The unintended consequences of COVID-19 lockdowns in Nigeria (2)


Written by Adebayo B Aromolaran

This blog presents a snapshot of the efforts of Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) to help stakeholders to track the initial impacts of the COVID 19 pandemic on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, labour and employment, and poverty and well-being in rural Nigeria.

This follows on from a blog posted in September, 2020 on the same subject.

Read more on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Nigeria in the Round One and Round Two APRA country reports.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Introduction

Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in Africa, there have been serious concerns about the impact of the pandemic on agri-food systems – given that most of the population depends directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods. These concerns are compounded by the fragile state of the continent’s health and food systems.

The first case of COVID-19 in Nigeria was reported on February 27, 2020. In order to mitigate an impending health crisis, the Nigerian government commenced a series of COVID-19 lockdowns across states in Nigeria on 30 March, 2020. These lockdowns lasted for 3 months before a gradual relaxation began on 1 July, 2020. By the end of June, 25,694 infections and 590 deaths related to COVID-19 had been recorded, rising to 58,848 infections and 1,112 deaths by the end of September 2020.

By late November 2020, the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) was reporting a cumulative total of 67,412 cases, 1,173 deaths, and 3,184 active cases.  Currently, a more serious second wave seems to have emerged with 127,024 confirmed cases and 1,547 deaths recorded by the end of January 2021. This interprets to a respective 89% and 32% increase in confirmed infection and death cases in the 2 months between the start of December 2020 and end of January 2021. 

Data

The study involves three rounds of data collection and analysis from a random sample of 109 rural farming households drawn from five Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Ogun (Ijebu East, Obafemi Owode, and Imeko Afon) and Kaduna (Chikun and Soba) States. At the time of the start of the first-round survey, these LGAs had reported a small number of COVID-19 cases. The survey data was complemented by insights from seven in-depth key informant interviews conducted in the LGAs. This blog presents some insights obtained from the first and second round surveys implemented in July and October 2020. The third wave data collection is planned for mid-February 2021.

Highlights of findings

Our findings from the first two rounds of survey show that, compared with pre-COVID 19 period, most rural farm households in Nigeria experienced the following during the COVID 19 period:

  • Increase in cost of purchased farm inputs, tillage services, land rentals and casual labour;
  • Increase in prices of food items;
  • Decreased access to farm inputs and agro-services;
  • Decline in accessibility to agricultural markets;
  • Decline in land area under cultivation; and a decline in household food consumption and dietary diversity.

In addition, the negative effect of the lockdown on children’s education was severe, in that the majority of households reported that boys and girls spent a substantial amount of the lockdown time in non-school related work and leisure activities.

The study also observed the softening of some negative impacts of COVID 19 lockdown on livelihood in Round 2 relative to Round 1 of the study.  Some of the observed areas of improvement in between R1 and R2 data collection were:

  • Increased availability of purchased farm inputs;
  • Better access to farm-gate markets, increase in food availability;
  • Improvements in food consumption and dietary diversity.

Even though, our study locations, Kaduna and Ogun states, are currently among the first 7 states in rank on the NCDC list of confirmed COVID 19 cases; less than 5% of sampled households have seen someone with COVID 19 in their community. Consequently, it can be said that the negative effects of COVID 19 pandemic on livelihood recorded in this study is largely due to government lockdowns and restrictions in movement rather than direct COVID 19 infection.

Case study: a poultry farmer

An interview with a prominent member of the Poultry Farmers Association of Nigeria demonstrates how the sub-sector was badly hit in the first two months of interstate border closures between April and May 2020. This poultry farmer had to starve the stock of layer birds of feed to bring down egg production from 90% to zero per cent in order to cope with the egg glut after about 2 weeks of inter-state lockdown. This was caused as most of the egg buyers were from outside of Ekiti State and could not easily cross state borders reach the farm in Ekiti. 

To compound the problem, egg sales declined because of shrinking incomes of consumers resulting from low reduced level of economic activity due to the lockdowns. This was in addition to very high transportation costs that carriers of agricultural produce experienced during the lockdown. This high cost was partly driven by extortions from law enforcement officers in multiple check points on most Nigerian roads.

All of these factors put together nearly crippled investments of this poultry farmer in the first 3 months of lockdowns in Nigeria.  The situation adversely affected the health of this farm household as the household head and the spouse needed sleeping pills to get some sleep at night.

This demonstrates how poorly managed the lockdown was by agencies of government, leading the unintended consequences, caused partly by inter-border closures and bribery by law enforcement agencies, arguably being more of a health risk to families than COVID-19.

Looking ahead

Finally, the APRA study observed a significant decline in compliance to government COVID 19 safety regulations between the first and second 4-month periods of COVID 19 pandemic in Nigeria. The Government may therefore need to find more effective ways of enforcing compliance if a severely impactful second wave is to be averted. To do this, the Government could identify and financially support influential local/community organisations to advocate for increased compliance to COVID 19 safety regulations at the grassroots level.


Feature photo: The Dopemu bus stop is seen amid the COVID-19 Pandemic in Nigeria. Credit: © IMF Photo/Ebun Akinbo


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

The rich people’s virus? Latest reflections from Zimbabwe


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

A few weeks back Oxfam released a major report, ‘The Inequality Virus’, documenting the way COVID-19 has affected different populations and parts of the world. The now well-established impacts on the already-marginalised are presented, alongside how the rich have benefited. But the debate in Zimbabwe is currently rather different – people are wondering why the virus is hitting the urban rich and well-connected the most.

The last weeks have seen a massive spike in reported cases and deaths in Zimbabwe. The deaths of senior politicians, party officials and business people have been widely reported. It has provoked a level of concern, even panic, across the country, especially given the parlous state of the health care system.

Last weekend I caught up with the team who is monitoring the situation across our rural study sites – in Mvurwi, Gutu, Masvingo, Matobo, Chiredzi and Mwenezi areas. This is the tenth blog in a series (see herehere and here for updates since last March)

A disease of the urban rich and powerful?

In our rural study sites the experience of COVID-19 as a disease remains limited. Team members were able to report a few cases from each of the sites, with some deaths usually among older business people, but many of the funerals were of those coming back from towns or from South Africa. COVID-19 is still, it seems, not a rural disease – although of course, given the complete absence of testing in these areas, we cannot know for sure.

Over the past week or so, team members have been discussing why COVID-19 seems to be concentrated among the urban rich and powerful with locals in the rural areas where they live. Many explanations were offered. The rich move around more, they fly in planes, drive in cars; we barely move, especially with lockdown. The rich don’t do physical exercise, they move in cars; we walk everywhere – we have to, and do manual work. The rich work in offices and enclosed spaces; we are outside, in the clean air. The rich eat junk food, and have conditions like BP, diabetes and so on; we have fewer chronic conditions and get good food from our own local vegetables, which give immunity.

All this makes sense epidemiologically, but what was central to local narratives across sites was that local responses were not just passive – the consequences of being poor – but due to active choices about prevention and treatment. Unlike a few months ago, there is a tangible fear of the virus now. The news reports of the rich and influential dying despite their privilege, mean that people have to act to protect themselves.

Local remedies and vaccine anxieties

There is today a booming market in local vegetables (such as Rudhe/Ulude and Mutsine/Umhlavangubo (Shona/Ndebele)– ‘weeds’ from fields mostly), as well as local medicines. Hot teas of many sorts – lemon and ginger, guava and eucalyptus, soaked onion – are combined with steaming using a variety of herbs. Herbs, roots and tree products such as Ndorani/IntolwaniRufauchimuka/UmafavukeZumbani/Umsuzwane and Chifumura are hot commodities, and lemons are reportedly selling for 20 bond notes a piece.

As people explained, they cannot get to town for conventional medicines, and in any case they have no money, so local approaches are better. They point to cases where people have recovered using such medicines. WhatsApp group messages are full of advice on local herbal medicines, and offers of their sale.

What then of the prospects of a vaccine? Here there is a raging debate across our sites. When asked, most people seemed highly sceptical. The Chinese have offered vaccines to the country (to be available free, despite early confusion), and this has been widely trailed in the press, as part of China’s effective vaccine diplomacy. While in time there will hopefully be allocations from COVAX, the central global facility too, it’s the Chinese vaccine offer that seems to be generating the most debate.

Where does the scepticism come from? In part it emerges from (usually unfair and often racist) attitudes towards Chinese interventions in Zimbabwe and the quality of Chinese products, disparagingly referred to as ‘Zhing-Zhong’ – cheap, low quality products likely to break or be useless. People also worry that the state will force people to have the vaccine.

There are also rumours that vaccines cause infertility, make women grow beards and have other severe side-effects, potentially resulting in death. It is difficult to know where such rumours come from, but they are very real. I was sent a whole string of videos (mostly coming from anti-vaxxers and others in the US) by a friend who had received them from a church-based WhatsApp group. There are likely many similar ones circulating.

Amongst our informants across the study sites, there was a general unease about the rapidity of the vaccines’ development – pointing out of course that there is still no vaccine for HIV/AIDS after many years. There was also a sense that, among poor rural people, they have not been affected so far, and that the local medicines and remedies being used seem to be working so far.

As across the world, vaccine anxiety mixed with vaccine nationalism will be a big issue for Zimbabwe when vaccines finally come to the country.

Farmers’ lockdown struggles

Combined with the flood of migrants from South Africa coming back over the festive period, there were many press reports of the elite partying unprotected and churches gathering in large numbers. The consequences are now being felt with the current surge. For good reason, the government has clamped down on the strong advice of the medical professionals. Since Jan 2nd there has been a strict ‘Tier 4’ lockdown across the country, recently extended for two weeks until the middle of February.

People report that this is the strictest lockdown yet, with severe movement restrictions, a curfew and business hours restricted from 8am to 3pm. Many arrests have been reported and once again there are accusations that the lockdown is being used to suppress political dissent. In the past, people could flout the rules or get round them – especially if you could bribe the police or were well-connected. Some are still able to get round the lockdown restrictions, but many fewer this time. There are shebeens (drinking places) that operate after dark, some transport operators that dodge the police road-blocks and a few churches still flout the rules, but for most the elaborate process of getting exemption letters is a daily struggle. One of our colleagues explained how he had to get an exemption letter locally in the township in Masvingo to get another exemption letter in town to travel to Chiredzi so he could look after his sugar farm. It’s not easy being a farmer at the moment.

The informal markets and many shops remain shut. Getting farm inputs is nearly impossible as movement restrictions and curfews mean many businesses have closed. Farmers cannot move their produce, and horticultural produce is rotting in the fields. Those who used to rely on vending of agricultural products at fixed locations have to move around or sell from home, with far reduced returns. Input supplies for farming have dried up – with fertiliser being absurdly expensive (up to US$40 per bag) and much in demand because of the heavy rains this year. The rains have resulted in livestock disease outbreaks, notably blackleg, but getting access to medicines is difficult because of movement restrictions, and cattle are dying in numbers. Despite it being a good season overall, especially on heavier soils, gaining the advantage of this is proving tough, both in terms of production and marketing.  

With the good season, there are at least some early crops. Cucumbers, pumpkins, sweet reeds and early maize are already being consumed, along with the proliferation of local vegetables and wild fruits that have grown this year. This is a major help to many. Those who planted early look like they will get a decent crop in most of our sites, including those that are traditional ‘drought prone’. But late planted maize is currently looking weak and, with the lack of fertiliser and incessant rain, much of it is yellowing.

The COVID barter economy

Even the COVID economy discussed in previous blogs is highly constrained at the moment. There is very little money circulating and people must get along with their own production and barter exchange. The growth of farming in town is dramatic – the outskirts of Masvingo are reported to be ‘one big farm’! Sugar beans or sweet potatoes with maize seem to be the favoured crops, and these will be keeping many people fed in the coming months.

Those who have some crops can exchange for other goods in their neighbourhoods. Barter is the basis for exchange without cash, and word is put out on the street or via the WhatsApp groups if things are available or needed. Goods are moved around the townships by a proliferation of push-carts, operated by many who have lost their jobs. And with the informal markets closed, selling has moved to people’s homes or mobile shops – in carts, wheelbarrows or cars – linking informal township-based wholesalers (who source for other towns or abroad) and a network of small-scale retailers and vendors.

As we have discussed before, there has been a massive growth of small-scale mining across our sites. In the last few weeks, two new areas have opened up near Masvingo and adjacent to our study sites, with now thousands of miners arriving in a new gold rush. Many underground mines have been flooded with the heavy rains, and some are now dangerous, but mining continues in others, often with serious attendant dangers – not only of mine collapse, but also of COVID-19 infection.

An unequal disease

COVID-19 is certainly an unequal disease, but in unpredictable ways. In Zimbabwe, it affects the rich and powerful disproportionately through illness and death and the poor through livelihood struggles during lockdown. How will the inequality virus’ evolution pan out over the coming months? Check out the blog for further updates.   


Thanks to the team in Mvurwi, Gutu, Wondedzo, Masvingo, Matobo and Chikombedzi.


Picture credits: Felix Murimbarimba (Mrs Florence Magura and her daughter selling sugar bean seed to farmers from her place of residence as the kutrain market is closed due to lockdown; Road-side vendors, Mucheke; Loice Dzoro’s maize and sweet potato crop in Victoria ranch suburb, Masvingo).

Can relaxed COVID-19 restrictions ease food insecurity among the rural population in Kenya?


Written by John Olwande and Miltone Ayieko

In our latest blog, John Olwande and Miltone Ayieko of the Tegemeo Institute examine the results of recent APRA studies and assess the impact of an easing of COVID-19 lockdown restrictions in Kenya on the livelihoods of small-scale farming households.

This blog is linked to APRA Round One and Round Two country reports on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Kenya.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Kenya confirmed its first case of COVID-19 on March 12, 2020. Since then, the Ministry of Health has confirmed a cumulative total of 98,432 cases of new infections, 81,255 recoveries and 1,716 deaths as of January 12, 2021. The initial response by the Kenya government was to implement a range of policy measures in efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus. These included:

  • Restricted movement of people;
  • Countrywide dusk to dawn curfew;
  • Ban on dense crowds of more than 100 persons;
  • Closure of universities and schools, restaurants and other entertainment spaces, and some open-air markets, which are managed by county governments and hence the discretionary to close only some of them;
  • Ban on all inbound and outbound international flights restricted cross-border movement of people and;
  • Mandatory testing of drivers of vehicles transporting cargo over long distance.

Consequences of restrictions

Some of these measures helped to restrict the local spread of virus, but with negative consequences to the country’s food system, such as limiting supply of food, particularly perishables, to the local markets.

For example, a discussion we had with an agricultural officer from Kwale County in June 2020 revealed that the restricted cross-border movement of food and people from and into Kenya and Tanzania at Kinango border point resulted in reduced supply of food in local markets and increased prices. Prices for food items such as beans, cowpeas, green grams, rice, and onions went up, with the price of 1 kg of onions, which is mostly imported from Tanzania, doubling from KES 90 ($0.82) to KES 180 ($1.64). The quality of produce in local markets also deteriorated due to the prolonged transit, caused mainly by police roadblocks set up to enforce COVID-19 protocols.

In a survey that we conducted in June 2020 on rural households in five counties in proximity to Nairobi, Mombasa and Kilifi towns (the five initial hotspots for COVID-19 infections in Kenya), over 40 per cent of the households experienced reduced availability of fruits and vegetables, pulses, nuts and seeds, and white roots and tubers in local markets, while about one-third observed a decrease in the supply of grains, processed foods and fish and seafood.

The reduced supply of food and higher prices not only reduced food access by rural populations, but employment, and therefore income to meet their food and other needs, was also negatively affected.

As an agricultural officer in Nakuru County said, “When COVID-19 struck, many large farms especially in the flower industry lost contracts and laid off labourers”. This observation was also made by an agricultural officer in Kilifi County:  “Finding casual work for small-scale farmers was a challenge as demand for off-farm labour decreased drastically”. About 58 per cent of the households in the rural survey in June 2020 also reported that they were unable to hire labour for their farm and off-farm enterprises”.

Household needs not met

Approximately 89 per cent of the households in the June 2020 survey reported that they did not have adequate food for their needs. Additionally, 97 per cent of the households reported that the cost of living generally increased since restrictions, outlining the struggle faced by rural households.

In the third quarter of 2020, the national and county governments relaxed some of the restrictions that were previously in place. According to a follow-up survey on the same households and key informant interviews with government officers in early October 2020, the removal or relaxation of the restrictions appears to have resulted in stabilised food supply in local markets and subsequently moderated food prices. In Nakuru, for example, food supply in the markets generally stabilised compared to June 2020. In Kiambu, some marketplaces had been closed, which led to many traders using their own cars as mobile roadside stores. However, there have been significantly less cars since the markets opened. In Kilifi County, food supply in local markets has changed a little since July 2020. Since transport services have normalised, food traders are able to access the Mombasa market, and food prices have decreased slightly.

Rural labour demand

Employment of rural labour has increased since restrictions were eased in July 2020. People are less cautious about COVID-19 and farms are more accommodating to labourers. The October 2020 survey indicates that 46 per cent of the farming households could not hire labour, down from 58 per cent in June 2020. But demand for labour is low because many farms and businesses have not fully resumed normal operations, while the poor economic situation has lowered farmers’ purchasing power to hire labour. For example, in Muranga County, many export-orientated horticultural farms have not resumed full operations, while in Kilifi County, low demand for labour in the non-farm businesses in nearby towns has continued to affect many small-scale farmers who depend on casual work to supplement their income.

Conclusion

Results from the October 2020 survey show that approximately 77 per cent of the households reported that they did not have adequate food for their needs, which is lower than the June 2020 survey (89 per cent), and a noticeable improvement between July and October 2020.

This implies that a significant improvement in food security among the rural population can be realised if policy responses to curtail the spread of COVID-19 do not restrict food supply in local markets, which would raise food prices, and stymie rural employment, leading to reduced income earnings of rural people. With many COVID-19 restrictions removed or relaxed,  the food security situation in the country’s rural areas will likely continue to improve. This will be clear when the third round of the survey is finalised in the first quarter of 2021.


Cover photo: Nakuru, Kenya. ©The Sanitation and Hygiene Fund on Flickr.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Rural gender inequalities (2): feminisation of agriculture and COVID-19


Written by Libor Stloukal and Susan Kaaria, Inclusive Rural Transformation and Gender Equity Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), Rome, Italy

In the previous blog, demographic factors that leave rural women more susceptible to socio-economic marginalisation were highlighted. In this blog, we focus on the socio-economic participation of rural women, including the “feminisation of agriculture” phenomenon and the impact of crises such as COVID19.


Feminisation of agriculture

Evidence for many developing countries indicates that women’s involvement in agriculture is increasing over time, whether as independent producers, as unremunerated family workers, or as agricultural wage workers. This shift is often referred to as the feminisation of agriculture, and sometimes it is (incorrectly) portrayed as a global trend.

In reality, national-level data sources are seriously deficient with regard to women as independent producers. In many countries, much of women’s work in rural areas is informal or unpaid, and therefore goes unrecorded. From the patchy evidence available, it can be estimated that women comprise over 37 percent of the world’s rural agricultural employment, a figure which rises to 48 percent for low-income countries (estimates based on ILO, 2020). In Sub-Saharan Africa, women make up about 46 percent of agricultural employment. In Southern Asia, although fewer women than men are engaged in employment activities in general, women still make up 30 percent of agricultural employment. In Latin America and the Caribbean, women make up 21 percent of agricultural employment. These shares are higher in some countries and vary greatly within countries.

Globally, there is evidence of only a slight feminisation of the agricultural labour force over the last 30 years, except in the Near East and North Africa regions where the trend is clearly pronounced. In other regions trends are much less clear-cut, with variations in both directions (e.g. significant masculinisation of agricultural labour in parts of South-East Asia and some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean; and feminisation in some parts of Africa, where women traditionally have engaged strongly in agriculture, but their share seems to be rising, e.g. in Botswana, Chad, and Malawi).

We can determine that rural out-migration seems a more significant phenomenon in South-East Asia and Latin America (where the diversification of the rural economy appears more advanced, at least in some regions, and where women seem to be taking on farm management responsibilities in some cases) than in South Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Africa, however, is more effected by the HIV and AIDS epidemic, which through its sex- and age-specific mortality effects on the composition of rural households, has a stronger influence on the feminisation of agriculture than in any other region.

Agricultural transformation is affecting rural areas everywhere, and each region and country in different ways, depending on local socio-economic and institutional structures. For example, the increased demand for female labour in the agricultural wage labour market as a result of expanding non-traditional agricultural exports is affecting Latin America the most, and to a lesser extent India and some countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda.

Socio-economic participation of rural women

Evidently, the forms and conditions under which women participate in agriculture matter for demographic reproduction, gender equality and economic development – as does whether an increase in the percentage of women in the agricultural labour force relative to men is because more women are economically active or because fewer men are working in agriculture.

However, in many settings rural women’s social and economic participation is severely hindered by deeply rooted discriminations which affect their access to resources and assets such as land, technology, education, information, services, rural organisations, employment opportunities outside the family farm, and legal rights.

Women are significantly disadvantaged relative to men with regard to their land rights. This is true for all dimensions of land rights associated with agricultural land: ownership, management, transfer and economic rights. According to FAO’s Gender and Land Rights Database (http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/en/), less than 15 percent of all landholders in the world are women. The distribution of women landholders ranges from 5 percent in Middle East and North Africa to 18 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean. The proportion of women out of all landowners ranges from less than 20 percent in Honduras to slightly over 50 percent in Malawi. Furthermore, women reported owners are less likely than men to have a legal document proving ownership of their plots or to have their names on the land ownership document. Women’s limited land rights effect all dimensions of land use: ownership, management, transfer and economic rights. Existing studies suggest that the gender gap in land ownership is substantial in many countries. In Nigeria, 3.9 percent of women own land, compared with 23.3 percent of men (FAO, 2020).

Two young boys look at a member of FAO trained group of youth Blessed Achievers Group who is watering a garden of indigenous vegetables at a farm in Kiambu, Kiambu County, Kenya on October 5, 2020. Credit: ©FAO/Luis Tato.

One restricting factor is a lower education level by women compared to their male counterparts. This is partly due to discriminatory access as children and partly due to higher school drop-out rates, driven by factors such as early marriage or pregnancy, but also unsafe school environments and girl’s engagement in unpaid or paid labour.

Similarly, rural women’s access to improved technologies, agricultural inputs, credit and other productive resources, as well as to decision-making, is generally much more limited than men’s. In some rural settings, it continues to occur mainly through the mediation of men, especially husbands or fathers. The multiple biases against women’s access to services, information, financing, technology, and decision-making make it more difficult for them to produce and market as much as men with similar assets. The impacts of climate change further aggravate the situation for rural women, who tend to be generally more dependent on natural resources than men, but their disadvantaged socio-economic status undermines their access to climate-smart technologies and services.

Rural women and COVID-19

Rural women are particularly vulnerable to shocks affecting the agricultural sector, including rising food prices, climate change and socio-economic crises. In this regard, evidence on the gendered impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic is especially revealing. From the limited information that exists, we can conclude that the pandemic has significantly reduced the economic opportunities for rural women.

In Africa, women constitute nearly 46 percent of agricultural workforce and own 1/3 of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). COVID-19 restrictions have undermined women’s ability to access resources for productive activities, find finance to keep their SMEs afloat, and earn incomes in rural markets (CARE, 2020a).

The pandemic has also worsened women’s and girls’ access to nutritious and safe food. According to research conducted by CARE across 40 countries, 41 percent of women and 30 percent of men reported lack of food was a key impact that COVID-19 had on their lives (CARE, 2020b).

Due to COVID-19, women’s unpaid care work and the unequal division of labour within households both increase, as response measures close schools, public spaces and care services (CARE 2020a). Gender-based violence has also increased during the COVID-19 crisis as lockdowns and self-isolation measures increase stress and economic hardship. In Tunisia, initial information indicates an average increase in the incidence of gender-based violence of 50-60 percent, rising up to 400 percent, based on survivors’ calls for help to women’s organisations hotlines (UN Women, 2020).

Therefore, there is urgent need to prioritise women’s access to social protection programs and humanitarian aid. Programs also need to ensure that women (including married women) are able to access aid independently, and that they participate equally with men in COVID-19 response committees and task forces (CARE, 2020b).

Conclusion

The current global demographic and socio-economic picture is one of considerable diversity and ongoing change. The continuation and consequences of demographic trends present unique opportunities as well as challenges for all societies. Understanding a country’s demographic situation should help in prioritising policy responses.

Empowering rural women economically and socially emerges as a clear priority regardless of the country’s demographic scenario, but especially so for the LDCs. Empirical evidence strongly indicates that lasting improvements in household food security in less developed countries can only be achieved through the expansion of women’s access to productive resources, decent employment and education, and their enhanced role in decision-making at all levels.

Improving gender equality in rural areas is one of the most powerful instruments to fight rural poverty and hunger, improve human capital for future generations, and foster inclusive economic growth. The specific nature of gender equitable interventions should reflect the different demographic realities as well as the diverse development needs of countries.


References

CARE, 2020. COVID-19 Rapid Gender Assessments. http://www.careevaluations.org/keywords/covid-19-rga/

CARE, 2020b. She Told Us So. Rapid Gender Analysis: Filling the Data Gap to Build Back Equal. https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/media/k2/attachments/CARE_RGA_SheToldUsSo_Sept-2020.pdf

Committee for the Coordination of Statistical Activities, 2020. How COVID-19 is changing the world: a statistical perspective. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/ccsa/documents/covid19-report-ccsa.pdf

FAO, 2019. RuLIS – Rural Livelihoods Information System [online].

FAO. 2020. Gender and Land Rights Database [online].

FAO, forthcoming. Data Snapshot: Using sex-disaggregated data to better understand gender gaps in agriculture.

Global Strategy for Improving Agricultural and Rural Statistics (GSARS), 2017. Field Test Report: Intra-household decision-making in agriculture. http://gsars.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/WP-02.05.2017-Field-Test-Report-.pdf

ILO, 2018. Women and men in the informal economy: A statistical picture. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—dgreports/—dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_626831.pdf

ILO, 2020. World Employment and Social Outlook. http://ilo.org/wesodata

Slavchevska, V., Kaaria, S. and Taivalmaa, S. 2016. Feminization of Agriculture in the Context of Rural Transformations: What is the Evidence? https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/11866

Komatsu, H., Malapit, J. L. H. and Theis, S. 2015. How does women’s time in reproductive work and agriculture affect maternal and child nutrition? Evidence from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ghana, Mozambique, and Nepal. IFPRI Discussion Paper 01486.

UN DESA, 2019. World Population Prospects 2019.

UN ESCWA and UN Women, 2020. The Impact of COVID-19 on Gender Equality in the Arab Region. https://www.unescwa.org/sites/www.unescwa.org/files/20-00131_gpid_pb_eng_apr5.pdf

UN Women, 2020. Press release: Gender-responsive measures to combat COVID-19 urgently needed to preserve and advance Tunisia’s progress on human rights, warns UN Women. http://gsars.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/WP-02.05.2017-Field-Test-Report-.pdfer equitable interfor-gender-responsive-measures-to-combat-covid-19


Feature photo: Members of FAO trained group of youth Blessed Achievers Group harvest indigenous vegetables at a farm in Kiambu, Kiambu County, Kenya on October 5, 2020. Credit: ©FAO/Luis Tato.

No commercial use, advertising, marketing, storage or third-party distribution of FAO photographs is allowed. Photographs may not be modified without prior permission.

Can South Africa help find a way out of Zimbabwe’s on-going crises?


This blog was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

I don’t know how many times this blog has commented on the worsening economic and political crises in Zimbabwe. It seems to be never-ending and still getting worse. The misplaced expectations that the ‘new dispensation’ would provide an escape route following the 2017 ‘coup’ were short-lived. If anything, things have got worse.

It is a nightmarish combination: faction fighting within the ruling party and military top brass; capture of the economy by business-political elites; relentless corruption across public activity; violence by state security forces against dissent; sanctions by the international community; lack of investment and a divided opposition barely worthy of the name.

And added to all this is the COVID-19 pandemic, now accelerating across the region, with many of Zimbabwe’s elite being struck down, including four cabinet ministers being among the dead to date.

Tough times for most

In the midst of national political and economic chaos, now going on for over two decades in different forms, people must get on with their daily lives in increasingly difficult circumstances in the midst of a pandemic. With many having lost formal employment, the economy operates largely informally and public services barely function. Times are tough for most. A ‘lost generation’ is talked about – those growing up since the late 1990s have not seen any of the fruits of Independence that people profited from in the 1980s. The image of the educated Zimbabwean, employable across the world, is fast disappearing.

This dire situation has made self-reliance and local innovation essential. And access to land, as a vital route to securing livelihoods, is especially important. This is why the land reform, especially the distribution to many households – who are in turn linked to many more in the communal and urban areas – in the smallholder A1 areas, is so vital to Zimbabwe’s story over the past 20 years. Without state support and shunned by donors as being ‘contested areas’, the A1 resettlements have for many been the focus for survival in a collapsing economy.

The ‘development’ agencies meanwhile have concentrated on humanitarian and emergency aid and avoiding the productive sectors of the economy – for sure such aid is much needed, but it’s barely making a dent on the core challenges of economic development. The state has hardly been present, so incapacitated has it been by the exodus of skilled personnel, lack of funding and rising debt. Instead, it has been people’s hard work and ingenuity that has held things together….but only just.

Those living in the elite neighbourhoods of Harare – the party, business and military elites and the expat, diplomatic and donor community – are shielded from much of the worst. They have foreign exchange cash, health insurances and the ability to escape to South Africa if needs be… and the golf courses and some tourist resorts are still open (and gloriously empty). For most people, though, the situation is really difficult, and increasingly so, as the chasm between the (very few) rich and the (majority) poor increases. As everyone has been saying for over two decades: it can’t go on, surely.

Can South Africa help find a way out of the current mess?

So what can be done? For a long time, opposition supporters and allied liberal commentators from inside and outside Zimbabwe were holding out for ‘regime change’. For many years, Robert Mugabe was the bogey-man, so when a well-oiled PR machine emerged around Emmerson Mnangagwa some fell for the spin. Others focused on the opposition and the hope of electoral change, but when Morgan Tsvangirai died, and the opposition fell apart in unseemly disputes, this option seemed to shrink. Now hopes seem to be pinned on South African intervention.

An interesting International Crisis Group briefing came out recently that suggested that the South African government was abandoning its approach of ‘quiet diplomacy’ promoted by Thabo Mbeki, premised on solidarity between two liberation movements, and becoming more assertive. This is probably necessary to unblock the impasse. Unlike previous ICG commentaries, this one is more sanguine about the prospects of opposition politics. Endemic corruption and economic mismanagement is evident across the state, mostly at the hands of ZANU-PF politicians, but also from MDC allied politicians in major cities. The solution no longer seems to be a naïve assertion that all will be well with a new party in power; even the once-feted Nelson Chamisa’s star seems to have somewhat faded.

Unravelling ‘state capture’ by political and military elites is not straightforward, as South Africa has clearly found in addressing the catastrophe of the Jacob Zuma era. However, rather than a holier-than-thou rhetoric from Western diplomatic missions about ‘good governance’, maybe Cyril Ramaphosa and colleagues will be able to address the Zimbabwe situation more sensitively and concretely with practical solutions, rooted in a better understanding of the context.

Pragmatic compromises

So can the South Africans engineer some form of national government that incorporates opposition politicians, technocrats and others, and sets up forms of accountability that stops the rot? Not an easy task, especially in the midst of a pandemic, but it will be necessary to satisfy international investors and aid donors, and it may be the only survival route for some within ZANU-PF. Backing a more technocratic political network within and outside the ruling party may provide the basis for a relaxing of sanctions too.

The South Africans will have to seek a pragmatic solution that is widely acceptable. Maybe such an initiative might just capture the moment when there is a new administration in the US, and find a way for the UK and EU to find a route through the sanctions impasse. Easing sanctions could have a huge impact. For example, sustained development in the land reform areas has been constrained for two decades due to their designation as ‘contested areas’ by Western donors. The agreed compensation deal with former white farmers offers a (yes tricky and fraught) way forward, and the potential for investment and growth from the core sector of the economy – agriculture –opening up.

Of course there must be conditions to any deal, with political reforms firmly on the table. What this means for scheduled elections in 2023, for the military’s support to a new government and for some of the most corrupt in the political-business elite who profit from on-going chaos, is unsure of course. As Brian Raftopolous argues, “Zimbabwe’s future looks bleak. Its state continues an authoritarian trajectory as it carries out its intention to dismantle the opposition. Yet the legacies and the futures of Southern Africa’s liberation movements face increasing public scrutiny even as the alternatives remain opaque.”

South Africa cannot afford the complete collapse of Zimbabwe given the fragility of its own economy, and with insurgency troubling Mozambique the usually stable southern African region looks extremely volatile, requiring solutions soon.


Photo credit: GovernmentZA, President Cyril Ramaphosa arrives in Zimbabwe. 11 Mar | Flickr.

Journal Article: The Resurgence of Agricultural Mechanisation in Ethiopia: Rhetoric or Real Commitment?

Written by: Seife Ayele

Ethiopia’s agricultural development strategies bypassed smallholder mechanisation for decades. Mechanisation returned to the policy agenda in 2013 but recent pro-mechanisation rhetoric lacks operational commitments. Based on primary and secondary data, this paper traces the policies and policy narratives that have led to low mechanisation, and finds that mechanisation was deprioritised on the grounds that Ethiopia is labour- and land-abundant, but short of capital. With policy encouraging multiple cropping, but farming vulnerable to climate change, the paper argues for the development of a market for mechanisation, including mechanisation service provision through private and cooperative agents, to enhance smallholder access to mechanisation and unleash human energy.

Perceptions and misconceptions of smallholder farmers of COVID-19 in central Malawi


Written by Masautso Chimombo and Mirriam Matita

This blog focuses on the perceptions of Malawians in the rural districts of Mchinji and Ntchisi towards COVID-19 and their perception of risk and vulnerability based on the qualitative APRA interviews. It highlights the difficult task faced by authorities in Malawi as they try to curb the threat of the pandemic across the country.

For more on the impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Malawi, read our round one and round two country reports.

Access the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, for free, here.


Background

The first confirmed cases of COVID-19 in Malawi were reported in April 2020, but the then President of the Republic of Malawi, Arthur Peter Mutharika, introduced lockdown measures which included the closure of learning institutions, mobility restrictions and the closure of borders. Furthermore, markets had to close at 5pm, bars were only allowed to open from 2pm to 8pm for takeaways, no more than 100 people (later reduced to 50) could meet up in public, and many employers were encouraged to let their staff work at home.

APRA study

From late June to early July 2020, the APRA Malawi team conducted both qualitative and quantitative interviews with randomly selected heads of farming households and key informants from government and NGO organisations in the two central districts of Ntchisi and Mchinji. The aim was to understand how ordinary Malawians were reacting to the COVID-19 restrictions and preventive measures, and how these are impacting on the agrarian-based food and livelihood security.

Misconceptions of the pandemic

There is a false and discriminatory view among some in Malawi that because China is the purported origin of the coronavirus (‘China virus’), Chinese people are more likely to have it. In a similar view, which targets the rich, the virus is known as the ‘biggies virus’, apparently because they think the virus only targets rich people who are living in Malawi’s big cities of Mzuzu, Lilongwe, Zomba and Blantyre.

With testing being done mainly in the four big cities, all confirmed COVID-19 cases, critically ill patients, and deaths were only being reported in the four cities. There were, generally, no confirmed COVID-19 reported cases in the rural areas at the time. The profiles of people that were confirmed to be COVID-19 positive portrayed the better off urban elite as the exclusive social class who were affected by the pandemic.

Rural communities therefore only experienced reduced traffic of visitors, such as agri-business vendors who normally travel together to buy farm produce from farmers. For these reasons, in the rural community narratives and discourses, COVID-19 is being discussed in the context of being a disease for the town and city residents.

Smallholder farming households’ perception of risk and vulnerability to COVID-19

According to the Health Belief Model, people will not change their health behaviours unless they are convinced and believed that they are indeed at risk of catching a serious life-threatening disease.  If people think that they can’t be infected, or at least not become seriously ill, they will ignore all the COVID-19 preventions which are being promoted by the World Health Organization and its member countries.  It is therefore important that farming households, led by their heads, should feel that they are not immune to COVID-19.

Our findings show that overall, the smallholder farming communities in the two central region districts of Mchinji and Ntchisi do not feel that they are at risk of catching the virus. And even if they do, they think the hardships they survive on a daily basis will help them not to get seriously ill with the disease

The rural farmers also attributed their diets – dominated by indigenous vegetables and low use of processed foods like cooking oil – as another reason for their apparent immunity, equating such to herbal vaccinations against diseases. They argue town folks eat processed foods that are full of fats giving them weaker bodies and no immunity.

The key informants reported that the rural farming households believe that the coronavirus cannot affect them, as it is only found in hotels, airports, airplanes, and other places frequented by rich and successful people. Consequently, the people are living within their own world of ‘exaggerated’ safety.

Some members of smallholding farming households in central Malawi think that they are not vulnerable to Covid-19 as they are not “Azungu” (white or light skinned foreigners), who they see as being more susceptible to coronavirus.

‘Fake news’

The same people believed that the local media coverage of COVID19 is fake, for two reasons. Firstly, they accused Peter Mutharika’s government of trying to avoid court-sanctioned fresh presidential elections, which had threatened his grip on power. Secondly, they thought he was faking COVID-19 cases in order to benefit from potential aid from the World Health Organization and other rich western countries, who they believe pressured the government to declare the existence of the virus. They speculated that the government was under pressure to declare existence of COVID-19 from the world super powers.

This conspiracy theory did not spare urbanites, the majority of whom were believed to back regime change and therefore as a result, urgently needed the court-ordered fresh elections to take place. That most of the people who contracted COVID-19 were asymptomatic and never required hospital treatment added to the speculation. Questions arose such as where are COVID-19 patients? Or worse still, where are the dead bodies?

COVID-19 and secularisation

Malawi is very religious country. When COVID-19 restrictions were announced, congregations in churches and mosques were instructed to limit gatherings to no more than 100 congregants. Face masks were also mandatory, which dissuaded some worshippers from attending services at all for reasons such as not being able to afford a face mask. This also led to many religious conspiracy theories, creating further mistrust of the authorities and COVID19.

Conclusion

Perceptions are very important because of their behavioural implications. Those of the smallholder farming communities in Malawi’s central regional districts of Mchinji and Ntchisi points to the conclusion that people do not believe in the existence of COVID-19 and the threat to life that it poses to Malawians. It is therefore important that whatever strategies are being put in place by government and other stakeholders to manage the virus, their existence should be taken into account. As the Health Belief Model warns, people first have to acknowledge the existence of a serious risk for them to change their health seeking behaviours. Preventing COVID-19 is crucial, as only physically healthy people can contribute to food and livelihoods security.


Feature photo: Man transporting firewood along the 50km road to Lilongwe, Malawi. Photo Credit: Mitchell Maher/International Food Policy Institute.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Rural gender inequalities (1): demographic factors, women’s economic participation, and implications for rural development


Written by Libor Stloukal and Susan Kaaria, Inclusive Rural Transformation and Gender Equity Division, Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), Rome, Italy

This blog looks at gender inequalities in rural areas, with the aim to sketch how they are shaped by demographic factors; highlight consequences for rural women’s economic participation; and outline broader implications for agriculture, food security and sustainable rural development.

Read part two on the feminisation of agriculture, and COVID-19, here.


Few factors shape the development agenda – and therefore efforts to eliminate hunger, reduce poverty and strengthen food security and nutrition – as fundamentally as the size, demographic structure and spatial distribution of national populations. Adequate understanding of demographic trends, and their implications for social phenomena like gender equality, is thus key to fight socio-economic inequalities and achieve important development goals.

In 2019, the world’s population surpassed 7.7 billion and if current trends continue, it is likely to reach 8.5 billion in 2030 and 9.7 billion in 2050 (UN DESA, 2019). Global population trends are driven largely by trends in fertility, often measured by the average number of births per woman over a lifetime. This indicator has fallen markedly in many regions over the past several decades. Today, close to half of the global population lives in a country or area where lifetime fertility is below 2.1 births per woman. In 2019, fertility remains above this level, on average, in sub-Saharan Africa (4.6), Oceania (3.4), Northern Africa and Western Asia (2.9), and Central and Southern Asia (2.4). Globally, the level of fertility is expected to fall from an average of 2.5 live births per woman in 2019 to 2.2 in 2050 and to 1.9 in 2100, according to the medium-variant projection. The largest reductions in the level of total fertility are projected to occur in sub-Saharan Africa.

As a result of these differentials in regional fertility levels, most of the population growth projected for the 2020-2050 period will be concentrated in a limited number of countries. A decisive share of this growth will occur in the least developed countries (LDCs), whose economies continue to be heavily dependent on agriculture. Although the LDCs currently contain only 13% of the world population, they are projected to account for 42% of the global population growth during the next thirty years. The massive population growth expected in LDCs will put additional pressure on resources and the environment, as well as strain the already limited capacities of LDCs’ governments to provide adequate services and develop appropriate policy responses.

Persistence of very high fertility in LDCs: a driver of gender inequality

High fertility rates in certain developing countries appears to be an important driver of gender inequality. The LDCs are a case in point. Fertility decline in LDCs has been markedly slower than in the other developing countries. The total fertility rate in LDCs is estimated to be 4.0 children per woman in 2015-2020, in contrast to 2.6 for the rest of the developing world and 2.5 for the world as a whole. This very high level of fertility has wide-ranging implications:

In LDCs, childbearing and childcare occupy a much larger portion of women’s lifespan than in more demographically advanced countries. In addition to direct health effects (e.g. maternal mortality and other pregnancy-related health risks), high fertility rates create conflict between women’s domestic and non-domestic responsibilities, and reduce their capacity to access educational and employment opportunities outside the domestic sphere. Having many children and/or short birth intervals also prevents women to maintain continuity of employment, with negative implications for their earnings and occupational choices, as well as employers’ willingness to hire and train them.

Fertility-related constraints

While it varies by country, in many low and middle-income countries, agriculture is the main employment activity for the majority of rural women and men (FAO, 2019).  For example, almost 70 percent of employed women in Southern Asia and more than 60 percent of employed women in sub-Saharan Africa work in agriculture (ILO, 2018). In terms of farm support, women constitute a significant proportion of contributing family workers, partly because such work makes combining productive with reproductive responsibilities easier than employment away from the family farm.

However, because of competing demands of care responsibility within the household and productive work, women face limitations in terms of the time and energy they can dedicate to economic activities. As a result, and because of additional factors such as women’s lower literacy levels, women are less likely to engage in wage employment than men, and, when they do, they are more likely to be segregated in less secure forms of employment, e.g. part-time, seasonal and/or low-paying jobs in the informal economy. They also tend to be paid less for equivalent jobs and comparable levels of education and experience.

Women typically confront a narrower range of job opportunities than men. In general, therefore, livelihoods diversification is more of an option for rural men than for women. In settings where it is male labour that is predominantly able to take advantage of diversification opportunities, women may be relegated back to the domestic sphere and to subsistence food production. In this sense, diversification can improve livelihood security of some households, while at the same time trapping women in customary roles.

A key implication of the above is that demographic factors are powerful determinants of women’s participation and roles in agriculture and rural development. In many rural settings, the existing demographic regime, combined with the constraints that women face in the social and economic spheres, undermine women’s ability to contribute to development to their full potential, with negative consequences for productivity, inclusiveness and resilience of agri-food systems.


Part two (1st February 2021) of this blog series will look at rural gender inequalities and feminisation of agriculture and COVID-19. A full references list will be included.


Feature photo: Agro-pastoralist women collect harvest greens next to their crops in Amudat, Uganda next to the Kenyan border on January 26, 2020. ©FAO/Luis Tato.

No commercial use, advertising, marketing, storage or third-party distribution of FAO photographs is allowed. Photographs may not be modified without prior permission.

Analysing the impact of COVID-19 on food systems and livelihoods in Africa


To better understand the impact that COVID-19 is having on food systems and rural livelihoods in the region, APRA researchers have been conducting a rolling series of telephone-based household surveys and key informant interviews. This blog is based on the findings of these two reports, that were written by Amrita Saha, Marco Carreras and John Thompson.

The first round of surveys and interviews was conducted in seven countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe – in June-July 2020. The second round was built on these baseline reports, with the addition of Zambia as an eighth country in October 2020.

Click here to access the country reports.


Since arriving in Sub-Saharan Africa in early 2020, the shockwaves of COVID-19 have hit food systems throughout the region. Many countries, to varying degrees, introduced a series of strict control measures on social and commercial activities with detrimental impacts on food systems in several areas, arguably causing more damage to livelihoods and local economies than the virus itself.

Food and nutrition security at local levels, particularly in Africa, is under the most strain, in spite of global agricultural markets being predicted to remain stable throughout 2021. Further stresses, such as extreme weather events, conflict and insecurity (or a combination of these), and desert locust infestations have added to the pressure for smallholder farmers.

Emerging income-nutrition-livelihood crisis

As efforts to tackle hunger decreased due to the pandemic, there has been an intensification of pre-existing vulnerabilities and inadequacies of Africa’s food systems – understood as “all the elements (environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, institutions, etc.) and activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food and the outputs of these activities, including socioeconomic and environmental outcomes” (HPLE 2014: 12).

Round 2 findings from October 2020 suggest that the shock of COVID-19 has resulted not so much in a ‘food production crisis’ as an ‘income-nutrition-livelihood crisis’ in some communities and households in the eight countries, mainly from a decline in economic activities, which in turn led to income losses and reduced household purchasing power, and a multitude of food-system wide shocks.

Compared to Round 1, fewer (though still a large proportion) respondents reported a decrease in the number of buyers or traders coming to their village to do business (Stevier Kaiyatsa’s recent three-part blog outlines the decrease of grain buyers in Malawi), excluding in Ethiopia, where marketing activities were largely unaffected.

The availability of transport also declined, while food prices have increased, thus reducing access to vital farm inputs and constraining the movement of goods to local and regional markets. Supplies of staple foods in local markets were also reduced as a result of the trade restrictions, and food prices saw a marked increase.

The loss of income, decrease in food availability and increase in food prices is reflected in local diets, with a sizeable number of households stating that they have been skipping meals and facing a shrinking basket of available foods locally. For example, a large number of households in Kenya (40%), Malawi (34%) and Nigeria (16%) indicated that they “went without eating for a whole day because of a lack of money or other resources”. In Zambia, food availability issues appear particularly stark as nearly half of all respondents reported a decrease in the availability of several food groups. Concurrently, food prices have increased across several major food groups, with the prices of grains, pulses, and nuts and seeds most affected.

The report also outlined that women and girls in Zambia, Kenya and Ghana are encumbered the most by childcare and housework, households continued to report more childcare and housework compared to any other study area. Meanwhile, individuals were still reducing their movements both within and outside their own village, except in Tanzania where travel restrictions have been limited (for more on life in Tanzania following the lifting of restrictions, read this two-part blog series).

However, the effects of COVID-19 restrictions and control measures have not all been negative. Some households have innovated to survive, shifting towards more local production, shorter value chains and diversifying the range of their off-farm livelihood activities (see Ian Scoones’ Zimbabwe blog for an example of how farmers adapted to the challenges brought by COVID-19).

APRA researchers interview households in Adao Abeokuta suburb, Ogun State, NigeriaCredit: Anas Umar

Decrease in emergency assistance

As government COVID-19 restrictions eased in most countries, a general decrease in households receiving any type of emergency assistance was observed, with many stating they had yet to receive any support since June-July, especially those in Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Ghana (see this blog for the agricultural implications of the pandemic in Ghana). Family, friends and local religious organisations remain important sources of support for some households, particularly in Ethiopia, Malawi and Zambia.

Mixed results

The APRA assessments found both positive and negative examples of the ability to households to continue their farming activities and non-farm economic enterprises during the COVID-19 crisis, depending on the community and country in question. For example, most respondents in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Tanzania reported no major changes in their own participation in farming activities since the first round, but did experience a decrease in participation in business or household enterprises (except in Ethiopia). In Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe, though, most respondents continued to report a decrease in their participation in farming activities as well as in their business activities. Conversely, in Ghana, farmers’ participation in both farm and off-farm economic activities has generally improved since June-July.

The impact on farm labour also saw mixed results in the different study countries. Most of the respondents in Ethiopia reported that they had managed to hire farm workers (see Agajie Tesfaye’s three-part blog series on the impact of COVID-19 on daily labourers and rice commercialisation). This was also the case in Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and Nigeria (for more on the unintended consequences of the lockdown in Nigeria, read this blog) but access to hired labour continued to be disrupted in Ghana, Kenya and Malawi. However, in several countries labour costs were on the rise, forming obstacles for many farm operations.

Way forward

For the majority of households in the sample communities, APRA’s multi-country research indicates that they have experienced significant hardship since the onset of COVID-19, with many facing a loss of income, reduced purchasing power, rising food prices and decreased food availability. Farming and business activities have also been affected. While some households have been able to cope with the crisis in innovative ways in the short-term, the intersection of COVID-19 restrictions with other environmental and political economic shocks and stresses has made it hard for others to adapt, particularly with little external assistance.

Although only a second ‘snapshot’ of changing conditions, these results suggest that it will be important to continue to track these households and communities over time to assess how the pandemic is unfolding in different parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. As several countries recently reported an increase in the number of COVID-19 cases, APRA is planning to return to the study communities in the first quarter of 2021 to analyse how local people, governments and food systems are responding.


APRA researchers interview households in Adao Abeokuta suburb, Ogun State, NigeriaCredit: Anas Umar


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

‘The land is the economy, the economy is the land’, but does this include young people? Reflections from Zimbabwe


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

There has been a flurry of studies on young people and agriculture in recent years, including in Zimbabwe. The wider critical literature has challenged the standard narratives around youth specific policy measures – such as narratives that youth are innovative, entrepreneurial, tech-savvy and so the future of agriculture that we see in report after report. Instead, much of this work makes the case that broad, fairly standard development policies – improved infrastructure, better education, agricultural R and D, labour policies and so on – are what is needed to expand “landscapes of opportunity” for everyone, including younger people.

A recent comparative study using survey data from six African countries showed (rather obviously) that opportunities expanded when people were near markets (for off-farm work) and when agricultural potential was higher (for farming). More interestingly, the patterns were not much different between different age groups, although those in their 20s reported ‘no activity’ most frequently and those in their 30s were more likely to engage in off-farm work.

Large surveys such as this reveal very little however about the relational dynamics of generational change and the ways life courses are adapted. This is an important point made by a paper on youth and food systems, which eschews an age-based categorisation beloved of surveys and argues that youth is a “transitional phase within a life cycle”. It’s this transition (often including considerable periods of ‘waithood’) – of establishing a home, gaining access to land, investing in agriculture or starting up a business – that is crucial. Of course, as the paper argues, such processes of generational change intersect with gender, class, wealth, location and other dimensions.

In this sense, there are particular challenges faced by young people – across a variety of ages depending on their life course. This comes out in the more empirically-grounded, qualitative studies, which are increasingly coming out on this theme with work on Zimbabwe.

For example, a comparative assessment of young people’s experiences in commercial farming ‘hotspots’ in Ghana, Tanzania and Zimbabwe highlights the many challenges people face in first gaining access to land, capital and markets for agriculture as a young person. As the paper highlights, social relations – amongst family and beyond – are crucial, but overall it’s very hard work and challenging, according to the testimonies collected.

Successes can quickly be reversed, as ‘hazards’ strike – both misfortune and mistakes. The paper’s conclusions that it is not land or credit that is needed are slightly contradicted by the data, as it’s clear that in Ghana and Zimbabwe land constraints are very real, and access to finance is a challenge across sites for young people. The paper concludes that what young people need is an insurance or form of protection from sudden, unexpected shocks, adding to the array of policy measures on offer.

More in-depth studies are offered from different parts of Zimbabwe that reinforce some of these themes. For example, based on in-depth life histories from Matabelaland (Lupane and Umguza districts), Vusilizwe Thebe argues that challenges of young people are very contextual. In the A1 resettlement area many young people who occupied land or joined parents who did so are disconnected from the sort of deep networks that provide access to resources and help transitions in life courses as in nearby communal areas. Nevertheless, young, independent, single women have been able to make a go of agriculture in the resettlement areas, whereas patriarchal institutions would have constrained such opportunities elsewhere.

A study from Goromonzi in Mashonaland East by Clement Chipenda and Tom Tom focused on the challenges of social reproduction in the new resettlements, and pointed to the complaints of young people feeling left out of the land distribution. This has resulted in generational conflicts between young people and their parents, as those without land and employment have to resort to highly precarious work, such as gold panning or temporary hired labour. Young people in Henry Bernstein’s terms are a new fragmented class of labour. These class tensions and implications for social reproduction are important themes raised.

A similar sense of struggle was highlighted in our study of young people in land reform areas in Masvingo district and Mvurwi farming area (see also earlier blogs hereherehere and here). The ROAPE paper that summarises the findings shows how

Opportunities for young people following land reform are severely constrained. The precariousness of work, the challenges schooling and getting qualifications, family disputes and illnesses, the lack of land, the poor productivity of dryland farming, and the difficulties of establishing businesses without capital, are all recurrent themes. While a few have found their way into reasonably remunerated jobs, the routes to accumulation, and getting established as independent adults, are limited for others, with very small-scale irrigated farming seemingly by the far the best option.”

The wider politics of young people and land reform is picked up by another recent paper by Fadzai Chipato and colleagues, which focuses on youth struggles. The paper documents the long association between youth, the liberation war and ruling party politics and the particular position of young people in the struggle over land. However, the paper highlights the real problems of the conflation of state and party politics and the use of land as patronage resource. This has resulted in an increasing disenfranchisement of young people, as they next generation does not feel it is being provided for, with land not available and the economy in ruins. However, the cross-generational struggles for livelihoods are being revived, often outside party control, as young people exert their agency and organise to take land through informal invasions as well as upsetting land use laws and claiming land and water for their farming.

‘The land is the economy, the economy is the land’ is a well-known ZANU-PF rallying cry. The centring of land in the politics of the country means that questions are always raised about who gets land and through what means? The land reform undoubtedly benefited a large number of people, many of whom are doing well, but this was a particular generation, and others who were children or even not born in 2000 are now seeking out livelihoods in rural areas. The generational dimensions of the agrarian challenge does not go away through a redistribution; in some ways the conflicts intensify, but between different people.

COVID-19 and price uncertainties in grain marketing in Malawi


In the third and final blog of the series on grain marketing in Malawi, APRA researcher Stevier Kaiyatsa looks at the contributing effects of COVID-19 on grain price instability, the implication of this, and what the Malawian government can do to tackle the problem.

Part one examined the role played by small-scale traders in the grain supply chains of Malawi, while part two looked at how farmers are being exploited by some of these traders.


For more on the impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Malawi, read our round one and round two country reports.

Access the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, for free, here.


Written by Stevier Kaiyatsa

Malawi recorded its first COVID-19 case on 2 April 2020. Prior to the first COVID-19 case, the former President Peter Mutharika declared the disease a national disaster on 23 March 2020. The government closed schools and banned large gatherings as measures to control the spread of the disease. Further, the government announced a 21-day lockdown on 14 April that would run from 18 April to 9 May 2020. However, the Malawi High Court barred the government from implementing the lockdown on the basis that the Human Rights Defenders Coalition petitioned for more consultations on how to protect the livelihoods of poor and vulnerable Malawians.

Post-harvest period

The post-harvest period in Malawi starts in April, when small-scale traders buy agricultural produce from smallholder farmers. The APRA Malawi team has observed that fewer small-scale traders purchased grain from rural areas during COVID-19. As indicated in part one of this blog series, small-scale traders operate at different scales, namely; low-tier, mid-tier, and top-tier. Thus, COVID-19 created a situation where the big buyers, including local processors, were uncertain on the future of grain markets within and across national borders, which affected the grain supply chain.

Between April and July 2020, most countries implemented lockdowns with additional border controls, so it became risky for the big buyers to invest in grain – particularly those that rely on export markets. Rural areas did not see an influx of top-tier small-scale traders in the midst of COVID-19 relative to the previous years. Thus, it become difficult for the big buyers to purchase the grain through top-tier small-scale traders. As a result, the low-tier and mid-tier small-scale traders were the only ones that were purchasing grain from smallholder farmers since they use their own savings to invest in the grain trade. Although the mid-tier small-scale traders were functioning, their level of operation was affected by trading in smaller quantities, and therefore less trips to sell their grain to the big traders in urban areas.

Grain price instability

As we transition from the lean period (i.e. from October to March) when the grain is scarce to the post-harvest period (i.e. from April to September) when grain is abundant, the overall price of grain drops. Then, the price starts to increase as the post-harvest period progresses. As usual, purchasing prices were lower at the onset of the post-harvest period and farmers expected the prices to increase as the season progressed. However, due to lower competition among the grain traders, coupled with increased supply of the grain on the market, the price of grain continued to drop. For instance, at the onset of the post-harvest period in April, the price of soybean was MWK250 (US$0.33)[1] per kg, but it dropped to MWK180 (US$0.24) per kg in May, and reached as low as MWK150 (US$0.20) per kg in July. Compared to the previous season, the price of soybean increased to MWK320 (US$0.42) per kg in July 2019. Further, the purchasing price of groundnuts was MWK550 (US$0.73) per kg in April, but the price dropped to MWK500 (US$0.66) per kg in May and reached as low as MWK450 (US$0.60) per kg in July, while it was trading at MWK700 (US$0.93) per kg in July 2019. However, I observe that the price for maize grain remained unchanged between April and July 2020 at MWK120 (US$0.16) per kg in most food markets, on average. This might make sense, given that maize grain is a staple crop while soybean and groundnuts are cash crops for smallholder farmers in Malawi. Both mid-tier and low-tier small-scale traders might have enjoyed lower purchasing prices between April and July 2020.    

Farmers accessing inputs from private dealers in Mchinji district Malawi. Credit: Symon Duwe

Implication of unstable grain prices

The lower grain prices that most smallholder farmers were offered have implications for smallholder farmers’ income and food security. Smallholder farmers that produce smaller quantities had no option but to sell their produce at very lower prices, while those that have other sources of income are hoarding their grain in anticipation of better prices in the lean period. The lower output prices have eroded farmers’ income, limiting their access to productivity enhancing technologies, such as improved seed and fertilisers, for the next growing season. Therefore, it is more likely that most farmers will not be able to invest in farming to produce greater market surpluses, which will directly compromise their food consumption and agricultural income. Conversely, small-scale traders have aggregated grain at lower prices in anticipation of better prices in the future should big buyers such as the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), the National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM), and processors open up their markets as the lean period progresses.

Conclusions

As low levels of COVID-19 continues, the government has reopened schools and lifted the ban on large gatherings. However, uncertainty regarding the future of grain markets both local and across the borders continues to grow among grain traders. This has affected the incomes of smallholder farmers, which may lead to lower production in the upcoming growing season, particularly for non-staple commodities such as soybean and groundnuts. Further, through the Affordable Input Programme (AIP), a successor to the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP), the government has invested about MWK160 billion (US$212.5 million) to subsidize maize production for about 4.3 million smallholder farmers. AIP beneficiary would be able to purchase two bags of fertiliser (NPK and UREA) weighing 50 kg at MWK4, 495 (US$5.97) each, a pack of maize, rice or sorghum seed weighing 7 kg at MWK2, 000 (US$2.66). Unlike the FISP, AIP does not subsidise legume seed for pigeon peas, cowpeas, beans, soybean, and groundnuts.

As a result, we should expect a decrease in the production of legumes including soybean and groundnuts in the upcoming growing season due to smallholder farmers’ limited access to legume seed and an increase in maize production.

A separate investment by government to procure expected surplus maize will be required to protect the incomes of smallholder farmers. One way is to fund ADMARC and NFRA in time to allow them to open up their markets early in the season and procure the maize grain directly from smallholder farmers. This would eliminate grain traders particularly top-tier small-scale traders in the supply chain that benefit at the expense of smallholder farmers. In the future, AIP should include seed for legumes, which are central to smallholder farmers’ incomes and food security.   


[1] US$=MWK753 as of November 2020


Feature photo: A women wears a face mark in Mchinji district, Malawi. Credit: Symon Duwe.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Rapid Assessment of the Impact of Covid-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa – Synthesis Report 2

Written by, Marco Carreras, Amrita Saha and John Thompson.

This report presents a summary of findings emerging from the second round of a three-wave rapid assessment led by the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) in October-November 2020 to examine how COVID-19 is affecting food systems and rural livelihoods in eight countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It builds on a set of phone-based household surveys and key informant interviews conducted in those countries in June-July 2020, which served as the baseline for this research.1 APRA will continue to monitor the situation as the
response to the pandemic unfolds through the third round of data collection and analysis planned for the first quarter of 2021.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia – Round 1 Report

Written by, Chrispin Matenga and Munguzwe Hichaambwa.

To assess the impact of COVID-19 on local food systems and livelihoods, a total of 115 small-scale farming households (102 male- and 13 female headed) were interviewed from five communities (Lilanda, Luang (Mankanda), Masansa, Nshinso and Miloso (Tazara Corridor) surrounding the Mkushi Farm Block in the Central Province of Zambia between 30 September and 6 November 2020. The respondents were selected as a random sample, targeting 20-25 households per community or village. The small-scale farmers in these areas benefit from linkages with commercial farmers in the block.

How small-scale traders exploit farmers in Malawi


In the second of a three-part blog series on grain marketing in Malawi, APRA researchers Stevier Kaiyatsa and Mphatso Susuwele examine the methods used by some small-scale traders are taking advantage of farmers who produce a market surplus, and what the government should do to help.

Part one looked more closely at the vital role played by small-scale traders in the grain supply chains of Malawi, while part three charts the impact of COVID-19 on grain marketing.


Written by Stevier Kaiyatsa and Mphatso Susuwele

Primary level agriculture production remains the main economic activity in Malawi. Poor infrastructure undermine efforts to diversify the economy to other sectors such as industry, mining, and tourism causing many job seekers in particular the youth to end up in traditional agriculture. For instance, the Malawi Labour Force Participation Survey (2013) found that 64.1% of employed persons work in agriculture. However, agricultural production landscape faces a number of challenges that include, but not limited to, over dependence on rain-fed farming, low absorption of improved technologies due to high illiteracy levels, vulnerability to weather-related shocks, and declining natural resources. As a result, output per unit area of land (i.e. productivity) is low among smallholder farmers. Where about 80% of the population relies on agriculture for income and food consumption, producing a market surplus is the ultimate goal of each farmer. However, the amount of money that the smallholder farmer can earn in a season is subject to not only the output prices but also purchasing behaviour of the grain traders in the market, which are geared towards exploitation. 

The role of the Malawi Bureau of Standards (MBS) in grain marketing

The MBS is a government owned parastatal organisation that has the mandate to inspect and verify that traders use recommended weighing and measuring instruments when procuring grain from farmers across Malawi. The organisation operates centrally with one office in each region. The MBS certify all the weighing and measuring instruments, apply an “MBS label” to them, and confiscate uncertified weighing scales from traders. However, the organisation fails to conduct a comprehensive inspection exercise every year across all the food markets due to understaffing and inadequate funding from government.

Grains and salt blocks stored in a warehouse at St. Louis Convent, Malawi. Credit: Meiling on Flickr

Standardised equipment

Farmers consider the use of standardised weighing scale as the most the transparent way of trading. However, small-scale traders tamper with the weighing scales to get more grains when purchasing from farmers and give less grains when selling to consumers. Further, not all small-scale traders have access to standardised equipment. It is a standard practice to store grain in bags weighing 50 or 90 kg. To demonstrate how the farmer may lose out when the trader uses unauthorised weighing scale in procuring maize grain, we use the price observations in October 2020 from Mpherembe market in Mzimba district. The purchasing price of maize grain per kg was MKW140 (US$0.18)[1], as such, it would cost the trader MKW7000 (US$9.23) to procure a bag weighing 50 kg from the farmer. Conversely, when an unauthorised weighing scale is used, the trader may get more grain from the farmer, for example, an additional 100 g for each 1 kg of grain that the scale records. Thus, the bag of grain weighing 50 kg would weigh 45 kg on traders’ scale and the farmer would get MWK6300 (US$8.31) and lose out about MWK700 (US$0.92). The losses to the farmer increases with increase in the volume of grain sold.

Unstandardised equipment

Since some of the small-scale traders do not have access to weighing scales, the use of unstandardised equipment such as plastic cups and plates, and 5 or 20-litre plastic buckets, is common across the food markets. Traders can tamper with and reduce the volume of the equipment. As such, many traders use tampered equipment to procure grain from farmers and use untampered equipment when re-selling the grain to smallholder farmers who rely on food purchases at different times of the year. To demonstrate how a farmer may lose when a trader uses unstandardised equipment, our research used prices from the same market. About 2.5 standard (i.e. untampered) 20-litre plastic buckets make up a bag of grain weighing 50 kg. At that time, we observed that the price of grain per 20-litre plastic bucket was MWK2500 (US$3.30). When the trader uses unstandardised equipment, the farmer earns MWK6250 (US$8.24) per bag of grain weighing 50 kg. Thus, the farmer loses about MWK750 (US$0.99) for each bag of grain weighing 50 kg sold. The losses may increase where the trader uses tampered unstandardised equipment. 

Farmers accessing inputs from private dealers in Mchinji district Malawi. Credit: Symon Duwe

Recorded prices on charts  

Smallholder farmers that do not produce market surpluses also sell some of their produce as cash needs arise. These farmers sell grain in smaller quantities than the bag of grain weighing 50 kg, therefore small-scale traders display their purchasing prices in chart recorded per kg. If the smallholder farmer comes with the bag of grain weighing 50 kg or more to sell, the trader would buy at the price recorded on their charts. Similarly, if the smallholder farmer comes with the bag of grain weighing less than 50 kg for sell, the trader would buy at the price below the prices recorded on their charts. Thus, farmers that sell smaller quantities at a point in time get lower prices than those that sell more quantities and the higher the quantity, the higher the chance of bargaining.  

Conclusions

The Government of Malawi recognises the role that agricultural commercialisation would play to achieve its development agenda of creating wealth for all. Given that agriculture is the main source of income for the majority of the people in the rural Malawi, there is need for the government to strengthen institutions that support the sector such as MBS for them to carry out their mandates effectively and efficiently. One way to strengthen MBS in order to protect smallholder farmers from unscrupulous small-scale traders is to establish its representation in district councils, where an officer would be responsible for carrying out the inspection and verification exercises of weighing and measuring instruments that traders use in grain marketing at such a lower level. Further, government may prohibit the use of spring scales in grain marketing and provide a subsidy on digital scales, which would increase their affordability. Doing this, would increase transparency in grain marketing and protect farmers from exploitation in Malawi.


[1] 1US$=MWK758.15 as of November 2020.


Feature photo: Farmers accessing inputs from private dealers in Mchinji district Malawi. Credit: Symon Duwe.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Lockdown politics: reflections from Zimbabwe


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.


Last week, the blog looked at the COVID-19 situation in Zimbabwe. The situation continues to get worse. On 9 January, there were 20499 reported cases and 483 deaths – 6000 more cases and over 100 more deaths in just a week. It looks like the South African ‘new variant’ is taking hold. Another very severe lockdown was imposed on 2 January, with strict movement restrictions, many businesses closed and a curfew.  

However, like many other African settings, as discussed last week, so far at least the rural areas in particular seem not to have significant coronavirus incidence, with reported cases concentrated in urban areas. So are widespread, national lockdowns justified? Should governments persist with the harsh lockdowns that are perhaps best designed for different Western, urban settings with different social and economic profiles?

This is a difficult one. We don’t know if the early action by African states – including Zimbabwe – prevented a massive early spread, and it would be foolhardy to experiment with releasing lockdowns to boost the economy if it resulted in a massive transmission of disease during a second wave. And especially so in settings where health systems are deeply inadequate.

The Swedish experiment of a light lockdown has faltered badly in recent months, and the haphazard approach of the UK government to pandemic control measures has resulted in a huge and unnecessary death rate, even with a top quality health service.

Hardships, but innovations and transformations

What then are the downsides of the current approach of strictly following international public health guidelines? As we have documented in the blog series since March last year, the impacts of lockdowns on rural populations across our sites have been harsh. And the new lockdown in Zimbabwe is already biting hard.

This is a pattern seen across Africa as many studies have now shown. Reduced market access, lack of mobility for labour and work, school closures meaning kids don’t get an education… and so on. The story is now familiar. There have been many surveys of the impacts and the considerable costs of lockdowns. Lockdowns particularly hit those reliant on formal markets and those requiring mobility for their livelihoods.

Yet, as our field reports during 2020 have shown, in a largely informal economy, where exchanges are local, there has been an impressive resilience in rural areas and small towns in Zimbabwe so far. Without wanting to dismiss extreme hardships, falling perhaps especially on women and young people, the adaptations and innovations we saw over the past 9-10 months across our sites have been impressive. 

Whether in terms of marketing, health care, off-farm income earning, trading or artisanal mining, a new array of new activities have sprung up so that people can survive during lockdowns. Compared to the formal phone surveys that many researchers are fond of, asking not just about what has changed from the status quo, and so highlighting the costs, we have also been asking what has emerged, highlighting innovations and opportunities too.

Our qualitative work across multiple sites in Zimbabwe shows not just how the existing agro-food and livelihood system suffered, but how it also was transformed – by necessity, and through skill and ingenuity. Reading back across our accounts from March 2020 onwards it is interesting how the tenor of the commentary changed: from negative impacts to positive opportunities, even in very tough circumstances. 

Authoritarian reactions

A common argument about the downsides of lockdowns is that they provide space for authoritarian states to exert control on restive populations under the guise of public health measures. The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition has recently produced a significant report (and video) on the shocking abuses that have occurred in Zimbabwe (and across SADC) over the past year, with heavy lockdowns and restrictions on movement seemingly being used as a pretext for arrests and violence, directed particularly against the opposition.

The ‘closing of civic space’ is very apparent in Zimbabwe, and was heightened especially in the build-up to the proposed 31 July uprising. While this never happened in the ways envisaged, the clamp-down was severe, affecting everyone, but especially journalists (arrested and imprisoned) and opposition leaders (sexually assaulted and imprisoned). This pattern continues, with new arrests during the past week, and some still imprisoned.

The argument in the Crisis Coalition reports is that lockdown measures were ‘excessive and disproportionate’, with state and security services using lockdowns to boost their control against rising opposition and internal faction fighting. It is implied that lockdowns should be released with ‘civic space’ restored. In other words, it is suggested that lockdowns are manipulated, becoming simply a political tool.

Many public health officials would however disagree, and especially now. With great hardship and without resources, they have been implementing the measures in good faith, with the genuine fear that the pandemic will take hold, and that only strict public health measures will hold it at bay. Public freedoms are always curtailed in a health emergency for the greater, longer-term good, they argue. Lockdowns are therefore essential, even if private civic freedoms are curtailed.

Lockdown politics

This of course is a tension seen in many countries, with anti-lockdown protests in favour of ‘freedom’ a common occurrence. However, in Zimbabwe, the context is particular. A more sophisticated reflection on these tensions is necessary.

It is always about politics, and political assessment of trade-offs. In the UK, for example, the discussion has been about opening up to boost the economy and people’s jobs and livelihoods, while protecting health through a complex and confusing set of public health measures. In Zimbabwe, the state had similar concerns, as the already dire state of the economy was made worse by the pandemic, and fears of public unrest and opposition mobilisation were raised.  Yet, actually, those economies with stricter public health measures have actually fared better economically over the pandemic, particularly in east and southeast Asia.

Lockdowns are of course no excuse for human rights abuses and illegal activities. These have been seen in many places, as the ‘emergency’ rhetoric of a pandemic provides the pretext for authoritarian measures, as well as corrupt practices. The rush to acquire personal protective equipment (PPE) at the beginning of the pandemic saw procurement practices abused massively across the world.

In Zimbabwe, media exposes resulted in the sacking of the health minister and fingers pointed to the very top, while in the UK the extent of involvement of senior politicians and associates in the Conservative party in getting favourable government contracts is only now becoming clear. This is now subject to a number of lawsuits, although still remarkably little mainstream media commentary, despite apparently extreme forms of corruption.

Pandemics are windows onto society

A pandemic exposes the worst and best of any society, and Zimbabwe is no exception. The failure of governance, the abuse of power and the authoritarian approach to politics has been laid bare, along with the tragic lack of capacity in the health service and the neglect of key workers, notably doctors and nurses who have been underpaid for years. But, at the same time, the way public health workers have worked tirelessly across the country sharing messages about keeping a distance, washing hands and so on has been impressive; in many cases involving people who are barely paid a living wage. The commitment of medical professionals is also amazing. Despite the terrible working conditions, they have insistently argued for solid public health measures and may have helped offset something worse. And, in response, the extraordinary resilience, as well as the improvisation, ingenuity and innovation, that people have shown over these months continues to impress.

Over the coming months, we will continue to monitor the situation across our Zimbabwe sites and report back via the blog, as the unpredictable life-cycle of a pandemic reveals much about the struggles of daily life and the political, cultural, social and economic responses to adversity in rural settings, which remains the on-going focus of this blog.


Photo credit: Ian Scoones

Understanding small-scale grain traders in Malawi


In the first of a three-part blog series on grain marketing in Malawi, APRA researchers Stevier Kaiyatsa and Mphatso Susuwele examine the vital role played by small-scale traders in Malawi in the grain supply chains, how they are classified, and why understanding them is key for any kind of programme intervention that aims to improve food security and incomes of smallholder farmers.

Parts two and three look at how farmers are being exploited by some of these traders, and how COVID-19 is impacting grain marketing in Malawi.


Written by Stevier Kaiyatsa and Mphatso Susuwele

Small-scale traders play a critical role in linking producers to consumers in the grain supply chains. In Malawi, farmers cultivate their crops from November to March under rain-fed production every year. This period is considered as the peak of the lean period, where farmers who do not produce enough food for their own consumption rely on food purchases. During this time, the food prices are high and farmers must invest in their farming to meet their food needs for the next consumption period (i.e. from April to March). During the post-harvest period (i.e. from April to September) farmers transition from a period where food prices were high due to scarcity to a period where food is available at lower prices. Given that the majority of farmers earn their income from crop sales, farmers would need to sell more during the post-harvest period than during the lean period to make the same amount of money. Unfortunately, waiting for the lean period when the food prices are high is not an option for most of the farmers because of their immediate need for cash.

The big buyers in grain marketing such as the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), the National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), the National Association of Smallholder Farmers of Malawi (NASFAM), and processors who offer relatively better prices, open up their markets very late in the season. The big buyers delay in opening up their markets to allow the grain to dry to the right moisture content. Meanwhile, small-scale traders access the rural markets to purchase grain from smallholder farmers early in the season when the grain has high moisture content at relatively lower prices. The traders dry the grain to reach the right moisture content, and re-sell to the big buyers later in the season when they open their markets. As a result, small-scale traders provide an immediate market to most of the farmers at the time when the need for financial stability is high.

Classification of small-scale traders

The food markets (including for grain) are liberalised, and anyone can participate in the food market as a buyer. Participation in the grain market as a small-scale trader is less labour-intensive due to relatively low trading volumes than for medium- and large-scale traders. To become a small-scale trader, one needs cash and a weighing scale. The use of digital scales is less common among scale-traders and those that have access to weighing scales use spring scales or a spring balance, which can be easily tampered with. Usually, small-scale traders operate in permanent structures or an open space in the food markets, along the main roads that connect farmers to their food markets, or set up tarpaulin at the centre of the village. Their access to financial credit and storage facilities is limited. Small-scale traders may be classified into three categories based on their level of operation:

Low-tier small-scale traders:  This category of small-scale traders use their own finances, and usually reside permanently in the village or closer to the farmers. They operate in a permanent structure with a storeroom. During the post-harvest period, this category of traders procure grain from farmers in any quantity at a lower price, stock the grain, and re-sell the grain to the same farmers during the lean period at a higher price. These traders are not part of any established social networks.

Mid-tier small-scale traders:  This category of small-scale traders also use their own finances but have a strong relationship with large-scale traders that operate in well-developed urban centres or in the cities. Similarly, they reside permanently in the village or closer to the farmers, and operate in a permanent structure with a storeroom. During the post-harvest period, this category of traders procure grain from farmers in any quantity at a lower price, aggregate, and transport the grain to large-scale traders within their networks. These traders neither stock the grain for a long time nor re-sell the grain to the same farmers during the lean period at a higher price. As a result, their operations are limited to post-harvest period.                 

Top-tier small-scale traders:  This category of small-scale traders act as agents for employees working for big buyers who usually open their markets late in the season such as ADMARC, NFRA, NASFAM, and processors or the elites with strong relationships with these institutions. The employees or the elites finance the operations of these traders, of whom temporarily reside in the village or closer to the farmers during post-harvest period. They operate in rented permanent structure with access to storage facilities. This category of traders procure grain from farmers in huge quantities, treat and stock the grain, and sell to these institutions when they open up their markets at very high prices.

Malawi Grain Nsundwe trading centre. Credit: Melissa Cooperman/IFPRI

Conclusions

Understanding how small-scale traders operate in the grain marketing is vital for programming interventions that aim at improving food security and incomes of smallholder farmers. The low-tier small-scale traders maintain availability of grain at the community level while mid-tier small-scale traders facilitate the flow of grain from areas that produce market surpluses to deficit areas, widening the availability of grain across the food markets.

Since the big grain buyers are known to delay in opening up their markets, employees for these organisations and the connections the elites have with these organisations distorts competition in the grain market through the operation of top-tier small-scale traders. Therefore, the big grain buyers may seem to delay in opening their markets, but have instead informally opened earlier in the season to give smallholder farmers a poor deal, which does not improve their incomes. The employees and the elites along with their top-tier small-scale traders benefit from interventions that aim at supporting producer prices at the expense of smallholder farmers. 


Cover photo: Farmers accessing inputs from private dealers in Mchinji district, Malawi. Credit: Symon Duwe.


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Malawi – Round 2 Report

Written by, Mirriam Matita and Masautso Chimombo.

COVID-19 continues to impact households and economies worldwide. For this reason, in June 2020 APRA started assessing its likely effects on food systems and livelihoods in Malawi. This report presents insights from the second round (R2) of data collection in October 2020. Data was collected from a stratified random sample of 111 households (59 female and 52 male respondents) drawn from an APRA household survey of groundnut producers in Mchinji and Ntchisi districts, Central Region, as well as from eight key informants. One additional round of research is planned for the first half of 2021.

eDialogue: What Future for Small-Scale Farming? Policy Options


By Jim Woodhill, Ken Giller and John Thompson

The final eDialogue in our five-part series on the ‘What Future for Small-Scale Farming?’ finished off by exploring policy implications for the inclusive transformation of small-scale agriculture in challenging times.

A stellar panel of experts from five continents brought a rich and insightful set of perspectives to the table.

We asked: “Is a fundamental shift in incentives and policies needed to tackle the ongoing issues of poverty and malnutrition facing rural-households who farm, and to align small-scale agriculture with the goals of a transformed food system? If so, how might such shifts be brought about?”

Rhetorical questions perhaps, but it was enlightening to hear from a group of highly knowledgeable panellists that profound shifts in policy are needed and that such change is possible, despite the difficulties. The need for new visions of policy goals, that take a much more integrated approach to food systems was a clear message.

It was also clear that policy does matter. Current incentive structures and market externalities are often driving food systems and the conditions for small-scale farming in the wrong direction. Past policy settings may have been appropriate for a staple crop-oriented approach to food security, prior to times of resource scarcity, climate change, the growing nutrition crisis, and more complex rural-urban interlinkages. Today, however, emerging challenges and future risks require a substantial policy rethink.

Against a backdrop of ‘progress’, too many people are being left behind

Given a set of mega-trends, we were encouraged to be optimistic about the future. Taking Africa for example, wage rates, education levels, health status, financial inclusion, access to mobile phones, and off-farm employment rates have all improved dramatically and appear to be heading in the right direction. However, this does not mean that specific groups aren’t being left behind or that there aren’t fundamental challenges in the food and farming sectors related to livelihood security, health and nutrition and the environment. These are very real challenges that affect large numbers of the most vulnerable male and female farmers, and farm workers, and they require substantial policy innovation. This wider positive development trajectory does though give hope for change. However, linking back to the theme of ‘recognising diversity’, what is possible is profoundly shaped by a country’s specific economic status and its particular political economic dynamics.

Recognising good public benefits

It was observed by the panel that farming and food is a largely a private sector activity. Yet, depending on the way food systems are functioning, the outcome can lead to huge public good benefits or costs. Basic, public investments in agricultural research and development, and in ensuring rural infrastructures such as roads and communication along with the right incentive mix for good health and environmental protection are foundations for society to reap benefits rather than costs from the ways we produce and consume food. Deeper discussions about public costs and benefits, both in the short and longer-term and how they link to market failures and incentive structures is a critical starting point, for the transformations that are increasingly recognised as necessary.

Working backwards from a new vision for food systems and rural economies

Arguably, policies related to small-scale farming have focused too narrowly on immediate issues rather than longer-term visions for change. The food systems agenda creates an opportunity to rethink small-scale farming within a wider context of creating visions and transformation pathways for food systems that are oriented towards improved livelihoods, good nutrition, environmental sustainability, and that are economically inclusive. This ties into utilising what will be substantial growth in the value of both domestic and regional food markets to help drive wider rural economic development. But all this requires longer-term and more integrated and dynamic policy thinking that works back from these visions of possible ‘food futures’ to the policies, practices and programmes that are needed to guide the transformation. At the same time, the risk and uncertainty of such complex and dynamic socio-technical systems must be recognised. Linear management and control approaches to policy are increasingly ineffective. Framed by a risk-based approach, our institutions and policies are often poorly equipped for our uncertain world.

An enabling pathway for ‘small food system entrepreneurs’

An underlying message was that the future for many small-scale producers will most likely not be as farmers, but rather as ‘small-scale food system entrepreneurs’, generating income and employment opportunities from diversified sources both on and off the farm. Policies are needed to support this entrepreneurial transition and capture the value from food markets to help drive wider rural economic development.

Responding to vulnerability

Future policies must prepare for and be able to effectively respond to the increasingly complex, intersecting social, economic, and environmental vulnerabilities faced by farmers and farm workers. COVID-19 has well illustrated the devastating impact of the pandemic on household incomes and their ability to purchase sufficient healthy food. The climate crisis is likely to dramatically increase the risks of droughts, natural disasters, disease outbreaks and even conflicts, all of which disproportionately impact on small-scale producers. This uncertain context with its overlapping short- and long-term shocks and stresses, presents a complex set of challenges for food and farming policy, demanding more adaptive, experimental, reflexive forms of governance and institutional arrangements.  This call for much more innovative forms of affordable insurance schemes and risk-oriented social protection.

Territorial innovation

Forget the notion of large cities and rural areas. Increasingly populations are spread across a vast number of towns and small- and medium-sized cities, creating vast peri-urban areas and stronger rural-urban connections. This creates tremendous opportunities for small-scale farmers, both in terms of new market linkages and value addition, but also in terms of off-farm employment opportunities that can complement farm income. However, at national and sub-national scales, tailored policies are needed to support such territorial development and the often unique conditions of different locales.

Land reform and inequality

Equitable land access and rights that balance the needs and interests of small-scale farmers with small-holder commercialisation and the development of larger-scale farming remains one of the most critical aspects of policy. Land policies have a profound influence on gender equality and empowerment, the rights and livelihoods and vulnerable groups, and investment by both small-scale farmers and larger operators. The world is seeing an increasing polarisation between consolidated large-scale agri-food sector investments and small-scale family farming which risks growing inequalities and difficulties in creating a more economically inclusive food system. Policymakers need to come to terms with the sort of land and investment policies that can better balance food system outcomes of health, equitable livelihood opportunities and environmental sustainability.

Malawi Market. Credit: Melissa Cooperman/IFPRI

Cultural identity

Farming and rural lives are about peoples cultural identities. Policies need to be careful of instrumental approaches that ignore the cultural connections with land and the role that food plays in culture and identity. These factors also have a significant role to play in the decisions farmers take and the importance of land beyond pure economic returns. Empowering rural groups to express and strengthen cultural identities that help maintain social cohesion solidarity should not be overlooked.

Access to capital

Although access to land matters, equally important for many households is credit and longer-term investment funds. For all the talk of rural banks and micro-finance, most small farmers simply cannot get working capital. They rely on whatever they have as ready cash which often must be spent on pressing priorities, such as school fees, medical bills, and household consumption. Thus, many small farmers struggle to buy quality inputs or hire labour when they need it the most, and in the process forego yields they can ill-afford to miss.

Fundamentally perverse incentives

Our panellists left no doubt that past policy decisions that have resulted in a set of deeply perverse incentives, at both the global and domestic scales. Too often existing public expenditures drive towards the production of calorie-rich rather than nutrient-dense foods and put ‘band-aids’ on poverty rather than enabling the conditions for rural economic development. Current subsidies drive unsustainable use of natural resources or distort trade to the disadvantage of small-scale farmers. The extent to which small-scale farmers receive public support varies enormously among continents and countries. In South Asia, where public support to rural households is multi-layered, a wider view of how policies impact on food prices makes it clear that small-scale farmers are often ‘net taxpayers’. Essentially, they subsidise cheap food for consumers and value extraction by more powerful enterprises further along the food value chain.

Beyond “subsidies” to investing for the public good

Panellists stressed the point that the right kind of targeted subsidies can make a difference to agricultural productivity and livelihood security. While the pros and cons of input and price subsidies have been hotly debated over the past decade, a rethink around the language of subsidies is needed. Given market externalities, the huge public costs and risks of a failing food system, widespread rural poverty and inequality corrective public good investments are essential. These include for example creating incentive mechanisms to drive the demand for and production of a diversity of more nutritious food, incentives for good environmental practices, ensuring rural infrastructure, or improving social protection schemes, particularly in relation to risk. The challenge is to design so-called ‘smart’ subsidy programmes that have a significant impact on the availability of food and the improvement of household incomes in the short run while stimulating growth and rural development and increasing (or at least not suppressing) effective demand for and commercial distribution of inputs in the long run.

Political realities

No one should be naive about the political imperative of keeping food prices low and ensuring national food security. For a majority of people in low- and middle-income countries food is a large proportion of their expenditure and even slight rises in food prices can easily push them into a food deficient situation and dramatically impact on their ability to pay for other life needs. As was well seen in the 2008 food prices crisis, this has significant implications for social and political stability, something of which most governments are acutely aware. Further, many poor farming households are net purchasers of food. Consequently, governments are often very risk-averse in terms of changing policies that relate to food prices and food security. Further, the existing regimes of input and price subsidies have significant benefits for some, often influential, interest groups who bring their influence to bear in maintaining the status quo.

Practical realities

As one panellist highlighted, even with strong political will to reform food systems, incentive structures and how these impact on small-scale farmers, there are significant practical challenges. In general, more effective use of public investment requires effective targeting to the needs of specific communities and households in specific locations, often involving direct cash payments. However, many of those who need such support do not have bank accounts. There are huge data gaps in knowing who to target in what sort of ways and significant administrative challenges. This is one of the reasons more broad-based approaches are often used, despite the challenges of a distorting influence, poor targeting, and leakage of resources.

Mobilising political commitment for change

There is a tendency for people (and governments) to overplay the risks of doing something differently and underplay the risks of the status quo. Consequently, policy innovation and reform to drive the transformation of small-scale farming within a broader vision sustainable and socially-just food systems require four things: One, a clear perspective of the negative consequences of ‘business as usual’ that is understood not just by a small network of informed researchers and activists, but by political leaders of all stripes and wider society (after all, we are all consumers of the goods and services provided by our food system). Two, evidence that alternative pathways can work, based on sound research and detailed case studies documenting the emergence and persistence of ‘islands of innovation’ to provide ideas and inspiration for future policy and practice. Three, practical transition strategies to bring about change and which can balance out the interests of the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ and ensure ‘no one is left behind’. Finally, sufficiently strong international and national coalitions for change from across government, business, civil society, and science are required. Global public goods need to be invested in helping to generate the data and evidence, and the informed processes of dialogue and coalition-building necessary for change. Such processes are needed from local to global in ways that help to link understanding of how issues connect across scales. Of critical importance is building national and local level capability for generating and synthesising data and supporting stakeholder and policy dialogue with foresight and scenario analysis.   

Farmers voices

The fundamental importance of engaging farmers themselves, with all their diversity, in policy dialogue was underscored. This is vital for understanding what farmers are actually experiencing, hearing their ambitions and ensuring they are able to protect their interests. Inclusive processes of policy dialogue from local to global levels need support and investment.


Acknowledgement: This blog drew in particular from the comments and inputs of the panellists of the fifth session of the eDialogue and we are very thankful for their rich contribution to the discussion. The blog is the authors’ interpretation of the session and may not necessarily represent the overall perspective or specific opinions of the individual panellists.

Panellists: David Nabarro, Meike van Ginneken, Thomas Jayne, Elena Lazos Chavero, Rebbie Harawa, Ángela Panegos, and Avinash Kishore.


Cover photo credit: Roy Waddington

Can Zimbabwe survive a second wave of COVID-19?


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

On January 2nd, Vice-President and Minister of Health, Constantino Chiwenga, announced another strict lockdown on the whole country. As in March, non-essential businesses are shut, travel is restricted and schools are closed. Everyone is urged to stay at home. In the last week, there have been a further 1342 cases, adding to the total of 14084 recorded. There have been a further 29 deaths too, including a number of high profile business people and politicians, adding to a cumulative total of 369.

Zimbabwe seems to be facing a second wave, driven by the new variant coronavirus from South Africa. I caught up with colleagues yesterday to hear about the current situation and to reflect on how has Zimbabwe fared since the first case was identified in March 2020 (see the Zimbabweland COVID-19 blog series).  

On the face of it, Zimbabwe like many other African countries outside South Africa and to some extent Nigeria, has been relatively spared the ravages of COVID-19 to date. The total (reported) cases and deaths remain low. Compared to the US, UK and much of the rest of Europe, where last week’s reported figures are a small fraction of what is happening each day in these countries, the figures seem to portray (relative) good news.

At the beginning of the pandemic, there was a wave of Afro-pessimism: Africa was going to be hard hit, and with poor health services and many co-morbidities the toll would be massive. This did not happen during the first wave of the pandemic. In fact, the richest, supposedly most ‘efficient’ countries on the planet suffered worse. Why is this?

Why so few cases?

There are many theories out there, and no one really knows – uncertainties are everywhere. Some claimed it was the heat, but of course there are cold parts of Africa in some seasons and places, and hot places around the world have suffered terribly too, notably in Latin America. Some said it was because of widespread BCG tuberculosis vaccination, but the comparative data proved dodgy. Some said it was because of a young population demographic. This certainly helped, given the susceptibility of different age groups, but there are plenty of other places where a ‘young’ population was hit hard.

Certainly African countries, including Zimbabwe, responded to the pandemic quickly and effectively in line with WHO recommendations, with national lockdowns, restrictions on movements and health campaigns. This was unlike Western nations where the response was sluggish, with an arrogance that they knew best. Clearly, they didn’t and coronavirus did not turn out to be like ‘flu as all the elaborate preparedness and contingency plans assumed.

The experience of past pandemics/epidemics has also probably helped in Africa. The AIDS pandemic taught African nations and peoples a lot of important lessons: know your epidemic, take it seriously and change behaviour to save lives. The same applied to Ebola in West Africa and of course SARS in southeast Asia. Such experiences shape cultures and practices, and citizens, experts and institutions learn lessons the hard way. In the West, assuming that COVID-19 was ‘flu was fatal – literally, and resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths in the US and Europe – but Western nations had not experienced the ravages of a serious pandemic for many years outside certain communities.

In some ways it may have been that poor health conditions actually helped. Acquired or pre-existing immunity through the frequent attack of multiple pathogens may have made certain people more able to fend off COVID-19. Noone knows this for sure, and plenty of poor and marginalised people have died, but it’s a hypothesis worth exploring, as many of the (recorded) deaths have been among middle class and richer people, where co-morbidities – being overweight, having diabetes etc. – are similar to those in the ‘healthy’ West.

The spatial pattern of cases also gives some clues. Cases in Zimbabwe, for example, are heavily concentrated in the larger urban centres, where poorer people live in crowded places and moving to jobs means travelling on crowded transport. The colonial design of racially-segregated cities has resulted in increased susceptibility to this type of respiratory disease, requiring new thinking in city planning.

The other foci of infection are on the borders, highlighting the impact of migration as a spreader of disease, especially from South Africa. With the new variant extending from the coastal areas of South Africa, the transfer of the virus through migrant populations moving back and forth, especially through the festive period, has already happened. Add to this the crowded conditions and long queues at the borders such as Beitbridge seen over the holidays, it has been a recipe for rapid spread.

Understanding disease contexts in rural areas

However, there still remain very few (recorded) COVID-19 cases in any of our rural study areas, and few stories about people who have died. This is the case across the country – from Mvurwi to Chikombedzi – and the exceptions are in all instances a few imports from returning migrants, most common in Matobo. This is striking and contradicts the national narrative of growing infection.

We have been observing the local situation now for 9-10 months, and the pattern seems clear. Despite massive under-reporting due to an almost complete absence of testing, the rural areas seem to have been spared so far. As colleagues noted, “it may be that we have had the disease, but there are a range of ‘flus’ (respiratory diseases), and we know how to treat them with herbal medicines. Even the local village health workers are encouraging their use.”

We asked people in each of the study sites about why there were so few cases, and they consistently identified the activity patterns of people in rural areas. They live outside, there is ‘plenty of air’, they are not crowded together, as villages and homes are spaced out and people don’t move around so much – certainly compared to the ‘big bosses’ from Harare who seem to be suffering most. The moments when infection might happen included, according to their listing, funerals, markets, tobacco selling points, schools, indoor church services and beer parties where receptacles are shared. They also all pointed out that people are generally good at hygiene as this part of cultural practices for washing and cleaning, especially before eating.

As Paul Richards and Daniel Cohen point out on the African Arguments blog, understanding infection risk in context is essential, and this requires detailed insights into what people do where and why. In Africa it is not meat packing plants or care homes where concentrated transmissions occur, but in other settings. In order to shift behaviours and reduce infection, there is a need to know more about – for example – “the way infection hazard is shaped by key ceremonial activities in private spaces.” This means not just relying on the generic ‘science’ and projections from generalised models, or even the direct experiences of elite policymakers in large urban centres, but engaging with those who are confronting the disease, even if at this stage at very low levels. As they comment, it’s imperative to:

involve at-risk communities of all kinds in debate about how to manage the hazards associated with a second wave of the disease in Africa, based on diligent backward contact tracing undertaken while disease circulation remains relatively low. The time to do this work is now.

Paul Richards and Daniel Cohen

Only with such engagement and supported by effective testing – as was the case with Ebola in West Africa – will people shift practices, perhaps in quite subtle ways, to prevent disease spreading. The blunt tool of lockdowns and generic health messaging may be increasingly ineffective in a second wave, and more attuned responses will be needed.

Dangers at the borders

As colleagues said, “people are fed up with lockdowns, they don’t know why they are happening”. In the last period, things had got back to a (sort of) normal. Or at least people had found ways of managing the restrictions. Businesses had been re-established, markets had reopened, people were moving about (even if paying bribes to the police at roadblocks), funerals were being held with numbers way beyond the stipulated number, schools were open and mask wearing had become much more casual. The announcement of a new harsh lockdown has been met with dread. People remember the first major lockdown from late March, and cannot afford to return to that situation of extreme hardship.

But notes of caution also come from the border areas, especially in the last weeks. Over the festive period there have been a huge number of returnees from South Africa wanting to visit their relatives and rural homes. The massive queues at the border posts, with traffic jams of 20km or more have been widely reported. Traffic disruption has also occurred further away as police check for COVID test certificates among motorists and truckers.

As we have observed in previous blogs, migrants have invested in their rural homes during the pandemic, and have opened up fields, moving members of their families to these homes and away from towns in Zimbabwe or South Africa. Some villagers have been complaining that grazing areas are becoming short as so much land once fallow (and so available for grazing) has been ploughed this year, spurred on by the very good rains. There is now more movement and mixing with migrants from elsewhere, and especially around holiday times.

With the main border posts highly congested, others have resorted to illegal crossings. The Limpopo is flowing due to plentiful rains and normal crossings on foot are not passable. Boat operators have sprung up using large inflatables, with crossings costing Rand 200 per head. Huge numbers of people cross each day – around 150 per boat – along with goods and supplies, and sometimes even vehicles. Soldiers and border security forces are paid off, and a lucrative transport business has emerged, alongside other activities including supplying food to travellers. These crossings are taken by those without the full paperwork and who cannot pay for the U$50 cost of a COVID test. No doubt viruses along with people and goods are being imported too.

What next?

To date, the rural areas of Zimbabwe have yet to experience the direct impact of the disease, and only the consequences of lockdowns. This may yet change. In the coming weeks, we will continue to monitor the situation in our study areas. How will they cope with the new lockdowns? Will the second wave hit the rural areas this time? What strategies are being used to respond locally, with they remain effective even with greater transmissibility of the virus? Before the next update report, next week the blog will look more broadly at the debate about lockdowns and their politics.


Thanks to the team from Mvurwi, Gutu, Masvingo, Matobo and Mwenezi.


Photo credit: KB-Mpofu/ILO

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe -Round 2 Report

Written by, Vine Mutyasira.

In response to COVID-19, the Government of Zimbabwe enforced a nationwide lockdown on 30 March 2020, closing most sectors of the economy, including informal markets. However, with limited cases, lockdown movement restrictions were eased and supermarkets, restaurants and vegetable markets allowed to reopen. Between 3-13 October 2020, a second-round (R2) of surveys was conducted, targeting farming communities in Mvurwi and Concession Areas of Mazowe District, to assess COVID-19 impacts on food production systems, supply chains and general livelihoods. This report summarises insights obtained from the phone-based survey, covering 102 respondents (20 female and 82 male-headed households), and 5 local key informants (councillors and extension officers). Results are compared to the earlier R1 survey carried out in late June/early July.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania – Round 2 Report

Written by, Gideon Boniface and C.G. Magomba.

On 8 June 2020, the Government of Tanzania officially declared the country to be free of COVID-19 and all restrictions have since been lifted. As of 3 December 2020, Tanzania had only 509 confirmed cases of the virus and 21 deaths. Nevertheless, neighbouring countries are still facing the threat of the pandemic, all of which are key trading partners. Their continuing COVID-19 control measures have disrupted regional and domestic agricultural markets and affected local livelihoods and food systems. This study analysed the resulting impacts in those systems in several rice-producing communities in Morogoro Region, south-western Tanzania.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Kenya – Round 2 Report

Written by, John Olwande and Miltone Ayieko.

Since 12 March 2020, when Kenya reported the first COVID-19 cases, the Ministry of Health confirmed a total of 45,076 cases and 839 deaths, as of 19 October.1 Despite the rising number of COVID-19 confirmed infections and deaths in Kenya during the third quarter (Q3) of 2020, the national and county governments relaxed some of the restrictions that had been in place during Q2 aimed at controlling the spread of COVID-19. This assessment was aimed at understanding the effects of COVID-19 at household level and attendant policy responses during Q3 of 2020, to inform actions to assure protection of local food systems, rural livelihoods and the supply of adequate, affordable food of acceptable quality to the population.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Ghana – Round 2 Report

Written by, Louis Hodey and Fred Dzanku.

This study seeks to assess the continuing impact of COVID-19 on food systems and livelihoods in south-western Ghana and provides insights obtained from household-level and key informant data in the second of three surveys conducted during October/November 2020. This second round (R2) survey involved 107 households of oil palm farmers (86 male-headed and 21 female-headed) and 5 key local informants in the Mpohor and Ahanta West Districts of the Western Region.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Fogera Plain, Ethiopia – Round 2 Report

Written by, Abebaw Assaye and Dawit Alemu.

This report presents an assessment of the changes in effects of COVID-19 on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, labour and employment, and poverty and well-being in rural Ethiopia by comparing the results of a baseline household survey (R1) in late June 2020 with a follow-up survey (R2) in late October 2020. Data was collected from a stratified random sample of 106 smallholder rice farmer households (24 female and 82 male-headed) in five kebeles (villages) in the Fogera Plain
area of Amhara Region. Data was also collected through 25 key informant interviews conducted in the kebeles.

Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Nigeria – Round 2 Report

Written by, Adebayo B. Aromolaran and Milu Muyanga.

This study provides insights from a second survey assessing COVID-19 impacts on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, labour and employment, and well-being in rural Nigeria. Data for round 2 (R2) were collected between September and October 2020, from 109 households that were interviewed in mid-July (R1). Households were drawn from a stratified random sample from three Local Government Areas in Ogun State and two in Kaduna State. This survey data is complemented by insights from seven in-depth key informant interviews. This analysis compares COVID-19 effects in the second quarter and the third quarter of 2020, which corresponds to the first and second 3-month periods after Nigeria’s countrywide lockdown was put in place.

APRA researchers present findings on the changing face of African farmland at conference

The APRA Work Stream 3 (WS3) team have been busy promoting their research in recent weeks, including providing a keynote presentation at the 5th Annual Centre for African Research on Enterprise and Economic Development (CAREED) on 9th December, 2020. The Zoom event was focused on the theme “Enterprise and Economic Development in Africa: The Way Forward”, and included prominent academics and participants from Africa, Europe and North America.

Thomas Jayne, an APRA academic based at the Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics, Michigan State University, was the first of four keynote speakers. His presentation, titled “The Changing Face of African Farmland in an Era of Rural Transformation”, drew upon a recent WS3 study Are Medium-Scale Farms Driving Agricultural Transformation in Africa, published in Agricultural Economics. The paper reflects upon mounting evidence of profound farm-level transformation in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and emphasises the need for a further examination of sources of dynamism in the sector, and the need for an updated typology of farms that reflects the evolving nature of African agriculture. 

For example, during 2000 – 2016, the share of national marketed crop output value accounted for by medium-scale farms rose in Zambia from 23% to 42%, in Tanzania from 17% to 36%, and in Nigeria from 7% to 18%. However, the share of land under medium-scale farms is not rising in densely populated countries such as Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda, where land scarcity is impeding the pace of farm acquisitions by investors. 

Jayne highlighted the increase of medium-scale farms, and how it affects the region in many different ways that are difficult to generalise. Findings from the APRA study indicate that these farms can be a dynamic driver of agricultural transformation, but the authors stressed the importance for land policy to maintain a clear commitment to supporting smallholder farms.

To read the WS3 paper presented by Thomas Jayne in full, access it for free, here

The three other keynote presentation topics were “The Fintech Revolution in Africa”;  “Youth employment, employability and the future of work in Africa”; and Charting the pathway for African Economic Development in the 21st Century. The full conference schedule can be accessed here.


Feature photo credit: MSU

Armed conflicts, land expansion and resilience: evidence from Nigeria


In this blog, APRA researchers Adesoji Adelaja and Justin George summarise their two latest working papers on the role of resilience factors in mitigating the negative effects of conflict on land expansion, and how conflicts affect land expansion by smallholder farmers in Nigeria. They condense the findings from both studies and offer policy recommendations on how to counter the negative effects of armed conflict on smallholder households.

This blog is based on Working Papers 45 and 47. Access Working Paper 45 here, and Working Paper 47 here.


Written by Adesoji Adelaja and Justin George

In the last decade, armed conflicts became a major barrier to achieving agricultural growth and food security in Africa. Its negative impacts on agricultural output, investments, land use decisions, input distribution and support institutions are a great concern to African governments, multilateral agencies and other development partners. The previous decade also saw a significant rise in the number of medium-scale farms in the region, primarily driven by scale-up by smallholder farms (SHFs). Here, we summarise two studies which empirically investigate the impacts of armed conflicts on the scale-up ability of SHFs, and the role of household-level resilience factors in mitigating those impacts. Both studies are based on household level data from Kaduna and Ogun, two states in Nigeria that had direct and indirect exposure to conflicts such as the Boko Haram insurgency, farmer-herder violence and ethnic violence.

The main findings

We find that when a household is exposed to armed conflicts, measured by the number of incidents within a 20 km radius, its ability of transitioning from small to medium/large scale farming is hampered.  Also, longer drought seasons limit the ability of the household to transition to a larger scale. However, the education level of the household head and greater off-farm income improve the likelihood of transitioning.

Further investigation into other factors showed that farm-led transition, financed by proceeds from farm operations, is impacted more by armed conflicts than non-farm-led transition, which is financed by off farm activities. While we confirm empirically the hypothesised negative impacts of armed conflicts on SHFs, we also find evidence to suggest that development resilience, measured by factors such as assets, education, off-farm income and access to social safety nets help mitigate these negative impacts. Households that are more resilient in terms of their socio-economic endowments are more likely to cushion the shocks afflicted by conflicts.

We also uncover differential impacts on Kaduna, a state more directly affected by conflicts vis-à-vis Ogun state, which is relatively more peaceful. Surprisingly, the adverse effects on the transitioning capacity of SHFs in Kaduna were more pronounced than on SHFs in Ogun state. In places such as Kaduna, which are directly exposed to the conflicts, forced displacement may leave many parcels of idled land, increasing opportunities for remaining SHFs to expand their operations. We also find the mitigating effects of resilience factors to be stronger in Kaduna State than in Ogun State.

Photo credit: Immanuel Afolabi/The Center on Conflict and Development at Texas A&M University

Policy Implications

In Nigeria, policy attention in response to conflict has focused mostly on the Northeastern region, the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency. While this focus is justified, our studies revealed that areas which are not in the immediate vicinity of major conflicts are also negatively affected by conflicts. This is worrisome. Typically, post-conflict relief and rebuilding efforts targeted toward farmers tend to focus on active conflict zones, not places indirectly affected. Our findings suggest that policymakers should be concerned about the spillover effects of conflicts, which extend to places that may not intuitively draw public attention. 

Our main finding that conflicts reduce the likelihood of SHFs transitioning to larger sizes suggests that there are longer-term impacts of conflict through the discouragement of agricultural growth. This is in addition to the several short-term impacts armed conflicts inflict on rural agricultural economies. In countries that are reliant on agriculture, conflicts can change the macroeconomic growth trajectory by impeding land expansions.

Policymakers should therefore be aware that even in places facing relatively milder incidence of conflict, there is need to implement effective programs and policies which would facilitate resilience building among households. Focusing on the resilience building tools such as better education, improved access to safety nets and asset building would be a very good starting point.


Feature photo credit: Immanuel Afolabi/The Center on Conflict and Development at Texas A&M University


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Zimbabweland’s 2020 wrap-up


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

2020 has been quite a year in Zimbabwe and across the world. The blog has had two major series of posts, and this wrap-up features both – now with the links all working.

One series has followed the COVID-19 pandemic in Zimbabwe, and particularly the consequences of lockdown in rural areas. The blogs are based on discussions with our team based across the country – from Mwenezi to Matobo to Masvingo to Gutu to Mvurwi. The pandemic measures have radically reshaped the rural economy, with diverse impacts on different people. Heavy-handed clamp-downs have combined with (as ever) plenty of innovation and adaptation as people find ways of surviving. Luckily, despite dismal predictions, Zimbabwe has as yet not been heavily affected by the disease, a pattern seen in many parts of Africa. Why this is will be the focus of continuing discussion in the new year when this series will continue.

2020 has also seen the 20th anniversary of the fast-track land reform. Our surveys across Masvingo province have continued throughout the 20 years, documenting how livelihood changed in this turbulent period in Zimbabwe’s history, where economic collapse, political chaos and continuous sanctions preventing investment by Western development agencies have persisted. The other major blog series this year therefore presents of the results of our longitudinal studies looking at what has happened in A2 medium-scale farms, A1 self-contained, villagised and informal settlements across Masvingo. The story is fascinating yet complex, and the blogs present much data to show how there have been both important successes, but also major challenges.

Links to the two blog series are presented below. Additional themes discussed this year include commentary on the important compensation deal signed between former white commercial farmers, yet another blog on land tenure (given the on-going intransigence of the debate) and one on conservation and development in the Lowveld. A new paper on the history of commercial farming in Mvurwi was also highlighted.

As ever the blog has been widely read across the world, with many thousands of views, multiple subscribers and plenty of reposts, notably in The Zimbabwean and Chronicle newspapers. The blog will return in the new year with more evidence-based research and comment on agriculture and rural development in Zimbabwe and beyond. 

COVID-19 in Zimbabwe: a blog series

Women and young people in Zimbabwe’s COVID-19 economy, Nov 9

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“Know your epidemic”: Reflections from Zimbabwe, Sep 27

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Innovation in the pandemic: an update from ZimbabweSep 7

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Viral politics and economics in ZimbabweJul 27

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COVID-19 lockdown in Zimbabwe: ‘we are good at surviving, but things are really tough’Jun 15

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COVID-19 lockdown in Zimbabwe: a disaster for farmersApr 27

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Surviving COVID-19 in a fragile state: why social resilience is essentialMar 30

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Twenty years after Zimbabwe’s land reform: a blog series

20 years after Zimbabwe’s land reform: what does the future hold? Jun 29

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Zimbabwe’s land reform areas twenty years on (summary and reflection)Jun 22

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Zimbabwe’s land reform areas twenty years on (A2 areas)Jun 8

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Zimbabwe’s land reform areas twenty years on (A1 informal settlements)Jun 1

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Zimbabwe’s land reform areas twenty years on (A1 villagised areas)May 25

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Zimbabwe’s land reform areas twenty years on (A1 self-contained areas)May 18

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Zimbabwe’s land reform areas twenty years on: Introduction to the blog series,May 11

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All photo credit: Ian Scoones

ALRE Stakeholder Survey Analysis

Written by, Louise Clark and Ed Small.

The Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) programme has an innovative monitoring, evaluation and learning approach known as the ‘Accompanied Learning on Relevance and Effectiveness’ (ALRE), which is being delivered by a small team of embedded evaluation specialists. ALRE has conducted a survey on agricultural commercialisation with key stakeholders in Africa to improve understanding of the policy issues related to inclusive agricultural commercialisation that require better-quality evidence. The insights generated are intended to support researchers to better frame their research around stakeholders’ priority policy issues across the African continent.

ALRE Stakeholder Survey Analysis: Key Findings

Written by, Louise Clark and Ed Small.

This summary shares the results of a stakeholder survey on the policy issues and demand for evidence related to inclusive agricultural commercialisation across Africa by the Accompanied Learning for Relevance and Effectiveness (ALRE) team of the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) programme. The survey collected data between January and March 2020 on a series of closed questions to i) understand the top five policy priorities to support agricultural commercialisation and the most effective communication methods, and ii) the different factors and the role of research to influence inclusive agricultural commercialisation.

Drivers of market orientation among farm households in Nigeria

APRA academics Adebayo Aromolaran, Milu Muyanga and Thomas Jayne summarise their latest working paper to look the drivers of market-orientated land use decisions among farm households in Nigeria, with particular focus on Ogun and Kaduna states.  The authors then suggest possible government interventions in order to increase access to input and output markets.

This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 46. Access it, for free, here.


Written by Adebayo Aromolaran, Milu Muyanga and Thomas Jayne

Introduction

Agricultural commercialisation is a process that involves the transformation of agriculture from subsistence to market-oriented production. The process is characterised by increased engagement of farmers with farm inputs and outputs markets. In recent times, the Nigerian Government has devised strategies aimed at accelerating smallholder transformation for enhanced food security, employment creation and poverty reduction. However, despite these efforts, the process of agricultural commercialisation in Nigeria has not progressed as fast as expected.

Aromolaran et al (2020)[1] recently concluded a study that sought to identify factors that constrain agricultural commercialisation and possible policy levers that could be used to enhance the commercialisation process in Nigeria. The study adopted the concept of market orientation as a measure of agricultural commercialisation among farm households. Market orientation is measured by an index called the market orientation index (MOI). The index not only considers household’s output market participation – like the household crop commercialisation index (HCCI), but also takes into consideration the share of total farmland a household allocates to crops grown for sale. The HCCI is defined as the proportion of total production of a crop that is sold in the market.

Cocoa Seed drying at Agboro Village near Abeokuta, Ogun State Nigeria . Pix Ademola Lawal

The study first estimates the levels of farm households’ crop commercialisation using the CCI. A crop is categorised as ‘food crop’ if its CCI is below 0.75. Such a crop is considered as produced primarily for household consumption. A crop with a CCI of 0.75 and above is classified as commercial, cash, or market-oriented crop. Second, MOI were computed by farm types (small and medium-scale) to find if commercialisation varies by scale of production. MOI ranges between 0 to 1, where the higher the MOI, the more market oriented or commercialised the household is. Third, econometric methods were used to determine the drivers of farm households market orientation levels. The study used primary data collected from a survey of over 2000 small and medium-scale farms in Ogun and Kaduna States of Nigeria.

Main study findings

Crop commercialisation levels among farm households: The results show that the degree of crop commercialisation varies by crop types and scale of production. Most cereal and pulse crops such as maize, sorghum, rice, millet, soya beans, and cowpeas are grown for household consumption among small- and medium-scale farms. Conversely, most tree/permanent crops, starch/sugars crops, vegetable crops, arable fruits, and spices/condiments are grown for commercial purposes.  

CCI among crop groupings. Source: APRA Survey, April/May 2018

Market orientation status of farm households: The study finds MOI does not vary by farm scale of production. The MOI for both small and medium-scale was 0.77. That is, farm households on average, irrespective of scale of operation allocate about 77 percent of their crop farmland to the cultivation of crops grown for sale. When the MOI is computed by state, farm households in Ogun State are found to be substantially more market-oriented than their counterparts in Kaduna State. Specifically, MOI for farm households in Ogun and Kaduna States was estimated at about 0.90 0.65, respectively.  

Source: APRA Survey, April/May 2018

Drivers of farm household market orientation status: The study reveals that farm size, land market access, access to extension service, access to all-weather roads, access to established market place tend to exert significant positive influence on households’ market orientation. Farm households that operate relatively larger farms tend to allocate a larger proportion of their farmland to production of crops for sale. The study finds that medium-scale farms with access to land markets allocate 2.5 percent more of their farmland to crops produced for sale compared to those with limited access to land markets. Medium-scale farms with access to extension services tend to allocate about 2.9 per cent more farmland to cash crops compared to those without access to extension services. The study finds that access to all-weather roads and established marketplaces increase market orientation for both small- and medium-scale farm households. In Ogun State, the findings show that medium-scale farms with access to agro-dealers are more market oriented. Access to labour markets also determine crop commercialisation levels in medium-scale farms. Medium-scale farms who only use family labour tend to allocate less land to crops meant for sale compared with those with access to hired labour.

Plantain on sale at Gbamugbamu Market in Ijebu east LGA, Ogun State, Nigeria. Credit: Moses Olayemi

Conclusions and policy thrusts

The study provides evidence indicating that agricultural commercialisation could be enhanced by policies that encourage the growth of medium-scale farms, improved access to land markets, increased efficiency of labour markets, increased access to farm inputs and outputs markets, improved agricultural extension services, and road infrastructure.  

Even though the Nigerian government has made efforts in the past decade to create funding interventions that support increased access to input and output markets, more work still needs to be done.  Intervention programs that are still in operation or needs to be revived include:

  • General Enhancement Program (GES) – initiated in 2011 and under proposal for rebranding as Agricultural Input ad Mechanisation Services (AIMS);
  • Anchor Borrower’s Program (ABP) launched in 2015;
  • National Agricultural Land Development Authority (NALDA), re-introduced in 2020 and ;
  • River Basin Development Authorities (RBDA).

It is important that these efforts be intensified, in light of the findings of this study.

In addition, interventions aimed at improving rural infrastructure, such as all-weather roads connecting farms to agro-service centres and market places, are also key. The government may also need to drastically improve on the current low ratio of agricultural extension agents to farmers by initiating intervention programs that will promote the growth of private extension agencies, in addition to reviving the currently poorly funded and ineffective public extension system.  


[1]Aromolaran, A.B, Muyanga Milu, Jayne Thomas, Obayelu A. E., Awokuse Titus, Ogunsola O. O. and Issa F.O. (2020), “Drivers of Market-oriented Land Use Decisions among Farm Households in Nigeria”. Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Working Paper 46. https://bit.ly/APRA_WP46


Feature photo: Cassava peeling during processing to Gari in Abeokuta suburb, Ogun State Nigeria. Credit: Anas Umar


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

APRA researchers feature in webinar on the impact of COVID-19 on food systems and livelihoods

On Wednesday, December 16, 11.00 – 12:00 GMT, a one hour webinar ‘‘The impact of COVID-19 on food systems and rural livelihoods in Africa’ will feature two presentations by John Thompson (SSRP Deputy Director, IDS Fellow and CEO of the APRA Programme) and Imogen Bellwood-Howard (SSRP Member, IDS Fellow and APRA Researcher).

They will discuss recent APRA work, providing policy-relevant insights into the differential impact of COVID-19 in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The presentations will be followed by a question and answer session chaired by Joseph Alcamo, Director of SSRP.

Visit our events page for more information. For more information about this event, please contact ssrp@sussex.ac.uk.


Feature photo credit: World Bank.

APRA showcase COVID-19 research at key conference in Tanzania

Following APRA Tanzania’s recent report on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania in October, the team has presented further evidence of the effects of COVID-19 on agricultural value chains in Africa.

Researchers Aida Isinika, Ntengua Mdoe, Gideon Boniface, Gilead Mlay, Devotha Kilave, Christopher Magomba and John Jeckoniah attended the Agricultural Society of Tanzania (AGREST) 12th Scientific Conference in Dodoma, 2-4 December 2020, with the theme ‘Unleashing the potential of food systems to enhance intra-African agriculture trade.’

Gideon Boniface presents his paper. Credit: APRA Tanzania

On the opening day of the event, Gideon Boniface presented a paper on ‘Effect of COVID19 on agricultural value chains in Tanzania: The case of the rice value chain in Morogoro region’.  Several points were highlighted:

  • The COVID -19 crisis brought rice surplus due to significant reduction of trade from neighbouring countries;
  • Most traders now depend on the local market, which has also shrunk due to reduced income;
  • Farmers’ purchasing power has significantly declined;
  • 58% of the respondents reported a decline in their living standards;
  • Reduced rice paddy production next year;
  • Urgent  measures to be taken to address the liquidity problem facing farmers. 

The paper was also summarised in APRA Tanzania’s recent two part blog series ‘Rice value chain: has life returned to normal after lifting of COVID-19 restrictions in Tanzania?’ (Click here to read the blogs).

Conference in progress. Credit: Calvin Gwabara, SUA media

Ntengua Mdoe then presented a paper on ‘Youth participation in commercial rice farming in Kilombero Valley, Tanzania’.

On the second day of the event, Aida Isinika  presented a paper called ‘Rice exports, an untapped potential in Tanzania: Factors limiting rice commercialisation in Mngeta, Kilombero valley’.

The APRA presentations were amongst 38 scientific research papers presented to over 80 participants from across Tanzania who attended the conference, including academics, researchers, NGO representatives and government officials led by retired Prime Minister, Hon. Mizengo Pinda, who was the guest of honour.

Ntengua Mdoe welcomes retired Prime Minister, Hon. Mizengo Pinda. Credit: Calvin Gwabara, SUA media

Goals of conference

The theme of the conference was “Unleashing the Potential of food systems to enhance Intra-African Agricultural Trade.”  The outbreaks of the COVID-19 pandemic and the responses to the crisis has created deep structural problems in the way our food system works with the shrinkage of the global and local food supply in particular in many countries, which has resulted in a ‘food emergency’ being declared by the UN.

Conference organisers, AGREST, defined the “food emergency” as, first, the difference between rural and urban food prices due to the break in connection between the food supply in rural regions and the food demand in urban areas. Secondly, they highlighted smallholders’ restricted access to inputs, which disrupted preparations for subsequent production season. Thirdly, they underlined that agri-businesses only had a limited capability to cope with severe disruptions such, as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Aida Isinika presents a gift to Hon. Pinda. Credit: Calvin Gwabara, SUAMEDIA

To respond to the situation and seek some answers, the following questions were posed in AGREST’s call for papers for presentation and discussion at the conference:

1. How should food systems be transformed to meet the rural and urban demands while ensuring sustainability?

2. What initiatives have been and or are being taken to ensure that food systems transformations contribute to the attainment of SDGs?

3. What kind of policy frameworks are needed to foster sustainable food systems?

4. How can we better nature domestic and intra-African Trade for improved resilience?

Group photo of AGREST conference attendees. Credit: Calvin Gwabara, SUAMEDIA

Other conferences attended by APRA

In what was a very busy week for APRA Tanzania, Ntengua Mdoe also presented two papers based on the APRA Study to the Tanzania Animal Science Association (TSAP) and the Tanzania Society of Agricultural Extension (TSAE), in Dodoma, 2-9 December 2020. The papers were:  “Agropastoralists and rice commercialisation in Kilombero valley, Tanzania”  for TSAP and  “The effects of formal education and agricultural extension on rice productivity in Kilombero valley:  Implications for agro-industrial development in Tanzania. 


Feature photo credit: Calvin Gwabara, SUAMEDIA

Rice value chain: has life returned to normal after lifting of COVID-19 restrictions in Tanzania? (2)


In part two of this blog series, APRA Tanzania researchers Ntengua Mdoe, Gilead Mlay and Gideon Boniface use data from follow-up interviews with raw rice traders and the hospitality business in Morogoro and Mbeye regions, before drawing a conclusion on the way forward.

For the first blog on their interviews with farmers, processors and input suppliers, click here.

This blog is linked to APRA Round One and Round Two country reports on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Written by Ntengua Mdoe, Gilead Mlay and Gideon Boniface

Part two: Experiences from follow up interviews with raw rice traders

Previous COVID-19 blogs have indicated that the Tanzanian Government’s decision to close educational institutions and suspend big social and other gatherings on 17th March 2020 to prevent the spread of the pandemic negatively affected rice businesses.

The decision to remove most of the control measures (listed in part one of this blog series) taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19, effective from 29th June 2020, except the enforcement of the WHO health standards was well received by the rice value chain actors, including those who stepped out of the value chain. This blog highlights experiences of the value chain actors on the effect of the government decision on their businesses through follow-up interviews with the same actors interviewed in June 2020 as presented below

Effect on hospitality businesses  

The follow-up interviews conducted by the APRA Tanzania team covered owners of hospitality industry businesses, including hotels, restaurants and other eateries selling rice recipes in Morogoro municipality who were interviewed in June 2020 to determine the effect of COVID-19 control measures on their business. The control measures that affected their businesses included the closure of educational institutions, the ban on big social and other gatherings, restriction of international flights, and the enforcement of the WHO health standards (such as the costs associated with providing washing facilities for clients). 

The removal of the first three measures at the end June 2020 led to recovery of businesses in the hospitality industry. The interviewed businesses highlighted the positive effect of the government decision, as the number of customers has been increasing over time. However, they indicated the recovery is slow because of the following reasons:

  • Fear of the pandemic among potential customers is still prevailing.
  • Low purchasing power of potential customers resulting from low business during period with   COVID-19 control measures.
  • Travel restrictions prevailing in a number of counties with potential visitors to Tanzania especially tourists.
Rice traders in Morogoro waiting for customers. Credit: Gideon Boniface

Effect on domestic traders of raw rice

All categories of the interviewed domestic traders of raw rice reported that, contrary to the negative impact experienced before the removal of the COVID-19 control measures, they have been experiencing a slight increase in rice revenue due to an increase in the number of buyers and a slight increase in rice prices. On average, rice retail prices in Morogoro municipality have increased from TZS 1,300 ($0.56) per kg of grade 1 rice during COVID-19 to TZS 1,600 ($0.69) after the removal most of the COVID-19 control measures. However, prevailing prices of low quality rice grades remain unchanged.

Effect on inter-regional (export) traders

The experience of exporters of rice to neighbouring countries of Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Zambia, Malawi and DRC Congo on the effect of removal of COVID-19 control measures is mixed. Some processors have stopped exporting rice despite the removal of the cross-border physical barriers while others are still exporting, although in lower quantities than the pre-COVID period. The interviewed traders who are exporting rice to Zambia reported that the prevailing charge for a truck transporting rice across the Tanzania-Zambia border is more than twice the charge during the pre-COVID period – from TZS 300,000 ($ 128.21) to the prevailing charge of TZS 700,000 ($ 299.15) per 30 tons-truck.

Besides the high transport charges at the Tanzania borders, rice export trade has been affected by a decline in export demand. Most neighbouring countries are still restricting gatherings and movements that are affecting cross-border trade, implying that domestic traders will largely depend on local demand for rice, estimated at about 6 million tons, which is lower than the estimated current supply of about 8 million tons. Like the processors, they have piles of paddy and milled rice in their warehouses. Some of the exporters with processing facilities are resorting to provision of processing services.

A processor/exporter’s stock of paddy to be processed as rice export trade recovers. Credit: Gideon Boniface

Conclusion

Evidence from the follow-up interviews with the various actors in the rice value chain indicates that the business across the rice value chain is gradually returning back to normal after the government’s decision on 29th June 2020 to remove most of the restrictive measures taken to prevent the spread of the pandemic. However, this gradual revival suggests that a full recovery may take longer, not only due to the COVID19  control measures still existing in neighbouring countries that limit cross border trade, but also due to international travel restrictions in other foreign countries that limit visitors to Tanzania.

This suggests that it is unlikely that most of the businesses will be able to meet their operational costs and meet debt obligations. To sustain the rice business, the actors need liquidity support in terms of accessing and making good use of any government established survival fund for small businesses. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has funds earmarked for bailing out COVID-19 affected businesses. This should be complemented by a revision of the repayment terms of the funds borrowed by the businesses before the COVID-19 pandemic as directed by the Bank of Tanzania.

Regarding facilitation of cross-border trade, a regional committee has been established to coordinate the implementation of guidelines and facilitate the resolution of operational issues at borders during the COVID-19 pandemic. These guidelines include allowing cargo trucks to cross the borders if they submit certificates from the member state that they have been screened and are have no COVID-19 disease. What remains is authorities at the borders to fast track verification of the certificate to avoid delays at the borders.


Feature photo credit: Nkumi Mtimgwa/CIFOR


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Working Paper 47: How Conflicts Affect Land Expansion by Smallholder Farmers: Evidence from Nigeria

Written by, Adesoji Adelaja, Justin George, Thomas Jayne, Milu Muyanga, Titus Awokuse, Adebayo Aromolaran and Lenis Saweda O. Liverpool-Tasie.

The expansion of smallholder farms into larger farm sizes is a key strategy for growing agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa. This strategy could simultaneously expand farm incomes while addressing poverty since the majority of farms in sub-Saharan Africa are smallholder farms. There is limited existing research on the possible role of conflicts in stymying the ability of smallholder farmers to transition into larger-scale farming and on the impacts of conflicts in areas that are not directly within active conflict zones. In this paper, we investigate the impacts of conflict on the ability of smallholder farmers to transition to larger scales in two regions that are not in a traditional conflict zone, by developing a household utility maximisation model to explain choices made by farm households in response to conflict.

COVID-19 reinforces pre-existing market risks for pastoralists in northern Kenya


Following his blog on the winners and losers in livestock commercialisation in northern Kenya and the accompanying working paper, researcher, pastoral development and dryland management specialist Guyo Roba examines the impact of COVID-19 market risks, explaining how strengthening their resilience is a key priority.

Access this previous blog, and Working Paper 39, here.

This blog is linked to APRA Round One and Round Two country reports on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Kenya.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Written by Guyo Roba

Livestock represent a marketable asset owned by pastoralists in northern Kenya, as well as other arid and semi-arid southern rangelands. Livestock marketing in these rural communities are highly personal exchanges, emphasised by more familiar relations between traders and pastoralists, particularly at the informal markets where the organisational structure or presence of authorities are minimal, and in a more controlled interactions at the formal markets. The latter offer opportunities for buyers and sellers to congregate in large numbers, and trade in substantial volumes. Although the numbers of market participants are usually very high in relatively vibrant markets that are locally referred to as “hot” markets, the number of both the market participants and animals transacted varies from one market to another.

Typically, transactions in these markets involve lengthy negotiations between buyers and sellers, while deals are usually sealed through closer social interactions that involve a seller and buyer holding hands, raising and releasing mid-way to signify closed deal(s). Since most local markets have actors with common ethnic identity, other kinship discussions also take place.  As such, markets also attract other people interested in dialogues that go beyond price negotiations to other exchanges related to the potential of grazing lands, animal health, and state of security in specific area. However, such ethnic connections cannot cushion pastoralists to deal with multiple risks, such as supply uncertainty, price volatility, high transaction costs, post-harvest losses and other market risks.

Livestock market, Marsabit County, Kenya. Credit: Fredrick Omondi

Common risks in livestock trade

Risks are common and highly unpredictable events that distinguish between success and failure in livestock trade. Risks occur at all stages of the marketing channel, from the purchase, collection stage through the transport to their final sale at a terminal market. Several attributes of livestock trade increase risks and the likelihood of losses, including live transportation, the high volume and value of animals moved, and the credit sales and possible payment default at the terminal markets. These risks applies to all, irrespective of the experience of a market actor, the scale and geographical scope of his/her trade activities or affiliation to a particular ethnic group.

In long-distance livestock trade, the risks increase towards the terminal markets. This include the risk of losing animal during the collection, the danger of the animal catching diseases while being hauled over long-distances, livestock thefts, loss from asphyxiation from poor and frequently overloaded conditions of livestock trucks. Weight loss or mortality is also more likely to occur when trucks are delayed for several hours at the multiple police roadblocks.

Although both pastoralists and local traders have adapted to mitigate common risks through strategies like collaboration on purchase and sales, pooling working capitals and sharing of information, the level of risks are aggravated with the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic, which is already disrupting food supply chains, including along pastoral value chains.

COVID-19 reinforces existing risks

The impacts of COVID-19 pandemic in pastoral areas of northern Kenya, due to transport restrictions and quarantine measures, are likely to impede the access of pastoralists to input and output markets, thereby decreasing their cash flow, profit margins and reinforced already precarious situation of pastoral and agro-pastoral households. Shortages of market labour due to COVID 19 travel restrictions have also widened, which could slow market activities, most notably for labour-intensive activity of collecting livestock prior to transportation to terminal markets.  COVID 19 movement restrictions have also affected the itineraries of traders from outside pastoral areas to visit and purchase animals. This has led to external traders offering relatively better prices to pastoralist.

Similarly, the closure of international transport routes, particularly the sheep and goats export to Middle East countries may also result in reduced incomes for traders, livestock keepers and other actors along the meat export supply chains. So far, Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait have all closed their doors to livestock imports from Kenya and other countries in the region.

The intermittent closure of live animal markets by the government have affected the operations of both formal markets as well as informal market in more remote areas and by extension contributed to liquidity challenges among pastoral households and disrupted their livelihoods. Meanwhile, the retention of some level of restrictions such as night curfews makes it difficult for pastoralists and buyers to travel to markets either for fear of being contaminated or because of the high cost of transport. This limits the number of external traders and buyers in local markets and overall affects price competitiveness, household incomes and household purchasing power.  Together, these weaken households’ food security and preparedness to manage drought related stress.

Way forward

Strengthening resilience of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists facing the negative impacts of the coronavirus pandemic is a priority.  The immediate intervention should aim to maintain productivity and strengthen livelihood and resilience of the vulnerable actors by supporting existing community safety nets. This could entail provision of targeted food support to vulnerable households, short-term credits, subsidies or financial support to assure business continuity for traders, agro-vets, butchers and other actors.

In the long term, strengthening of regional value chains should be a priority to diversify risks and increase resilience to future shocks. ASAL counties should increase investments to fast-track regionalisation of livestock trade, operationalise abattoirs and engage private sector players in bulk meat supply chains. This offers both the alternative trade avenue and ensure seamless connectivity.

Invest in value chain management information systems at national and county levels. The weak information system in livestock trade implied that the social restrictions of COVID-19, led to slump in market activities. As such, investing in appropriate ICT technologies and infrastructures can offer mechanisms to crowdsource market prices to make real-time price information available to buyers and sellers and offer a stronger platform for open purchase and sales orders. Success will result in improved coordination and tighter market linkages that ICT solutions can provide.


Cover photo: Herder drives his goats in Marsabit County. Credit: Credit: Fredrick Omondi


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

APRA Nigeria training for data collection field work

The APRA Nigeria Work Stream 1 team have been busy in recent weeks, returning to the field to collect the second round of panel data for their research on the pace at which farm size distributions are changing in Nigeria. The research has a particular focus on the rise of medium-scale farms and their influence on agricultural commercialisation and livelihoods of farm households.

CAPI training workshop. Credit: APRA Nigeria

Originally planned for April/May 2020, the field work was delayed due to the current COVID-19 pandemic. While conditions in Nigeria are now such that the data collection in the field can proceed, additional measures have, understandably, had to be put in place to ensure the safety of all the research team and enumerators, as well as the communities who will take part in the data collection surveys to mitigate and reduce any risk of transmission of COVID-19. For example, each day of the training has started with a daily temperature check and regular hand-washing facilities have been made available. Workshop participants have also worn face masks during training and out in the field.

Participants have their temperatures checked prior to entering the workshop. Credit: APRA Nigeria

The computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) workshop has been held with 30 enumerators, six supervisors, and two quality control officers at Peak Olam Suites located close to Federal University of Agriculture (FUNAAB) in Abeokuta, the capital of Ogun State from November 30 – December 5 2020. The training workshop has been led by Adebayo Aromolaran of Adekunle Ajasin University, Nigeria and supported by Elijah Obayelu of FUNAAB and Fadlullah Issa of the National Agricultural Extension Research and Liaison Services, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. Training in Survey Solutions – the data software being used – has been overseen by Louis Hodey from the APRA Ghana team, supported by Amrita Saha of the APRA Data Management Team from the Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, UK, and Milu Muyanga of Michigan State University, USA.

A lady peels a cassava during the survey instrument pretest exercise. Credit: APRA Nigeria

The team have also been out to pretest the survey instrument in five villages close to Abeokuta; namely Fami, Erinle, Adenle, Akintobi and Adao. As displayed in the photos, the team are happy to help assist the respondents and can be seen peeling cassava while the lady is being interviewed!


Feature photo credit: Enumerators concentrate during the CAPI workshop. Credit: APRA Nigeria

The Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Africa

Add this event to your calendar

Wednesday 16 December 11:00 until 12:00 on Zoom


Speaker: John Thompson and Imogen Bellwood-Howard
Part of the series: SSRP Webinar Series on the Pandemic and Sustainability

Register to attend this Sussex Sustainability Research Programme (SSRP) webinar: ‘The impact of COVID-19 on food systems and rural livelihoods in Africa’.

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, the United Nations reported that more than 250 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa faced severe food insecurity. Incomes for farmers were lower in real terms than anywhere else in the world, and more than 30% of children were stunted, partly due to poverty and poor diets.

Since then, the World Food Programme and other agencies have warned that COVID-19 could cause one of the worst global food crises since World War II and predicted a doubling of the number of people going hungry over the next year – more than half of them in Africa.

The Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC), a partnership of over 100 African and UK researchers working on agricultural policy issues, has been conducting a number of comparative studies to assess how COVID-19 measures and restrictions are affecting local food systems, rural livelihoods and value chains. 

This one hour webinar will feature two presentations by John Thompson (SSRP Deputy Director, IDS Fellow and CEO of the APRA Programme) and Imogen Bellwood-Howard (SSRP Member, IDS Fellow and APRA Researcher) discussing recent APRA work, providing policy-relevant insights into the differential impact of COVID-19 in Sub-Saharan Africa. The presentations will be followed by a question and answer session chaired by Joseph Alcamo, Director of SSRP.

Register now to attend this free webinar that will take place on Zoom.

For any enquiries about this event, please contact ssrp@sussex.ac.uk.

About SSRP

The Sussex Sustainability Research Programme (SSRP) is committed to delivering science for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Building on the University of Sussex’s tradition of interdisciplinarity, SSRP provides critical research focused on identifying possible trade-offs and synergies among the SDGs for achieving global goals for humanity and the environment. Read the blogs on SSRP’s forum for the pandemic and sustainability.

About APRA

Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) is a six-year research programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC). APRA aims to identify the most effective pathways to agricultural commercialisation that empower women, reduce rural poverty, and improve food and nutrition security in sub-Saharan Africa. Through in-depth interdisciplinary, comparative research across nine countries, APRA is generating high-quality evidence and policy-relevant insights on more inclusive pathways to agricultural commercialisation. Find out more and read blogs about APRA’s response to COVID-19.


Feature photo credit: World Bank.

Unequal land, unequal societies


This post was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

A really important report from the International Land Coalition and Oxfam is just out called ‘Uneven Ground: Land Inequality at the Heart of Unequal Societies’, along with 17 supporting papers. Through new analysis it shows that land inequality is even larger than previously thought, and that this has dramatic effects on poor people’s livelihoods, particularly those of women and young people.

In the rhetoric around the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) there’s lots of talk about rising inequality, and pleas to ‘leave no one behind’, but most discussion barely touches on land, despite land access being vital for so many people’s lives. The corporate-driven concentration of land holding has been well researched around discussions of the ‘land grab’, but this report goes further, digging into the dynamics of inequality and how changes in the agri-food system are driving it.

New analysis, dramatic conclusions

The report adopts a new methodology for exploring land inequalities, taking account not just of patterns of land holding and farm size, but the significance of multiple holdings across a corporate portfolio, land value and the presence of landless people. This shifts the metric dramatically, highlighting levels of hidden inequality so far not exposed.

The report estimates that there are around 608 million farms in the world with most being small family farms. But it is the largest 1% of farm operations that make use of more than 70% of the world’s farmland, and these are linked into global, corporate led food systems that in turn support this inequality. The 80% of farms that are smallholdings of under two hectares are by contrast excluded from the benefits of such markets. The report’s extended analysis of land value shows how, “the wealthiest 10% of rural populations across the sampled countries capture 60% of agricultural land value, while the poorest 50% of rural populations, who are generally more dependent on agriculture, capture only 3% of land value.”

Patterns vary across the world of course, but levels of land inequality are high everywhere and are rising. Not surprisingly, land inequality is particularly high in Latin America, the US and parts of Europe, where smallholder farming has all but disappeared in many farming areas. The UK is of course a stark example, and has been discussed on this blog before (see here and here).

In Asia, the huge numbers of smallholders make inequality measures just of land holdings less high, but when you take account of the equally huge numbers of landless people, then the measure changes quite dramatically. Under any measure, patterns of land inequality are not as high in Africa, but they are rising. And the post 2007-08 land grab documented widely shows how land investments were concentrated in Africa with, according to the Land Matrix, 42% of deals across 10 million hectares over a decade. As countries seek out investment, especially in cash-strapped, debt-ridden post-COVID-19 times, the temptation to allocate notionally ‘empty’ or ‘idle’ land is high. Combine this with corrupt governance practices with deals to be made with politicians and others, the likelihood of the land grab accelerating again is high.

Focusing exclusively on ‘farms’ and ‘holdings’ of course misses key populations making use of land that do not use land in this way. This is a gap in an otherwise good report. Whether shifting cultivators, hunter-gatherers or pastoralists, such populations typically suffer the brunt of land expropriation. The inequality is just as keenly felt, but it is not measured in terms of the metrics used here.

Redistribution and development

The report has a lot of good recommendations, although none of them are that new. Good land governance, land taxation, effective land registries, corporate and investor accountability, protecting the commons and women’s land rights, building sustainable and equitable production and food systems, encouraging inclusive value chains and so on have all long been talked about. But the big question is of course the political economy of inequality: why is that such a pattern is acceptable? Why isn’t redistribution at the centre of the sustainable development agenda? The report unfortunately is rather quiet on this.

The period of the great land reforms in the 1960s and 70s resulted in major decreases in land inequality. As the report shows, these gains have been massively reversed since. Through various examples, cautionary tales are told – for example of Ecuador – where land reforms occurred only to be reversed by land consolidation and the extension of large-scale capitalist farming.

The report however is seemingly rather equivocal on redistribution, saying land reforms can be unsettling, redistributive policies have to be ‘aligned’ to socio-economic goals and that when post-land reform support limited (as is frequently the case), this can undermine the benefits leading to reconcentration subsequently. But land redistribution surely must be a major response to land inequality, even if (of course) inequalities in the wider agro-food systems must be addressed also. So it was a bit disappointing that the report was a little coy on the subject.

There are many possibilities for land redistribution and shifts in its use. And this is not just in the so-called ‘developing world’. For example, the Downland Estate around Brighton in the UK is owned by the city council and is leased out to tenant farmers. They have continued to consolidate land into larger chunks, expanding arable farming and reducing access land through hunting/pheasant enclosures. But moves are afoot, pushed by citizen alliances in the city and beyond, to regulate land use differently, and allow smaller scale farm holdings to be allocated as tenancies, helping to transform the local food system and local livelihoods, widening access, as well as improving environmental care. If rethinking land and its use is possible in the UK, surely it must be possible elsewhere. The report could have been more ambitious in my view.

Missing the Zimbabwe experience

Rather surprisingly, Zimbabwe is not mentioned at all in the report. Still too much of a hot potato even for the ILC and Oxfam maybe? As the most significant land redistribution of the past several decades, it surely offers important lessons. A massively unequal land holding system was redistributed with mixed effects – many positive, some negative – as discussed on this blog multiple times. In many respects, especially through the transfer of land to smallholders, Zimbabwe implemented what the report is arguing for, offering a new trajectory for agrarian development.

In Zimbabwe, as has been seen again and again elsewhere, the failure to provide the needed supportive infrastructure of investment, regulation, taxation, land administration and so on may potentially undermine the gains of land reform, as this blog has long argued. And if the pressures of capital are the same as elsewhere, the process of land grabbing of extensive areas taken by smallholders will be an issue to look out for.

Zimbabwe is broke and claims it is ‘open for business’ and, with a deeply corrupt polity, the conditions are right for a dangerous reversal of land reform in the name of ‘investment’. Indeed, on the margins of the country this is already happening, whether in quasi-privatised national parks or in new investments in commercial agriculture.

Land and power

The report concludes that “reversing land inequality to any significant extent will require a deep transformation in power relations. Solutions will require major changes in political, economic, and legal norms. They will require action that strikes at the root of what makes societies and economies unequal and unsustainable”. Absolutely. But, as the Zimbabwe experience has shown, this will require more than just ‘inclusive processes’ and ‘involving civil society’.

Challenging inequality is a struggle against powerful interests, and redistribution always affects the powerful – which is of course why it often doesn’t happen. Moving beyond the easy rhetoric about inequality being at the heart of the SDGs and central for tackling sustainability and development together, land must be at the centre of this inevitably political struggle.


Image credit. International Land Coalition

Rice value chain: has life returned to normal after lifting of COVID-19 restrictions in Tanzania? (1)


In the first of a two part blog series, researchers from APRA Tanzania follow up on their earlier blog series on the COVID-19 coping strategies of rice value chain actors. In this blog, they use data from follow-up interviews with farmers, processors & input suppliers in Morogoro and Mbeya regions to determine what difference there has been since the easing of lockdown in late June.

Part two examines the effect on the raw rice traders and the hospitality industry, and a way forward. Read it, here.

This blog is linked to APRA Round One and Round Two country reports on the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania.

Read the full APRA synthesis report on the Rapid Assessment of the Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa, here.


Written by Ntengua Mdoe, Gilead Mlay and Gideon Boniface

Part one: rice farmers,  processors input suppliers and financial service providers

Previous COVID-19 blogs have indicated that the Tanzanian Government’s decision to close educational institutions and suspend big social and other gatherings on 17th March 2020 to prevent the spread of the pandemic negatively affected rice businesses.  The effects include but not limited to:

  • Complete loss in revenue from food services offered to educational institutions;
  • Substantial decline in revenue from provision of food services to seminars and workshops as the measures to control the spread of COVID-19 pandemic limited services to offer to gatherings with a maximum of 15 people;
  • Costs associated with provision of washing facilities to clients in accordance with the World Health Organization (WHO) health standards despite limited number of clients;
  • Compensating laid-off workers  in kind in the form of food items such as rice and beans and;
  • Difficulties in meeting loan repayment obligations due to a decline in cash flow.

The decision to remove most of the control measures taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19, effective from 29th June 2020, except the enforcement of the WHO health standards was well received by the rice value chain actors, including those who stepped out of the value chain. This blog highlights experiences of the value chain actors on the effect of the government decision on their businesses through follow-up interviews with the same actors interviewed in June 2020 as presented below

Effects on rice farmers

Telephone interviews with some farmers in Morogoro and Mbeya regions show that they have been experiencing a slow recovery in paddy business since the government decision to remove most of the COVID-19 control measures. The number of traders buying paddy at the farm level has been increasing since July 2020, resulting into increase in farm-gate prices. In Morogoro region, paddy price declined by about 41% as a result of COVID-19 and then increased by 21% after the removal of the COVID-19 control measures while in Mbeya Region, paddy price declined by about 36% as a result of COVID-19 and then increased by 27% after the removal of the COVID-19 control measures as shown in the table below. However, the prevailing prices in both regions are still below the pre-COVID period prices by 29% in Morogoro and 19% in Mbeya. The interviewed farmers indicated that their purchasing power for rice production inputs has declined significantly as they have to sell more rice to purchase the same amount of inputs such as fertilisers they purchased before the COVID-pandemic. 

Changes in price of rice paddy

Effect on input suppliers and financial service providers

The interviewed suppliers of rice seeds, fertilisers and pesticides in major rice producing regions of Morogoro and Mbeya indicated that the removal of the COVID-19 measures has had little impact on their business because the new rice season is just starting. However, they thought a decline in demand for rice production inputs, due to the prevailing low paddy prices, very likely. However, financial service providers indicated a positive effect from the removal of most COVID-19 control measures, as many actors (farmers, traders and processors) with outstanding loans are gradually meeting their credit obligations.

A rice processing warehouse in Morogoro, Tanzania. Credit: Gideon Boniface.

Effect on rice processors

Like rice farmers, rice processors have been experiencing a slow recovery of their businesses since the end of June 2020, when the government removed most COVID-19 control measures.  All of the interviewed processors were operating under capacity, despite the increase in the quantity of processed rice compared to when the restrictions were active.  However, the current operating capacity is still below the pre-COVID-19 period capacity (before March 2020). Most of the processors have large stocks of paddy in their warehouses awaiting processing when business returns to normal. They indicated that they were facing financial cash flow problems, thus failing to cover operational costs or to pay outstanding loans.

The second blog in this series looks at the effect of the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions on the raw rice traders and the hospitality industry.


Cover photo credit: Malingerist on Flickr


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

eDialogue: What Future for Small-Scale Farming? Emerging themes

5th eDialogue, ‘Wrap-up and Policy Implications’,
25th November


By Jim Woodhill, Ken Giller and John Thompson

Tuesday 10 November was another fantastic session of our eDialogue series on ‘What Future for Small-Scale Farming?: Inclusive Transformation in Challenging Times’.

The panellists explored the complementary roles of commercialisation, food production for self-consumption and social protection in tackling farming household poverty and poor nutrition.

Now with four eDialogue sessions under our belt, a set of very thought-provoking perspectives are starting to crystallise. They have profound policy implications.

Achieving the SDGs hinges on transforming small-scale farming. Let’s step back to the fundamental issue. The world has an estimated 500 million small-scale farmers. In terms of rural households this represents a population of some 2.5 – 3 billion people – over a third of the world’s population. On the one hand, this group produces much of the food consumed in low- and middle-income countries. On the other, this group encompasses the majority of those who still live in extreme poverty and suffer hunger. A transformation of small-scale farming is fundamental to eradicating poverty and hunger, to feeding the world sustainably and well, and to tackling the climate crisis.

Small-scale farming households are very diverse. In thinking about this necessary transformation, our eDialogue panellists time and time again stressed the point that small-scale farmers are not a homogenous group. We often hear it said that there are no “one size fits all” solutions. We would go further and say that generalisations are not only misleading, they can be very dangerous and lead to ineffective policy directions and sub-optimal outcomes.

Gender dimensions are critical. In understanding household diversity, it is critical to understanding the roles and changing role of women. For example, as male members of households seek employment outside the farm, either locally or further afield, the women take on greater farming responsibilities, but often without commensurate decision-making power, access to finance and expertise and security of land tenure. Women’s and girls’ empowerment remains a critical element of any transformation strategy for small-scale farming.

Most small-scale farming households don’t just farm. It is vital to recognise that rural households who farm are not only farmers. Farming households have a diversity of income sources. Household members engage in a combination of farming, off-farm micro-enterprises, rural wage labour, and migrating to work in urban areas. Poorer households may also rely on various forms of social protection. A shift of perspective is needed from “small-scale farmers” to “rural households who also farm”, recognising that farming is often just one of several important income streams.

The number of small-scale farms are not declining as economies develop. There is another critical observation. In OECD countries, economic development during the 20th Century saw a very rapid decline in farm numbers and significant land consolidation. Although there is a trend towards consolidation of farms in some countries of East Asia, this is not happening in most low- and middle-income countries. In fact, in South Asia and Africa farm numbers are increasing and farm sizes are shrinking, while perhaps counter-intuitively in parallel there is also an increase in the number of medium-sized farms. Two factors are at play. First, increasing populations without commensurate employment opportunities create an increasing demand for land. Second, without employment security, social protection, health insurance or pension schemes, many people hang on to their land as security. This occurs even if the land area is very small and even when they have substantial off-farm income. This situation is also leading to forms of informal and temporary land leasing and consolidation, in ways that enable people to maintain their legal or customary title.

Most small-scale farmers can’t make a living from farming. Against this background, we need to understand the profitability of farming. The harsh reality is that for many farmers growing staple crops – or even traditional cash crops such as coffee and cocoa – on small areas of land it is hard to make a living, given the low productivity and current market prices. Production of low-value commodities on small parcels of land generates small, often negligible, surpluses that make it difficult for the household to cover the basic income requirements for daily living. Some crop sales by poor semi-subsistence households are, therefore, not sales of surplus, but so-called “distress sales” to meet immediate cash needs, even if the household then has to buy in quantities of the same crop a few months later – when prices are higher. This makes livelihood diversification essential. Very small-scale farmers who are unable to diversify their livelihoods remain the poorest and most malnourished group of people on the planet.

On its own, linking farmers to markets is not a solution. The last decades have seen a development ethos around the idea of linking farmers to markets and agricultural commercialisation as a core strategy for tackling rural poverty. On its own, this focus on ‘making markets work’ is not a solution for the complex challenges faced by a majority of small-scale farming households. There is a reality of how much can be produced on a given area of land. With the very small land holdings many farm families maintain, the numbers simply don’t add up for the many crops they grow and the prices they receive for their produce. It is not a question of investing in “sustainable intensification” to increase yields by 20, 50 or even 100 percent nor of improving prices by similar amounts. Most small-scale farmers would need a multifold increase in farm income to get anywhere close to a living income. Without doubt, connecting to markets is important, but only part of the issue. It is what can be earned from producing for markets from a given area of land combined with other sources of off-farm income that ultimately matters.

A Pareto Principle for small-scale farming? The economic value of growth in the food sector will be very substantial over the coming decades. This leads to the argument that there will be significant opportunities for small-scale farming households in agriculture. However, this assumption needs to be unpacked carefully. It is already clear that a small minority of larger, more viable small- and medium-scale farmers produce the bulk of food being consumed by urban populations. Future demands for food will be for high-value perishables and will have requirements for quality, safety, traceability and volumes of delivery which create substantial barriers for most small-scale producers. The degree to which future food demands will be inclusive and translate into viable futures for large numbers of more marginal, small-scale producers is questionable at best.

Food system opportunities beyond the farm. Growth in food demand can help to drive overall rural economic development and create a diversity of both on- and off-farm employment and enterprise opportunities. The pathway out of poverty for many small-scale farmers is most likely through diversified livelihood strategies where they become more integrated into off-farm economic activity and much greater levels of value addition. In the medium term, many will take up these opportunities while still doing some farming. The scale of off-farm food system employment opportunities along and beyond the value chain needs to be better understood. These are the places likely to create multiplier effects in the wider rural economy to drive structural transformation.

Don’t forget informal markets. While some supply chains are formalising, for the foreseeable future informal and semi-formal markets will dominate domestic food trade in most countries. They have supply networks that may stretch over great distances. At the consumption end, these systems meet the growing demand for prepared foods, with the role of women and youth being particularly important throughout. Optimising inclusive on and off-farm economic opportunities in these markets is essential for reducing rural household poverty. Policies need to be geared towards supporting more pluralistic arrangements, strengthening both informal and formal marketing channels to meet the growing demands of a diverse set of rural and urban consumers. At the same time, it is important to recognise that employment and trading conditions in the informal sector can be very exploitive, making it difficult for people to escape poverty and move towards a living income.

The need for holistic approaches. Tackling the poverty, food insecurity and malnutrition faced by many rural households whose livelihoods largely or partly depend on farming will require a multi-pronged and integrated approach. Strategies need to be targeted to the specific circumstances and needs of particular households and particular geographic locations. Broadly, four elements need to be integrated into a coordinated approach:

  1. Enabling inclusive commercialisation opportunities for those who have the potential for farming to be a viable element of their livelihood mix, with a particular focus on diversifying production systems to support more nutrient-rich diets.
  2. Optimising the potential for farming households to improve their nutrition and food security through what they can produce for self-consumption.
  3. Extending, targeting and innovating social protection to support those who are most vulnerable, to provide better risk management and insurance mechanisms and to support people to become economically active and self-reliant.
  4. Creating enabling conditions for farming households to diversify into off-farm income earning activities.

An enabling rural environment remains critical. Alongside initiatives that target the needs of individual households, there is also a need to put in place the public goods and services, including infrastructure, telecommunications, energy, education and health services, and sustained business investment and dynamic small and medium-scale enterprises which are needed to underpin the overall economic development of any rural area. Striving to create a vibrant rural environment where people actively choose to live – including young people – is key for the long-term future.

Getting the data. The eDialogue posited many observations about the trends and emerging opportunities and challenges for small-scale farmers. But the message was clear – the data does not exist to adequately understand what is happening locality by locality or country by country. There is a big gap in knowing who is on a pathway to greater prosperity and who is being left behind. Targeted and effective support strategies need to be based on a much more granular understanding of the livelihood strategies of diverse range of farming households and how their circumstances are changing. Investing in longitudinal, multi-sited, interdisciplinary research that can track livelihood trajectories over time and space and assess differential outcomes of various strategies and interventions will be essential if we are to fill those knowledge gaps.

Utilising digital potential. In all aspect of transforming small-scale farming digital solutions are seen as critical. This includes generating data, providing market information and access, payment systems, insurance, banking and finance, providing targeted social protection, and providing technical services. However, it must be stressed that these are not a panacea. They cannot replace, but only enhance other public and private services that are essential for creating and sustaining a vibrant rural economy.

Services to society. Rethinking the contribution of small-scale farmers. Instead of looking at the plight of small-scale farmers as a problem to be solved, what happens if we look at how small-scale farming can be part of the solution to a wider set of societal challenges? Four areas are key, providing a more nutrient-rich and diverse diet for society at large, providing eco-services that protect the environment, carbon sequestration through land use, and diversified and attractive rural livelihood options that help avoid large out-migrations (which put unmanageable pressures on urban areas and exacerbate the problems of cross-border migration).

Diversification – an underlying theme. Across the eDialogue series, diversification has become a common thread that has bound the panel discussion together. The diversity of farming households. The diversifying nature of household livelihoods. The need to diversify food production and marketing arrangements to meet nutritional needs. The diverse ways in which small-scale farming can contribute to society’s needs. And the need for a diverse yet integrated set of support measures to enable a socially just, environmentally sustainable, nutritionally smart and a resilient transformation of small-scale farming.

Acknowledgment. This blog draws on the views and perspectives offered by the eDialogue panellists (listed below) in the first fours sessions of the eDialogue and we thank them very much for their inputs and insights.  The conclusions in this blog are those of the authors and may not necessarily be those of the panellists.

Panellists: Gilbert Houngbo, Jemimah Njuki, Milu Muyanga, Julio Berdegue, Avinash Kishore, Irene Annor Frempong, Theresa Ampadu-Boakye, Ajay Vir Jakhar, Kofi Takyi Asante, Regis Chikowo, Audax Rukonge, Hannington Odame, Steve Wiggins, Heitor Mancini Teixeira, Milena Umana, Claus Reiner, Maija Peltola, Alejandra Arce, Abdelbagi M Ismail, Aida Isinika, Martin T Muchero, Cyriaque Hakizimana, Adebayo Aromolaran, Aditi Mukherji, Sudha Narayana, Mekhala Krishnamurthy, Jeevika Weerahewa, Mamata Pradhan, Ranjitha Puskur, Grahame Dixie, Fabrizio Bresciani, Andrew Powell, Marlene Ramirez, Irish Baguilat, Tran Cong Than, Mario Herrero, Fábio Veras, Namukolo Covic, Felix Kwame Yeboah, Iris van der Velden, and Clara Colina


Feature image credit: Fruit Stall, Andrew Moore (CC BY-SA 2.0)

Abdel Ismail: Is small-scale farming changing for the better?


By Abdelbagi M. Ismail

The final blog in a four-part series highlights the reflections of Abdelbagi Ismail, Principal Scientist and Regional Representative at International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), on the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Foresight4Food, IFAD and APRA eDialogue session on the future of small-scale farming in Africa.


In any discussion about the future of small-scale farming in Africa, it’s critical to highlight that in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), about 33 million farms are small-scale and that this sector supports over 60% of the population. Yet, small-scale farmers are the poorest and most food insecure of all. SSA is also the region at most risk of food insecurity in the world, with the current dependence on food imports, especially cereals, population growth and stagnant agricultural production. However, the opportunities are there for this sector to grow and move forward, simultaneously sustaining productivity, while reducing hunger and poverty. The realisation of this potential in SSA largely depends on the growth of this sector, by improving and sustaining productivity, quality and competitiveness of farm products and access to markets.

Changes in African small-scale farming

Awareness of the potential of smallholder farming in SSA is now growing, as governments and stakeholders start to consider the opportunities for small-scale farms to realistically contribute to food and nutrition security in the region. This also seems to be high on some government agendas, with support for small-scale farming being incorporated into national strategies and policies, and investments being made in infrastructure, roads, irrigation systems, and so on. In addition, there is a growing number of technologies more specific to small-scale farming, which can help transform farming from the current traditional production systems into more modern systems, including small-scale mechanisation and new varieties of seeds. Farmers are also increasingly organised into cooperatives to enhance their bargaining power and secure better prices and access to market information than before. With these advances, as well as appropriate harvest and post-harvest handling and greater accessibility of inputs to smallholder farmers, such as fertilisers, the productivity of this sector could at least double, or even triple, judging by previously observed successes in rice farming, as in Asia.

Drivers of change

So, what is driving these changes? The first driver is the realisation that small-scale farmers have to move from being subsistence to commercial production farms, they have to be market oriented. Also, as urbanisation increases, there is an emerging need to meet the rising demand for food and good market value. The availability of technologies that weren’t previously accessible to smallholder farmers in SSA has also motivated transformation. Lastly, many governments have been prompted to realise the need to depend less on foreign imports and more on local production by fluctuating market prices and food availability in international markets, and by global disasters, such as COVID-19 and weather calamities.

Policy directions for moving forward

How can we move forward, though, to ensure the protection of smallholder farmers and provide incentives for them to increase production? I argue that the answer is policies. It is critical that governments provide assurance against exploitation, facilitate sustainable access to fair input and output markets, price guarantees and provide some sort of insurance against crop failures due to pests, diseases, pandemics and climate change adversities. Policies also need to be in place that speed the delivery of modern interventions, while ensuring capacity to adopt them, improve and sustain the value chains, support private sector engagement and provide direct access to input and output markets. Lastly, with more than 65% of the population in SSA under 25 years, policies that provide incentives for younger generations to engage in agriculture are more crucial than ever.


To learn more about the rest of the eDialogue series, click here

To download a printable PDF version of this blog, click here


Cover photo credit: Indian  National Academy of Agricultural Sciences (NAAS)


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Land and compensation in Zimbabwe: frequently asked questions


This blog was written by Ian Scoones and first appeared on Zimbabweland.

The debate about compensation of former white farmers in Zimbabwe continues to rage. The compensation agreement signed in July agreed a total amount of US$3.5 billion to pay for ‘improvements’ to the land that was expropriated. After 20 years of discussion, this was a major step forward. However, there seem to be multiple positions on the agreement and little consensus, along with much misunderstanding. However, some things are happening, and a joint resource mobilisation committee has been established with technical support from the World Bank and others.

Since my earlier blog on this subject, I have been asked many questions. Below are some of the frequently asked questions, and the responses I have offered (sorry, a bit long, but it’s complex). Although there are many remaining doubts and concerns, it remains my view that now is the time (tentatively and carefully) to move forward.

How is the money going to be raised? This is the big one. All sorts of ideas have been floated, but given the state of Zimbabwe’s economy and the lack of trust in the current government, it’s going to be tough. Some significant moves towards the demanded political reforms (also central to the Constitution) will be a prerequisite for any substantial debt deals with the international financial institutions. And with the whole world in debt and with economies depressed due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, this is not a good time to raise such amounts of money, even with novel bond instruments being suggested by some. However, there are other routes to paying off at least some compensation amounts that don’t involve raising huge sums in uncertain international markets – and at least getting the process started. As discussed below, revenue raised from land taxation, leveraged funds through bankable leases, joint venture arrangements, land swaps and donor investment in public goods could all contribute to elements of the compensation – perhaps quite a lot. A fund that held such revenues – a simpler mechanism than a frequently-touted land bank – could in turn be the vehicle for both paying compensation and also investing in agricultural recovery. Overall, if some progress is made, signalling a willingness to continue the process in good faith, there will be possibilities for further dialogue and new international market financing options down the line. There has to be a way out of the impasse, but it requires all parties to engage, and it will take time, but it’s the direction of movement that’s critical. The South Africans and the wider SADC community of nations can help with this, as can wider friends and allies of Zimbabwe, including the Chinese together with Western nations.

The compensation is only for improvements, what about the land? The painstaking calculation of the value of fixed improvements on farms taken over by land reform came to an agreed figure of US$ 3.5 billion. It is imprecise but it is important, as for the first time an agreement between the parties was reached. Paying it all in full and within expected timeframes will almost certainly be impossible. But the important thing is to show that the Zimbabwean government is serious and payments for improvements flow faster than before. But some argue that this is not enough and another equivalent amount will be needed to pay for the land. This runs against the cross-party agreement in the 2013 Constitution, approved in a national referendum, where compensation for land is only offered to land held under investment treaties (BIPPA farms) and, reflecting a deeply-problematic racial bias in the provision, ‘indigenous Zimbabweans’. While the Constitution points to the former colonial power as the potential payer of compensation for most land acquired during the land reform, no one – neither the Zimbabwean state nor the British – expect this to be realised. This was formulaic political positioning, seen as rhetoric rather than any real expectation. Yet some, referring to various court rulings, still think this is a possibility, and the lobbying of the UK government on this continues. To my mind, this is an unfortunate diversion, and is a route to the sabotage of the carefully agreed Constitutionally-aligned deal. Continuing to debate wider compensation for land gives credence to a view that has since been abandoned by the pragmatists. US$ 3.5 billion is a lot of money, and paying it would be a signal that this phase of Zimbabwe’s history is over.   

How can donor financing of compensation be focused on public goods in A1 areas? In the absence of a wider deal with full financing at least for now, how could some steps towards addressing compensation be initiated? As discussed before on this blog, breaking down the payments into different elements is the first step. Disaggregation between A1 and A2 areas is crucial. Within each area further disaggregation is required between payments for items that have become public goods (farmhouses that are now schools or clinics for example, or dams irrigation systems that are now jointly used by multiple smallholders) and those that remain private. The public good elements could be part of a major public, donor-supported investment in infrastructure development, including rehabilitation of such assets. Mostly in the A1 areas, these could be part of an aid programme supported by donors and international finance institutions as part of a commitment to rehabilitating the productive economy and addressing poverty and food insecurity. This may end up being a quite large proportion of the funding. With compensation payments being made – yes incrementally over years – the designation of fast-track resettlements as ‘contested areas’ would be removed, and donor support for basic development and humanitarian aid in a the fast-track resettlements could commence. This would address long-standing issues of development, including schooling and health that have been denied to residents for 20 years due to international agencies’ ‘restrictive measures’.

What about private financing of compensation payments for improvements in A2 areas? Private payments towards farm improvements is in my view a perfectly legitimate expectation of A2 farmers who have acquired larger farms and inherited improvements, including houses, fixed equipment, dams, roads and so on. Now surely is the time to establish a system of land taxation, appropriate to the natural region and the expectations of production from a particular farm. This would contribute in part to paying off compensation owings over the coming 30 years or so and would also providing ongoing financing for the necessary land administration system – of audit, land registration/lease issuing and so on – that must accompany any formalisation of compensation and shifts in legal ownership. A taxation system would also provide incentives to invest in A2 farms, some of which have lain idle, while also flushing out those who are holding land simply for speculation. It will not be popular, and some of course will find ways of not paying it, but partial private financing of compensation and agricultural recovery will offer an important message for wider financing.

What about former farm workers? This is an important question, but the Constitutional arrangements that the deed addresses deal only with compensation for land improvements. A separate arrangement is needed to ensure that former farm workers get a fair deal after the land reform. There were around 300,000 workers working on commercial farms at land reform. However, it’s important to get the numbers right. Only half of these were permanent workers, and so on salaried arrangements with accommodation and/or other benefits; the rest were temporary workers moving to and from their own homes and so outside legal obligations for compensation for being laid off. The 150,000 odd permanent workers were supposed to have been paid salaries owed and some form or redundancy payment when farms were taken over. Ensuring that this was paid by the former farm owners should certainly be a condition of any payment of compensation. Any owings due could be removed from the payment and distributed to listed workers. The approximately 40,000 former workers who were displaced in situ are perhaps the most vulnerable group of those workers who lost out due to land reform. A focused development effort is required to support their livelihoods, including land allocation, improving accommodation conditions and assuring worker rights in the new land reform farms. While essential, this wider development challenge is another issue, separate from the compensation arrangements, but must follow on from it as a key aspect of post land reform development efforts by government and development partners.  

If donors invest in land reform areas won’t this all go to party cronies and the military? This is a line that I have heard from some, reflecting the (still) poor understanding of land reform distribution. Noone denies that patronage has been important in allocating land, and continues to be so under the new dispensation as political scores are settled through reallocating land. However, this is concentrated almost exclusively in the A2 areas, where public investment in paying for infrastructure as improvements would not be focused (see above). A1 areas were occupied largely by poor and marginalised people from communal areas and the unemployed from towns. Yes there were war veterans involved, but many of them were poor communal farmers too, and had been for 20 years. Of course after the invasions the ruling party has made use of its capital, sometimes by force, in the new resettlement areas to exert its power. But this doesn’t mean that all A1 farmers are party followers; they may ‘perform ZANU-PF’ in order to get by, but many are extremely critical of the lack of state commitment to post land reform support and are very critical of the party-state. And even within the A2 areas, not everyone is a ‘crony’ as is sometimes suggested. Far from it. Depending on which part of the country, the proportion is limited, perhaps 20 percent at the most. For this reason targeting public aid investments can maintain the position of ‘restrictive measures’ (aka sanctions), avoiding direct support to party officials and the military, and so not contradicting the demand for political reform and the tackling of corruption and party-military patronage.

Isn’t all this a gambit by ZANU-PF to gain credibility? Yes of course it is, but it also represents a commitment to at least one part of the Constitution, agreed across all parties, and a commitment to reengagement. As a move by the technocrats within the party, led by Mthuli Ncube and others in the Finance Ministry, it’s a last ditch attempt as the economy sinks even further following the pandemic to gain recognition and pursue dialogue with international partners, particularly in the West. The opposition have rejected the move as they want wider regime change and the Western diplomatic community as ever are hedging. It’s a difficult call, but given that the compensation issue – largely raised as a key condition by Western governments under lobbying pressure from white former farmers – has held up economic development for 20 years, rejecting it now seems self-defeating. Caution is required, but failing to grasp an opportunity now opens up more dangers of an extended impasse, deepening poverty and the likelihood of more regressive forces making their move in Zimbabwe’s factional politics.

Won’t the compensation deal open up the opportunity for land grabbing and speculative investment? With compensation paid and land transferred formally and no longer ‘contested’, this does open up new opportunities. While there are dangers of unscrupulous investors, land grabbing by elites and land speculation emerging, these are all issues that an effective land administration system can deal with. Land is still held by the state so a free-for-all land market can be avoided, while checks and balances should emerge through an effective land audit, cadastral survey, land registration (through permits and leases with conditions) and a land taxation system. Zimbabwe is far away from this now, which is why I have long argued for compensation to be seen as one part of wider land administration system, which could be tested then rolled out on a district-by-district basis. Dangers accepted, there are also positive opportunities that emerge from the releasing the impasse of ‘contested areas’. With clarity of ownership and use, leases and permits can then become vehicles for raising funds through the banking system and other investors will be more interested in joint ventures and contract farming arrangements of different sorts, with much-needed capital investment following. This may allow opportunities for former white farmers to rejoin the farming community on a new basis, but now with security and clarity. Equally, external investors – whether from China, Germany or Britain – may at last see investment in Zimbabwean agriculture, across the value chain, as a viable option, providing impetus to the rehabilitation especially of A2 farms. There are two sides to any coin and with the right safeguards, with a substantial investment in land administration – another area where external donor funding and expertise can pay dividends for wider development – the prospects for investment and growth could be substantially enhanced.

Where next? The need for a pragmatic politics

There is a lot of technical work ahead to make the compensation arrangement work, whether around systems of international financing or debt restructuring or around the mechanisms of payment by farmers for private goods and by donors and the government for public goods. It requires some painstaking work assessing different farms and defining the pattern of payment required, as well as setting up funding mechanisms to make it happen. If land taxation and payment of dues to workers are to be conditions respectively for A2 farmers and for ex-commercial farmers, this will require some hard bargaining, as well as some robust systems for checking compliance. But all this is possible: if there is a will, there is a way.

For starters, there are some clear low-risk opportunities for international partners to engage with – around paying for improvements through an infrastructure rehabilitation programme in the A1 areas; through setting up a functioning land taxation system or through establishing an effective land administration system to allow investment to flow. These are all good bets, technically-focused and uncontroversial, yet important for much-needed development. With such public and aid commitments, then other private investments will be encouraged, either through taxation systems or through external investment into the sector.

With the opposition crying foul, the Western donors and diplomats prevaricating, some white ex-farmers remaining vocal critics and demanding compensation for land too and the more radical elements in the ruling party and beyond suggesting that this is selling out to the colonisers, gaining a political consensus around this is going to be hard. It will require some hard-nosed pragmatic politics, focused on rebuilding the economy and constructing a platform for on-going dialogue and reform. If this breaks the 20 year impasse on land and the economy this could still be a major breakthrough for development, one that could improve the lot of all Zimbabweans now and for the longer term.


Photo credit: Ian Scoones.

Jemimah Njuki looks to an inclusive future for small-holder farming in Africa


In the third of a four-part blog series following the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Foresight4Food, IFAD and APRA eDialogue session on the future of small-scale farming, Jemimah Njuki, the International Food Policy Research Institute’s Director for Africa, reflects on the discussion and emphasises the importance of this sector’s social dimensions.


Written by Jemimah Njuki

In all meetings I now attend regarding African small-scale farming, including the Regional Perspectives eDialogue session, I consistently highlight a key issue: the social dimension of smallholder farming from a gender and youth perspective. There is a need to change our approach to women and youth in agriculture. We need to stop thinking that the solution to making agriculture more accessible and inclusive is to ‘fix’ women and youth. Women and youth are already capable and are working in the sector, ready to step into larger roles. Instead, we need to fix those issues and systems that are holding them back. The meaningful inclusion of women and youth in agriculture is something I am very passionate about, and I believe that any discussion surrounding the future of smallholder farming in Africa would be remiss to not include women and youth in that future.

Engaging with women and youth

One of the things we know is that a sustainable and inclusive smallholder agriculture sector is only going to be possible if women and youth everywhere that are engaged in agriculture are empowered, and their rights recognised and respected. But, when we speak about smallholder agriculture, we are often characterising it based on either land size or farm size, and really ignoring some of the huge differences that exist, based on whether these farmers are male or female and young or old, as well as who is managing the farms, where they’re sourcing their labour and how much labour they have. These are dimensions that we really have to critically think about because otherwise, we are missing some of the trends that are happening. For example, contrary to the current narrative, which says that the age of the African farmer is between 50 and 60, the demography of smallholder farmers is changing and more young people are engaged in agriculture and agriculture related activities. A few years ago, the International Development Research Centre did some research and found that only 11% of youth were interested in agriculture in the region. Conversely, more recent studies are showing that the average age of the farmer is between 34 to 45 years. Thus, we really need to look at some of the social dimensions of agriculture because some of these groups face very specific challenges that are often being overlooked.

Women, for example, are often lacking access to productive resources, agricultural inputs information, finance, services, markets, social protection, as well as technological and entrepreneurial know-how. Women are also typically the primary caretakers in their households, which means they face heavy workloads that undermine their productive capacity and overall well-being, particularly in the wake of COVID-19. Additionally, harmful social norms and stereotypes on what women can or should do persist in many parts of the world. With regard to youth, the intergenerational transfer of land is no longer happening, so a lot of young people are often farming on land that they have no claim to. This is affecting young women more.

Missing voices

We know that when women and young people have better access to resources, services, economic opportunities and decision-making, communities have more food, their nutrition status improves, rural incomes increase, and food systems become more efficient and sustainable. It becomes clear, then, that while women and youth in the region need agriculture, agriculture in Africa also needs young men and women. Yet, they are often missing from the policy discourse and large programmes in agriculture. We really need to think critically about why their voices are missing, and why we are still talking about smallholder farms as though they are only defined by the size of their land. We need to start fixing some of these issues and making sure women are visible, we need better defined evidence on how men and women are treated differently in the agriculture sector and how different agricultural policies are affecting them. We need to recognise the underlying assumptions and stereotypes of women that are embedded in agriculture policies and how these are impacting women and agriculture. For the development of smallholder agriculture, we need to make these policies more gender responsive and then take the next step to implement them.

So in other words, we need to fix the smallholder agriculture sector so that it’s working for everybody, and we need to start redefining some of the social characteristics of smallholder agriculture beyond their smallness, or the size of their land.

We also need to take decisive action. It is only through changing the gendered rules, both formal and informal, that create and reinforce these inequalities, including access to resources, income, and degrees of authority for men and women, that women and youth will be able to work as leaders in this sector and allow it to achieve its full potential moving forward.


To learn more about the eDialogue series, click here

To download a printable PDF version of this blog, click here


Feature photo credit: IFPRI


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Final eDialogue on ‘Policy Implications’

On Wednesday, November 25, 12:15 – 14:00 GMT, we held the ‘Wrap-up and Policy Implications’, the fifth and final part of the eDialogue series: ‘What Future for Small-Scale Farming?’

Small-scale farmers are integral to food systems in much of the world. Many householders depend, at least in part, on agriculture for their livelihood. However, many small-scale farmers struggle, being among the poorest and most food-insecure people on the planet, who are furthest away from reaching SDG 1 (No Poverty) and SDG 2 (Zero Hunger). In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the importance of resilient food systems and the vulnerability of poor rural households.

To develop transition strategies and avoid future crises and suffering, perspectives on the future – 5, 10 and 20+ years -are needed.  It is crucial to better understand how changing demographics, economies, food systems, natural resources and climates will impact on small-scale farmers.

Our final session took key messages and insights, and explored the implications for national policy, and development investments. The session asked what fundamental changes are needed to create a better future for small-scale farmers.

For more details on the session, click here.

Our panellists were:

David Nabarro, Strategic Director of 4SD, Convenor of the Food System Dialogues, Envoy of WHO Director-General on COVID-19, and Co-Director and Professor of the Institute of Global Health Innovation at Imperial College London

Thomas Jayne, Professor at the Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics at Michigan State University

Meike van Ginneken, Associate Vice President for Strategy and Knowledge at IFAD

Rebbie Harawa, Regional & Research Program Director, Eastern and Southern Africa at ICRISAT

Ángela María Penagos Concha, Director of Agrifood Initiative and Vice- Presidency of Research, University de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia

Avinash Kishore, Research fellow at IFPRI, India

Elena Lazos Chavero, Professor at the Institute of Social Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico

Watch the full session, here:

Listen to the full session, here:


Previous eDialogues

Click on links for full session details:

Setting the Scene (Jul 16): emerging trends, challenges and opportunities for small-scale farming in the context of changing food systems – round-table discussion and question and answer session

Local Perspectives (Aug 27): grounding the dialogue in local experiences with Vlogs from farmers and young professionals – short visual stories and panel discussion and audience questions

Regional Realities (Oct 21-22): – exploring and comparing the dynamics of small-scale agriculture and food system change across Asia, Latin America, Africa and OECD country – parallel regional round tables with a synthesis panel

Transition pathways and strategies (Nov 10): assessing the options and scenarios for an inclusive transformation of small-scale agriculture with a focus on the specific challenges for different groups of farmers given their scale, gender, assets or geographic and market context – propositions presented by panelists, panel discussion and audience reactions.


Feature image credit: Media Club South Africa.

ALRE Research Note : The Diamond of Influence, a Model for Exploring Behaviour in Research to Policy Linkages

Written by, Louise Clark

This learning paper presents an initial analysis of the emerging research to policy linkages within the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium, which is funded by the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO).

APRA has an innovative monitoring, evaluation and learning approach known as the ‘Accompanied Learning on Relevance and Effectiveness’ (ALRE), which is being delivered by a small team of embedded evaluation specialists. This paper discusses how ALRE has applied the COM-B (Capability, Opportunity, Motivation and Behaviour) (Mayne 2018; Mayne 2016; Michie, van Stralen and West 2011) model of behaviour change to explore the interactions and influencing strategies between researchers and policymakers in the context of agricultural policy research in Africa. These insights have produced the Diamond of Influence, a new ALRE-adapted model, which applies each of the COM-B elements to discuss the different aspects of research to policy processes, drawing on examples of how researchers in each of the APRA focus countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) are engaging in policy spaces.

Working Paper 46: Drivers of Market-Oriented Land Use Decisions Among Farm Households in Nigeria

Written by, Adebayo B. Aromolaran, Milu Muyanga, Thomas Jayne, Abiodun E. Obayelu, Titus Awokuse, Omotoso O. Ogunmola and Fadlullah O. Issa

In recent times, the Nigerian Government has devised strategies aimed at intensifying smallholder transformation for enhanced food security, employment creation and poverty reduction. However, despite these efforts, the process of agricultural commercialisation in Nigeria has not progressed as fast as expected. Consequently, this study examines agricultural commercialisation in Nigeria with the aim of establishing factors that are constraining commercialisation and identifying potential policy levers that can be used to fast-track the process.

APRA researcher questions Malawi’s approach on poverty reduction

Following two widely-circulated media stories on a hard-hitting policy brief on agribusiness investment, and a report on how COVID-19 is affecting food systems and rural livelihoods, the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Malawi team have engaged with the press on their research activities once again.

APRA researcher and member of Economics Association of Malawi, Dr Jacob Mazalale, hosted a live radio and television dialogue program on November 5, which featured poverty reduction and economic growth. The live debate took place on leading media house in Malawi, Times Radio and Television, and was streamed live over Facebook. Together with listeners and viewers, the program questioned how Malawi as a country has performed in reducing poverty and where we would like to be in 2045.

Dr Mazalale set off the debate by explaining that various strategies have been employed to reduce poverty since independence in Malawi with little progress. In some areas, Malawi has done well but poverty largely remains entrenched – there is hunger, food insecurity, and not all children, are in school, for example. If Malawi does not change its approach to development in the next 25 years, the proportion of Malawians in poverty will increase and the extent of depravation will become severe. He emphasised the need to change the way we do things to eradicating poverty and achieve economic growth.

He also stressed the need to rethink our agricultural development policies since it is the mainstay of the economy and where many obtain their income. In addition, if agriculture is fully nurtured, it will have spill over effects in other sectors of the economy.

Other key factors he mentioned were:

  • Hand-hoe to mechanised farming is a key transition;
  • Important to diversify to grow other cash crops besides tobacco, and other food crops apart from maize;
  • Agricultural marketing – liberalisation of markets and reduced role of Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) has seen proliferation of vendors that trick farmers on prices reducing their profits. Reforming ADMARC is key for it to return to its strategic role, such as the  timely purchase of produce from farmers;
  • Land reform – land usage for those engage in farming as a business (not just living/own food) needs to be redefined. Communities have to discuss how to aggregate their land into bigger parcels for those engaged in agribusiness;
  • Governance, accountability, transparency is key, and citizens need to participate and demand this from duty bearers (e.g. government). The recent anti-corruption stance by the government, where several corruption cases have been investigated,  is an example of this;
  • Ensuring taxes are fair and equitable with accompanied visible services for the taxpayer;
  • Experiential education should be given priority that allows young people to go into self-employment other than waiting to be employees.

There is a hope that Dialogues such as this will continue across different media platforms in Malawi to inform the UN global vision with focus on three areas: defining the future we want, looking towards 2045; identifying global megatrends leading the world away from that vision; and ideas for improving global cooperation.


To learn more about APRA’s work in Malawi, click here.

Martin Muchero’s perspective: small-scale farming, its challenges and how to address them


The second instalment of a four-part blog series highlights the experiences and takeaways of independent consultant Martin Muchero, expert panellist from the Africa Regional Perspectives session of the third UN Sustainable Development Solutions Networks, Foresight4Food, IFAD and APRA eDialogue, regarding the future for small-scale farming.


Written by Martin Muchero

The eDialogue session focusing on Africa regional perspectives regarding the future of small-scale agriculture was not only very informative but brought about a shift in the traditional thinking of the importance, significance and value of smallholder farming. I found it very interesting, thought provoking and most valuable to even the broader debate about poverty reduction. During the discussion, I highlighted three critical changes impacting small-scale farming from a food security perspective: climate change, macro-economic conditions and, lastly, COVID-19 and similar such pandemics. Thus, it became important to ask, ‘what are the pathways of impact of these changes on smallholder farming?’ In addition, we need to consider the implications of these changes on public policy. More specifically, what should we be promoting to ensure small-scale farming remains an important element and is better improved for the future?

Mitigation of critical impacts

Climate-induced shocks and hazards are linked to reduced agricultural production, displacement of people and damage to homes and critical infrastructure. Food production is affected by access to arable land with suitably fertile soils, adequate water resources, adequate inputs, including high quality seeds, fertilisers and agro-chemicals, and conducive climatic conditions. Therefore, the availability of food and the purchasing power of households, as influenced by the amount of household resources a family has and the affordability (prices) of food commodities being offered, lead to reduced food security as a result of climate change.

Next, macro-economic conditions, such as poor governance and accountability, political instability and conflicts dynamics impact food security in numerous ways. High levels of inflation and rising unemployment both lead to increased poverty levels and eroded household purchasing power which, again, result in heightened food insecurity, particularly for rural households. Additionally, the continued multiple and large-scale complex crises, such as protracted insecurity and mass displacements, have taken a toll on small-scale farming through a loss of income and livelihoods and thus increased levels of poverty, inequalities and food insecurity.

Lastly, considering that local food markets are the backbone of the informal economy and particularly small-scale farming for most countries on the African continent, the restrictions in movement to prevent the spread of COVID-19 have led to serious impacts on economic activities, health, wellbeing and social protection and gender and other inequalities. Hundreds of thousands of informal traders, including those servicing small-scale farming, cannot undertake their normal business operations, the health systems of most countries at least in the SADC region have been highly compromised with inadequate investment into health facilities and services, which is more felt in small-scale farming, and a rise in cases of domestic violence by upwards of 30% in reported cases have deepened pre-existing inequalities in the largest labour force in the agricultural sector; women.

Martin Muchero speaks during the eDialogue

Effect on policy

COVID is giving some of the countries in the southern Africa region reason for insight. Botswana is now looking at upscaling its horticultural strategies, as restrictions on travel and movement, and therefore imports, have highlighted the importance of smallholder production. We’ve also seen a policy shift towards focus on the smallholder producers and the key question policymakers are grappling with is “can the smallholder farmers do more, and what can be done to help them achieve more?”

On reflection, we also need to think more holistically and broadly towards rural development, a key area that needs to be promoted. Although we are not short of rural development strategies, we are lacking effective implementation of, and the necessary investment in, those strategies. I believe that provides a much broader response to the various issues we’re talking about and the importance of smallholder farmers.

So, one of the key changes from a policy perspective is now a shift away from the standard trickle-down effect theory of economic benefits rising or affecting rural poverty, in favour of a more active way of addressing rural poverty, or smallholder difficulties, with more robust non-farm activity taking place. There are various means of achieving the assurance of small-scale farming from a public policy perspective, including areas such as agroecology and non-farm enterprise systems, and their growth and promotion. This is in addition to the other key elements of rural development that require effective approaches, effective resourcing, enhanced commitment, improved income and non-income related factors, and social innovativeness (decentralisation of power and enhanced collaborative competences) as well as the full participation of the smallholder farmers in various policy formulations and implementation.


To learn more about the eDialogue series, click here

To download a printable PDF version of this blog, click here


Feature photo. Martin Muchero (3rd on right) addresses participants of the APRA 2019 annual workshop. Credit: CABE Africa


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.

Aida Isinika: reflections on the eDialogue


In the first of a four-part blog series,  – Aida Isinika, APRA Tanzania Country Lead and Professor, Sokoine University of Agriculture, shares her experience of the third UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, Foresight4Food, IFAD & APRA eDialogue session, all about African regional perspectives on the future for small-scale farming.

Click below for links to eDialogue blogs from other expert panelists:

Martin Muchero
Jemimah Njuki
Abdel Ismail


Written by Aida Isinika

It was an honour to participate in the ‘African Regional Perspectives’ discussion at the third eDialogue session; there were a number of valuable points raised and interesting conversations. First, it was evident from the discussion that, despite the many challenges facing smallholder farmers, their presence will remain important for some time to come because they still account for a significant share of the overall food production in many countries. Second, despite some studies showing a trend of increasing numbers of medium-scale farmers in some countries, agriculture in the form of smallholder faming and engagement in agricultural value chains remains the source of employment for over 70% of the households in many countries as it is in Tanzania.

These countries also typically have limited alternatives, such as service and industry, for agricultural labour to move into. This means there is a need to explore and support opportunity spaces which have presented some dividends for smallholder farmers. Some of these areas include; intensification, when consistently supported, and diversification of income sources, leading to increasing agricultural productivity, food and nutrition diversity and poverty reduction. These opportunities have been driven by population growth, regional integration through improved infrastructure and market access, and increasing irrigation. These areas require continued facilitation, with particular focus on supporting smallholder farmers who still produce the largest share of food in Africa.

The session also turned to areas that require further improvement, primarily in regards to equality and sustainability of African food systems. For example, population pressure and area expansion to meet the growing demand for food and fibre is putting more pressure on marginal areas, hence the need to address environmental concerns for the sustainability of ecosystems long term. Additionally, gender gaps in access to resources, productivity and benefits accruing from farming and participation in agricultural value chains need to be monitored and addressed for inclusive and sustainable development. Likewise, youths should be encouraged and supported to participate in agriculture, addressing their challenges related to access to land while capitalising on their competitive advantage through the use of ICT and technology (such as WhatsApp and YouTube) as niches, especially for market access. Experience from the APRA study in Tanzania shows that youths are actively engaged in the rice value chain (a high value and tradable crop), manoeuvring their way through the challenges they face.  Their participation in rice commercialisation ranges from engaging directly in farming to related services demanded by actors along the value chain, which included providing labour services from ploughing, weeding and spraying rice fields to applying pesticides and providing rental services for sprayers. Others provide mobile money services, and transport to and from the field. These activities, and many others, widen the scope for youth inclusion in the rice value chain.

Aida Isinika addressing journalists at a recent APRA Media workshop. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI

Across multiple countries in Africa, there have been efforts to address the many challenges facing smallholder farmers. In Tanzania, for example, such efforts have included a stoppage on export bans, as well as continuing efforts to improve infrastructure (road, electricity, communication and irrigation). These endeavours need to continue and penetrate deeper into rural areas. However, many uncertainties also remain in commodity markets due to frequent reforms, some of which have worked against farmers due to inadequate analysis before they are implemented. Thus, moving forward, governments and policymakers need to ensure that reforms are well-thought out and properly implemented.

In sum, the session provided a valuable opportunity to discuss critical aspects of agriculture and smallholder farming in Africa, as well as to look to the future of this field to better understand all that can be done to support farmers and agriculture in order to benefit the continent as a whole.


To learn more about the eDialogue series, click here

To download a printable PDF version of this blog, click here


Feature photo: Aida Isinika addressing journalists at a recent APRA Media workshop. Credit: APRA Tanzania/MPOLI


Please note: During this time of uncertainty caused by the COVID19 pandemic, as for many at this time, some of our APRA work may well be affected but we aim to continue to post regular blogs and news updates on agricultural policy and research.