Oil palm is the most important export crop in Ghana, aside from cocoa. Compared with cocoa, however, oil palm has a more extensive local value chain, including greater opportunity for local industrial and artisanal processing into palm oil and other products, which creates a high potential for employment generation and poverty reduction; as a result oil palm is classified as a priority crop. The selection of oil palm as a priority crop aims to promote agricultural commercialisation through domestic agroindustry development and exports. In spite of this, the oil palm economy has still not achieved its potential, and this begs the question, why? Although it is known in general that commercialisation potential and its benefits are not equally distributed across groups, it is not clear how and why different subgroups (women, men, youth) might benefit differently from the oil palm economy. This brief addresses why different groups of smallholders (women, men, youth) benefit unequally from oil palm value chains, and how returns to oil palm production and marketing could become more inclusive.
The rush for land and resources has featured prominently in recent studies of sub-Saharan Africa. Often happening alongside regional projects to upgrade and expand infrastructure, this urgency to unlock untapped economic potential has generated heated debate around the social and environmental impacts, as well as consequences for livelihoods, rights and benefit sharing.1 More than ever before, the gaze of global investment has been directed to the pastoral drylands of Africa. This matters because of the varied land and natural resource uses, social organisation and the histories and legacies of development that are unique to these areas. Given ecological uncertainty and the patchy distribution of resources, adaptability and flexibility have been the basis for sustaining lives and livelihoods in the drylands (Catley et al. 2013b; Mortimore and Adams 1999; Scoones 1994). The introduction of this book is Open Access, and can be accessed below:
Written by: Joseph Yaro, Joseph Kofi Teye and Steve Wiggins
Since cocoa began to be cultivated in the 1880s in southern Ghana, it has created jobs, incomes and prosperity for the many farmers growing the crop. Until recently, cocoa farmers could make use of highly favourable conditions when clearing forests to plant cocoa. They needed to do little other than plant seedlings then wait to harvest the pods. When trees aged, or soil fertility declined, or swollen shoot viral disease attacked the trees, they could abandon the old groves and move to establish new stands of cocoa in virgin forests. Over the decades, the frontier for new cocoa farms moved west across the country. By the 2000s, however, the last available forests in Western Region were being taken up and the frontier closed. With no new land available for cocoa, farmers would need to maintain and renew their groves to preserve their incomes, and to intensify production if they wanted to earn more from cocoa. At the same time, farmers faced increasing attacks from pests, fungi, parasites and the deadly threat of swollen shoot – while their trees aged and needed replanting. As a result of a lack of technical knowledge and capital, farmers struggled to respond to these challenges, continue cocoa production and intensify further. This study explores if it is still possible to make a living from cocoa in the region and if so, how.
The introduction of rice into Ethiopia in the early 1970s provided a potential solution to widespread food insecurity. Moreover, it held high hopes for positive impacts on the incomes and opportunities of smallholders, through increasing commercialisation. Recent national policy continues to emphasise this relationship. In retrospect, this initiative has been hugely successful, as the region where rice has been introduced has been transformed from heavily relying on food aid to becoming a thriving commercial centre. This transformation owes much to the increase in the production, consumption and commercial value of rice. However, it appears that the benefits of rice commercialisation have been unequally distributed. This seeming paradox is central to APRA Working Paper 78, which finds that farmers with very small amounts of farm land devote high proportions of their land to rice production. Yet, these same farmers have lower levels of commercialisation – in other words, they do not reap the benefits of selling rice to the market.
A puzzling pattern?
Figure 1: Relationship between Rice Commercialisation Index, rice specialisation and land ownership
The above figure, and the study’s wider findings, suggest that the larger and wealthier landowners are producing rice for the market and for profit, while the smaller and poorer farmers are producing largely for food security purposes. At the same time, we observe that farmers with the lowest level of rice specialisation are those reporting the highest levels of rice commercialisation. To investigate this further, we conducted analysis using data from the Fogera Plain of Ethiopia.
Methods
The data for this study was collected in 2018 using a household survey that included questions on plots cultivated, crops grown and sold, and incomes. The questionnaire also asked for extensive information on other topics, including household characteristics, asset ownership and values, household income sources, and key questions in relation to multidimensional poverty. The sampling followed a stratified sampling procedure, where we used woreda, kebele and village strata to randomly select respondent farmers. A total sample of 722 households was split between three districts across the Fogera region, accounting for the total land allocated by considering proportion to population.
The limits to rice commercialisation
Using descriptive analysis of survey data and regression analysis, we argue that the negative relationship between specialisation and rice commercialisation is being driven by smallholders who are, on average, poorer. That is, poorer as proxied across a range of indicators, including age, gender and education of household head and asset ownership. Smallholders have little choice but to dedicate a larger share of the cultivated land to rice, due to economies of scale and farming economies with respect to rice. Yet, the majority of that rice production is used to satisfy domestic consumption and household food security, with only a small surplus being sold. The high commercialisers have larger land sizes, and farm a relatively small proportion of their land with rice (yet, in absolute terms this can be larger than the amount sown by smaller farms). These bigger farms cultivate rice for commercial, profit purposes. This suggests that there are distinctly different stories and behaviours driving the rice cultivation and commercialisation trajectories of smaller, poorer landowners, versus their larger, wealthier counterparts.
Implications
The recent historical policy emphasis on rice as a pathway out of poverty has not necessarily translated into positive outcomes for all households. This has implications for the nature of structural change in the area and the associated (in)equitable access to the gains from market-oriented commercialisation strategies. To enable those smaller/poorer farmers to move into market-oriented commercialisation pathways rather than consumption-oriented ones, the following targeted interventions are likely to be helpful.
Encourage rice intensification, that is the production of rice at least twice per year with better use of inputs (seed, fertiliser, and other agro-chemicals), through the application of necessary agronomic practices and promotion of access to irrigation.
Promote diversification into high value crops alongside rice, which will allow smallholders to exploit market opportunities, for instance with irrigated vegetable production during the ‘rice off-season’.
Strengthen the land marketing system to ensure the transfer of land from low to more efficient users, given the huge range in paddy rice productivity levels achieved.
Facilitate the development of entrepreneurial skills for those with small farm sizes and landless farmers, to ensure the emergence of complementary farm service businesses like mechanisation, plant protection, post-harvest and transport services.
RSVP: jason.mosley@africa.ox.ac.uk for videocall log in details
More than ever before, the gaze of global investment has been directed to the drylands of Africa, but what does this mean for these regions’ pastoralists and other livestock-keepers and their livelihoods? Will those who have occupied drylands over generations benefit from the developments, as claimed, or is this a new type of territorialisation, exacerbating social inequality?
This book’s detailed local studies of investments at various stages of development – from Kenya, Tanzania, Somaliland, Ethiopia – explore, for the first time, how large land, resource and infrastructure projects shape local politics and livelihoods. Land and resources use, based on ancestral precedence and communal practices, and embedded regional systems of trade, are unique to these areas, yet these lands are now seen as the new frontier for development of national wealth. By examining the ways in which large-scale investments enmesh with local political and social relations, the chapters show how even the most elaborate plans of financiers, contractors and national governments come unstuck and are re-made in the guise of not only states’ grand modernist visions, but also those of herders and small-town entrepreneurs in the pastoral drylands. The contributors also demonstrate how and why large-scale investments have advanced in a more piecemeal way as the challenges of implementation have mounted.
With the expansion of rice production in Ethiopia’s Fogera Plain, the rural labour market, highly characterised by the casual unskilled labour supply, has flourished. This is mainly associated with the nature of rice production, where certain agronomic practices demand a significant investment of time and thus family labour may not be sufficient. This has created an opportunity for rice farmers to hire labour when they need for extra help, and also for unskilled labourers to gain casual employment. This paper explores the characteristics of rural labour markets, trends in hired labour use and the impact of hired labour on smallholder farmers’ rice productivity and commercialisation using data collected from 723 randomly selected smallholder rice farmers in the Fogera Plain.
Dr. Saweda Liverpool-Tasie, a researcher in the APRA Nigeria Country Team and Associate Professor in the Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics (AFRE) at Michigan State University (MSU), has been appointed to the Board for International Food and Agricultural Development (BIFAD). BIFAD advises the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) on agriculture and higher education issues pertinent to food insecurity. Along with other BIFAD board members, Dr. Liverpool-Tasie will play a key role in shaping the USA’s perspectives on international food and agriculture.
“It is a privilege to be appointed to serve in this capacity,” enthuses Liverpool-Tasie. “I am looking forward to the opportunity and particularly with such a distinguished group of professionals.”
John Thompson, CEO of the APRA Programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium, observes, “President Biden’s Board for International Food and Agricultural Development will benefit greatly from Saweda Liverpool Tasie’s tremendous knowledge and expertise on emergent issues related to smallholder productivity and welfare in dynamic food systems in sub-Saharan Africa. She is a core member of our Nigeria Country Team, which has been documenting the pace at which farm size distributions are changing and assessing the growth of medium-scale farming. She is also an expert in developing international capacity for food and agricultural policy and has much to offer this important initiative.”
USAID Executive Director of BIFAD, Clara Cohen, says, “I am delighted to congratulate and welcome Dr. Liverpool-Tasie and other newly appointed members of BIFAD. USAID greatly values the partnership with BIFAD in supporting our engagement in global food security. The diversity and depth of expertise among the new members will bring thought leadership and broaden the dialogue to reduce hunger, respond to climate change, and lead more inclusive development around the world.”
“In Saweda Liverpool-Tasie, BIFAD has gained a board member with deep understanding of evolving agri-food supply chains and firm commitment to institution-building in the Global South,” said AFRE Chairperson Scott Swinton. “As a university colleague and as a U.S. citizen, I am excited to see her helping to shape our international food and agricultural development policy.”
The Co-Directors of MSU’s Food Security Group, David Tschirley and Eric Crawford note, “Dr. Liverpool-Tasie has stood out from the very beginning of her career for her commitment to doing high quality academic research on development challenges in a way that builds local capacity, promotes local ownership, and has real effects on policy and program design. This is a great combination to bring to BIFAD, and we could not be more pleased with her nomination.”
See below some of the APRA Nigeria research Dr. Liverpool-Tasie has contributed to:
With a goal to share feedback on their research process and the outcomes of their studies in terms of publications, policy messages, and policy engagements, APRA Tanzania researchers gathered members of the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office in Tanzania on 2 December, 2021. This blog shares the presentations, discussions and lessons emerging from this feedback session, which took place virtually and included APRA researchers based at Sokoine University of Agriculture, Nairobi-based Dr Hanington Odame, and Mr Alex Mangowi, representing the FCDO office in Tanzania.
Two presentations were made, each focusing on one of the APRA Tanzania team’s value chains of interest; rice and sunflowers. These presentations were entitled, “Inclusive commercialisation: Policy lessons from the rice value chain in Mngeta, Kilombero”and “Sunflower commercialisation in Singida Region: A longitudinal study’’.
The rice value chain
The rice study’s primary objective was to assess the effect of different commercialisation pathways on poverty and food security, especially on that of women and youths. A number of research questions were addressed, including:
What is the level of commercialisation attained by different categories of farmers?
What factors influence the level of rice commercialisation attained by households?
Is commercialisation inclusive?
How do we measure livelihood improvement? or poverty level changes?
Have different farmer categories benefitted differently from rice commercialisation?
This presentation highlighted the importance of rice in Tanzania as a food and cash crop. This was followed by the study’s methodology, which was characterised by a panel study involving two cross sections of data – one collected in 2017 for the 2016/17 crop season, and the second collected in 2020 for the 2018/19 crop season.
Some drivers of rice intensification in Mngeta division
The key findings from the study show that:
Rice commercialisation has been ongoing in the study area, driven by several factors including:
Migration which brought population diversity and competition to succeed;
Infrastructure improvement (electrification, roads, communication, mobile money);
Intensification due to technology (e.g. sustainable rice intensification, area expansion (extensification) mostly through animal-drawn technology, rising urban population and regional markets.
However, rice commercialisation is not yet on a sustained rising path. It remains susceptible to changes in weather and market factors.
Rice is an important crop contributing to income and food security, however, gender gaps exist due to resource constraints that lead to productivity and thus commercialisation differences.
Employment and value addition opportunities for women and youths exist along the value chain, but they face resource and cultural barriers that need to be addressed.
Rice commercialisation still faces many challenges including:
Increasing population pressure leading to declining average farm size;
Low use of improved inputs, especially seed and inorganic fertiliser;
Poor handling of agrochemicals, especially herbicides, the use of which has been rising quickly;
Poor feeder roads;
Poor processing quality and packaging;
Policy inconsistency regarding imports and exports;
The susceptibility of rice exports to regional markets to none-trade barriers across borders as exposed during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Low resilience to shocks.
The sunflower value chain
The second presentation, which covered the team’s study on the sunflower value chain, highlighted the importance of sunflower as a strategic crop for poverty reduction, not only in Singida Region but in all sunflower-producing regions of mainland Tanzania. As Tanzania is a net importer of edible oil, meeting the local demand by only 45 per cent, there have been many efforts to increase the production of sunflower with the aim to reduce the huge import bill. In Singida region, as efforts to increase sunflower production have been ongoing, other economic enterprises have been growing as well, including the production of cashewnuts, chickpeas, onions and livestock.
Diversity of livelihood options in Singida Region
The objective of this longitudinal study was to examine how different pathways of sunflower commercialisation have evolved in Singida Region. Specifically, the study assessed changes that have occurred over a twenty-year period from 2000–2019, and how these changes have influenced livelihood opportunities and outcomes for different categories of farmers. The findings show that sunflower production has been rising in terms of number of farmers and area. These changes have been driven by:
Infrastructure improvement (road, electrification, mobile money)
Increasing processing capacity
Facilitation by the government, development partners and NGOs
Farmers’ diversification, funded by sunflower profits, such as into livestock and the production of other crops. As government facilitation declined after 2005, especially in supporting the availability of improved seed, sunflower productivity and production also declined, giving room for farmers to switch to alternative crops.
The study concludes by stating that in Singida Region, farmers depend on diverse sources of livelihood, within and outside agriculture. Sunflower commercialisation stimulated diversification as well as benefitting from other enterprises, since income from sunflower catalysed investments in high-value crops such as onions and green gram in response to market dynamics. In the ongoing commercialisation process, everybody benefitted from commercialisation, but with social difference (gender, age, wealth status, social behaviour). For instance, medium-scale farmers (MSF) and male-headed households were more food secure and less impoverished than small-scale farmers (SSF) and female-headed households.
Key policy messages
The key policy messages emanating from both the rice and sunflower studies, respectively, are presented below. Opportunities for policy influencing were also presented and discussed with a hope that many more such opportunities may come in future.
Rice:
Support infrastructure and institution development for sustainable intensification and extensification; intensification works for all including women and youths.
Establish an institutional framework to monitor and educate farmers on agrochemical input use and salinity management to ensure sustainable rice production.
Increase investment in health and education services; and enforce health laws for inclusion of remote villages where women face a more significant gender gap.
Support alternative income-generating activities (IGAs), which are more inclusive for women and youths.
Involve local communities in developing solutions to address negative cultural norms to enhance the inclusion of women and youths so they benefit from rice commercialisation.
Make strategic moves to sustain and expand regional markets and address rising competition from imports and national drives to rice self-sufficiency.
Sunflower:
Facilitate the production of high-quality sunflower seed and its products to consolidate import substitution.
Promote complementary enterprises based on their relative competitive advantages (in the use of land, labour, and capital) in the short-, medium- and long-term.
Control livestock populations to encourage communities to practice proper land use.
Promote alternative IGAs to enhance household food security in marginal environments.
Ensure the availability of productivity-enhancing inputs and technologies at affordable prices.
Conclusions
In sum, it was observed that there is a need to look at the political economy of the value chains in order to contextualise regional issues including markets. Given that the findings show that MSFs had stronger employment and technological spill-over effects to SSFs than the large-scale investor, APRA’s policy messages should be used to promote more inclusive and sustainable commercialisation that support MSFs along with SSF. It was also recommended that commercialisation should be addressed from a profitability perspective, which also relates to the call to improve the business environment as it will reduce the cost of doing business. The discussion also touched on avenues for potential collaboration in future between APRA and FCDO.
As COVID-19 took hold in March 2020, the primary focus was on ensuring that people stayed healthy and safe from infection. However, it soon became clear that the pandemic would have much further reaching effects than just the disease itself – and nowhere was this more evident than in sub-Saharan Africa.
Restrictions enforced to help curb the pandemic created additional challenges for a region already facing myriad trials, from climate change and malnutrition to political unrest and inflation. Many parts of society were negatively affected, none more so than the agricultural sector. Thus, on 9 February 2022, researchers of the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) programme, together with expert commentators, came together for a two-hour e-Dialogue to discuss, more specifically, the effects of COVID-related interventions on rural livelihoods and local food systems in the region and what can be done to support their recovery.
Despite the fact that households in Africa demonstrated impressive resilience and managed to defy the United Nations World Food Programme’s prediction that the number of those experiencing hunger would double, families did not go unscathed – and “an intersecting crisis between food and livelihood has been noted,” highlighted Amrita Saha, APRA researcher and Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies. The lockdown restrictions, which varied in severity between countries, posed one of the biggest challenges. Movement restrictions halted in-country and cross-border trading, causing huge financial losses. Unable to match their usual trading levels, households saw decreases in income and, in turn, experienced higher food insecurity and lower living standards. These movement limitations also had consequences for those (such as farmers) working elsewhere in the production process: for example, with significant labour shortages and breaks in supply chains further contributing to reduced food supplies and incomes. Thus, the APRA findings suggest that the shock of COVID-19 has resulted not so much in a “food production crisis” as an “income-nutrition-livelihood crisis” for many communities.
Worsening inequalities
The lack of State aid and humanitarian relief created issues in many countries. Social support payments for individuals in sub-Saharan countries typically totalled less than US$5 per person, and a lack of communication and accessibility saw large numbers unable to obtain even this small amount. There were also discrepancies between support measures provided to urban and rural communities, with the latter being more frequently overlooked. In these instances, households relied on aid from local religious organisations and traditional leaders rather than the state or other outside agencies. But, according to John Thompson, CEO of APRA and Senior Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies, this was “very piecemeal”. While there was evidence of the emergence of a “COVID economy” in some places, where people were able to adapt the restrictions by shortening supply chains, producing and selling masks and soaps, and so on, this was also patchy.
In addition to new challenges, the pandemic served to exacerbate and highlight existing concerns – a key one being that of gender imbalance and bias. “Women have borne the brunt of COVID-19 related impacts,” stated Akosua Darkwah, associate professor of sociology at the University of Ghana. For instance, women in the agricultural sector “struggled to access resources previously – and COVID-19 only exacerbated this issue,” shared Aida Isinika, Professor at Sokoine University of Agriculture and Country Lead for APRA Tanzania. Government measures and policies created to assist families during the pandemic also rarely took women into account, said Sandra Gagnon, Programme Officer at Canada’s International Development Research Centre. “Policies aimed at formal businesses excluded low-income women engaged in production and informal trading,” she added. Furthermore, with schools closed and children at home, women were tasked with childcare and home-schooling responsibilities – leaving them with notably less time and energy to dedicate to their own work and pursuits, either on- or off-farm.
Planning for a stronger future
A number of recommendations were made with regards to what households, communities and governments can do to be more resilient to future shocks, such as the pandemic. Digital innovation was a key suggestion, as this “will create opportunities for extension, remote education and trade,” suggested Matsautso Chimombo, Lecturer in Rural Sociology at Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources and APRA Malawi researcher. Greater access to the web will allow for online trading when it is not possible to do so in-person and, in some instances, this is already occurring: Darkwah revealed that traders in Ghana began engaging in deals virtually following the introduction of movement restrictions. Providing better internet and telecommunications access would also serve to enhance the flow of information to all actors across food chains, which is critical so that “individuals can make more informed decisions,” said Isinika.
Governments also need to ensure their policies and support measures are more inclusive, encompassing both genders, all age groups – youths were particularly affected by the pandemic – and communities. “While it was positive to see that social protection was ramped up,” noted Steve Wiggins, Senior Agricultural Economist at the Overseas Development Institute and APRA researcher, he saw no reason why they could also not have increased even further. While richer countries in the North didn’t hesitate to run-up large budget deficits during the pandemic, most African countries were constrained in their spending as a percentage of GDP. However, it seems that some lessons have been learned by those in power and positive changes are occurring as a result – with ministers in Malawi dedicating more funding to hospitals and medical supplies, for instance.
Maximising resilience
Finally, it’s important for people to recognise the value of community. While “community support efforts rose to new levels,” explained Adebayo Aromolaran, Professor at Adekunle Ajasin University and APRA Nigeria researcher, households should better utilise farmer organisations – as these provide an invaluable source of assistance across a number of areas, including loans of otherwise costly agricultural equipment.
Ultimately, the agricultural sector needs to be viewed more broadly and larger emphasis put on more than just a few primary areas – such as imports and exports, economic growth, and environmental impact. Only then can resilience be maximised and guarantees put in place to ensure that no-one is left behind in the face of evermore frequent shocks and stresses.
Did you attend the e-Dialogue? If yes, we want to hear from you! Fill out this feedback survey now and let us know what you thought.
All APRA COVID-19 publications can be found, here.
The next APRA e-Dialogue, ‘Transition Pathways and Strategies for Supporting More Equitable and Resilient Food Systems in Africa‘ will be held on March 23rd, 2022. Register, here.
Written by: Masautso Chimombo, Mirriam Matita, Loveness Mgalamadzi, Blessings Chinsinga, Ephraim Wadonda Chirwa, Stevier Kaiyatsa and Jacob Mazalale
Many years of significant investment into the production and adoption of productivity-enhancing technologies and practices in agriculture have not yielded the desired results. Most smallholder farmers in Africa remain trapped in poverty. Having realised that addressing production challenges alone is not enough to impact the lives of poor smallholder farmers, resources and attention have now shifted to the marketing side of agriculture. Organising farmers into farmer producer organisations (FPOs), like clubs, associations and cooperatives, has been one of the strategies aimed at commercialising smallholder agriculture. In Malawi, smallholder farmers have been organised into FPOs of various types and sizes. This qualitative study interrogated the effectiveness of FPOs in Malawi in meeting their objectives, including the objective of enhancing commercialisation of smallholder farmers through increased access to farm inputs, markets, and agricultural extension and advisory services.
Contract farming in different forms has become increasingly common in farming systems across the world, not least in Zimbabwe, but does it benefit smallholder farmers or exploit them?
Contract farming rose to prominence globally as a proposed solution to ‘market failures’ in the extension of commercial agriculture. Farmers offered their land and labour while contract companies, more often than not linked to multinational capital, provided credit, extension advice and other inputs, as well as direct access to markets. In contexts where finance was short and markets difficult to link to, contract farming seemed like the win-win neoliberal solution to extending capitalist agriculture, without relying on land dispossession to create estates and plantations.
Twenty-five years ago an important book was published – Living under Contract: Contract Farming and Agrarian Transformation in sub-Saharan Africa, edited by Peter Little and Mike Watts. It offered a much more critical political economy perspective on contract farming based on case studies from across Africa (including Zimbabwe, with the chapter written by Jeremy Jackson and Angela Cheater). It proved an enormously influential book, as it countered the simplistic win-win narrative of contract farming advocates. The book argued that contract farming necessarily was embedded in political and social relations, which were often deeply unequal. While providing opportunities for some (mostly relatively wealthy smallholders), the result was the creation of a ‘disguised proletarianisation’ of the countryside, whereby farmers effectively laboured on behalf of the contracting companies on very unequal terms.
The current state of play: insights from a new special issue
With increasing integration into global value chains, smallholder agriculture in Africa and elsewhere has increasingly become reliant on contract farming for a range of commodities. Contract farming is strongly advocated by aid agencies, development banks and private companies as part of an ‘inclusive’, ‘pro-poor’ business agenda for agriculture. The win-win narrative is very much alive, 25 years on.
So what is the current state of play? Has contract farming lived up to the expectations of its advocates or has it resulted in the problems predicted by its critics? A great new special issue of the Journal of Agrarian Change edited by Mark Vicol, Niels Fold, Caroline Hambloch, Sudha Narayanan and Helena Pérez Niño offers some answers. The issue includes diverse cases from China to India, Indonesia, Laos, Mozambique, the Philippines, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
What is striking is the diversity of contract farming arrangements – sometimes large schemes, some very informal, some with very direct state involvement, some without, and across a whole range of crops and livestock. No simple story emerges; the response to both the advocates and critics is that the outcomes are not totally clear-cut. Contract farming clearly generates new relations of power, new labour regimes and very often accelerates existing processes of differentiation. But is this all bad? The answer of course is, it depends, and particularly on the social, economic, political and historical contexts for contracts.
State and private-led contracting in Zimbabwe
The Zimbabwe contribution to the issue – Private and state-led contract farming in Zimbabwe: accumulation, social differentiation and rural politics – by Toendepi Shonhe and myself draws on extensive household surveys in Mazowe and Hwedza districts and looks at private and state-led contract farming, respectively for tobacco and maize. The consequences for social differentiation, accumulation and rural politics are in turn examined. As with other recent studies of contract farming in Zimbabwe by Freedom Mazwi and colleagues (also here and here) and our earlier study from Mvurwi, a complex story emerges. Our new paper clearly shows how contract farming adds to existing patterns of differentiation, building off unequal power relationships – and that a political economy analysis is essential to understanding outcomes.
So in private tobacco contracting, it is those who are neither rich (and can finance and sell their tobacco independently) nor poor (who cannot afford the risk of loans and dependence on a contract) who are involved. And it’s mostly men who have the contracts. Across both sites, and particularly in the A1 resettlement farms, these farmers are benefiting from contracting, and accumulating significantly; but perhaps not as much as their richer counterparts who can go it alone. Poorer farmers are left out, and must engage in tobacco farming through joining others on their contracts, often on very poor terms, while women either join their husbands or opt for other farming activities.
While tobacco contracting clearly fulfils a need for agricultural financing (which is spread beyond tobacco to other crops) in the absence of any bank finance for smallholders, it also reinforces existing patterns of differentiation. Contracting farmers are not completely dependent on the company as in some other schemes, and many wish they could contract more area than the one hectare usually offered for tobacco. On the other areas of the farm, other family members lead the growing of other crops and so overall there is a more diversified approach both to production and market engagement than the vision of ‘labouring for the company’ sometimes portrayed.
By contrast, state-led contracting (supported by the military) under the ‘command agriculture’ programme, targets the already well-off, very often in the larger A2 farms; again nearly all relatively older men. The programme aims to boost cereal production in particular, including on irrigated plots. Far fewer farmers in our sample were recipients of such loan financing, and those who gained access were often well-connected politically. Recipients certainly produced more and were able to accumulate, benefiting from the very favourable terms, with loans often not paid back. Those who are less well-connected also have benefited, but often from partial packages and many were disgruntled with the programme. Again, while benefiting production, contracting added to patterns of differentiation – including along gender and age lines – and reinforced political differences and allegiances.
In both cases, we see how contract farming is not a simple ‘win-win’ solving ‘market failures’, but it is the wider socio-political context that affects outcomes. Contracting is not just a route to the selective penetration of private capital, but also a route to leveraging state presence and forms of political patronage. Contracting is thus very much bound up with rural politics and the post-land reform landscape of politicised negotiation over resource access. With both tobacco and maize being crucial ‘political’ crops, the state has a keen interest in the terms of contracts and in the case of command agriculture intervenes directly to favour certain producers and political ‘clients’ over others. As we note in the paper, this is not so different to how the Rhodesian government intervened to influence contract terms in favour of (certain) white farmers in the colonial era, but today allegiances to the ruling party become crucial in defining state-led contracting.
Political economies matter
Just as Living under Contract argued 25 years ago, understanding contract farming requires attention to political economy, including gender and age differences, as well as history. While the outcomes of contract farming may not all be negative, and a simple argument for forced but disguised proletarianisation and simple exploitation by capital doesn’t hold up, at least in the Zimbabwe case, the terms of negotiation around contracts are always uneven, power-laden and intensely political.
Written by: Mirriam Matita, Ephraim Wadonda Chirwa, David Zingwe and Jacob Mazalale
In the past few decades, climate-smart agriculture (CSA) has been promoted to improve food security and raise incomes as a strategy for sustainable agricultural development. The adoption rates among smallholder farmers, particularly in Africa, remain low and have varied in different contexts. We investigated the market participation spill over effects from the adoption of CSA practices in central Malawi. We tested the hypothesis that the extent of the use of CSA practices in the past 10 years can lead to production surpluses that enable smallholder farmers to participate in markets and thereby increase agricultural incomes. The findings suggest, among others, the need to intensify efforts to promote CSA adoption specifically over a longer period for benefits of the technologies to materialise. The adoption of CSA practices over time enhances crop market participation – an important aspect required for production sustainability as well as for transforming agriculture towards greater market orientation among smallholder farmers.
The COVID-19 crisis has caused severe disruptions to agri-food systems across the world. In sub-Saharan Africa, where many people already suffer from shocks and stresses related to climate change, conflict and poverty, the pandemic further threatened the economic and nutritional status of tens of millions of people. With border closures and mobility restrictions imposed by governments to curb the spread of the virus, access to markets and trading were disrupted, thereby affecting the livelihoods and well-being of poor farming households across the region who rely on these activities to survive. In collaboration with a range of local and international partners, the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC), with support of the UK Foreign, Development and Commonwealth Officer/UKAid, conducted a series of studies over 2020-21 to track how responses to the crisis were affecting local food systems, value chains and rural livelihoods across the region.
Lessons from APRA research
On Wednesday 9 February 2022, APRA researchers presented the results from a ‘Multi-Phase Assessment of the Effects of COVID-19 on Local Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods’ spanning eight countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). That research involved three rounds of telephone surveys with over 800 households and qualitative interviews with more than 65 local and regional key informants. Expert commentators engaged in complementary studies of COVID-19 and agri-food systems then offered reflections on the APRA work and highlighted implications for agricultural development and food and nutrition security in the future.
This event is part of the on-going e-Dialogue series on ‘Towards an Equitable and Sustainable Transformation of Food Systems’, which is being convened by APRA in partnership with UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network and Foresight4Food. Because of the emphasis on equity, this e-Dialogue focused on how and why the effects of the pandemic have led to differentiated livelihood and food and nutrition outcomes for various households and communities, often to the detriment of the most vulnerable groups. After reviewing the evidence presented by the APRA team, the dialogue will also ask: what can we learn from this crisis to respond to major shocks in future?
Understanding equity mediating factors
In the APRA studies, researchers found that decisions made by many African governments to navigate and manage the COVID-19 crisis left deep marks on the region’s food systems, leading to inequitable livelihood and food and nutrition security outcomes for the most disadvantaged groups. The capacity of households and individuals to respond to those decisions was influenced by a range of equity mediating factors, including their social position in society, job status, socio-cultural beliefs, and the availability of local or external support structures. While neither uniform across countries nor among all social groups, these factors influenced the extent to which household livelihood security and well-being are compromised. Those with the least capacity to cope with the restrictions often faced higher care burdens, lower access to healthcare and inadequate diets.
Many of the people most affected were already facing intersecting vulnerabilities due to insecure livelihoods and other inequities. The barriers to movement and trade imposed by governments during the initial lockdown period in 2020-21 led to job and revenue losses and disruptions to the labour supply for many people. Further, those not reached by national support systems and official state aid were at a particularly high risk of loss of income and insecurity at a time of high unemployment and constricted incomes. Those groups include temporary and landless labourers, smallholder farmers, and women and girls, who are more likely to be at risk of long-term nutritional losses as the pandemic threatens their access to education and healthy meals.
Although formal support structures, such as social protection programmes and humanitarian assistance, are often seen as a protective (when they exist), APRA research observed that there was little COVID-19-specific support provided from governments, NGOs or the private sector. In many cases, community-based organisations were seen as the groups who could help those most in need, although this was not universal. This community mobilisation often built on pre-established local structures, e.g. religious organisations, traditional leaders, community support schemes created for previous public health crises, etc.
Preparing for future shocks
Together, as the e-Dialogue deliberations showed, the APRA studies highlight key lessons and priority actions that need to be taken to respond to the food and livelihood security challenges resulting from the pandemic in a way that addresses informality and the intersecting vulnerabilities of the most marginal groups.
To mitigate impacts of large natural and human-driven shocks, such as COVID-19, countries must meet the immediate food and income security needs of their vulnerable populations, keep agricultural markets open and trade flowing, and support smallholder farmers and small and medium enterprises to continue to operate.
Adaptive social protection measures can build the resilience of these households to the impacts of major shocks, such as pandemics, but structural inequalities must also be addressed to ensure these reach the poorest and most vulnerable populations. Local support structures can fill some of the gaps, but they are often localised and patchy and therefore insufficient to meet the needs of larger populations.
COVID-19 provides an opportunity to rethink policies for ensuring food and nutrition security and economic recovery that are aligned with the commitment of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to ‘leave no one behind’. We are hopeful that the robust evidence and analysis provided by APRA researchers and our partners can inform those charged with the responsibility of charting that course, and help build more just and resilient food systems in future.
Read the latest blogs from our APRA country teams on their own COVID-19 research, here:
Written by: Kojo Amanor, Joseph Yaro and Joseph Teye
Cocoa production has a long history in Ghana, originating in the late nineteenth century. Since then, cocoa production has seen significant changes. Originally, cocoa was cultivated in newly cleared forests in which many forest trees were preserved as shade trees. Cocoa is ideally suited to these conditions and produces high yields with minimum investment in labour and inputs. However, over time, as the forest conditions change, the cost of cultivating cocoa has increased and yields have declined. As long as new forest frontiers exist, farmers have continued to move into these areas, which have displaced older areas of cultivation, since the costs of production are significantly lower in the new frontiers. In recent years, however, new forest frontiers have declined and most cocoa farmers have been forced to rehabilitate and replant cocoa in open land. This study examines the rational of frontier development; changes in land relations, labour relations and use of technology; and the impact of these factors on different categories of farmers, including women and youth. This is developed through two comparative case studies drawn from the older cocoa frontier of the Eastern Region, and the more recent frontier of Western North Region.
Zimbabwe enforced its first lockdown on 30 March 2020 in an attempt to contain the further spread of COVID-19. On that day, the Ministry of Health and Child Care had officially recorded eight confirmed cases and a single death. The government had declared the COVID-19 crisis a national disaster a few days earlier, on 27 March 2020, allowing it to focus state resources towards fighting the pandemic. Several statutory instruments and a raft of measures were developed to support the lockdown, which closed most sectors of the economy, including informal markets, while allowing only a few ‘essential services’ to operate. To examine how COVID-19 affected food systems and rural livelihoods, APRA Zimbabwe conducted a series of rapid assessment studies. The results of the three survey rounds are presented in A Multi-Phase Assessment of the Effects of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Zimbabwe.
The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted agri-food systems around the world, laying bare their fragility and worsening the welfare of millions of smallholder farmers whose livelihoods depend on farming. And it’s not just food systems that have been impacted but economies as a whole – both directly through the debilitating toll on human health, and indirectly through complex dynamics triggered by lockdown measures. In Zimbabwe, COVID-19 struck at a time when the country was experiencing a worsening economic and humanitarian situation, and when runaway inflation had already eroded the purchasing power of households and, hence, their ability to access diversified diets. Several global and country-level studies have been carried out to analyse impacts of the pandemic on food systems. However, these high-level studies provide limited insights on localised dynamics and coping mechanisms, including changes in labour participation and consumption patterns as households adapted to changes in their economic environment. Our multi-phase study, therefore, focused more on community and household dynamics and response measures to cope with the pandemic.
Shaking the core of rural livelihoods
One of the biggest impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic has been its disruptions to critical input supply chains for seeds, fertiliser, tillage services, agrochemicals and hired labour. Farmers have been unable to access essential inputs as local agri-dealerships were unable to restock due to supply chain blockages. This led to a general rise in input costs due to the shortage, and as a result of opportunistic behaviour of traders seeking to cash in on the situation. Movement restrictions also increased the cost of hiring labour services for critical farming activities, which also increased the risk of post-harvest losses, especially for time-sensitive operations such as soybean harvesting. These disruptions, and increasing overall costs, also resulted in a contraction in cultivated area.
Access to veterinary drugs was also reduced, which led to a surge in tick-born and other livestock diseases. As a result, cattle deaths increased, negatively affecting the availability of draught power which normally compliments tractor tillage services.
Beyond the farmgate, ravaging impacts of the pandemic were felt through disruptions to other livelihood activities. The closure of local shops and marketing stalls as part of the stringent lockdowns left farmers with limited marketing opportunities. Limited availability and rising cost of hiring transport to ferry agricultural produce, also limited farmers ability to access different marketing channels. The pandemic also affected households’ ability to engage in non-farm enterprises that are a traditional source of income, as well as their ability to access off-farm work within and outside their villages.
The lockdowns limited the ability of traders and brokers to access farming communities for the purpose of buying agricultural produce. They also limited arbitrage activities and hence the availability of grain at local markets, thus causing local shortages and rising prices for consumers. As a result, a significant number of households reported that the cost of living had gone up since the onset of the pandemic.
What has been evident throughout the multi-phase studies, which took place between June 2020 and February 2021, is that the nature and extent of pandemic disruptions varied depending on the stringency of lockdown conditions adopted; with disruptions in general easing as lockdown conditions were lifted. It was also observed that the magnitude of impacts varied across households depending on their adaptive capacity and differential access to support services.
Can we build back better?
Generally, the pandemic has exposed the serious lack of resilience in the smallholder farming system, as farmers struggled to cope with the shocks induced by COVID-19 especially in the absence of external support and safety nets. But while the pandemic poses some serious challenges for agri-food systems, it is also an opportunity to make strategic interventions to bolster the resilience of farming systems and protect incomes and assets of smallholder farmers so that they can emerge from the pandemic shocks and effectively participate in economic recovery efforts. COVID-19 has made it abundantly clear why transformative changes in food systems are needed. One of the biggest impacts observed has been the disruptions to input systems and food supply chains. This points to the need for interventions to support more diverse and resilient input and food distribution systems. Options include strengthening agri-dealer networks and empowering agri-food small- and medium-sized enterprises by addressing their capacity, liquidity and financial constraints so that they can effectively participate in transforming Zimbabwe’s food system.
To hear more about APRA’s research findings on COVID-19, join the e-Dialogue on February 9th, 2022. Learn more and register, here.
Read about previous APRA research on COVID-19 in Zimbabwe in the following blogs:
Written by: Gideon Boniface, Aida Isinika and Ntengua Mdoe
Since the onset of COVID-19, which was first announce in Tanzania early in March 2020, consecutive waves of the pandemic have resulted in a series of health, social and economic impacts. This was revealed in A Multi-Phase Assessment of The Effects of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Tanzania, which was based on data collected from farmers in Mngeta division in Kilombero District to gain knowledge on the real time impact of the pandemic on that rural community. The data were collected from 100 farmers at three intervals; July 2020, October 2020 and February 2021. Key informants including rice processors, village executive officer, traders and extension officers were also interviewed.
Disruption to rice trading
Unlike many other countries, Tanzania did not impose a lockdown in order to contain the spread of the virus. Nonetheless, movement and gatherings were restricted; not only due to government guidelines, but also due to fear among traders about travelling to rural markets to buy rice, and fear from rural residents about receiving strangers from urban areas. These changes had a direct, and negative, impact on rice trade, which is the major cash crop in the study area, accounting for more than 90% percent of farm income. The flow of local traders visiting Mngeta Division was reduced to a trickle, while foreign buyers from neighbouring countries stopped visiting completely. This in turn caused a backlog of rice/paddy supply stored at mills and at home because the domestic market could not absorb the entire stock of paddy carried over from 2019/20 plus the new harvest from 2020/21. Consequently, the price of rice/paddy significantly declined. More than two thirds of farmers reported that they did not sell their paddy/rice during the whole survey period. A few farmers were, however, forced to sell at the prevailing low prices due to pressing family needs.
The impact of COVID-19 was also not limited to the producers. Other actors and service providers up and down the value chain, including processors and transporters, were also affected. Rice processors reported operating at only 30% of their installed capacity. This led to jobs losses for many people, youth and women in particular, who used to provide various services along the value chain as casual labourers, transporters, food vendors, input suppliers, and hospitality services.
Reduced participation in farming activities
Following the decline in farmers’ purchasing power, resulting from their inability to sell rice/paddy and other farm produce, their farming activities were affected. Most farmers could not afford inputs, including fertilisers, agrochemicals and tillage services, even though prices were reported to have remained unchanged. Many farmers (20-37%) could also not afford to hire labour, and relied exclusively on family labour instead. Due to restrictions on gatherings, farmers could not access advisory services for hands on instruction. They also missed opportunities to share knowledge with others at farmer field schools.
COVID-19 also negatively affected people’s participation in off-farm businesses, hence reducing opportunities to raise household income. About 40% of responses confirmed experiencing decreased participation in off-farm businesses.
Threats to food security and the cost of living
The significant decline in farmers’ purchasing power also impacted their food security, since they could not afford to buy as much food from the market. This was confirmed by most (51-76%) respondents who stated that they were not able to eat a variety of foods for a balanced diet. Others reported they were unable to eat as much healthy and nutritious foods as they had before the start of the pandemic. The findings also revealed an increase in the number of households experiencing severe food insecurity compared to pre-COVID-19 times, even though the prices of most food groups remained constant. The most severe impacts on food insecurity were also found to be highly gendered, with female- and youth-headed households being most affected because they already faced lower access to resource and less power in decision-making.
High levels of households (more than 40%) also reported experiencing a rise in the cost of living, with many also stating that they felt less in control of their lives.
Social isolation
The government’s restriction on gatherings and discouragement of ‘unnecessary’ movement, limited the people’s participation in various important events such as religious gatherings, village development meeting, sports and games, weddings and funerals, and other ceremonies. Since such occasions used to bring unity within communities, the restrictions left people feeling isolated and being more wary of strangers due to fear about contracting the virus.
So what next?
Due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, most respondents felt less confident about the future; their ability to participate in agricultural commercialisation in future, has been undermined. The government and other development stakeholders therefore need to address the challenges which emerged during the pandemic. Support including social protection for the most affected, or subsidies and grant schemes for inputs to farmers, for example, would ensure that agricultural value chains remain active for the benefit of both upward and downward stream actors and service providers. It is also essential to continue tracking the impacts of COVID-19. Developing strategies for better preparedness at difference levels – including national and local government, businesses as well as rural communities – would raise the resilience of everyone in Tanzania to face future pandemics and crises.
To hear more about APRA’s research findings on COVID-19, join the e-Dialogue on February 9th, 2022. Learn more and register, here.
Read about previous research on COVID-19 in Tanzania in the following blogs:
This blog is the second in our two-part series on the APRA Ethiopia team’s recent national event, entitled “Rice Sector Transformation Event in Ethiopia – Lessons from APRA Programme”, which aimed to discuss the country’s rice sector, including the trends in the production, import and consumption of rice, the key challenges facing the sector, and the policy and development lessons for addressing the identified challenges. The previous blog reflected on the key findings and takeaways of the synthesis presentation given during the event, which was followed by a lively discussion among the speakers and attendees around the pathways to improving Ethiopia’s rice sector. This blog presents the key topics and conclusions of these discussions.
Scaling from the Fogera Plain
Before we talk of scaling lessons from the Fogera Plain, we need to think of mainstreaming rice in the regional and national extension system. Second, we must develop an inventory/suitability assessment of Ethiopia’s rice potential in terms of natural ecology including for irrigated rice. So far, the natural ecology is fragmented and hence promotion of rice will incur high transaction costs. The suitability analysis requires involvement of research on the ecology study by the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) on extension to effectively utilise both the natural rice ecologies and artificial rice production ecologies – such as construction of dams. The latter should consider issues of climate change.
Increasing rice productivity
Increasing rice productivity should consider ‘producing rice in a system’. This includes integrating rice with aquaculture, horticulture or livestock. It is also important to think of rice in the context of rural-urban linkages in terms of markets, employment, and services. For example, rice productivity in Tanzania and Japan is based on farmers’ total income. Rice is thus promoted in synergy with horticultural (e.g. vegetable) production for income generation during the dry season. The income from horticulture is reinvested in the procurement of improved rice seed and machinery services.
Competitiveness of rice in Ethiopia
When we talk about import substitution, do we have sufficient quantity and quality of rice produced at the local level that can competitively substitute rice imports? What is the relationship between quantity and quality of rice and rice processing in Ethiopia?
To enhance rice import substitution, we need to increase rice productivity (quantity and quality of rice). This, in turn, calls for supportive policy and incentives in rice production and processing. It was argued that the smallholder rice commercialisation process in Ethiopia is slow because of the weak linkages between rice production and processing, as well as low rates of mechanisation to improve quality and quantity of rice (both paddy and milled). The poor quality of paddy rice and processed rice are associated with the type of machinery in the rice production and processing stages. For instance, in the Fogera Plain, there is rampant use of traditional machinery for pre-processing, processing, and post-processing of rice. This situation calls for investing in better processing machinery, building better capacity of use, repair, and maintenance of the machinery, and providing incubation and demo sites to create jobs for the youth.
Overall, mechanisation is critical for improving quantity and quality of rice in Ethiopia in order to address import substitution. This can be achieved by first developing a suitability map for both irrigated rice and rain-fed rice production; and second, enabling a proper design of production and processing systems – which require incentives on mechanisation and collaboration among the government, private sector, and civil society. Specifically, the role of the private sector is critical in linking private processors to the producers – with the government playing a facilitative role. Mechanisation in rice processing is a big challenge in the country; therefore, MoA can play a catalytic role in providing cost-sharing arrangements in the production and post-production stages for the private sector to invest in rice mechanisation.
Making rice an important strategic crop in Ethiopia
Why talk of improving productivity when there are already 38 new high-yielding rice varieties available? What is the problem? How can we ensure competitiveness of Ethiopian rice in the market? Does this require revising the National Rice Strategy? How do we strengthen the steering and the technical committees on rice development in the country? How do we strengthen monitoring, evaluation and learning to document lessons in the Fogera Plain and scale them up in other areas?
The important debate these questions create revolves around developing a research and development strategy and rice flagship which can first make the Fogera National Rice Research and Training Centre a centre of excellence in research, extension, and mechanisation. Second, from a productivity and competitiveness perspective, the 38 rice (and other additional) varieties should consider different market segments/niches and the required preliminary quality attributes. Third, the Fogera Plain is mid-altitude for rice – which means that there are other productivity and ecological systems which are not catered for by the available rice varieties. This situation calls for developing rice varieties for the diverse niche ecologies that exist in Ethiopia.
Fostering global partnerships
Global partnership is about ‘give and take’ in a business relationship. The partnership includes the government creating incentives for the private sector to invest in the rice value chain because there are multiple opportunities in the sector especially in mechanisation. In particular, the private sector can foster incubation in mechanisation. This situation calls for revisiting National Rice Strategy Plan and the flagship documents on global partnerships –not only in technology but also knowledge management (know-how and innovation) in a sustainable business relationship among the existing and new actors.
After Kenya confirmed its first case of COVID-19 on March 12, 2020, the country underwent a series of movement restrictions and closures to stymie the spread of COVID-19 infections. The containment measures helped to slow the local spread of coronavirus, but with negative consequences for the country’s food system and livelihoods. Thus, we would expect improvements in people’s food security and overall livelihoods after relaxation of the containment measures, which began gradually in July 2020. The APRA Kenya research team conducted three rounds of mixed-method, comparative assessments to investigate the impact of COVID-19 and associated containment measures on the food system and the sub-set of the country’s population that is largely dependent on agriculture. The results of the three survey rounds are presented in A Multi-Phase Assessment of the Effects of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Kenya.
Food and nutrition security
One of the most important pathways through which the COVID-19 pandemic has affected households is through its impact on their food and nutrition security. This is especially true for agricultural households who disproportionately depend on their own production for food supply, and on agricultural markets for income and other household needs. In round 1 (R1) of the survey in June 2020, most respondents reported no change in the availability of most food items in local markets, except for vegetables where a decrease in availability was noted. This pattern changed in the second survey round (R2) in October 2020, during which the majority of households reported an increase in the availability of vegetables in local markets. In the third survey round (R3) conducted in February 2021, however, things took a largely dismal turn with most respondents reporting reduced availability of most food items, including grains, roots, tubers, and plantains which constitute the major staples.
In terms of food prices in local markets, the majority of respondents in R1 and R2 reported an increase for most food items except those of animal origin (milk and milk products, meat and poultry, eggs and processed foods). In R3, most respondents reported a decrease in the prices of meat and poultry and processed foods. A significantly higher percentage of respondents (76%) in R3 compared to R2 (49%) stated that the prices of grains had increased in local markets, despite the fact that the November–February period coincides with the harvesting season for maize – the main staple grain – and ordinarily prices would not be expected to increase.
Using the food insecurity experience scale, reported food and nutrition insecurity was highest in R1 and lowest in R2 and R3. Although this finding may appear to contradict the above results, given that November–February is usually the harvesting season for maize, it may be that most households had their own stock of grains and were not selling, hence the lower incidence of hunger in households and reduced supply and higher prices of grains in local markets.
Cost of living
Approximately 96% of respondents in R1 stated that their cost of living had increased. This percentage reduced to 66% in R2 before increasing to 98%, in R3. . These statistics are generally consistent with the official consumer price index (CPI) published by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, which indicated that the CPI increased by 1.2% between June and October 2020 and by 3.4% between October 2020 and February 2021. It is also important to note that schools opened in January 2021 and so households also needed to pay school fees and purchase school items for their children, a factor which further strained household budgets.
Control over own life
On average, the respondents felt that they had greater control over their own life before COVID-19, compared to after the pandemic had struck. Perceived control over their own life also increased, on average, in subsequent survey rounds.
Conclusion
Despite the gradual relaxation of COVID-19 containment measures which significantly affected households’ participation in social and economic activities, food and nutrition insecurity generally remained a challenge for most households. Households mostly continued to experience a high cost of living, consistent with the official statistics which reported increases in CPI between October 2020 and February 2021. While the government was the main source of assistance to households to support them in coping with the negative effects of the pandemic, that assistance sharply declined over time, leaving most of the households to manage the pandemic’s effects on their own. On the positive side, however, perceived control over the respondent’s own lives increased over time, which suggests that the relaxation of COVID-19 containment policies was making individuals feel that they were gaining more control.
To hear more about APRA’s research findings on COVID-19, join the e-Dialogue on February 9th, 2022. Learn more and register, here.
Read about previous APRA research on COVID-19 in Kenya in the following blogs:
On 20 January 2022, an e-dialogue was convened to analyse the dynamics of agricultural commercialisation and agrarian change across East, West and Southern Africa. The programme began with participants engaging in three parallel regional presentations and discussions, and culminated in a continental-level panel involving expert commentators and audience questions.
Social differentiation and livelihood trajectories
The Southern Africa session began with four presentations, highlighting key regional concerns. Mirriam Matita, APRA Malawi Country Lead and Economics PhD Student at the University of Malawi, commenced proceedings by analysing lessons learned regarding groundnut commercialisation and livelihood trajectories in Malawi, and was followed by Loveness Msofi, Lecturer at Lilongwe University of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who spoke on gender and social dynamics in commercialisation in Malawi. Toendepi Shonhe, Agricultural Political Economist at the University of South Africa, then looked at agricultural commercialisation, changing labour regimes and rural transformation in Zimbabwe, before Chrispen Sukume, APRA Zimbabwe Country Lead and Co-Administrator at Zimbabwe’s Livestock and Meat Advisory Council, examined the impact of smallholder tobacco commercialisation on food security in the region.
Following these insights, expert commentator Kezia Batisai, Associate Professor at the University of Johannesburg, highlighted key shifts required to support agricultural transformation in the region. These include addressing the informality of the sector’s development due to poor implementation of policy, ensuring any change to agricultural commercialisation is inclusive, sustainable and permanent, and directing resources to those who have historically been marginalised because of a lack of political power and connections. Batisai also noted the need for gendered responses, as women landowners are currently grappling with gendered intergenerational land transfer biased towards male inherence, often pushing women to the margins. During the discussion, she also emphasised the need to address patriarchal structures and cultural practices to reduce gender inequality and amplify the voices of women.
Patience Mutopo, Founding Chair and Professor of the Centre for Development Studies at the Chinhoyi University of Technology, said the critical question was that of labour. She presented several myths that exist in Zimbabwe, including that there is a shortage of farm labour (when, in reality, unemployment is very high in many African countries), and that people working on farms solely do just that – when, in fact, most people are engaged in a number of diversified, income-generating activities. During the general discussion Matita also argued for the need to tailor solutions to different kinds of farmers; for example, smallholders versus those with large-scale operations.
To finish, Ian Scoones, Co-Director of the ESRC STEPS Centre of the Institute of Development Studies, emphasised the importance of having access to land, and how this is linked to opportunities for commercialisation, gender equality, labour, and more. He highlighted that commercialisation is a complex process with no single trajectory, and that there is a need for wider and more agile policies to promote and enable commercialisations.
Dynamics of rice and sunflower commercialisation
The East Africa session focused on agricultural concerns in Ethiopia and Tanzania. APRA Ethiopia Country Lead and Country Representative of Stichting Wageningen Research Ethiopia of the Wageningen University in the Netherlands, Dawit Alemu, launched proceedings by using examples from the Fogera Plain to review the dynamics of rice commercialisation and agrarian change in Ethiopia. Next, Gideon Boniface, an APRA researcher in Tanzania, reviewed how small-scale processors support agricultural commercialisation among smallholder rice farmers in the region, before Aida Isinika, APRA Tanzania Country Lead and Professor at the Sokoine University of Agriculture, spoke on the connections between rice commercialisation, livelihood outcomes and women’s empowerment in Tanzania. Finally, Ntengua Mdoe, also a Professor at the Sokoine University of Agriculture, explored correlations among sunflower commercialisation and livelihood diversification and poverty reduction in Tanzania’s Singida Region.
To start wider discussion on these topics, Dr. Mary Mutembei, Head of the Rice Promotion Program at the Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture, emphasised the common situations and solutions across the region, saying, “There is a lot we can learn from each other.” On the solutions side, she noted that the creation of rural-urban markets can generate jobs in rural areas through the commercialisation of value chains and help reduce rural-to-urban migration. She also called on development partners and the private sector to come together to work towards the same goals, particularly in addressing challenges. One example given is how mechanisation and technology promote youth in agriculture, but unfortunately at the expense of women. She said: “We need to find ways to increase equity and inclusivity, even as we specialise and modernise.”
Alemu added that there is an untapped need for machinery suppliers and servicers, and that this is an important opportunity to create even more jobs as service providers, while also supporting farmers. Isinika added that commercialisation also offers job creation opportunities and can add value as processors become leaders in the value chains.
Expert commentator Isaac Minde, Professor of Agricultural Economics and Associate Director of the Alliance for African Partnership at Michigan State University, added that it is important to include other lenses, for example political economy analysis, to better understand key issues, such as how politics affects economic outcomes of value chains. Mutembei added that food and nutrition security is another important lens, and there is a need to mainstream nutritional issues as sectors commercialise, as well as the need to be cognisant of how climate change will affect the value chain.
Inclusivity and smallholder transformation
Discussion from the West Africa region addressed cocoa- and agricultural-related issues in Ghana and Nigeria. This first saw Adebayo Aromolaran, APRA’s Nigeria Country Lead and Professor at Ajasin University, use evidence from Nigeria to explore whether medium-scale farms are a driving force behind agricultural transformation in Africa. Next, Fred Dzanku, APRA’s Ghana Country Lead and a Research Fellow at the Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research, discussed approaches that can be taken in Ghana to achieve inclusive oil palm commercialisation. Kojo Amanor, a Professor at the University of Ghana, then highlighted long-term patterns of change within the Ghanaian cocoa sector, before Adeola Olajide, an Agricultural Economist, summarised the issues and prospects surrounding cocoa commercialisation in Nigeria.
Launching the expert review discussion was Charles Abugre, Executive Director of the International Development Economics Associates, who highlighted that a food systems approach suggests a broader focus on: food system activities beyond production, such as trade, transport and value addition; food systems outcomes beyond poverty reduction and food access, such as nutrition employment, inequalities; as well as food systems drivers such the impacts of population, changes in consumption patterns and climate change. He also noted that questions remain with regards to the future of cocoa production given global price trends, climate change and their income distribution effects at the local level.
Soji Adelaja, Distinguished Professor in Land Policy at Michigan State University, emphasised the importance of APRA’s research in the region and the role it plays in supporting Africa’s agricultural future with regards to both commercialisation and economic transformation. For example, farmers who ‘step up’ into larger acreage farms are positively associated with productivity and size, and “as long as we can continue to push and encourage these farms, we can see the kinds of productivity increases that are consistent with economic transformation,” he said. However, he also noted that gender- and youth-related challenges remain in the sector, and to make farming truly inclusive, the government must take greater action in addressing these.
Continuing points discussed during his presentation, Aromolaran recommended that incentives be devised and offered by policymakers to encourage further interactions between medium- and small-scale farms.
Finally, Olajide stated that policies which support cocoa consumption and utilisation within Nigeria need to be implemented – as once consumption and demand for produce are created, this will translate to increased production and expansion.
Emerging Challenges and Opportunities for Inclusive Commercialisation: Insights from the Regional Sessions
Participants and speakers came together to share the key points from the regional sessions and draw conclusions on a continental scale. Many focused on the issue of gender, with Mutopo calling on the group to consider the ‘missing women’, and the need to engage them rather than consider them as victims. Janice Olawoye, Professor at the University of Ibadan, noted that when the incomes of women farmers rise, health and educational outcomes improve. Batisai added that women need to be put into policymaking positions at all levels so they can become agents of change.
West Africa expert commentator Abugre called for a systems approach which would also address land grabbing, the overuse of chemicals and other inputs, and a broader set of goals to be achieved by agriculture, such as human and planetary health. Adelaja added increasing populations, shrinking farm sizes, and climate shocks to the list, and said Africa needs to become and remain self-reliant in terms of food production despite these challenges.
Professor Minde, however, emphasised the need to be realistic in terms of goal setting, policymaking, and monitoring, calling for achievable goals, implementable programmes, and prioritisation of areas of investment. This sentiment of looking to the future and ensuring sustainable progress was echoed by Dr. Mary Mutembei, who emphasised the need to assess the impact and long-term benefits of transformational food systems on rural areas and disadvantaged groups.
Closing remarks came from Ken Giller, Professor of Plant Production Systems at Wageningen University. He highlighted several key action points, including the need to raise awareness of these issues among governments and policymakers and the necessity of finding solutions that are flexible and can be adapted to a wide diversity of contexts. He particularly highlighted the persistent challenge that the poorest in Africa’s supply chains are greatly left behind and that they need more than commercialisation; they need policies to reduce inequality.
This blog was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland.
The Omicron wave peaked in Zimbabwe just before Christmas. With people moving about for the festive season and large numbers coming back from South Africa and elsewhere for the holidays, the fear was that the spread would be dramatic, with devastating consequences. Border restrictions were maintained, curfews imposed and the lockdown was extended.
As we reported in our last blog on 20 December, many had already reported that the infection was proving relatively mild, a finding subsequently supported by hospital evidence from South Africa, the UK and Denmark. And, just as the spread of Omicron was dramatic and fast, its decline has similarly been sudden, although cases still persist. Across our sites in the last few weeks, multiple cases have been reported, but way down on the situation a few weeks back. No deaths have been recorded in our sites in the past weeks. A few of our agricultural extension colleagues went down with Omicron around Christmas, but they all isolated and quickly recovered.
A festive mood
Although Omicron presented more uncertainties to contend with for the holidays, people across our study areas reported that they were not going to be put off. People were in a festive mood, relatives had returned after a long gap and there were parties to be had. Many large gatherings were reported, including the return of large church services. In towns and business centres large crowds gathered, bars were open and there seemed to be little social distancing, there was reduced mask wearing and people were sharing calabashes in communal drinking sessions.
The now familiar ‘bakosi’ markets were in full swing across our study sites, especially in locations further south. These sprawling open air markets usually operate once a week and sell everything from food to clothes to hardware and more. Huge numbers attend, perhaps several thousand at times, and of course are potentially major infection hot spots. But they also serve important economic and social functions: they are places to gather, to meet people, to exchange ideas and goods, and are now an essential part of rural economic life, and no matter what the potential risks people were not keeping away over the holidays.
Open air market Guwini, Chikombedzi
Despite the caution of the public health authorities, the people were not going to let the virus get in the way of a holiday mood or the need for business. Fear had receded of COVID, perhaps because of the experiences with Omicron in the previous weeks of relatives and others both in Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Changing remedies and home treatments
As we have reported many times before, local remedies and home treatments have become the way people have coped. People fear quarantining and forced isolation now more than the disease. Because Omicron presents differently – more ‘flu-like symptoms, with a combination of nose and throat congestion and a dry cough, rather than the impact on breathing and the chest as in previous waves – the treatments have changed.
The most recent, circulating widely on family Whatsapp groups, is a concoction of Coca-Cola and chilli, which is supposed to work wonders. Others reported include a mix of lemon, cooking oil and onion. And of course the full array of other herbal treatments we have discussed on this blog before. The important point is though that with an effectively new disease in Omicron, with different symptoms, people have experimented, learned and shared new remedies – literally in a matter of weeks.
Mrs CF holding her traditional medicineMr F. Soko from Mvurwi at his nursery: lemon trees are selling fast because of the pandemic
Nurses in clinics across our sites reported that it was a busy time over the holidays, but many were not coming to the clinics if they thought they had COVID as they feared quarantine. They would prefer to treat themselves at home, while self-isolating. Having a variety of treatments to hand people argue, is a more effective response. It seemed that the nurses (informally) agreed as they noted the problems in the public clinics.
A plural health system: fostering resilience
Meanwhile, public health interventions continue focusing on vaccines. There was a big spike in vaccine take-up in the rural areas over the holiday period. This was apparently due to people coming home from town, and choosing mobile rural clinics over the urban ones where they normally live. The rural alternatives were quicker, easier and more accessible it seems. Even diaspora relatives took up the opportunity, and many younger workers from town were persuading their parents and others to join them at the clinics.
During the pandemic a network of health professionals has emerged to support rural people’s response to the disease. These include of course the doctors, nurses, vaccinators and village health workers, part of the public health system, but the wider health system also includes herbalists (those with specialist knowledge of particular herbs), n’angas (spirit mediums with treatment powers), and family based health specialists (often individuals within a wider family recognised as especially knowledgeable). And supporting them there are the wide range of collectors of herbal products, those who process them and the vendors who sell them, often with street advice on how to prepare presses, teas or other concoctions.
Susan, a traditional healer from Mutomani village, Chiredzi, with her husband
A plural health system has therefore emerged, partly out of necessity as the public system is inadequate, but partly out of the need to respond in a diversified way, recognising that many people have expertise in a fast-changing pandemic setting, and there is no one right way, especially as the virus changes. With such a plural system, innovation, learning and sharing can happen quickly and effectively. Some of the remedies may not work that well, but others might, and people will respond accordingly.
In March 2020, right at the beginning of the pandemic, in the first contribution of this now long series on COVID responses in rural Zimbabwe, we argued that rural Zimbabwe might offer some level of resilience, having been able to manage turbulence and uncertainty of different sorts for many years, despite the obvious ‘fragility’ of the state. Resilience is not a single property; it is relational based on how people, individually and together, respond to unfolding events. This requires flexibility, responsiveness and collective sharing. As we have seen now over nearly two years, these are all features that have been central to rural Zimbabwe’s (largely informal) pandemic response.
Thanks to Felix Murimbarimba and the team in Mvurwi, Matobo, Chikombedzi, Masvingo and Gutu for contributions to this blog.
The APRA Ethiopia team held a national event to discuss the country’s rice sector, including the trends in the production, import and consumption of rice, the key challenges facing the sector, and the policy and development lessons for addressing the identified challenges. In the first of a two-part blog series, we present the key discussion points and takeaways resulting from this event, titled “Rice Sector Transformation Event in Ethiopia – Lessons from APRA Programme”. The event, held on 29th November 2021 at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR), was a critical presentation of the APRA Ethiopia team’s research over the last five years. Read the second in this two-part blog series, here.
The event was attended by 35 participants, who joined both in person and online, from the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), the Agricultural Transformation Institute (ATI), EIAR, Regional Agricultural Research Institutes (OARI, ARARI and SARI), and development partners including Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Ethiopia, EthioRice and Mennonite Economic Development Associates Ethiopia. The programme covered a synthesis presentation of the key findings of APRA Ethiopia by Dawit Alemu, followed by a moderated discussion on the way forward by Mandefro Nigussie, CEO of ATI, Ethiopia.
Key findings
The presentation highlighted a number of aspects of the Ethiopian rice sector that need attention, and sought to explain the factors that have led to the challenges currently facing the sector. Namely, the rate of rice importation is accelerating more rapidly than that of domestic production, which has led to a decline in national rice self-sufficiency from about 70 per cent in 2008 to a mere 24 per cent in 2019. This trend indicates the huge burden rice is putting in the meagre foreign currency reserves of the country, where rice imports cost about US$200 million in 2019. The key factors for the limited competitiveness of domestic rice and declining trend in the level of self-sufficiency are found to be:
Rice production and productivity remains low – national average is only 2.96MT/ha.
Huge competition of imported rice with domestic rice – hard to compete on quality.
The limited expansion of the relative successes in inclusive agrarian changes in Fogera Plain to other rice hubs, mainly in terms of enhanced food security, social inclusion, rural-urban linkage, and rural labour market development.
Shortage of pre-harvest mechanisation and post-harvest processing technologies – milling, storage, transport, etc.
Inadequate market development to link to both domestic and international value chains.
Lack of skilled human resources and training resources in rice research and development.
Rice commercialisation has caused a decline in the production of livestock and crops such as pulses, especially in the lowland rice zones (Fogera Plain).
Following the presentation of the above obstacles facing the rice sector’s success, the following key policy issues emerged:
The success of rice commercialisation in Fogera Plain leads to important policy and development questions: “Why are other areas in Ethiopia not as successful in this endeavour?” and “Why are the levels of national self-sufficiency continuously declining?”
The need to enhance the production and productivity of rice, along with its competitiveness with imported rice.
The key factors to enhance the competitiveness of domestic rice are to:
Enhance the full operationalisation of the National Rice Research and Training centre to ensure the availability of trained manpower in the production, processing, and marketing of domestic production.
Address the challenges arising from restrictive land and its use policy.
Ensure the competitiveness of local rice, both in terms of price and quality, compared to imported rice through adequate research and development efforts.
Develop incentive mechanisms for farmers and agro-processors to produce quality rice.
Modernise and build the capacity of rice processors, and standardise the key requirements for the licensing of rice processing facilities.
Improve the performance of marketing systems – not only for rice, but also for other crops (such as vegetables), which are the main contributors to smallholder rice farmers’ incomes.
Design implementation strategy with strong monitoring, evaluation and learning, and proper alignment of all relevant stakeholders.
Summary takeaway messages
Rice is an important strategic crop in Ethiopia, and its importance has led to the development of the National Rice Strategy Plan (2020 – 2030). There is an opportunity for follow-up activities, which calls for contributions by government, private sector, and civil society in the following areas:
Revitalise the functioning of the national steering committee to overlook the implementation of the National Rice Development Strategy (NRDS) II, 2020–2030, both at the national and regional levels.
Develop a national rice flagship programme that guides the implementation of the NRSD considering the specificities of the identified seven rice hubs in the NRDS II.
Explore adequately how the private sector can engage proactively in rice commercial farming, processing, technology importation and demonstration, etc.
Strengthen the collaboration with (i) Coalition for African Rice Development, of which Ethiopia has been a member since 2008, (ii) AfricaRice, of which Ethiopia has been a member since 2016, and (iii) the International Rice Research Institute, EthioRice project (2020 – 2025), which is the second phase supported by JICA Ethiopia.
Ensure alignment of all rice-related initiatives through the flagship programme.
Focusing on 9 February 2022, APRA, in partnership with the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and Foresight4Food (F4F), will host an interactive e-dialogue on COVID-19 and its Effects on Local Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in sub-Saharan Africa.
The context
Across the world, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused severe disruptions to agri-food systems. With border closures and movement restrictions imposed by governments to curb the spread of the virus, access to markets and trading were interrupted, thereby affecting the livelihoods and well-being of hundreds of millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa who rely on these activities to survive.
During 2020-21, with support of the UK Foreign, Development and Commonwealth Officer (FCDO)/UKAid, APRA researchers conducted a series of studies to examine how responses to the crisis were affecting local food systems, value chains and rural livelihoods across the region. The central research question was: How has the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted farming and domestic activities, health and human welfare, and agricultural markets and value chains, and what can we learn from this crisis to respond to major shocks and stresses in future?
Drawing on these studies, this event will bring together policy-relevant lessons on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on rural communities.
What to expect
Providing an overview, Amrita Saha, IDS economist, will highlight the main approach and key findings of APRA’s multi-phase assessment to analyse the differential effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, employment, poverty, and well-being in over 800 rural households in eight countries.
Country-specific lessons will be presented by APRA researchers:
Mirriam Matita and Masautso Chimombo – Malawi
Adebayo Aromolaran and Milu Muyanga – Nigeria
Aida Isinika and Gideon Boniface – Tanzania
Vine Mutyasira – Zimbabwe
John Thompson, APRA CEO, will wrap up the first discussion by providing the key findings for equity and nutrition.
Steve Wiggins, agricultural economist at ODI, will continue the talks with a review of the implications of COVID-19 for agricultural development, food and nutrition security. Brief reflections on this discussion will be provided by expert commentators Akosua K. Darkwah from the University of Ghana and Sandra Gagnon from the International Development Research Centre.
To conclude the session, a general discussion with the presenters will be lead by development economist Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, before a final Q&A with the audience and take-aways from the panel.
Join us to hear more on 9 February at 1300 GMT to gain more insights. Register, here.
To find out what to expect during the dialogue, read the programme here.
Did you miss the dialogue? A full recording of the event can be seen here!
Who is benefitting as food systems and rural economies are transformed and who is at risk of being left-behind? Throughout 2022, the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) Programme of the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC), UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and Foresight4Food (F4F) will be convening a series of e-Dialogues to provide an in-depth exploration of these critical questions.
Drawing on a wide range of perspectives, disciplines and approaches, we will examine pathways for bringing greater equity and inclusivity to how food is produced and consumed. Foresight thinking will be used to explore the impact of differing scenarios of food systems transformation in a variety of contexts worldwide. To look at equity and inclusion issues across the whole food system, we will be building on the content and format of the successful 2020 e-Dialogue series on “What Future for Small-Scale Farming?”.
Context
To kick-off the New Year, three e-Dialogues led by APRA will be held in January and February 2022. The aim will be to not only draw ideas and insights from APRA research, but also from other complementary initiatives across Sub-Saharan Africa. These events will feature new evidence and analyses to highlight the critical political, economic, social, institutional and technical factors that enable or constrain small and medium producers, farm workers and processors to invest in agriculture. They will show how and why agriculture is an important source of food and income for most rural households but needs to be seen in the context of multiple livelihood activities – both on and off the farm – as a large proportion of small and medium producers in Africa live in poverty and fail to achieve a ‘living income’ from farming alone.
The e-Dialogues
Emerging Challenges and Regional Realities (Thursday, 20 January 2022). This first e-dialogue will involve analysing the dynamics of agricultural commercialisation and agrarian change across East, West and Southern Africa in three parallel regional discussions leading to a continental-level panel involving expert commentators and audience questions.
COVID-19 and its Effects on Local Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods (Wednesday, 9 February 2022). The second in the series will highlight policy-relevant lessons on the effects of the COVID-19 emerging from two multi-country comparative studies, one analysing household-level livelihood responses and outcomes and the other focusing on the differential effects of COVID on agricultural value chains.
Transition Pathways and Strategies for Supporting More Equitable and Resilient Food Systems in Africa (Tuesday, 23 March 2022). Finally, in March, the final e-Dialogue event will assess options and scenarios for creating more equitable and inclusive forms of agricultural commercialisation and rural transformation, with a focus on the specific challenges for different types of farmers, farm workers and processors, given their scale, gender, assets or geographic and market context.
Support for APRA’s contribution to the e-Dialogue series is provided by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). APRA is funded with UK aid from the UK FCDO and will run from 2016-2022.
Written by: Kehinde Adesina Thomas, Adeola Olajide and Molatokunbo O. Olutayo
Despite the setback in the Nigerian agricultural sector’s development and its declining cocoa production in recent years, the nation still has potential to regain its production capacities in the cocoa sub-sector. In fact, cocoa farmers included in the study, across their gender disaggregation, opined that cocoa farming still has a bright future in the study area if attendant challenges are promptly addressed, because the interest and drive to expand production still exists among farmers. Thus, this paper explores the issues and prospects around cocoa commercialisation in southwestern Nigeria.
Written by: Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Marco Carreras and Dawit Alemu
The introduction of rice into Ethiopia provided a solution to food insecurity. More recently, national policy has emphasised the positive relationship between rice specialisation and commercialisation and, thus, higher incomes. In retrospect, this initiative has been hugely successful as the regions where rice has been introduced have been transformed from heavily relying on food aid to becoming a thriving commercial centre. This transformation owes much to the increase in the production, consumption and commercial value of rice. However, the relationship between specialisation and commercialisation is far from straightforward and is mediated by poverty, as proxied by farm size in this paper. Using a novel cross-sectional dataset of rice farmers from the Fogera Plain in Ethiopia, collected in 2018, in this paper we look at the relationship between rice specialisation and commercialisation and how specialisation and commercialisation decisions and outcomes are mediated by farm size. Specifically, we characterise farmers by the extent of rice specialisation and commercialisation and explore the role of landholding size.
Written by: Adebayo B. Aromolaran, Milu Muyanga, Fadlullah O. Issa and Oladele Oladeji
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 in Nigeria, there have been serious concerns about the impact of the pandemic on agri-food systems, given that most of the population depend directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihoods. These concerns are compounded by the fragile state of the country’s health and food systems. This blog summarises the findings of APRA’s A Multi-Phase Assessment of the Effects of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Nigeria, which studied the differential impacts of the pandemic on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, employment, poverty, and well-being in rural households. The assessment was designed to help gain timely insights into how the COVID-19 crisis was unfolding in various parts of Nigeria and how rural people and food and livelihood systems were responding.
Compliance with COVID-19 guidelines and support to households
To control the spread of COVID-19, the Federal Government of Nigeria, through the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), released COVID-19 prevention guidelines. These included various human and vehicular movements control strategies, social distancing, sanitary measures and wearing of masks. The study found a low rate of compliance with government guidelines and regulations for prevention of spread, due to skepticism about the genuineness of government claims about COVID-19, the inconvenience of adhering to the regulations, and inadequate enforcement of regulations by law enforcement agencies. Government and religious organisations were the main source of support during the peak of the pandemic but this support faded out very quickly as restrictions on movement were relaxed.
Impact on agricultural production
In most parts of Nigeria, hired farm labour (mostly casual) is provided by migrants across states borders. Thus, the COVID-19 related restrictions in movement severely affected the supply of hired labour for farming operations, especially during the planting season. Most households also experienced increased cost of tillage services and land rentals. A sizeable proportion of households reported having experienced a decrease in the availability of farm inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers, agrochemicals, and veterinary drugs. This likely led to a reduction in farm employment and income.
Impact on employment and income
Household participation in off-farm work and non-farm businesses was lower during 2020 compared with the pre-COVID-19 period due to restrictions on movement. In addition, households experienced a decrease in their ability to sell produce at the farm gate and local markets, partly due to high transportation costs and restrictions in movement. Also, the number of traders visiting local communities to purchase farm produce also fell substantially. All these impacts amounted to a severe reduction in income flowing into farm households. This, coupled with higher costs of living, indicates a decline in household welfare.
Impact on food consumption and nutrition
Households experienced a decrease in food availability, especially with respect to white roots, tubers and plantains, and grains, during the first 11 months of the COVID-19 pandemic in Nigeria. Furthermore, dietary diversity declined, as most households were unable to eat healthy and nutritious food. A substantial proportion of household members interviewed ate only a few kinds of food. Lack of access to markets, reduction in farm and post-harvest activities, and food supply chain distortion due to severe restrictions in movement were the main reasons for the negative effects of COVID-19 on food consumption and nutrition among rural farm households.
Conclusion
Compared with the pre-COVID-19 period, rural farm households in Nigeria experienced various challenges which included higher costs of tillage services, land rentals and casual labour, increased prices of purchased farm inputs and food items, reduced household income, a consequent decline in household food consumption and dietary diversity, and negative effects on children’s education. These observed effects of the pandemic were due to government lockdowns and movement restrictions rather than COVID-19 infections.
The government needs to actively support the recovery of farm and off-farm businesses in the informal sector that have suffered due to COVID-19 restrictions. This will result in the reabsorption of workers into the labour force. It is also important for the federal and state governments to address the issue of rising costs of food that resulted from declining crop and livestock yields, which indirectly arose from reduced access to and rising costs of farm inputs and hired labour. Finally, federal, state and local governments need to re-evaluate their commitment to social protection schemes to better provide livelihood support to targeted vulnerable groups such as unemployed youths and female-headed households.
To hear more about APRA’s research findings on COVID-19, join the e-Dialogue on February 9th, 2022. Learn more and register, here.
Read about previous APRA research on COVID-19 in Nigeria in the following blogs:
The session, which will be held on Zoom from 11am-12.30pm GMT, will involve analysing the dynamics of agricultural commercialisation and agrarian change across East, West and Southern Africa, focusing on the emerging challenges and regional realities. In three parallel discussions, four APRA scientists from each region will present on the implications of their research findings for agricultural policy and practice.
Following these regional dialogues, a synthesis discussion will take place from 12.45pm-2pm GMT to gather regional perspectives and share a commentary on agricultural commercialisation and smallholder transformation across sub-Saharan Africa.
West Africa: Inclusivity and Smallholder Transformation
Speaking from West Africa, APRA’s Adebayo Aromolaran will draw on evidence from Nigeria to examine the extent to which medium-scale farms are driving agricultural transformation in Africa. Adeola O. Olajide also from Nigeria, will highlight the poverty-commercialisation-food security linkages among smallholder cocoa farmers in the country’s southwest region, whilst Kojo Amanor will look at the long-term patterns of change in the Ghanaian cocoa sector. Also from Ghana, Fred Mawunyo Dzanku’s presentation will explore how best to enhance the inclusivity of smallholder agricultural commercialisation.
East Africa: Dynamics of Rice and Sunflower Commercialisation
Discussions from East Africa will take a different focus: APRA’s Aida Isinika will present on the effects of different forms of rice commercialisation on women’s empowerment and food and nutrition security in Tanzania’s Kilombero Valley. Also from Tanzania, John Jeckoniah will speak on sunflower commercialisation and its associated impacts for livelihood diversification and poverty reduction in the Singida Region. Dawit Alemu aims to highlight the dynamics of rice commercialisation in Ethiopia’s Fogera Plain, whilst Christopher Magomba will explore how small-scale processors are supporting commercialisation among smallholder rice farmers in Ethiopia and Tanzania.
Southern Africa: Social Differentiation and Livelihood Trajectories
Finally, from Southern Africa, the talks will start with Blessings Chinsinga and lessons on groundnut commercialisation and livelihood trajectories from Malawi. Understanding gender and social differentiation in the context of agricultural commercialisation will be the focus of the presentation by Loveness Msofi, also from Malawi. Next, Toendepi Shonhe will address agricultural commercialisation, changing labour regimes and rural transformation, drawing on evidence from Zimbabwe, and Chrispen Sukume will also look at agricultural commercialisation pathways in Zimbabwe, as well as input use and crop productivity among smallholder farmers.
To wrap up the presentations, two expert commentators in each regional group (Charles Abugre and Soji Adelaja, West Africa, Mary Mutembei and Isaac Minde, East Africa, Kezia Batisai and Patience Mutopo, Southern Africa), will offer brief reflections on the e-Dialogue issues from their own perspectives, before talks move on to an audience discussion.
A Synthesis Discussion: Implications for Policy and Practice
Following the regional discussions, the six expert commentators and all e-dialogue participants will come together to compare lessons in a plenary synthesis discussion. The focus will be on drawing out emerging trends, challenges and opportunities for the emergence of more inclusive forms of agricultural commercialisation and food system transformation, with a greater focus on policy.
This event will be the first in a series of three e-dialogues to be held by APRA, SDSN and F4F in January and February, which aim to feature new evidence and analyses to highlight the critical factors that enable or constrain small and medium producers, farm workers and processors to invest in agriculture. For more information on topics and timing for the other e-dialogues, see here.
A typically busy street in Ghana’s capital, Accra [Photo credit: Louis Hodey]
Written by: Louis Hodey
The COVID-19 pandemic has killed and destroyed – not only lives – but livelihoods as well. The COVID-19 crisis has disrupted food systems in Ghana since its emergence in the country in March 2020. According to the United Nations World Food Programme, the socio-economic burden imposed by COVID-19, particularly through restrictions on social and commercial activities, appears to be more devastating than the actual health burden of the virus in many countries. The story of the disruptive consequences of the crisis on food systems and livelihoods have been told worldwide. Yet, these stories are not the same for all societies and sectors. The recent APRA publication ‘A Multi-Phase Assessment of the Effects of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Ghana‘ explores these differential effects in Ghana. This blog explores the findings of this report.
In Ghana, evidence abounds that the impact of the COVID-19 crisis cuts across economic sectors, social strata, and geography, though the severity of impact is undoubtedly not the same. Earlier studies by the Ghana Statistical Service suggests that the pandemic has had severe consequences for agribusinesses in Ghana. Particularly, the demand and supply shocks, as well as the operational challenges that confronted agribusinesses in the country during the implementation of containment and lockdown measures, lingered even after the initial lockdown was lifted. It was estimated that 77.4% of households in Ghana experienced income reductions, 78,412 agribusiness workers were laid-off, and 267,211 experienced wage reductions during the post-lockdown period from May 2020 to January 2021 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2021).
What has been the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on the livelihoods and food systems of rural farmers whose vulnerability to shocks appear the greatest? Undoubtedly, the vulnerability and resilience of food systems and rural livelihoods were brought into sharp focus by the COVID-19 crisis. As the crisis continues to disrupt livelihoods and food systems globally, key questions on country- and region-specific impacts of the pandemic must be answered. This blog highlights outcomes of APRA’s study which investigated the impact of the crisis on food systems and rural livelihoods in south-western Ghana. Data for this assessment is taken from three waves of telephone surveys and interviews involving a sub-sample of respondents who previously participated in panel studies by APRA on agricultural commercialisation and livelihood outcomes in south-western Ghana. Based on a mixed-methods design involving household telephone surveys and qualitative interviews, the APRA Ghana study made the following findings.
Business activities underway at Madina market, Accra [Photo credit: Louis Hodey]
What have been the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on food systems and livelihoods?
Though the rate of reported COVID-19 infections appears quite low in the study area, the livelihood impacts were significant. Our findings show that the global crisis continues to impose adverse impacts on rural livelihoods and food systems. Most households in the study, for example, reported having experienced significant hardship and vulnerability in the form of restrictions on movements, reduced participation in farming and business activities, rising costs of transportation, perception of having reduced control over their own lives, decline in food availability and consumption, and a generally rising costs of living, culminating in food and nutrition insecurity concerns. Overall, as a direct impact of the pandemic, more than a half of the study participants reported having reduced the quantity and variety of food eaten due to a lack of money or other resources. Further, on a scale of 1-10, individual’s perceived control over their own lives declined from 5.3 in the pre-COVID-19 period to 3.9 by January 2021.
Further, the study found that the impact of the pandemic differed across gender and demography. Women and children appeared to be the hardest hit by the pandemic. For instance, schools were closed for almost a year which affected teaching and learning since remote learning opportunities were almost non-existent in the study area, thus affecting the education of children. This is expected to further widen the educational inequality gap between rural and urban children. Women, particularly those engaged in cross-border trade, also suffered some trade losses. Further, the extra burden of childcare during the school closures impacted women more heavily than men.
Some food items displayed for sale at the Madina market, Accra [Photo credit: Louis Hodey]
How did households survive the pandemic?
Households in the study appear to be showing remarkable resilience in the face of very little or, in most cases, no external assistance. Some farming households have been coping with the crisis by intensifying their engagement in non-farm business activities, reducing food and non-food consumption, and relying on savings. Further, we found that to escape the consequences of border closures on their livelihoods, traders diverted their activities from cross-border destinations to regional and national markets. Additionally, to mitigate the impact of the cost of sanitary items and other personal protective equipment, and to generate extra income, households embarked on the production of face masks, alcohol-based hand sanitisers, handwashing soaps, and makeshift hand washing buckets. Indeed, these together with enhanced hygiene practices such as regular washing of hands with soap under running water, and the wearing of face masks, appear to have minimised the health and the socio-economic burden of the COVID-19 crisis and other airborne and hygiene-related diseases among the study participants.
What challenges are lingering?
Even though households appear to have shown remarkable resilience in the face of the negative impacts of the pandemic, some shocks persist and may potentially impose greater livelihood challenges for smallholder farmers. First, food inflation continues to be on the rise, with consequences for nutrition and food insecurity. Second, access to farm inputs remain generally constrained due to increasing input prices and severe financial difficulties resulting from the COVID-19 crisis. Finally, Ghana’s land borders have remained closed since March 2020, further exacerbating the socio-economic consequences for households whose livelihoods heavily depend on cross-border trade. These impacts are far from over and may linger in the coming years; hence the need for policy to address them to safeguard lives and livelihoods.
What are the implications of the study for policy and practice, and the way forward?
These findings have relevant implications for the government’s poverty reduction strategy, especially in the design and implementation of COVID-19-related livelihood support programmes to safeguard the sustenance of poor and vulnerable households. Indeed, safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable people is important in minimising the impact of the COVID-19 crisis worldwide. Given the lingering challenges imposed by the pandemic on livelihoods, there is a need for coordinated recovery efforts focused on building the resilience of food systems by targeting the worst affected groups such as smallholder farmers, women, and children.
Hodey, L.S. and Dzanku, F.M. (2021) A Multi-Phase Assessment of the Effects of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Ghana. APRA COVID-19 Country Report. Brighton: Future Agricultures Consortium. Available at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/20.500.12413/16990
To hear more about APRA’s research findings on COVID-19, join the e-Dialogue on February 9th, 2022. Learn more and register, here.
Read about previous APRA research on COVID-19 in Ghana in the following blogs:
This post was written by Ian Scoones and originally appeared on Zimbabweland on December 20, 2021.
It was just a few weeks ago that our last report noted the arrival of a new variant identified in South Africa. In the interim Omicron has swept through the country. This initially resulted in panic, with a rush to get vaccinated and the government swiftly responding with further lockdown measures. As someone recalled, “it was like the world was about to come to an end”, so panicked were both officials and many in the population.
The rapid spread is reflected in the case data that is officially reported, but the real figures are massively higher. Across our rural sites, people report that about 50-60% of villagers have been struck down by a virulent ‘flu in the past weeks, suggesting massive under-reporting in official figures.
Just two weeks ago we were hearing reports of a ‘flu in our site in Chikombedzi, in the far south of the country near the border with South Africa. On 5 December, our research team member reported via Whatsapp that many people in the villages had been coming down with ‘flu, but no deaths were being recorded. Since then, the same reports have come from all sites as the variant has spread north and across the whole country.
However so far, just as observed in Guateng in South Africa, which has been the epicentre of the Omicron epidemic, there have been very few deaths. Indeed, in our last review across sites over this past weekend, no local deaths have been reported and the only COVID related burials have been of those who have died elsewhere – all in our Chatsworth site near Gutu, with four bodies returned from South Africa and one from Chiredzi.
Omicron seems to cause a debilitating flu, involving a severe headache, joint aches, body weakness and severe fatigue, together with a running nose. People say it’s like malaria, with hot and cold sweats. It is extremely transmissible and very often whole families are down with it together. Indeed one of our research team members has been suffering from it over the past week, but the whole family has now thankfully recovered. It affects all ages, and vaccinated and unvaccinated people are all affected. However, recovery rates seems extremely good and it lasts about five days, slightly longer for older people.
Rapid spread, rapid learning
While in the first days at the beginning of December people were seriously worried, as they have experienced the disease over the last couple of weeks and been able to treat its symptoms, people have become more relaxed. With such rapid spread, the learning cycle in this pandemic is speeding up. The remedies used in previous phases have all be deployed, but this time the focus on body aches and fatigue has meant new innovations. The long used medication from China called ‘Tsunami’ (an aromatic oil, as shown by Mr Mutoko from Mvurwi below) is in high demand, as it can be applied to joints and even drunk in a tea. Equally, onion compresses are widely used to help with body aches and cold symptoms.
While many have taken up the offer of vaccines (20% fully vaccinated, 27% with at least one dose), few think that this is enough. An interesting argument emerged in discussions across our sites about the importance of having lots of different responses so that new variants can be tackled on many fronts. A single response – just focusing on vaccines as the government is emphasising – is not enough, people argued: “You can be doubled vaxxed even have a booster and still get Omicron… the variant needs many things to fight”. “Treatment responses must be wide and varied and this must include local remedies”, was a wide consensus as expressed in one discussion.
The sharing of remedies and treatment responses has been as rapid as the spread. Those in the border areas near South Africa experienced it first, and shared information about symptoms and remedies to relatives and others elsewhere. Whatsapp messages and Facebook groups are full of advice on how to tackle Omicron. Each family and village has a different set of responses, but the sharing of options is widespread. There are many, diverse prongs of attack. And (so far) it seems to be working.
Major disruptions
With whole families out sick for a week, and with the rapid spread sometimes half a village at a time, this has seriously disrupted the beginning of the farming season. The rains have finally (it seems) come, with steady rain falling over the past days. This is the time to be in the fields to plough and plant, as timing is all. Omicron is causing havoc with farm labour and this may have knock on effects into the harvest. The need for labour for land preparation is heightened this year as many livestock have perished due to January disease (known as cattle COVID locally), and so draft power is scarce.
However, what is causing most disruption and what was the centre of people’s commentaries was the return of lockdowns. People are just fed up. They have no livelihood options, people are poor. Kids have been out of school for months and are really suffering. Social problems are building up. Noone can face another round of lockdowns, especially with what appears to be a mild disease. And for this reason, very few are reporting sickness to clinics with the fear of being quarantined. As someone observed, “getting locked up is worse for you; you don’t have the support of your family, you cannot use your local remedies”.
The politics of control
Perhaps more than in previous phases, or at least with a different accent, there is a political critique of the current response and a demand for freedom and liberty, with an abandoning of a standard, centralised response to the pandemic. “We must learn to live with the disease, just as we have before with AIDS, and so many other diseases”, someone argued. “It’ll always be there, so we need vaccination alongside our own methods”, another said. “Who profits from this very standard way of responding – vaccines, vaccines, vaccines?”, someone asked rhetorically, answering: “it’s the big businesses who make a profit, and the governments who want our resources. A vaccine may be free, but it isn’t really”. People are very aware of the vaccine politics being played out in Africa and they don’t like it. In commentary across sites, there was a widespread critique of the top-down response to the pandemic:
“It’s government, the WHO, corporations who are in control. The powerful. The messages come one-way from them to the masses. We are bombarded with messages and instructions, which require adherence without question.”
The restrictions of endless lockdowns were getting to many: “It’s just don’t, don’t, don’t; it’s terrible for us, we are trying to live. How can we live a life of lockdowns? We are not comfortable with this”. Another informant observed, “We are not scared now of this disease; the only challenge are the lockdowns. We are approaching Xmas, but we cannot do any business, we are stuck.”
Even those enforcing lockdowns are fed up. One police officer commented, “We are tired of this, but we have to enforce the law. We need a compromise”. Lockdowns, as we have discussed before, lead to businesses collapsing and people seeking other forms of income. Corruption and crime are rife. Civil servants have not been paid a living wage for years, so as someone observed “it’s no surprise that people steal and get involved in corrupt practices like the police….It’s the same with the rise in petty crime. People are desperate.”
Collaborative approaches
So what’s the way out of this endless cycle? There were some interesting ideas expressed about ‘living with the disease’ in discussions in our sites during the last week:
“We have to do this together. We cannot have government just saying do this, do that, the top-down control doesn’t work. We have to find a way to discuss. After all it’s us who must ultimately respond to the disease in our own localities”.
A more collaborative approach, taking account of local needs and knowledges, was advocated:
“We have our own ways of dealing with the pandemic, we don’t like being controlled. Those in charge don’t know what we do, let us do it. Yes, we need the vaccinations and the drugs from the clinics, but let’s recognise the many other responses. We have to work together”.
This may be an important lesson for other countries too as a wider social contract emerges about how to deal with what inevitably will be an ongoing response to a disease (or now seemingly a variety of diseases), even as it settles towards an endemic state across the world, with inevitable new variants and new surprises in store.
This is part of a series of reports, starting in March 2020 on the unfolding COVID-19 situation in Zimbabwe. It is based on reports from the field team led by Felix Murimbarimba based in Mvurwi, Chatsworth, Wondedzo, Masvingo, Hippo Valley, Chikombedzi and Matobo.
Written by: Chrispin Matenga and Munguzwe Hichaambwa
Following the identification of the first COVID-19 case in Zambia on 18 March 2020, the government announced some lockdown measures intended to prevent the spread of pandemic. Since then, the COVID-19 pandemic has not only led to loss of human life and negatively affected health systems in the country, it has also disrupted local food systems and rural livelihoods. This blog reflects on the findings of APRA’s A Multi-Phase Assessment of the Effects of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Zambia, which highlights a case study on small-scale farmers surrounding the Mkushi Farming Block in Central Province of Zambia. The study focused on documenting and understanding the impacts of the pandemic at the household level in terms of changes in farming activities, availability and cost of services for agricultural production, labour and employment, marketing, transport services, food and nutrition security, and poverty. It also reviewed the COVID-19 health guidelines and ‘lockdown’ measures imposed by the state authorities, and how they may have contributed to these observed changes over time.
COVID-19 guidelines and ‘lockdown’ measures
Following the announcement of the first COVID-19 case in the country, the Zambian government, in line with global trends, instituted orders and public health guidelines including face masks, handwashing, use of alcohol-based hand sanitisers, social distancing, and a partial lockdown involving phased restrictions. The ‘lockdown’ measures included the closure of learning institutions at all levels, restrictions on social and religious gatherings, ‘stay-at-home’ appeals, rotational work and ‘work-at-home’ orders, and closures of bars, restaurants, nightclubs, casinos, cinemas and gyms. However, most businesses, particularly those dealing with essential goods and services including shops, food markets and supermarkets, have been allowed to continue operating throughout the pandemic. Other measures included brief closure of borders and international airports. Of note is the non-imposition of a country-wide curfew, as well as early easing up of the restrictions and a lacklustre attitude by state authorities in the enforcement of the public health guidelines.
Despite the fact that government has not issued any regulation to prevent people from making movements within the country or confining people at home, apart from moral appeals for people to ‘stay at home’ to avoid contracting or spreading the virus, the study revealed that most households reduced their movements both within and outside their own villages during the two rounds of the study. This was attributed to the fear of contracting coronavirus as little was known about its channels of transmission. Zambia’s ‘lockdown’ measures can thus be described as moderate relative to other countries in Southern African.
Farming, labour and marketing
Results show that farmer participation in farming activities and business decreased since the pandemic began. The proportion reporting decreases in participation in farming activities increased from 47% to 58% between the survey’s first round (R1) in October 2020 and the second round (R2) in March 2021. Similarly, the proportion reporting a decrease in participation in businesses/household enterprises slightly improved from 87% in R1 to 76% in R2 although it still remained high. Availability of labour, key agricultural services and access to markets decreased, while costs of inputs, farm labour and transportation of produce increased.
While most households reported increasing ability to hire labour from R1 to R2 of the survey, the cost of labour continued to rise during the period. COVID-19 has adversely affected the availability of key services for agricultural production (farm inputs; agricultural extension; contractual arrangements) but an improvement in availability was reported by R2 except for contractual arrangements for cash crops and concessionary loans. Prices for farm inputs and other services were reported to have increased with the onset of COVID-19 by most households, and the proportion reporting an increase has continued to rise. Brief border closures and mandatory testing/quarantine of truck drivers disrupted cross-border movement and impacted the supply chain for agricultural inputs at the time. The pandemic reduced households’ ability to sell farm produce at all market levels although the proportion reporting a decrease in access to these markets has begun to abate. For instance, the proportion of households that reported a decrease in access to national markets was 65% in R1, but this reduced to 46% in R2. Access to markets across the border similarly reduced from 82% in R1 to 68% in R2. While most households reported the ability to transport produce to the different market levels, the proportion reporting an increase in the cost of transport increased from 56% in R1 to 74% by R2, signifying that the cost of doing business for small-scale farmers was getting higher.
Food and nutrition security
Results indicate that household food and nutrition security was compromised, as food availability generally decreased during R1 but generally picked-up by R2. That food availability increased in R2 can be confirmed by the proportion of respondents reporting a reduction in the prevalence of having insufficient food to meet family needs from 58% to 42% between R1 and R2. Food prices were reported to have increased in R1 for most food items by most respondents, and the proportion reporting an increase in prices for most food items continued to increase except for ‘other vegetables’ and ‘other fruits’, which remained the same and reduced respectively between R1 and R2.
Poverty
More than three quarters of the respondents in both survey rounds (83% and 85%, respectively) reported that the overall cost of living had increased. While COVID-19 significantly reduced households’ ability to take full control of their lives during R1, an improvement was reported during R2, although remaining far behind pre-pandemic levels.
Conclusions
Overall, the study results show that COVID-19 has had negative impacts on small-scale farmer agricultural production and livelihoods in the short- to medium-term. Largely, the impacts have manifested themselves through disruptions to farming activities and services, labour supply, market access and spikes in prices for farm inputs, and labour costs. These disruptions were driven largely by fears among communities of infection during the initial period of the pandemic, as well as the perceived movement restrictions by state authorities (though these were not legislated). However, by R2 in March 2021, a recovery in many deteriorating indicators had begun, although they remained behind pre-pandemic levels and it is likely that it will take small-scale farmer households a longer time to fully recover.
To hear more about APRA’s research findings on COVID-19, join the e-Dialogue on February 9th, 2022. Learn more and register, here.
Read about previous APRA research on COVID-19 in Zambia in the following blog:
Group photograph of APRA Ghana research team and participants at the workshop. Photo credit: APRA Ghana
Written by: Louis Hodey
Together with stakeholders from public and private institutions countrywide, the APRA Ghana family gathered at ALISA Hotel in Accra to discuss the key findings emerging from three streams of APRA studies since 2016. Historically, cocoa and oil palm have remained Ghana’s major export crops, providing employment for the country’s burgeoning labour force, contributing about 3% to its GDP, accounting for between 20-25% of total export receipts, and supporting rural livelihoods across the forest belt of the nation. In addition to rubber, oil palm and cocoa remain the most commercialised crops in Ghana. Throughout the research, the team sought to understand the welfare outcomes of the choice of output commercialisation channels adopted by farmers.
Prof. Joseph Yaro highlighting APRA’s research in Ghana and the sub-region [Photo credit: APRA Ghana]
Discussing the findings at the event, Prof. Joseph Yaro, APRA’s West Africa Coordinator, highlighted APRA’s research activities in Ghana and in the sub-region. He further emphasised that the overarching objective of APRA studies in Ghana is to investigate the pathways to agricultural commercialisation that have been most effective in reducing rural poverty, empowering women and girls, and improving nutrition and food security. Prof. Yaro indicated that APRA’s research in Ghana falls into three workstreams – Workstream 1 (WS1) which examines the outcomes of different types of commercialisation and analysing people’s selection choices and their outcomes; Workstream 2 (WS2) which explores longitudinal change over time and identifying different pathways of agricultural commercialisation and their outcomes; and Workstream 3 (WS3) which analyses key policy issues associated with changing patterns of agricultural commercialisation through six focused, multi-country, policy studies.
In attendance at the workshop were stakeholders in Ghana’s cocoa and oil palm sectors including officials from Ghana Cocoa Board, Ghana Tree Crops Development Authority, and the media. The event was widely reported in the Ghanaian media, including in Graphic Online, Business & Financial Times, and the Ghanaweb News Portal.
Dr Fred Dzanku presenting WS1 findings at the workshop [Photo credit: APRA Ghana]
Key findings
What are the key findings from APRA’s studies in Ghana? Presenting the key findings from WS1 studies in Ghana and their implications for policy and practice, Dr Fred Dzanku, APRA Ghana Coordinator and the research lead for the WS1 studies, announced that among four* key oil palm commercialisation channels identified in southwestern Ghana, farmers who process their own oil palm reported better welfare outcomes and are happier. Similarly, better welfare outcomes were reported by farmers selling directly to oil palm companies. Yet, farmers who sell output to companies through agents were the unhappiest and most discontented due to the breakdown of trust. He observed that smallholder farmers in the study area are very responsive to market incentives with high levels of specialisation in non-food cash crop (oil palm, cocoa, and rubber) production. Dr Dzanku concluded that oil palm commercialisation in southwestern Ghana is constrained by structural and institutional factors such as limited ability to participate in better remunerating markets, poor land tenure arrangements, poor road networks and unavailability of farmer associations. Assessing the role of policy in promoting oil palm commercialisation outcomes in Ghana, Dr Dzanku proposed that the acceleration of public-private partnerships for rural agro-industry development, farmer training in cooperative organisation and management, rural infrastructure development (e.g., roads and oil palm processing equipment), and policy continuity are key to success.
Prof. Kojo Amanor presenting WS2 findings at the workshop [Photo credit: APRA Ghana]
Next, Prof. Kojo Amanor, the research lead for the APRA WS2 study in Ghana presented the key findings on long-term changing patterns of cocoa production in Ghana; farmers’ access to land, labour and technology; environmental impacts of cocoa through time; and the changing costs and challenges that farmers experience in cocoa farming. Prof. Amanor enumerated the key findings as follows. First, the cost of cocoa farming (in terms of land, labour, and inputs) has increased significantly while international prices remain generally poor and volatile. This results in declining profit margins, relatively high input prices, and increasing strains on large numbers of farmers to intensify production with high inputs. Additionally, deforestation results in increasing costs of production, and the vulnerability of cocoa to disease and pest infestations.
According to Prof. Amanor, attempts to promote sustainability in cocoa production and maximise welfare outcomes should include the creation of more diverse agroforest crops with different income-generating products to hedge risk against fluctuating prices; focus on raising incomes rather than maximising yields; enhanced land tenure security for farmers; and more flexible production and marketing strategies with various options for different categories of farmers.
Left: Participants interacting with the research team during Q&A session Right: A cross-section of participants listening to a discussant [Photo credit: APRA Ghana]
Responses to research
Discussion of APRA Ghana research findings were further enriched by a Q&A session and discussant comments from experienced practitioners in Ghana’s oil palm and cocoa sectors. First, responses from Mr Kwasi Baah Ofori (Planation/Estate Manager of Benso Oil Palm Plantation) and Dr Richard Asare (International Institute of Tropical Agriculture Country Representative) largely confirm the key findings of APRA’s WS1 and WS2 studies in Ghana. For instance, Mr Kwasi Baah Ofori affirmed that there are huge challenges reaching oil palm farmers through the company agents in southwestern Ghana. He emphasised that the role of agents has become critical to the operations of oil palm processing companies, as the companies cannot directly reach most farmers due to the fact that small-scale farms scattered in widely dispersed small communities with poor roads. He further highlighted the breakdown of trust in the oil palm economy in southwestern Ghana. This was followed by some debate and diverse reflections from participants. While some participants consider farmers’ accusations of cheating against agents as misconceived, others believe such allegations should be thoroughly investigated by the oil palm processing companies to restore trust among actors in the sector. Some suggest that the use of electronic scales to minimise cheating. Others further suggested that, as it is for cocoa, farmgate prices should be announced for oil palm at the beginning of the harvesting season.
Another highly debated topic relates to the finding that farmers engaged in their own oil palm processing reported better welfare outcomes. Some argued that small-scale artisanal oil palm processing is economically inefficient and may not be profitable because of high per unit cost of production. On the contrary, others contended that even if artisanal processing is not as profitable as it should be, there are non-economic incentives for actors in that sector. The point was made that artisanal oil palm processing is key indigenous knowledge which continues to sustain livelihoods in the oil palm-producing areas in Ghana, and if artisanal processing is discouraged in favour of efficiency, such knowledge could be lost. Further, the inefficiencies in the artisanal sector could be blamed on lack of equipment (e.g. oil palm mills) and other productive resources such as roads, water, and electricity; so provision of such facilities would improve efficiency in the artisanal oil palm processing sector. Additionally, commercial oil palm processing does not target the local market, and palm oil from such units are not meant for household consumption. Hence artisanal processors fill that important gap in the food system. Finally, though most artisanal mills are owned by men, the bulk of oil palm-processing activities are performed by women. Thus, investments in improving efficiency in the sector would also foster women empowerment.
Moving forward
Key messages for policy and practice include the need for Ghana to focus on public private partnerships (PPPs) as the best pathway to agriculture commercialisation. PPPs have the potential to effectively link up the agriculture and the manufacturing sectors, which are labour intensive and therefore hold greater promise to reduce unemployment. By this, the country has the chance of reducing unemployment through PPPs that goes beyond the government’s One District One Factory initiative. Collective action by farmers would also yield greater welfare outcomes. There is the urgent need to create more diverse agroforests with different income-generating products, including fruit trees such as cola and non-timber forest products, to mitigate risks of fluctuating prices. Further, there is a need for government and policymakers in the cocoa sector to focus on raising incomes of cocoa farmers rather than maximising yields. Additionally, land ownership and acquisition for cocoa cultivation by young people under 30 who are interested in the commodity has become difficult, thus blocking their effective participation in the sector. Land policy reforms must immediately address this.
*The four key commercialisation channels identified in the APRA WS1 study are: (1) selling directly to oil palm buying companies; (2) selling indirectly to oil palm buying companies through intermediaries known as buying agents; (3) selling on the local open market (i.e., to market women, food vendors and artisanal and small-scale processors); (4) avoiding selling altogether and instead processing the fruits into palm oil or, less frequently, alcoholic beverages or soap.
Blessings is a political scientist with degrees from Cambridge and Mainz, and until his recent appointment he was the Director of the Centre for Social Research and Professor at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at Chancellor College, University of Malawi.
Learn more about Dr Chinsinga’s appointment and background, here.
Written by: Khamaldin Mutabazi and Gideon Boniface
The semi-arid drylands of central Tanzania have been characterised by low and erratic rainfall coupled with high evapotranspiration. Up until now, farmers of these local dryland farming systems have been able to cope with these climate conditions. However, climate change has led to new weather patterns that overwhelm traditional dryland farming practices and re-shape farmers’ commercialisation pathways. This paper explored the pathways in which smallholder farmers in Singida region in Tanzania engage with markets and commercialise in the face of climate change. The paper also examined how farm-level decisions on commercial crops and the commercialisation pathways they are part of, affect current and future resilience to climate change. Climate resilient commercialisation of smallholder dryland agriculture remains the centrepiece of inclusive sustainable development.
Written by: Chrispin Matenga and Munguzwe Hichaambwa
COVID-19 was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization in March 2020. The speed with which the pandemic spread geographically, and the high rate of mortality of its victims prompted many countries around the world to institute ‘lockdowns’ of various sorts to contain it. While the global concern in the early months following the emergence of COVID-19 was with health impacts, the ‘lockdown’ measures put in place by governments triggered global socioeconomic shocks as economies entered recessions due to disruption of economic activity that the ‘lockdown’ measures entailed. Data suggests that the socioeconomic shocks arising from ‘lockdowns’ have been more severe in sub-Saharan Africa countries, generating dire livelihood consequences for most citizens who depend on the informal economy for survival. In Zambia, the effects of COVID-19 combined with a severe drought, and a decline in mining activity to contribute to a downward spiral in Zambia’s economy. This report aims to gain real-time insights into how the COVID-19 crisis was unfolding in Zambia and how rural people and food and livelihood systems were responding. The study focused on documenting and understanding the differential impacts of the pandemic at the household level in terms of changes in participation in farming activities, availability of services for agricultural production, labour and employment, marketing and transport services, food and nutrition security and poverty and wellbeing.
Written by: Gideon Boniface and Christopher Magomba
Since the outbreak of COVID-19 at the end of 2019, the pandemic has brought both social and economic impacts to global communities, although to varying degrees. Since the onset of the pandemic, different regions have responded in various ways by taking different measures to fight the pandemic and its effects. In Tanzania, the first case was recorded on 16 March 2020 and, to contain the spread of the virus, on 17 March 2020, the Prime Minister announced measures including the closure of all education institutions, the suspension of public gatherings and international passenger flights, and mandatory quarantine for individuals entering Tanzania. However, in June 2020, the government announced the easing of the restrictions after observing a significant decrease in the COVID-19 infection rate and, despite a subsequent ‘second wave’ of the virus, the government declined to re-institute movement restrictions. This decision led to the implementation of non-tariff trade barriers which were imposed on cargo carrying grain and other exports to neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. The situation became so bad that diplomatic intervention had to be sought. In order to understand the resulting socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis in Tanzania, data were collected in three waves during mid-July2020, October 2020 and February 2021. This paper presents a synthesis of the results of these three survey rounds.
In its efforts to disseminate the results of a five-year research project, the APRA Malawi team held a national dissemination event at Ufulu Gardens in Lilongwe on 30 November 2021. The event brought together stakeholders from government, donor, civil society, media and research and academic institutions working in the realm of agricultural commercialisation in the country. At this event, the team shared results of a longitudinal tracker study of agricultural commercialisation and livelihood trajectories in Malawi. More information on this event can be found in the first of this two-part blog series, here.
Design of the study
The study that served as the foundation for this event was carried out in the districts of Mchinji and Ntchisi in central Malawi with particular focus on groundnuts. This study tracked households that had been interviewed in the 2006/07 growing season and surveyed them after a ten-year period in order to understand their experiences with regards to the processes of agricultural commercialisation. In this exercise, the survey extended to households that had branched out from the original households, as long as they were living independently and living in Malawi. This extension allowed us to understand how original households had influenced the branched-out households’ livelihood trajectories, and vice-versa, through agricultural commercialisation.
Findings of the study
We identified five different livelihood trajectories:
Stepping out – accumulating wealth and diversifying into non-farm activities;
Stepping up – expanding existing agricultural activities with the aim of increasing production and commercial activities;
Hanging in – subsistence agriculture for survival;
Dropping out – moving out of agriculture due to destitution and other challenges;
Stepping in – new households engaging in agriculture having mobilised resources from other livelihood strategies.
Prospects for agricultural commercialisation are relatively higher for households that are stepping out, stepping up and stepping in. These are, however, very few; the majority of households are currently either hanging in or dropping out.
There is a possibility for stepping out, stepping up and stepping in households to commercialise their agriculture on a sustainable basis, but they are constrained by a ‘triple crisis’ of land, productivity and marketing exacerbated by highly gendered social dynamics. Therefore, smallholder agricultural commercialisation is possible, but it is highly constrained by the contemporary agrarian set-up underpinned by this triple crisis. Female-headed households are particularly constrained by multiple deprivations and disadvantages that make it very difficult for them to benefit from bridging social networks that are critical in achieving agricultural commercialisation.
A positive response
Participants described the APRA results as insightful, novel and practicable to give the commercialisation agenda a new lease of life. Some participants enthused that, “these results are quite timely; they provide concrete and practical entry points for pushing a viable commercialisation agenda among smallholder farmers… it is a must that they should be shared with the National Planning Commission.” Further, another attendee explained that, “policymakers in government, parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations including donors must engaged on the results; they would give the commercialisation agenda a new meaning and lease of life, especially since it is the first pillar in the Malawi Vision 2063.”
Ready to act?
Stakeholders debated whether or not the country is ready to act decisively so as to translate these findings into tangible outcomes. While the results are quite novel on the smallholder commercialisation frontier, stakeholders reiterated the perverse bureaucratic incentive structure that presents obstacles to embracing new insights, let alone along pursuing them to their logical conclusion.
In this debate, the discussion on marketing constraints particularly caught our attention. There is no doubt that marketing is a fundamental constraint to smallholder agricultural commercialisation and, as such, addressing issues in the marketing system would require dismantling entrenched cartels.
For example, the groundnut export market is an obstacle in the establishment of a viable and widely accessible groundnut market. Operating in two centres, Mgona in Lilongwe and Mwansambo in Nkhotakota, the gatekeepers of the market are foreigners, predominantly from Burundi and Rwanda.
The main question among participants was how are markets that are blatantly illegal and exclusively controlled by foreigners allowed to operate? These informal markets have norms and traditions that are widely understood by all operators, but work to the disadvantage of smallholder farmers.
Local processors, predominantly owned by Malawians of Asian origin, constitute another obstacle that undermines efforts to establish structured markets. The vendors that constitute a market for smallholder farmers are infamous for their unscrupulous business practices, partly motivated by their desire to maximise their commission.
Profiles of most vendors, indeed, raise questions about where they get their capital from. According to the participants, vendors are financially empowered by the aforementioned Malawians of Asian origin who dominate the local processing industry. In turn, the political elite offer them lucrative contracts to supply food requirements for all government institutions, undermining efforts to create a viable alternative marketing framework to the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation.
Concluding remarks
The positive reception of APRA results by stakeholders is pleasing, especially the consensual recognition of the results’ potential to have a transformative impact on the country’s commercialisation agenda.
The main task remains to create an enabling environment to either overcome or navigate the perverse bureaucratic incentive structure that often impede taking, let alone following, policy action to its logical conclusion. The challenges around marketing exemplify the enormity of the task, but it is not insurmountable with the help of systematic and consistent engagement with key decision-makers and stakeholders in the agricultural sector over time.
Contract farming schemes often amplify existing patterns of socio-economic differentiation. In Zimbabwe, processes of differentiation were underway before the current expansion of contract farming and they have deepened through the Fast Track Land Reform process. This article examines how pre-existing dynamics of differentiation shape the forms of contract farming adopted, as well as which groups of farmers gain access and on what terms. Social differentiation partly explains the outcomes of contract farming, even if contract farming in turn results in further differentiation. This article contrasts private sector-led contract farming of tobacco and state-led financing of maize production (the ‘command agriculture’ programme) in two high-potential sites and across different forms of land use. Unlike in many other settings, contract farming in Zimbabwe is highly influenced by the state, through the regulation of private sector arrangements and the establishment of a state-led contracting programme. The state-led programme boosted maize production amongst medium-scale farmers and resulted in an embedding of patronage relations. Meanwhile, the private-led contract farming has supported a widespread boom of tobacco production, mainly amongst smallholders. We find therefore that contract farming is highly dependent on the contingent, politically mediated processes of social differentiation.
Ethiopia is facing a decline in national rice self-sufficiency and rice imports, which cost the country about US$200 million in 2019. However, there is a pathway to reversing this trend and recovering the national rice sector… The solution? An effective policy framework. This was the conclusion reached at a national engagement event held by the APRA Ethiopia team to discuss the country’s rice value chain with key stakeholders. The meeting, held on 29 November 2021, was convened by APRA Ethiopia to share the team’s research findings from studies on the transformation of the national rice sector with government officials, fellow researchers, development partners and more.
The meeting took place at the Ethiopian Institute of Agricultural Research (EIAR) and was attended by representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Agricultural Transformation Institute, EIAR, regional agricultural research institutes, and development organisations including the Japan International Cooperation Agency in Ethiopia, EthioRice and the Mennonite Economic Development Associates in Ethiopia. Other stakeholders who were unable to join the meeting physically opted to join virtually.
Presentation of key findings
To set the pace for the discussion, the researchers made presentations on the key production trends, import and consumption of rice, and the challenges currently facing the rice sector. Giving an account of agrarian transformation, APRA researcher Dawit Alemu explained, “the success of rice commercialisation in the Fogera Plain leads to important policy and development questions, such as why other areas in Ethiopia are not as successful and why the levels of national self-sufficiency are continuously declining.” The participants considered these questions alongside the findings, and attributed the declining self-sufficiency and competition from imported rice to the following factors:
Low rice production and productivity – the national average is only 2.96MT/ha compared to its projected productivity of 5.12t/ha in 2019.
High competition from imported rice which is of a higher quality than domestic rice.
Fogera Plain’s social inclusion, rural-urban linkages, rural labour markets, and other successes in inclusive agrarian change have not been expanded to other rice hubs.
Shortage of pre-harvest mechanisation and post-harvest processing technologies for milling, storage, and transport.
Inadequate market development to link domestic and international value chains.
Lack of skilled human and training resources, and inadequate rice research and development.
As the rice sector is commercialised, effort is withdrawn from the production of livestock and other crops, such as pulses, in Fogera Plain. This leads to a decline in these production sectors, and thus has negative impacts on national self-sufficiency.
Recommendations for policy and development
Following the discussions, the participants made five policy recommendations:
The government should revive the national steering committee to oversee the implementation of the National Rice Sector Development Strategy (NRSD) for rice sector development at national and regional levels.
The government should develop a national rice flagship programme that guides the implementation of NRSD with the identified seven rice hubs (Fogera, Pawi, Abobo, Gura Fereda, May Tsebri, Gode and Chewaka).
Stakeholders should explore how the private sector can engage pro-actively in rice commercial farming, processing, technology importation and demonstration.
There is a need to strengthen collaborations with bodies such as the Coalition for African Rice Development, AfricaRice and the EthioRice project (2020–2025).
The government should ensure the alignment of all rice related initiatives through the flagship programme.
The meeting suggested the following ways through which these recommendations can be achieved:
Enhancing the operationalisation of the National Rice Research and Training Centre to ensure the availability of trained manpower in the production, processing, and marketing of domestic rice.
Addressing the challenges which arise from restrictive land use policies.
Conducting research and development to ensure that local rice is competitive in price and quality in comparison to imported rice.
Development of incentive mechanisms for farmers and agro-processors to produce quality rice.
Modernising and building the capacity of rice processors, and standardising the key requirements for licensing of rice processing facilities.
Improving marketing systems, not only for rice but also for other crops – such as vegetables – which are the primary contributors to smallholder rice farmers’ incomes.
Conclusions
These policy recommendations and the plans for their adoption provide hope for the future of Ethiopia’s rice sector. Gathering research findings, engaging stakeholders, and collaborating to identify pathways to improve the value chain are critical steps in addressing the challenges currently facing the sector. It is hoped that these activities will be central to the scaling up of lessons learned in order to enhance the production, productivity, and competitiveness of domestic rice in Ethiopia.
Written by: Adebayo Aromolaran, Milu Muyanga, Fadlullah O. Issa and Oladele Oladeji
The first case of COVID-19 in Nigeria was reported on 27 February 2020. By 30 March 2020, Nigeria had recorded 131 confirmed cases and two deaths. To mitigate the impending health crisis, the Nigerian Government quickly commenced a series of COVID-19 lockdowns across states in Nigeria on 30 March 2020. These lockdowns lasted for three months before a gradual relaxation began on 1 July 2021. However, infection and death cases in the country increased substantially during the months of substantial relaxation of restrictions between October 2020 and March 2021. This paper presents the results of the rapid assessment study in Nigeria between July 2020 and February 2021, which sought to document and understand the differential impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on agricultural commercialisation, food and nutrition security, employment, poverty, and well-being in rural households.
Following the conclusion of their research into the opportunities and challenges of medium-scale farming as a pathway to inclusive agricultural commercialisation and improved livelihood outcomes for farming families across Nigeria, researchers on the APRA Nigeria Work Stream 1 (WS1) team have been engaging farmers, community leaders and policymakers to discuss the findings of its studies. These engagements have included dissemination events in Kaduna State and, even more recently, two stakeholder meetings in Ogun State held at the palace of His Royal Majesty, the Onimeko of Imeko on 22 November 2021 and in Ijebu East local government headquarters, Ogbere on 23 November 2021. These events have been held with the aim to share findings and develop policy insights, and include in that process those with the ability to incorporate the findings into actionable policy measures, as well as those impacted by any resulting policies.
Presentation of study findings
The APRA Nigeria country coordinator, Professor Adebayo Aromolaran, led the presentation of the team’s findings during the Ogun State meetings. During his presentation, Prof Aromolaran emphasised that “APRA is focused on working with key Nigerian stakeholders in agricultural and rural development to identify strategies to improve the livelihoods of farm families, women, and youth across Nigeria by providing research-based evidence to support the need for concrete changes in the food and agricultural systems of Nigeria.”
Professor Aromolaran highlighted the key finding of this study: that medium-scale farms could potentially create more farm and off-farm employment opportunities than small-scale farms, as a result of higher productivity. In addition to identifying the significance of medium-scale farms’ production potential, the research highlighted their potential in collaboration with their small-scale counterparts. “The study found,” he reported, “that interactions of medium-scale farms with small-scale farms could increase the productivity and incomes of small-scale farms and reduce poverty among small-scale farm households.”
In addition, a few small-scale farms in the state have ‘stepped up’ to medium-scale farming, while small-scale farmers who interacted with medium-scale farms in their neighbourhoods enjoyed higher prices for their products. In response to these findings, Chief Ismail Abdulazeez, a farmers’ association leader enthused that, “more effort should be directed at upgrading farmers from small-scale to medium-scale level. This would improve the welfare of small-scale farm families, as shown by the study findings.”
As well as the researchers’ findings of medium-scale farms’ potential, Professor Aromolaran noted that increased access to extension services could also play a role in enhancing agricultural commercialisation. In the same vein, Ms Nike Tinubu, the CEO of Premium Cassava flour in Ijebu-ode, Ogun State, and a member of APRA Nigeria WS1’s Advisory Board, spoke to participants on how they can benefit from her company’s programme on off-take and agro-input supplies for cassava farmers.
After the presentation of the study findings, the participants were divided into groups to discuss the issues raised in the meeting, as well as to recommend the specific roles that the government, private sector, and communities can play in addressing these issues. In response to the findings on extension services, Ijebu Zone’s Extension Manager, Mrs Caroline Akinyemi, noted that, “to make extension services more effective, there is a need to substantially increase the staff strength in the public extension system with younger workers, since many extension staff are nearing retirement age and need replacement.”
This was one of many responses to the WS1 team’s findings by those in attendance, highlighting the importance of such community engagement in research. Once study findings are shared with individuals in positions to comment and act on their implications, the research is better able to achieve its potential to influence policy and improve the lives of those affected by it.
Ijebu East stakeholder meeting
Recommendations
The meeting recommendations can be summarised in three key points:
There is need for inclusive agricultural commercialisation and its influence on the welfare of farm households.
There is need for a policy to expand on the growth of medium-scale farms to increase inclusive agricultural commercialisation and improve the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in Nigeria.
There is a need to increase access to labour and land markets, extension services, all-weather roads, and agro-dealer services, given that they are major drivers of agricultural commercialisation in Nigeria.
Conclusion
The outcome of this meeting will inform a national stakeholder meeting, which is planned for 16 December, 2021. In his final remarks, the Executive Chairman of the Ijebu East Local Government, Honourable Wale Adedayo, expressed his eagerness to participate in the upcoming national stakeholders meeting. He commended APRA’s efforts to disseminate its findings to influence the implementation of polices, which can move many farm families in Nigeria out of poverty.
The unfolding drama of the pandemic continues. With a new variant identified in the region (Omicron) thanks to the effective work of South African genomics monitoring, Zimbabwe has been subjected to international travel restrictions. However, despite the global concern about the potential spread of what may be a highly transmissible, immune-escaping variant, things on the ground feel very different. So far at least. After the sky-high infection rates and substantial deaths of a few months back, rates subsequently declined dramatically again. Will the new variant upset this? No-one knows of course.
Conversations with our team across our sites suggests that people have been getting back to ‘normal’ life, despite some remaining lockdown regulations. What does this new normal feel like? Some quotes from across our sites illustrate. “We are now not afraid, it’s not like the early days. We know how to prevent, treat and manage the disease”. “We have indigenous remedies at our disposal. We have made so many discoveries, and now know how to fight the pandemic”. This confidence may yet be shattered by the new variant, but for now a new version of normality seems to have settled in.
While people may wear masks on transport and mask wearing gets enforced during visits to town, the situation in the rural areas is much more lax. “These masks are far too hot in this season”, someone explained. Large gatherings have started again. Political rallies are the most noticeable as electioneering starts up already in advance of the 2023 vote. “It’s the politicians who are the biggest law-breakers”, someone noted. Churches, farmers’ fairs and so on are also being held, with few restrictions and little social distancing. Curfews too, people report, are barely acknowledged especially in the rural areas. It feels, at least on the surface, pretty normal, with people making judgements about risk not in fear but with knowledge about the trade-offs and consequences.
But of course such knowledge is not certain. All can be upset with a new variant, as it has been before. And the wider context has changed too through the pandemic as livelihood possibilities have been restructured and attitudes and practices towards health and disease have changed.
Local knowledge and innovation
People repeatedly mention their discoveries of local treatments that have given the confidence in the face of disease threats. “We have done so much research”, someone observed, “we really know the situation now”. As well as COVID-19, this applies to what people call ‘cattle COVID’ too (January disease) that has struck people’s herds in dramatic fashion, often resulting in greater impacts on livelihoods than coronavirus. “We have mixed grasses, mutsviri ash and water, soaking overnight… and it works for cattle”. We are trying mutsviri ash with lemon for humans too. Along with the many remedies from local herbs to boost immunity (such as ndorani) and for COVID treatment (like zumbani), as well as the range of mixes of garlic, onions, ginger and lemon, people have a battery of treatment meaning that for now they no longer worry about the disease as they once did.
Uptake of vaccines goes hand-in-hand, with supplies now good and queues small as people take up vaccine offers. This is far from universal and to date only 18.3% of the population have received two doses. But this combination of local systems of containment and disease management with external medical intervention is seen as efficacious, and the way forward for navigating on-going uncertainties.
As experience has increased with COVID, with different waves and different impacts on different groups of people, people’s local epidemiological knowledge has increased. The seasonality of the disease is often commented on (“now it’s hot, there’s much less disease, we are not inside”); the dangers of close proximity and crowded places is clear (“even though it’s hot, I wear my mask on the combi, but not around the town”); and the dangers to those who are already vulnerable is clear (“it’s the diabetes and the BP that’s the killer – we have to eat better and consume our indigenous foods”). The revival of debates about appropriate diet (millets, not processed maize, less meat and so on) has been part of the local conversation about the disease over time.
With this knowledge comes the ability to make choices. As people commented, “in the beginning we had so much conflicting information on Whatsapp, on the internet, from friends, we didn’t know who to believe”. Now people make judgements made on experience after 18 months of the twists and turns of the pandemic, taking account of local circumstances and not taking anything at face value.
Our conversations last week happened before the new variant was identified, and this of course presents a new uncertainty that may yet shatter local confidence, returning things to dark days of just a few months back. Such is the experience of the pandemic: continuous change, continuous uncertainty.
New livelihoods
No matter what a new variant throws at Zimbabwe’s rural population in the coming weeks, the pandemic has affected the structural conditions by which people remain healthy or become sick.
Due to repeated lockdowns and the parlous state of the Zimbabwean economy, people must make livelihoods in new ways. Many businesses have closed, jobs in town are scarce and people must increasingly rely on local provisioning, especially through agriculture. There are also many new opportunities that have emerged, which have been documented in this blog series before. In urban and peri-urban areas for example, the demand for COVID treatments is met by a proliferation of new gardens, growing key ingredients. Ginger is now widely grown for example, and no longer imported from Mozambique or the Eastern Highlands. While transport has returned and farmers can move their crops to market, many have adopted new market networks, spreading risk and going for shorter transport distances, as the predatory police presence on the roads is still a problem (and a cost).
As we have documented before, many have returned to rural homes, seeking out a plot from a relative or a parent, when jobs have dried up in Zimbabwe’s cities or in South Africa. Agriculture, and especially in the land reform areas where there is more land available, is a vital source of resilience in pandemic context.
Some have taken up new agriculture-based business, switching from a town job to intensive horticultural irrigation for example, or in the case of women vendors in Chikombedzi moving into goat rearing and trade to South Africa on a huge scale. Time will tell whether this is a more permanent restructuring of the economy, but the shifts are significant and will be important for thinking about post-COVID recovery.
Autonomy and resilience
Across the commentaries from our informants in all the sites, there is a great emphasis on autonomy, and how this brings resilience. People have learned and innovated on their own. They haven’t been reliant on the state or international donors. Indeed, they have not been able to provide – the government and party doesn’t care, the donors are not interested in Africa are frequent refrains. And the competition between the Chinese, Russians and Americans over vaccines and COVID response is seen from afar with disgust.
The emphasis in local commentaries is on local adaptation through experimentation and way of responding that is localised and seemingly effective. Knowledge is shared through local networks, through Whatsapp, but is sifted now more carefully as options are considered. As people confronted the information on a new variant this weekend, according to informants there was a mix of scepticism and stoicism, but equally a sense that people were on their own as before but now with the capacity to innovate and respond.
A politics of the ‘new normal’
These new social and economic patterns of the ‘new normal’ occasionally confront the emergency focused public health efforts from the state. The emergency mode is relinquished slowly, as it serves certain interests: both political control in a volatile context and also opportunities for corruption and enrichment as lockdown laws are enforced.
There is however a distinguishable shift in our informants’ attitudes in the last month or two. With the relief that the massive peak had passed, state-enforced public health is become less accepted. Before, public health was paramount, and people mostly accepted often quite top-down, heavy-handed state intervention. The government was getting high approval ratings. It was after all a crisis, and through the news from the UK or South Africa, people also knew how bad it could get and how limited the resources in Zimbabwe were to cope with it. “We saw it on the news, we were scared.”, someone commented.
Now with less fear and more grounded knowledge along with much more experience, there is a more circumspect view, with people prepared to make judgements about risk and assess trade-offs. In the end, basic survival and the sustaining of businesses and livelihoods is important. How the arrival of a new variant will affect the assessment of risk and collective responses is of course still unknown.
Vaccine mandates
These dilemmas reflect experiences elsewhere where the limits of state intervention are being tested. There are no mass protests as has been seen in Europe and other regions, but people are also asking where does public health stop and individual liberty start? A core focus of this debate is the vaccine mandate for civil servants. In one of our study sites, a district agricultural extension office lost a significant number of staff as they refused the vaccine due to their religious beliefs being members of one of the Apostolic churches. They were put on indefinite, unpaid leave, and so effectively fired.
This has caused reverberations among civil servants, in part because for some their workload has doubled, but also they are asking whether this is fair and just. Some labour unions are contesting the decisions in the courts arguing that the vaccine mandate is anti-constitutional. Others relay concerns that this is simply the exertion of authoritarian political control, linked to a surveillance state that has no concern for liberty.
Uncertainties are everywhere
If there is one thing that this pandemic has taught all of us it is that uncertainty is everywhere and we don’t know the future. But how uncertainties are navigated and how risks are perceived does change, and we have seen this clearly through our tracking of the pandemic in Zimbabwe since March 2020 (see the previous 20 odd blogs in this series). In the last months, there has been a tangible shift in ways people are going about their lives and how they see the disease. This may yet change if the new variant strikes hard as some fear.
However, for now at least and despite Omicron dominating the headlines, most people in our rural sites across the country currently don’t spend much time thinking about COVID, as the rains have come and it’s time to plant and get on with the agricultural season. There are always other uncertainties to contend with.
The COVID-19 crisis has disrupted food systems in Ghana since its emergence in the country in March 2020. According to the United Nations World Food Programme, the socio-economic impact of the pandemic caused by the imposition of restrictions on social and commercial activities appears to be more devastating than the actual virus in many countries. This study is part of the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa programme’s assessment of the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on food systems and livelihoods in Ghana and seven other African countries – Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Conducted between June–July 2020 and February–March 2021, the study seeks to estimate the potential impact of COVID-19 on food systems and livelihoods in south-western Ghana.
Written by: Blessings Chinsinga, Mirriam Matita, Masautso Chimombo, Loveness Msofi, Stevier Kayiyatsa and Jacob Mazalale
This blog is based on APRA Working Paper 75, which presents a historical and contemporary agrarian inquiry into the reality of agricultural commercialisation in Malawi. The study’s key message is that smallholder agricultural commercialisation is possible, but it cannot be attained on a sustainable basis in the context of the contemporary agrarian set-up. This blog looks beyond the study’s findings to identify a pathway forward for Malawi’s smallholder farmers.
Several factors such as land, productivity and the marketing crisis have conspired to make it almost impossible for smallholder farmers to engage with markets on a meaningful and sustainable basis. Agricultural commercialisation occurs when agricultural enterprises, and/or the agricultural sector as a whole, rely increasingly on the market for the sale of their produce and for the acquisition of production inputs, including labour.
Moreover, as a result of differential access to and control over land, off-farm employment opportunities, wage rates, markets and even social capital, female smallholder farmers are facing even more obstacles than their male counterparts. Social capital, specifically, plays a critical role in catalysing prospects for commercialisation at the smallholder level, so as a result of the disparity in this realm, women are relatively disadvantaged when compared to male smallholder farmers.
The method behind the findings
This study was designed as a tracker so as to understand the inherent complexity of agricultural commercialisation over time. Using a dataset by the School of Oriental and African Studies for the 2006/07 evaluation of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme, which provided subsidised inputs to nearly all rural farming households, we tracked 240 households in the districts of Mchinji and Ntchisi in central Malawi. The sample was extended to households that emerged from the 240 households – branching out households – which brought the total number of households in the tracker to 512.
The households were tracked as long as they were resident in Malawi. The experiences of these households vis-à-vis agricultural commercialisation were analysed through a framework that includes five different livelihood categories: stepping-in, stepping out, stepping up, hanging in and dropping out.
State of agricultural commercialisation in rural Malawi
Our results show that the majority of households in rural Malawi are simply hanging in. In other words, their efforts to commercialise are unable to take them beyond their ability to meet their subsistence needs. Although not many households are dropping out, those that are in this category are desperately poor and they barely depend on agriculture for their survival, typically depending instead on social safety nets or their extended family support system.
Households in the stepping-up and stepping-in categories demonstrate some progress toward sustainable agricultural commercialisation as measured by the household commercialisation index (HCI), which represents the level to which households are engaging with markets. HCI scores fall between a continuum of 0 and 1, with a score of 0 representing no engagement at all with markets and a score of 1 demonstrating full engagement with markets. Any HCI score of 0.5 and above represents a household’s engagement with markets that can potentially culminate in sustainable agricultural commercialisation. It is not simply the engagement with markets that matters, but also the quality of the engagement itself as well as the nature of markets that matter. The HCI scores for these stepping-up and stepping-in households have improved from 0.59 and 0.63 in 2007 to 0.77 and 0.67 in 2018, respectively.
These impressive improvements have not, however, consistently translated into sustainable agricultural commercialisation. Famers are unable to engage with markets a regular basis. Most of them engage with markets on seasonal basis, which rarely allows for a sustainable route out of poverty and household prosperity. In other words, even though these households engage with markets, they remain unable to meet and cross production thresholds that would enable them diversify their livelihood portfolios.
Men’s average HCI score is estimated at 0.58 compared to women’s at 0.50. As previously indicated, this disparity in HCI levels results from a culmination of factors including: differential ownership of, access to and control over land; unequal ownership of assets and opportunities for accumulation beyond land including wages from casual labour; disparate opportunities arising out of linkages with and benefits from bridging social capital; varying ability to recover from both generalised and individual-level shocks and differing access to lucrative markets.
Prospects for smallholder agricultural commercialisation are generally undermined by the triple crisis of land, productivity and marketing. These crises make it very challenging for smallholder farmers in rural Malawi to engage in meaningful and sustainable agricultural commercialisation.
The question of land tenure and security remains unresolved due to a protracted legislative impasse. While land per capita has progressively diminished due to rapid population growth, the uncertainties in the enabling legislative framework since the onset of the contemporary wave of land reforms in March 1996 are forcing many poor smallholder farmers to sell off their land. Regulating these sales is very difficult in the absence of definitive legislative framework.
Farmers’ ability to realise full productive potential of their land is rather limited. The cost of productivity-enhancing inputs, especially seeds and fertiliser, has progressively risen beyond the reach of most smallholder farmers since the removal of subsidies in June 1996. As a result, most smallholder farmers cannot afford these inputs without the subsidy programme. The situation is further exacerbated by the increasingly fragile climatic conditions in rural Malawi.
Farmers also have limited access to lucrative markets that would allow them to commercialise on a sustainable basis. Structured, reliable and dependable markets no longer exist, and efforts to do address this issue have been generally unsuccessful. In place of markets, farmers rely almost exclusively on vendors, which is problematic because the vendors indulge in unscrupulous business practices, such as manipulating weighing scales, and often offer farmers very low prices. In the pre-structural adjustment programme era, the state graining board – the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) – provided a predictable, reliable and lucrative market for farmers’ produce by offering smallholder farmers a guaranteed market for their produce. An equivalent to ADMARC is yet to be established since this era.
Which way now?
At this point, there is really nothing new that can be proposed – all the requisite policies already. What remains is to implement them to their logical conclusion with dynamism, flexibility and adaptability, and embedded within a culture of continuous learning and reflection. Key points to consider in this implementation include:
The triple crisis calls for policy refocusing, reviews and implementation to ensure that these are no longer insurmountable barriers for smallholder farmers to engage in sustainable commercialisation.
Promoting investment in research and development, extension services and rural infrastructure to ensure that smallholder farmers increase their productivity and are able to seize any opportunities, including participating in lucrative produce markets.
Ensuring that policy interventions are systematically tailored to the needs of different categories of smallholder farmers, given that they are not a homogenous group.
Ensuring vertical integration of smallholder farmers into agri-food value chains, coordination and collective action, stronger market information system, and better access to institutional credit to help smallholder farmers enhance their productivity and fully take advantage of opportunities in the sector.
Advancing policy interventions that are gender sensitive and specifically designed to promote the empowerment of women in the agricultural sector so that they can equally be engaged in agricultural commercialisation.
Promoting livelihood diversification among smallholder farmers so as to increase their adaptive capacity to the adverse effects of climate change.
Relative to small-scale farms (SSFs), recent trends across sub-Saharan Africa show that medium-scale farms (MSFs) are accounting for an increasingly larger share of the total value of marketed agricultural products. The rise of MSFs could substantially change the structure of the food system in future.
The APRA Nigeria Workstream 1 Research Team, which includes researchers from Michigan State University, Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba Akoko, National Extension and Research Liaison, Zaria, and the Federal University of Agriculture, Abeokuta, Ogun State, Nigeria, investigated this MSFs phenomenon and its implications on the livelihood outcomes of SSF families in Nigeria. The Ogun State Ministry of Agriculture, the Kaduna State Ministry of Agriculture and the Federal Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development were collaborators on this study.
The studies sought answers to the following questions:
Can the growth of MSFs help increase agricultural commercialisation and improve livelihood outcomes among SSF households?
If yes, how can policy help to encourage MSFs growth, and how can this growth be made more inclusive of women, youths and the vulnerable?
On December 16, 2021, with support from APRA/Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, the APRA Nigeria Workstream 1 team is organising a virtual national policy dialogue to share research findings from these studies. Please join us to share in the exchange of views and discussions on this interesting topic!
Written by: John Olwande, Milton Ayieko, John Mukundi and Nicholas Odhiambo
Kenya confirmed its first case of COVID-19 on 12 March 2020. Like many governments across the world, the Kenyan government implemented various measures aimed at slowing down local spread of the virus and cushioning the population against the negative economic effects of the pandemic and the associated policy restrictions. International organisations and researchers postulated that the measures would negatively affect economic activities and livelihoods, with undesirable implications for poverty and food insecurity. Particularly vulnerable would be populations in developing countries such as Kenya, where many people depend on food systems for their livelihoods, and the majority of those are smallholder farmers who often have low economic power. The objective of this rapid assessment was to investigate the impact of COVID-19 on the food system and the sub-set of the population largely dependent on agriculture in Kenya to inform actions that can assure protection of rural livelihoods and continued access to adequate and affordable food of acceptable quality to the population. This report presents results of that rapid assessment.
Since 2016, the APRA Malawi team has been working to understand the underlying factors of smallholder commercialisation in the groundnut value chain in Mchinji and Ntchisi. Now, following the publication of their research findings, the team is turning its attention to dissemination efforts to share these critical findings with those most impacted by them. In this campaign, APRA Malawi researchers Blessings Chinsinga and Mirriam Matita presented findings to 29 stakeholders from the government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), civil society networks and additional stakeholders at a national dissemination workshop on 30th November 2021. Among these attendees, 10 were women and 19 were men.
The researchers’ key finding, as presented at the dissemination event, was that there is limited viability of smallholder agricultural commercialisation in rural Malawi. They also concluded that agriculture is no longer an independently reliable source of livelihoods; in other words, smallholder farmers must diversify their sources of income using both farm and non-farm enterprises to survive. Further, in the absence of input subsidies very few farmers can afford productivity-enhancing inputs, which culminates into a productivity crisis where the output per hectare is very low. These effects are exacerbated even more so for women as a result of poor access to functional markets and persistent gender gaps. At the end of the presentation, they concluded that agricultural commercialisation is possible, but it is constrained by the contemporary agrarian set-up characterised by policies that are one-size-fits all in nature and thus not delivering the desired results.
Highlighting policy priorities
Following the presentations, the participants were given an opportunity to reflect on the research findings, ask questions, and provide feedback on the results. Some of the frequently asked questions were related to how we can enhance smallholder farmers’ production and the role of agroecology in achieving this. Others reflected on how to restructure produce markets for the benefit of smallholder farmers. This became a critical point, as some participants observed that, “the markets are there; but what matters is the kind of market…” Many markets that currently exist are exploitative, manipulative, and restrictive, and in some cases, only key players with connections to political entrepreneurs can access them. This exclusivity further marginalises smallholder farmers.
One participant, Grace Mijiga – the Executive Chairperson of the Grain Traders Association, explained that input capital financing through private sector participation could be accompanied by policies that protect the investor, especially given the practice of side-selling by farmers on contract to vendors. The meeting also noted that there seems to be a ‘shadow private sector’ – which tends to exist temporarily for the purpose of getting large government contracts but disappear afterwards – in Malawi, that is largely driven by incentives foreseen in state activities which sometimes undermine the sustainability of private sector actions in agriculture. For example, a corporation would get subsidy contracts to supply fertiliser under the government subsidy programme, but not exist beyond that. An official from the Farmers Union of Malawi, Derrick Kapolo concurred with the suggestion, noting that during planting season there is largely no private sector supporting farmers with production [except those selling seed/fertiliser products], and yet at marketing time they flood rural markets to purchase farm products … and complain about the quality of products. Despite this situation, the private sector fails to take the responsibility to sensitise the farmer on the required standards in the value chains where they forward the products.
Recommendations
Workshop participants in the plenary discussions made several suggestions:
The urgent need for mindset change accompanied by appropriate agriculture education
The need for increased recognition of the political economy of agriculture in Malawi and the role of collective action versus investments that offer benefits to individuals.
Interventions should strive to reorientation smallholder farmers away from the high dependence on subsidies which are mainly used for political patronage.
Programs should provide tailor-made commercialisation initiatives for different categories of smallholder farmers cognisant of their capacities.
Wider audience should be engaged in similar discussions – including the government, NGOs and their donors, the private sector and development partners – for further debate and development of concrete solutions. As expressed by Charles Govati, an attendee from civil society, “this is great research work, but who is listening?” and Dr Felix Lombe expanded, emphasising “I wish all the NGOs in the agricultural sector and their donors were here… they will have realised that what they promote as farmer commercialisation is essentially the provision of safety nets…”
To create transparent marketing systems and infrastructure that enhances vertical integration irrespective of ‘who owns the market’. This includes opening idle spaces held by the government that could be used for agricultural produce storage.
Practitioners need to find a niche in agricultural value chain activities where the youth can comfortably participate other than production, such as marketing, value addition, processing, packaging, etc., as well as make investments in mechanisation and technologies that could make agriculture attractive to young people.
The role and alignment of agricultural cooperatives need to be redefined. The meeting observed that agriculture cooperatives are more aligned to an extension system in Malawi that has little experience in commercial agriculture hence we may be missing an opportunity to enhance their commercialisation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the participants thanked APRA for sharing the findings and recommended that the issues be escalated to other national platforms with appropriate messaging, as well as community radios which can be used to inspire listeners to take action towards greater agricultural commercialisation. Other participants pledged to continue dialoguing on the results in their networks. Blessings closed the meeting with a remark that the results have generated insights and debate that was rich and will broaden further analysis. Gratitude was extended to all those in attendance, as well as the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office for supporting the research in Malawi.
Photo: Courtesy of Jacob Nankhonya of Nation Publications Limited
Marah Limani is a graduate of the University of Malawi with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Humanities.
Written by: Kojo Amanor, Joseph Yaro and Joseph Teye
The commercialisation of cocoa production in Ghana has a long history dating back to the nineteenth century. The process of commercial development in cocoa is well documented and provides an alternative mode to contemporary models of commercialisation rooted in the adoption of modern technology and integration of farmers into markets. This working paper critically analyses frameworks for agricultural commercialisation in cocoa through intensification based on the uptake of synthetic inputs and hybrid seeds, by placing agricultural development within a broader framework of the historical development of the frontier in Ghana, and the related problems of ecological and economic crises. The study examines access to land, labour and technology, and how the complex interactions of scarcity of access to physical resources and labour influence farmers’ farming strategies and adoption of technology.
From September, throughout October and into November, Malawi has seen its new daily COVID-19 cases sharply reduce to an all-time low. In fact, zero new daily COVID-19 cases have become very common during this period as reported by the Ministry of Health. New admissions into the COVID-19 hospital wards have also sharply reduced. The flattening of all these three curves is obviously a great relief to government, private sector, and households whose businesses and livelihoods ground to a halt as a result of the ruthless pandemic. This blog reflects on this steep decline in COVID cases and the public’s perception of its causes, as well as recent research presented in APRA’s Impact of COVID-19 on Food Systems and Rural Livelihoods in Malawi Synthesis Report.
The study, which drew from three rounds of face-to-face and phone-based surveys conducted in Mchinji and Ntchisi districts in central Malawi, aimed at assessing the impact of COVID-19 on food systems and rural livelihoods and found that farming households had become more concerned about their ability to access food during the pandemic. One of the study’s findings showed that the COVID-19 pandemic has negatively impacted important aspects of food security and rural livelihoods in Malawi, with significant slowdown in economic activities and worsening performance of agricultural produce market reported in both districts. No wonder, therefore, that the sharp slowing down of new daily COVID-19 infections, hospital admissions, and deaths is welcome news for government, private sector, and farming households in Malawi.
Government of Malawi relaxes COVID-19 restrictions
In fact, in response to the country’s sharp decline in COVID-19 cases, the Malawi Government announced relaxation of some of the COVID-19 restrictions on October 9, 2021. Among others, in closed places, a maximum of 500 people are now allowed to meet, up from 100, and in outdoor spaces 2,000 people can now meet up from 200. Subject to submitting a negative COVID-19 test certificate, all travel restrictions in Malawi have also been lifted. Moreover, passenger service vehicles are now permitted to operate at full seating capacity, rather than the 60 per cent capacity they were previously required to operate at, making transport more efficient. In addition, leisure and entertainment venues like bars and restaurants can now operate until midnight, rather than 8pm. Certainly, these relaxations are likely to bear positive impacts on government operations, business profitability and livelihoods.
People on the street, excited by the sharp decline in COVID-19 cases and the return to normalcy, have been commenting on the reasons behind the improving situation. In minibuses, radio programmes, social media and marketplaces, the public, from their layman streetwise perspective, are attempting to answer the question: what has led to the sharp decline in COVID-19 cases?
It’s the hot weather…
Firstly, since the first case of COVID-19 was reported in Malawi in April 2020, there has been a perception that when atmospheric temperatures are very high, coronavirus loses its potency and dies, rendering it non-communicable and non-infectious. Indeed, true to this belief, during the hot months of September, October, November and December in 2020, COVID-19 cases sharply declined in Malawi. This year (2021), the sharp decline in COVID-19 cases has also coincided with the onset of the hot summer season in Malawi which is characterised by very high temperatures and scorching sun during the day. Specifically, as previously stated, the sharp decline of COVID-19 infections and deaths began in September 2021 and remains the same up to now (November 2021). This has led people on the street to conclude that their theory on the negative relationship between COVID-19 infection rates and levels of atmospheric temperature to be true and valid. Potentially, this perceived validation of the theory could also result in the widespread adoption of herbal steaming as a home remedy for managing COVID-19 under the assumption that coronavirus cannot survive in hot spaces.
It’s herd immunity…
On the street, the public is not using the public health and epidemiological jargon of ‘herd immunity’ but some members of the public are implying it in their explanation of how the country has managed to slow down COVID-19 infections. In their explanations, there is a belief that most of Malawians already were, at one time or another, infected by COVID-19 since the virus arrived in the country. Low testing capacity masked and underestimated the extent of COVID-19 infections in the country. Strong immunity resulting from manual and tiresome labour and the consumption of organic foods meant that most Malawians who were infected with COVID-19 never displayed serious, if any, symptoms. As most Malawians had already been infected and recovered without needing any hospital management, layman theorists believe that such survivors across the country have developed herd immunity and are thus less vulnerable to the virus now. This theory has the potential to create a sense of safety among the public that they are immune to COVID-19, which could encourage them to totally disregard all COVID-19 prevention measures and protocols.
It’s the COVID-19 vaccines…
For city dwellers and white-collar workers in the cities, the decline in COVID cases is being attributed to the vaccinations administered to willing urban residents. The vaccines have reduced both the risk of infection and the risk of becoming symptomatic when infected among the city dwellers. Some urbanites believe that in rural areas, COVID-19 cases were already nearly non-existent and therefore the high level of anti-COVID-19 vaccination sentiments and the associated rejection of COVID-19 vaccines among the rural communities cannot subdue the impact of the vaccines in urban areas. However, others are of the view that even in the cities and other urban areas, only a tiny and insignificant percentage of residents had access to COVID-19 vaccines. In their view, the opponents of those attributing the sharp fall to COVID-19 vaccines believe that such a drop in the ocean of vaccinated people cannot have such a huge impact on COVID-19 trends in the country. The attribution of the fall in cases to COVID-19 vaccinations could be beneficial if leveraged in social-behavioural change communications that could see more people demanding COVID-19 vaccinations. Blowing the trumpet on the vaccine’s success and efficacy could go a long way in encouraging its uptake, especially considering that early in 2020, many vaccines expired as a result of low acceptance rates among Malawians – a waste that was unpopular with the bilateral and multilateral donors who donated the vaccines to Malawi.
Conclusion
COVID-19 remains a huge threat to Malawi and the current sharp decline in COVID-19 infection rates should not be interpreted as permanent. There is a high probability that the current trend is a temporary episode which could be followed by a sharp and lethal increase in COVID-19 cases, catching everyone unaware. This becomes an especially scary possibility when one recollects the events of last year when, following a similar decline in COVID-19 cases leading up to late December 2020, the public abandoned the COVID-19 prevention measures and enjoyed the festive season as though the pandemic did not exist. In January 2021, the country paid a huge price as COVID-19 tore through the population, with frighteningly high rates of COVID-19 infections, hospital admissions and deaths. Stakeholders should, therefore, pay attention to what the public are identifying as the explanations for the current sharp decline in cases in Malawi, and develop effective messaging strategies that could ensure the public does not become reckless again during the forthcoming festive season. As the old adage goes: Once beaten, twice shy.
The COP26 marathon is finally over and on Saturday 13 November, 2021, the Glasgow Climate Pact was agreed. Over ten pages there is lots of urging, noting, inviting, acknowledging, stressing and so on, but few decisions, beyond agreeing to meet again next year (more international travel, more per diems) and have dialogue on loss and damage. Nevertheless, the important momentum around the Paris Agreement remains, and the role of civil society’s protests and lobbying in assuring this is widely acknowledged.
There were a few unexpected additions to an otherwise bland statement, notably the focus on coal, which now the international community agrees to ‘phase down’ (rather than ‘phase out’ thanks to a last minute intervention by India). But there were also gaps. Coal is rightly in the spotlight, but what about oil and shale gas? Loss and damage (compensation for climate change to those most affected, but least polluting) is acknowledged, but where is the funding (beyond some from Scotland and a limited offer from some philanthropists, there is nothing on the table)? And, with all the good talk about tackling deforestation, a lot of the action is wrapped up in dodgy deals around offsetting and net-zero accounting. I could go on.
Attending a few days of the COP in the first week was certainly very weird, so contrasting were the divergent positions. I didn’t see the Zimbabwean delegation (they didn’t have delegation offices nor a ‘pavilion’), nor did I get invited to the drunken beach party (in November… really?). Like most African delegations they were marginalised and peripheral to the main action. President Mnangagwa was not the only head of state to speak to a near empty hall or be shunned by attempts at diplomatic rapprochement.
Instead, the COP negotiation action was centred on horse-trading between the US, China and the EU, with a few interventions from the likes of India and the oil-producing countries such as Saudi Arabia, while the small island states and ‘least developed country’ coalitions made effective noise from the margins. That any agreement was made at all is amazing, and the result of enormous hard work, including by the UK’s Alok Sharma as chair of the conference (although backing from the wider UK government was half-hearted at best).
Will this make a difference? I remain sceptical, as the fundamental challenge of addressing climate change – through the fundamental transformation of capitalist economies – remains untouched. Indeed, with corporate greenwash on show to such a sickening extent, much of the agenda has been captured through the slick jargon of carbon markets, offsets and net-zero targets. All these are approaches that fail to address the root causes of the problem and attempt to retain the status quo. They protect capitalist interests through a greenwashed ‘transition’, while very often exporting the problem elsewhere with devastating consequences.
Given that climate change is perhaps the biggest challenge humanity faces, Glasgow was disappointing. But it was the energy, radicalism and commitment in the spaces outside the main conference that give me hope. On my way home from Glasgow – in a state of exhaustion and with feelings of anger and frustration – I penned another piece for The Conversation with my reflections. This is reproduced below.
COP26: Two worlds talked past each other – or never even met
Delegates arrive at the COP26 climate summit on November 4, 2021 in Glasgow, Scotland. Photo by Christopher Furlong/Getty Images
At the 2021 UN climate change conference in Glasgow, moving between the corporate slickness of the official “Blue Zone” (a UN-managed space which hosts the negotiations) and the wider fringe was quite a disconcerting experience for me. These were two different worlds. Everyone was committed to saving the planet, but there were highly diverging views about how to do it.
A welter of announcements on everything from coal to methane to forests dominated the opening days. Large numbers were discussed and ambitious targets were set. The bottom line was keeping alive the Paris agreement to pursue efforts to limit global warming to 1.5°C, while assuring a ‘transition’ to a low-carbon future.
The contradictions were all too apparent at this year’s conference, known as COP26. The hired exhibition spaces in the conference centre were hosted by fossil fuel polluting countries and sponsored by large corporations. Corporate spin, also known as greenwash, abounded. There were a few African delegations with their own space and a vanishingly few civil society voices in the main venue.
Meanwhile, the discourse was very different in parallel fora. Here the talk was of inequality, climate justice and reparations. The focus was on radical transformations of systems of production and consumption. Many were critical of business-led and market-based solutions to climate change.
There was passion, commitment and a real sense of anger and frustration about the main conference. Huge suspicion around the corporate takeover of the climate agenda swirled, with much commentary on the double standards of the UK hosts, still proposing a new coalmine and oilfield as part of a so-called ‘transition’.
Unlike a decade ago, there was no climate scepticism on show. But how to address the underlying causes of climate change in capitalism remains the big, unaddressed challenge.
We hosted a photo exhibition exploring pastoralists’ own perceptions of climate change and uncertainty from across the world. We engaged in a dialogue with Scottish farmers and food groups, focusing on the future of livestock production under climate change. And our ‘sheep for the climate’ action brought a group together to discuss why livestock are not always bad for the planet, together with some fine rare breed sheep.
When I managed to find a few events in the Blue Zone (not an easy task) relating to our research, they were mostly extremely disappointing. There were parallel conversations going on. If climate change is genuinely a shared challenge for all of humanity, dialogue between different viewpoints is vital.
Within the main conference, there was much talk about trees and ‘nature-based solutions’ across multiple sessions, for instance. The mainstream media hailed the agreement on deforestation, but a significant part of this simply replicates the failed programmes of the past. Under such programmes, forest protection in the global south is used as carbon offsets for large polluting companies and rich, consuming publics in the north.
The huge ecosystem restoration efforts being proposed potentially cause real problems for pastoralists. This is because large areas of open rangelands are earmarked for tree planting and biodiversity protection through exclusion. These so-called nature-based solutions are frequently new forms of colonialism, opening the gates to ‘green grabbing’, where land and resources are appropriated in the name of environmental conservation.
Methane was also a hot topic. The huge reductions in emissions proposed under the Global Methane Pledge have major implications for livestock production. Yet a session I attended was obsessed only with technical solutions -– feed additives, methane-reducing inhibitors and vaccines, seaweed supplements, even face masks for cows.
Once again, livestock systems were lumped together, without differentiating between highly polluting industrial systems and more climate-friendly extensive systems, such as African pastoralism. Indeed, many of the solutions proposed are already being practised in extensive grazing systems. The problem I guess is that these practices could not be patented and sold by agribusinesses.
Climate and capitalism
So how do these two worlds intersect? Everyone is keen on nature, no-one wants catastrophic climate change, but why are the solutions so divergent? At root, the two camps (and many in between) have different views on the role of capitalism in climate change.
For those in the Blue Zone, a long-term shift from reliance on fossil fuels is (largely) accepted. But capitalism in its new green guise, many argue, can save the day through technology investment and market mechanisms – and notably through the plethora of offsetting schemes that make up the net-zero plans.
By contrast, critical civil society and youth voices argue that capitalism is the root cause of the problem, together with its handmaiden colonialism. The only solution therefore is to overhaul capitalism and dismantle unequal global power relations. But how, through what alliances?
In a recent paper –- climate change and agrarian struggles – we explored the challenges of ‘eroding capitalism’ to create structural transformation and climate justice. However, in Glasgow I missed these crucial, political debates about ways forward. Are new styles of multilateral negotiation possible? Can genuine inclusion occur, going beyond the performance of participation where an ‘indigenous’ person or ‘community’ leader is co-opted? Can a true dialogue emerge about our common future?
I of course had very limited exposure to the thousands of simultaneous events. But my sense was that there was little meaningful interchange between different positions. Two worlds talked past each other or – because of restricted access, problems with visas and the high costs of attending – never even met.
How has the Nigerian cocoa sector changed since the crop was introduced in the 1880s? What is the reality of this value chain now, in the country ranked fourth in cocoa production globally? What do stakeholders see for the future of the sector, and the thousands of livelihoods connected to it? These are all questions to be answered in the upcoming Nigeria Cocoa Summit and Awards, to be held at the Sandralia Hotel in Abuja from 30 November – 1 December, 2021.
The event, hosted by the Cocoa Farmers Association of Nigeria, the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Federal Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment, will feature government representatives, members of the private sector and cocoa sector stakeholders over its variety of panel discussions, presentations and keynote speeches. The topics of these sessions include sustainable public-private partnerships, the status of Nigerian cocoa processing, value addition in the cocoa value chain, best agricultural practices, the effects of climate change, and more.
One such session will be hosted by Professor Adebayo Aromolaran, the APRA Nigeria country coordinator. Professor Aromolaran will serve as the Lead Keynote Speaker during a session entitled, ‘Cocoa: Past, Present and Future’, which will be held at 11.25am GMT on the first day of the summit.
Learn more about what will be taking place at the summit in the event programme, here.
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