanzania's coastal and marine ecosystems is improved and maintained", and the two objectives were "To assist the management of the Mafia Island Marine Park so that the ecosystem processes and biodiversity are maintained for the benefit of the people of Tanzania, and particularly the Mafia Island community" and "To facilitate the development of economic activities to reduce pressures on the Park ecosystems, while ensuring all natural resources within the Park are used sustainably". In spite of the participatory intentions stated in the formation of MIMP, and the popularity of the initial successes in collaborating with local communities in order to halt the destructive and unpopular practice of dynamite-fishing perpetrated mainly by outsiders from urban centres, the long-term emphasis of MIMP is clearly on conservation of biodiversity and promotion of new economic activities.

Mafia Island Marine Park covers an area of 822 square kilometres, and it is the biggest marine park in the Indian Ocean. The park encompasses 10 villages and is inhabited by approximately 15,000 to 18,000 residents of whom 45-65 % rely heavily on marine resources for their livelihoods (Bryceson et al., 2006). There are "core zones" of coral reefs, mangroves and coastal forests where fisherfolk and inhabitants are not allowed to access resources at all, despite these areas being the richest traditional fishing grounds, whilst tourists, hotel businesses and researchers are allowed to visit, dive, snorkel and conduct research there. Secondly, there are "specified use zones" in which fishers are only allowed to use certain types of fishing gear (hand-lines and basket traps) and fishing by non-residents is prohibited. Thirdly, the remaining areas are referred to as "general-use zone" in which net fishing is allowed, but mesh-sizes are more restricted
than in general coastal waters (Francis et al., 2002). The fisheries regulations regarding allowable mesh-sizes and types of nets within and outside the Park have been changed several times in the last years, and hundreds of nets have been confiscated.

Despite claims about the participatory process towards the formulation of the General Management Plan, and the phrases about community-based conservation, the Plan was published in English language and was not translated into Kiswahili for seven years.

Statements about community-based conservation and co-management did have some meaning in the consultative period prior to the formation of MIMP, and in the initial period of collaboration with villagers to combat dynamite fishing, but in subsequent years have become mainly rhetorical. The MIMP administration became larger and larger, wherein internal administration, contact with national authorities and emphasis on patrolling and reinforcement of a "policing" role have become more prominent. Some villages are branded as being uncooperative or troublesome, and the MIMP leadership has not visited these places for several years: this is an attestation to a partial failure of their proclaimed co-management.

Some Mafia residents gain markets to sell products to the hotels, and to MIMP staff, others actually gain opportunities for employment, and some provide guest-house facilities for visiting researchers, but the better-paid jobs in the marine park administration and the tourism hotels are mainly awarded to people from outside Mafia or to foreigners. A problem with the intervention of the park is that the benefits mainly accrue to the State, to foreign-owned tourism enterprises, and to visiting foreign tourists, whilst local communities witness some gains but they have lost access to former traditionally governed and utilised natural resources (including most productive coral reefs, mangrove forests and the best beaches), without gaining commensurate economic compensation for losses in fishing rights and land rights or being allowed, for example, to make some income by taking visitors snorkelling. Many fisherfolk
and villagers from within the park express disappointment and scepticism about the practice of conservation for these reasons.

On Chole Island and in the small town of Utende within MIMP, some tourist hotels are expanding their land claims and thus preventing access by local residents to prime beaches, national archaeological ruins, market sites, and freshwater access points. The MIMP and District authorities have been contacted, but they have not supported the claims of villagers who then have to seek legal aid from land rights lawyers based in Dar es Salaam.

Supported by WWF’s East African Marine Ecoregion programme, MIMP embarked upon a pilot programme for exchanging fishing gears. According to Ngusaru (2003) "This was envisaged as part of a wider strategy to promote alternatives to fishing gears such as seine nets, which are considered by MIMP and WWF to be destructive and to lead to overfishing, although there are no substantial fisheries data to support these claims". The programme provided gillnets and collapsible fishing traps to fishers at Juani and Chole villages inside the marine park. Some local fishers initially responded to this opportunity, but many have become increasingly sceptical due to the low catches and long periods that they have to spend travelling to more distant fishing grounds. WWF claimed that fisherfolk were seeing land-based agriculture as the new "Big Idea", and suggested bee-keeping on the small island of Juani within MIMP as being a significant success story (Ngusaru, 2003), whereas the production of honey is tiny and the income is of low significance to the small community of Juani island.

During 2000-2004, WWF and MIMP launched an Environmental Education Strategy and Action Plan in order "to educate and train people to deal with major environmental problems such as degradation of ecosystems, depletion of natural resources, loss of biodiversity, soil, water and air pollution and haphazard urbanization and industrialization" (Ngusaru, 2003). Again, many villagers viewed this as reinforcing restrictions on their daily livelihood activities and presenting few avenues for economically viable alternatives.

In 2006 a "Fisheries Study in Tanzanian Coastal Waters: the effects of trial export of finfish from Mafia Island on ecological-social resilience and vulnerability"
(Bryceson et al., 2006; Mwaipopo, 2008) was initiated between the University of Dar es Salaam and the Norwegian University of Life Sciences. The study is still underway and will be completed in December 2011, but research findings preliminarily do not show signs of over-fishing and little destruction of habitats, a high dependence of people’s livelihoods on fish resources, and serious problems of governance based upon increasing lack of communication and trust between MIMP and many villagers, including the democratically elected leadership of several villages. Two Tanzanian PhD students, Victoria Moshy and Lydia Gaspare, shall complete their theses within 2011, and they are in the process of investigating and analysing these issues in greater depth.

Highly unfortunate incidents occurred in Mafia during December 2008 and February 2010, whereby MIMP patrol boats transported Army soldiers to some villages to physically beat the leaders and to confiscate all their fishing nets (both legal nets and ones newly defined as illegal). The latter incident led to considerable fear, food insecurity and impoverishment of the whole village community on the island of Jibondo, and caused much concern in other villages. This has led to increasing disenchantment with MIMP and the compliant District authorities, and to a serious loss in people’s respect for the legitimacy of the role of the State in relation to marine conservation. Similar incidents have occurred in other villages in Mafia and other parts of the Tanzanian coastline, and in August 2010, while trying to confiscate villagers’ nets in the dark, Army soldiers shot two fishers, killing one, before dawn in northern Tanzanian coastal village of Tongoni (George, 2010).

In relation to marine and coastal conservation, it appears that the proclaimed approaches of people’s participation and community-based conservation that were highlighted during the 1990’s have been replaced by a more authoritarian and violently repressive practice of conservation in more recent years. Some villagers feel that they are losing key land rights to rich tourism enterprises and rights of access to vast areas of the most productive marine resources sites, which they consider themselves to have traditionally governed and utilised sustainably in the past. WWF has plans through its partnership with the
Tanzanian Government and the East African Marine Ecoregion programme to advocate ever-larger areas of the coastline for conservation (Wells et al., 2007).

Conclusions

Debates about global ‘land grabbing’ have mainly focused on large-scale land deals and direct foreign investments in food and biofuel production in developing countries. The land grabbing effect of conservation projects is, however, rarely heeded. In Tanzania, conservation areas have steadily increased since colonial times leading to loss of land and resource access for small-scale farmers, pastoralists and fisherfolk. Today, around 40% of the land area of the country is under some form of environmental protection. This includes more recently conserved areas under so-called ‘community-based conservation’, which in practice proves to be business-as-usual in terms of conservation taking priority over local people’s rights and livelihoods.

In this paper, we have shown how community-based conservation, especially related to wildlife and coastal areas, steadily leads to local people’s loss of access to land and natural resources. In both wildlife and marine conservation, we see parallel trends of recentralization of control over resources combined with disempowerment of local communities. This happens despite the proclaimed win-win discourse that dominates international as well as Tanzanian conservation planning and self-presentation as being community-based and mutually beneficial. The increased commodification of biodiversity and natural resources by the boom in safari tourism is accelerating this process. The main actors behind this development are big international conservation groups, foreign donor organizations, and state agencies focused on recapturing control over valuable resources in order to capitalize on the increasing land rent.

On the other hand, participatory management in the forestry sector is often seen as a more successful example of community-based conservation. Tanzania is considered by many to be a leader in Africa in the implementation of Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) and Tanzanian CBFM is seen as a model for the implementation of REDD. An investigation of one of the most
celebrated CBFM cases in Tanzania demonstrates, however, that there exist some challenges also in this sector, the most serious of which are undue delays in implementation, which may be interpreted as passive resistance from central authorities and more active resistance from local government. One factor that could further impede the willingness of these actors to devolve authority to the local level is the expected financial windfall from REDD.

Finally, a case study of carbon forestry (large-scale tree plantations for carbon sequestration) gives another illustration of how on-going conservation efforts, which are intended to mitigate global climate change, may actually produce some distinct winners and losers. The main winner in this case is the industrial tree planting company that has been able to appropriate large areas of village land at a cheap price in order to sell carbon credits to polluting industry in the North. The losers are small-scale farmers who lose control over their land and do not receive the compensation they were promised.

The general pattern in all these cases is a new form of primitive accumulation created by global actors with certain interests (biodiversity conservation, safari tourism, climate change mitigation) obtaining cheaply acquired land through capital investments at the expense of the rural peasantry.
References


