



BMZ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development

Promoting Participatory and Evidence-Based Agricultural Policy Processes in Africa (PEBAP)

Collaborative research project

Ghana – Uganda - Senegal



Project partners



- International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
 - Michael Johnson, Ousmane Badiane, Sam Benin, Sunday Odjo
- Germany
 - University of Kiel: Christian Henning, Eva Krampe, Laura Seide
 - University of Hohenheim: Regina Birner, Jonathan Mockshell
- Ghana
 - Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER), University of Ghana, Legon: *Felix Asante*
- Uganda
 - African Institute for Strategic Resource Services and Development (AFRISA), Makerere University: *Patience Rwamigisa, David Kabasa*
- Senegal
 - Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles (ISRA), Senegal: Cheickh Sadibou Fall

Background




- Increased interest in the agricultural sector since the 2000s
 - by African governments as well as donor agencies
 - Food Price Crisis of 2008 as a major driving force
 - Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP); Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
- Agreement
 - Need to promote agricultural development in Africa
- Disagreement
 - What does it take to achieve this goal?
 - Which policy instruments are appropriate?
 - Examples: Input subsidies; import taxes; role of private sector
- Promoting evidence-based and participatory policy processes as a way to find solutions on contested issues

Contested agricultural policy issues



- Interpretation of the impact of Structural Adjustment
 - SAP failure story (implies that agricultural policy was successful prior to SAP – not supported by evidence)
 - "False promise versus false premise" (Jayne et al., 2002)
 - Effect of macro-economic policy changes often neglected in the debate
- Post-Structural Adjustment Policy Debate
 - Recognition that government support and institution-building matter for smallholders, but policy instruments remain debated
 - Example: Input subsidies
 - World Bank: Need for "market-smart subsidies"
 - Malawi: "Ending Famine, Simply by Ignoring the Experts" (Headline in the New York Times, 02/12/2007)
 - Banful (2011): "Old Problems in the New Solutions"?
- **Other examples**: Extension reform; trade policies, etc.


Major changes in agricultural policy during the past decades



Kym Anderson (2008, Slide 63)

Example - Uganda







Suboptimal policies exist both due to

1. Political incentives gaps

 Political institutions do not provide sufficient incentives or even create disincentives to select first-best policy options and to implement them effectively.

2. Knowledge gaps

- Policy instruments are difficult to assess if governance challenges of implementation are considered.
- Policy-makers, including donors, may not be fully aware of the impact that different agricultural policy instruments have.

Objectives of the project




- Combining qualitative and quantitative research methods to contribute to
 - address knowledge gaps
 - better understanding of the impact of policy instruments taking governance challenges into account
 - better understanding of policy beliefs (perceptions that actors have regarding the relevance and impact of a certain policy instrument

address political incentive gaps

- better understand the political incentives that formal and informal rules create within the respective political system
 - Influence of electoral competition, social/political networks, lobbying groups, informal rules (e.g., authority of the president)

Research Methods applied in Ghana, Uganda and Senegal





Overview of the session



- Qualitative research
 - Donors and domestic policy makers: Two worlds in agricultural policy-making? Jonathan Mockshell and Regina Birner
 - The Role of Policy Beliefs and Discourses in Policy Reform Processes: A Case Study of NAADS in Uganda Patience Rwamigisa
- Quantitative Research
 - Combining Political and Economic Models: An Evolutionary Computable General Political Economy Equilibrium Model (CGPE) Christian Henning and Eva Krampe (includes information on voter and stakeholder surveys)



Thank you!

References



- Anderson, K. (2008). Fifty Years of Distortions in World Food Markets. Presentation at an IFPRI Seminar, Washington DC, 14 October 2008.
- Banful, A. B. (2011). Old Problems in the New Solutions? Politically Motivated Allocation of Program Benefits and the "New" Fertilizer Subsidies. *World Development*, 39 (7), 1166– 1176.
- Jayne, T. S., Govereh, J., Mwanaumo, A., Nyoro, J. & Chapoto, A. (2002). False Promise or False Premise? The Experience of Food and Input Market Reform in Eastern and Southern Africa. *World Development*, *30* (11), 1967–1985.
- Matthews, A., Claquin, P., & Opolot, J. (2007). Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Uganda. Agricultural Distortions Working Paper, 51, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Annex: What is the Nominal Rate of Assistance?

RIBERT

- The percentage by which government policies
 - have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the government's intervention
 - or lowered them, if the NRA is negative.
- Similar to the OECD producer support estimates (PSE), but an NRA is expressed as a percentage of the undistorted (e.g., border) rather than the distorted price.

• See www.worldbank.org/agdistortions