

Narratives of Brazil-Africa Cooperation for Agricultural Development: New Paradigms?

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The **ESRC (UK Economic and Social Research Council - ES/J018317/)** funded CBAA project is exploring the new development cooperation engagements in agriculture across four African countries. The project is examining the politics of aid and investment policy in China and Brazil, exploring how understandings of agricultural development are translated in aid and investment projects.

The project is being carried out as part of the Future Agricultures Consortium, connecting researchers from institutions in the UK and Africa with colleagues from China and Brazil. The research involves a mapping phase that is generating a geo-referenced database of Chinese and Brazilian agricultural development cooperation projects in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In addition, in-depth case studies of a sample of these projects, are examining the ways in which experience and expertise from China and Brazil engage with the realities of African agriculture and the perspectives of African scientists and farmers.

Comparative analysis across projects, countries and types of intervention are addressing the question of whether a “new paradigm” of development cooperation is emerging, and assessing the implications for the future of agricultural aid and investment policy.

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1. Introduction

The subject of 'emerging donors' or 'rising powers' is becoming increasingly topical in debates on international development. It featured prominently in the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), held in South Korea at the end of 2011, an event that will be remembered as the first time traditional and non-traditional donors sat together, as providers of development cooperation, to agree on best practices for delivering assistance to poor countries. Although the Forum did not produce universal standards on aid effectiveness, but rather differential commitments for traditional and non-traditional donors, it reflected the world's 'shifting geopolitical realities' (Glennie 2011) by recognising the increasingly significant role played by South-South cooperation and the need to move beyond the narrow focus on aid and consider development finance more broadly.

The presence of the rising powers in Africa, particularly that of China, has been the focus of much attention and a great deal of negative reporting, although a more nuanced and balanced view is now emerging, as research on the topic builds up. Most evidence on the rising powers' development cooperation practices focuses on China (Alden 2007, Rotberg 2008, Bräutigam 2009) and thorough analysis of the experience of other rising powers like Brazil is still in short supply. Some of the work available, especially Bräutigam (2009), considers experiences of cooperation in agriculture, although a systematic analysis of how the rising powers may be changing the paradigm of agricultural development in Africa has yet to be produced.

A new Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) research programme, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, focuses on Brazil and China's agriculture cooperation in Africa and aims to contribute to filling this gap by documenting and analysing the experiences of such emerging cooperation engagements to assess the novelty and value added of the approaches used and their implications for African agriculture. The overarching research question guiding the analysis is whether a new paradigm for agricultural development is being forged by the rising powers in Africa. The selection of countries for detailed analysis comprises Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.ⁱⁱ

This paper summarises the findings of a scoping study on Brazilian development cooperation in agriculture in Africa. The study comprised, in the first instance, a review of the relevant literature and interviews with key informants in Brazil, undertaken between October 2011 and March 2012.ⁱⁱⁱ This was complemented by an international seminar on the topic held in Brasília on May 2012, which brought together experts and practitioners from Brazil, Africa, China and Europe to discuss Brazilian agricultural cooperation in the context of South-South engagements with Africa.^{iv} The seminar represented a unique opportunity to gather and contrast experiences and viewpoints on the subject across a wide range of state and non-state actors. This initial work will be followed by in-depth research in a selection of African

countries where Brazilian cooperation in agriculture is being put into practice. This process began with a series of background papers by FAC researchers in Ghana, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia and a field visit to Mozambique, site of Brazil's most ambitious agricultural development cooperation initiative, in July-August 2012.^v

The paper is structured into five sections. This brief introduction is followed by an overview of the general features of Brazilian cooperation, including its drivers, principles, modalities and institutional setting. Section 2 describes cooperation with the African continent, with particular focus on its agriculture component and its growing significance. The fourth section offers some preliminary observations and hypotheses for further investigation. Section 5 concludes with some suggestions for the subsequent stage of the research.

2. Overview of Brazil's cooperation for development

2.1 Significance and drivers

Brazilian development cooperation is increasingly in the spotlight. Despite having a small portfolio compared to other 'rising powers' – available 2010 estimates of the scale of Brazilian cooperation vary between 0.4 and 1.2 billion US dollars^{vi}, which puts it below Chinese cooperation estimated at around 1.4 billion US dollars in 2009 (Bräutigam 2009: 168) – Brazil is a source of world-leading expertise across a range of areas of great relevance to developing countries' development processes – most notably agricultural research, health (especially expanding access to primary care and antiretroviral treatment for HIV) and social protection (conditional cash transfers and school feeding) – and increasingly a reference for many African countries, especially those with historical and cultural affinities with this South American giant. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) are internationally renowned institutions for research on tropical agriculture and health, respectively. Bolsa Família is the world's largest conditional cash transfer programme and has played a central role in moving millions of Brazilians out of extreme poverty (Vaitsman and Paes de Sousa 2007).

Foreign policy has been a major driver of Brazilian cooperation and former President Lula da Silva was the engine behind the dynamism noticeable during recent years. His policy expanded the focus of cooperation beyond its traditional focus on Latin America and on Lusophone (Portuguese-speaking) African countries, in what has been interpreted as a strategy of autonomy (via-à-vis the US's hegemony) through diversification of diplomatic and economic relations (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). Africa had a prominent position in Lula's 'presidential diplomacy', justified by reference to a frequently-articulated sense of moral duty as well as to

the continent's commercial potential and geo-political significance as a southern ally (Matos 2011).^{vii}

The trend over the first couple of years of the administration of President Dilma Rousseff, who succeeded Lula in 2011, has been one of apparent continuity and emphasis on fulfilment of previous commitments. However, new nuances are being added to the approach. Reflecting the new President's decision to emphasise meeting Brazil's domestic development challenges ahead of assuming new global responsibilities, this approach is increasingly 'focusing on the search for new markets for national investment and exports, particularly for higher added value products, and the mobilization of international capacities aiming at strengthening innovation in Brazil' (Costa Leite 2013: 7). Lula himself remains very active in promoting Brazil-Africa relations, but since leaving the Presidency his own discourse has shifted to give greater emphasis to commercial opportunities. In Lula's speeches these opportunities continue to be linked to a discourse of Brazilian moral obligation; at a recent speech to representatives of major Brazilian firms with investments in Africa, the former President stressed that slavery had enabled Brazil's economic development to benefit from 'the sweat and blood of millions of Africans', before going on to urge Brazilian investors to expand their engagement with the continent as part of the 'repayment of this historic debt' (Bonilla 2012).

Within the federal government, budget cuts have forced a pause in the previously breakneck pace of expansion of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)^{viii}, and there has been a marked reduction in the intensity of Presidential forays into what became known under the Lula government as 'generosity diplomacy'. This has resulted in a slowdown in the rate at which key agencies like Embrapa receive new demands triggered by Presidential visits or other diplomatic offensives (such as the effort to secure the post of FAO Director-General for Lula's former advisor José Graziano da Silva). This has allowed these agencies a breathing-space in which to consolidate and internalise the lessons of the previous period and identify ways of streamlining the programme and making it more strategic without losing its distinctive commitment to responsiveness and horizontality.^{ix}

2.2 Principles and claimed advantages

Brazil states that its development cooperation is guided by the following principles: (i) joint diplomacy based on solidarity; (ii) demand-driven action, in response to demands from developing countries; (iii) acknowledgement of local experience and adaptation of Brazilian experience; (iv) no imposition of conditions; (v) no association with commercial interests or profit; and (vi) no interference in domestic issues of partner countries (ABC 2011: 3). These principles are claimed to distinguish Brazilian cooperation from traditional forms of cooperation, particularly by reflecting a horizontal relationship between southern countries. Indeed, Brazil

rejects being referred to as a 'donor', a label it associates with the vertical (donor-recipient) nature of North-South cooperation. Instead, it prefers to portray its cooperation as a mutually beneficial relationship between partners. The claimed benefits are not only economic or diplomatic, as Brazil's technical and scientific cooperation initiatives have long deployed a discourse of 'mutual learning'.^x However, there is as yet little evidence that Brazil has actually learned from the processes of 'horizontal exchange' in which it has engaged with African countries, with one study of Brazilian HIV/AIDS projects in Mozambique concluding that these projects were 'described as opportunities for sharing lessons learned but in reality were designed as activities through which Brazil delivers technical assistance to Mozambique, in a unidirectional learning process' (Taela 2011: 41).

As a provider of development knowledge, Brazil claims the advantage of having expertise and technologies that are a good fit with the needs of developing countries, due to greater proximity (vis-à-vis Northern donors) in terms of economic and institutional development, culture and language (in the case of some African countries) and agro-climatic conditions, which are particularly relevant for cooperation in tropical agriculture and health. As the former director of ABC, Minister Marco Farani, put it: 'Because of similarities in social and economic realities and challenges to be faced in many areas, partner countries can absorb knowledge resulting from exchanging experiences with Brazil, which are more easily adapted and applied to real cases if compared to traditional solutions offered by traditional partners. (...) Affinities of historical, ethnical, cultural, linguistic and economic nature – as well as shared heritage and aspirations – favour the expansion and realization of south-south cooperation and contribute to its success.' (ABC 2010a: 97)

Brazil also emphasises that it can offer its own tested solutions to development problems, rather than ideas of what may work.^{xi} Delivering appropriate 'solutions' to key development challenges that draw on Brazil's own experience is seen both as a moral obligation in South-South relations and as a factor underpinning the country's political legitimacy in Africa. In an interview given shortly after Lula took office, Presidential advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia, one of the most influential foreign policy thinkers in Lula's Workers' Party (PT), stressed that 'Brazil's political weight in global politics can come from its ethical and moral presence in Africa; through the sharing of solutions' (interview in Folha de São Paulo, 19 November 2003). However, as discussed in later sections, adaptability to different contexts should not be taken for granted.

2.3 Cooperation modalities and volume of resources invested in cooperation activities

Technical cooperation is the most visible modality of the country's development cooperation portfolio and


the one that is more explicitly used as a tool of diplomatic relations, as noticed by the direct involvement of the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic apparatus in promoting and initiating cooperation initiatives. These may originate from requests channelled by Brazilian Embassies in African capitals, as well as from Presidential visits to Africa or African delegations' visits to Brazil. Technical cooperation consists of the transfer and adaptation of expertise, skills and technology for development mainly through training courses, workshops, consultancies, exchange programmes, and, occasionally, the donation of equipment. Brazilian technical cooperation is notable for drawing mostly (though not entirely) on civil servants with direct experience of implementing the programmes whose transfer is being attempted, rather than consultants or other specialists from outside government. This means that the full cost (including the opportunity cost of staff time lost to the Ministries and other agencies providing the specialists) is difficult to account for. Brazil also uses other cooperation modalities, and even bearing in mind these indirect costs, technical cooperation represents a relatively small proportion of the country's international cooperation budget (Figure 1). It provides scholarships for foreigners to study in Brazil. It assists countries facing emergencies (Haiti is the largest beneficiary of Brazilian humanitarian assistance). It makes contributions to international and regional multilateral institutions

working in development, such as several UN agencies or the Inter-American Development Bank. It grants debt relief to highly indebted poor countries and it is increasingly offering export credits on concessional terms to countries in Latin America and Africa.^{xii}

At the end of 2010, the governmental Applied Economic Research Institute (IPEA) published, jointly with ABC, the first survey on Brazilian development cooperation, where the amount of resources channelled to the various modalities was calculated for the 2005-2009 period (IPEA and ABC 2010). According to the survey, Brazil's development cooperation programme amounted, in 2009, to US\$362 million, approximately 0.02 percent of GNI. The bulk of this amount (68 percent) corresponded to Brazil's contributions to multilateral organisations, whereas technical cooperation represented just 13 percent of the total. The weight of technical cooperation is lower if the full period surveyed is considered – Figure 1.


The IPEA/ABC survey excluded debt relief, export credits and food financing initiatives from the definition and calculation of Brazilian cooperation. ABC has subsequently attempted to fill this gap by estimating the amount of resources channelled through these modalities (ABC 2011) – see Figure 2. According to such estimates, export credits become the largest modality

Figure 1. Brazilian development cooperation by modality, 2005-9



Source: IPEA and ABC 2010: 21-22.

Figure 2. Brazilian development cooperation by modality (including debt relief and export credits), 2005-9



Source: ABC 2011: 13.

of cooperation, representing 42 percent of the overall portfolio during 2005-2009. The notion of export credits is not defined in any detail in the ABC (2011) report but these typically consist of loans on concessional terms provided to other countries to finance the acquisition of Brazilian good and services and hence promote Brazilian exports (Cabral 2011). If these modalities are considered, as Figure 2 shows, the weight of technical cooperation drops further, to a mere 3 percent.

Despite its relatively small weight, technical cooperation, a key instrument of Brazilian diplomacy, has been expanding rapidly over recent years, as illustrated in Figure 3.

Linked to the expansion of technical cooperation, another trend worthy of notice is the rise of trilateral (or triangular) cooperation arrangements, whereby cooperation is provided by Brazil alongside another donor (typically a traditional donor) to a beneficiary country. Japan, Germany, the United States and several UN agencies are amongst the main partners (on the provider side) of Brazil in trilateral cooperation. Trilateral cooperation has been suggested as a middle ground between bilateral cooperation and cooperation provided through multilateral channels (Abdenur 2007). It rests on the idea that it can combine the strengths of different cooperation providers to the advantage of the beneficiary country (Fordelone 2009). For Brazil, it allows its cooperation activities in third countries to be scaled up, complementing its technical cooperation inputs with financial resources granted by the partner donor. It also allows the country to overcome some of the legal and bureaucratic obstacles that face Brazilian government agencies working overseas (discussed below), for example by allowing procurement to be handled by the international partner. At the same time, triangular cooperation also offers a route for maintaining strategic links with traditional donors at a time when Brazil is making the transition from aid recipient to provider.^{xiii}


2.4 Overview of institutional setting and coordination challenges

The institutional framework governing Brazilian development cooperation is characterised first and foremost by significant fragmentation. This is in part due to the nature of Brazilian cooperation, particularly its technical assistance dimension, which entails first-hand transfer of Brazil's own experiences and the expertise of its institutions across an array of thematic fields, from agriculture, to education, health, security, energy, social protection, among many others. There are therefore a great number of institutions – governmental and non-governmental – directly involved in the implementation of technical cooperation projects, raising considerable coordination challenges.

ABC is the government institution with the mandate to coordinate technical cooperation. Its capacity has been greatly boosted over recent years – its budget increased threefold between 2008 and 2010^{xiv} – and it benefited during this period from the dynamic leadership of Marco Farani, a director who was not only an outspoken advocate of the expansion of Brazil's role in international cooperation but also able to trade on President Lula's interest in the issue to mobilise support from other sectors of government. His period as head of ABC, according to several accounts, revamped its image.^{xv} However, he was not able to address the broader institutional factors limiting ABC's ability to play its coordination role more effectively.

One such factor is ABC's relatively low-grade position in the government hierarchy. As a department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (commonly known as Itamaraty), it is a 'virtual' agency, with no financial autonomy or significant political clout. It has therefore limited space to set the cooperation agenda, plan ahead or act strategically in deploying its financial and human resources. The direction of cooperation (including selection of beneficiary countries and thematic focus) is largely determined by Itamaraty and specialised institutions, such as Embrapa for cooperation in

Figure 3. Brazilian technical cooperation, annual budget and new projects, 2003-9



Sources: IPEA and ABC (2010) and correspondence with ABC.

agriculture, often in response to promises made to African countries during periods of 'Presidential diplomacy' (see Section 3.1 below). ABC's coordination role takes shape at the implementation level, organising the protocol and logistics for missions of Brazilian experts to the field.

Another factor constraining ABC's coordination function is the obsolete legal framework for Brazilian cooperation, which still portrays Brazil as a recipient country. This limits the ability to operate abroad. Embrapa and Fiocruz are probably the only Brazilian cooperation actors, with the exception of the foreign office, which have the legitimacy to establish a presence overseas. However, in both cases the legal changes required to allow Fiocruz or Embrapa staff to be permanently based overseas have been highly controversial within the organisations and elsewhere in government. In the case of Fiocruz the necessary changes have failed to get through the approval process with the Ministry of Planning, which is responsible for agreeing civil servants' terms of service.^{xvi} In the case of Embrapa, the creation of an overseas branch attracted significant internal criticism which contributed to the resignation of the head of the agency in October 2012.^{xvii} ABC has not been granted such a right yet, although it has started placing contractors in strategic countries to support operations or coordinate specific projects. Its capacity to represent Brazil at the development partners' table is however limited, as its field officers do not generally have such mandate or profile. This is slowly beginning to change in countries and sectors where there is a strategic concentration of technical cooperation activities. In July 2012 ABC appointed a Maputo-based representative with specific responsibility for coordinating Brazilian agricultural cooperation in Mozambique; however, in the absence of structural reform the agency has struggled to provide sufficient institutional support for the new role.^{xviii}

Finally, ABC's mandate is restricted to technical cooperation, which represents only a fraction of Brazil's development cooperation activities abroad. Responsibilities for other modalities of cooperation, such as debt relief, concessional lending and emergency relief, are spread across several institutions including Itamaraty, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Commerce (MDIC), the International Trade Chamber (CAMEX) and the External Credit Assessment Committee (COMACE).^{xix} Although Itamaraty sets the foreign policy agenda in broad terms, the influence of CAMEX and COMACE on issues related to trade and investments is significant and has, at times, generated tensions between commercial and development cooperation objectives. This was apparent during internal government discussions around the design of a new export credit for supplying Brazilian agricultural machinery (mainly tractors) to African farmers, the More Food Programme (this programme is presented with further detail in sections 3.2 and 3.5). During these discussions, it appears that CAMEX favoured the use of conditionalities and focused on countries of commercial

interest to Brazil, whereas Itamaraty pressed for a no-conditionalities approach. What emerged was a compromise – a condition concerning the percentage of Brazil-made components in the machinery and equipment to be exported has been set (specifying that 65 percent of the value of the exported goods has to be of Brazil origin) but country selection seems to have been less driven by business considerations but rather demand from African countries themselves.^{xx}

3. Brazil's agricultural development cooperation in Africa: features and trends


3.1 Africa focus

Africa featured prominently in Lula's 'presidential diplomacy'. As noted above, the former president often spoke passionately about Brazil's affinities with the continent and his country's moral and fraternal duty to support Africa's renaissance. During Lula's administration (2003-2010), presidential visits to the continent reached record levels and the number of Brazilian embassies across Africa more than doubled (MRE 2011). Economic relations also intensified, with a considerable rise in trade and private investment in the mining, construction and oil sectors (Costa and Veiga 2011; Costa e Iglesias 2011).

The trend is likely to be maintained by Lula's successor, despite the slower pace of growth in technical cooperation commitments discussed in Section 2.1 above. During the first two years of her mandate, president Dilma Rousseff paid her first visit to the continent (touring Angola, Mozambique and South Africa – a selection that reflects Brazil's list of primary investment destinations as much as the country's cooperation agenda) and created Grupo África, an inter-ministerial group, with private sector representatives, to focus on Brazil's relations with Africa. Dilma's rhetoric seems, on the surface, less emotional and more pragmatic than Lula's, with an explicit emphasis on commercial and investment opportunities for Brazilian enterprises, although also urging them to leave a 'legacy' to Africans through the transfer of technology, training and social programmes.^{xxi}


Reflecting the country's diplomatic and economic motivations, Brazilian cooperation has been spreading steadily across the continent. According to the latest official information, there are technical cooperation projects at either design or implementation stage in 38 countries (ABC 2011). In 2010, Africa accounted for the largest regional increase in spending, having absorbed 57 percent of Brazil's overall technical cooperation budget (Figure 4). There are indications that the balance may have shifted back towards Latin America since the start of Dilma Rousseff's presidency, but the delay in publishing the latest edition of the country's development cooperation

Figure 4. Brazilian technical cooperation by world regions, 2010



Source: ABC 2011.

Figure 5. Top ten beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa, 2011



Source: ABC 2011.

report (known as COBRADI) makes it impossible to confirm this with up-to-date official figures.^{xxii}

The five Portuguese-speaking African countries^{xxiii} remain Brazil's main technical cooperation partners, with Mozambique as the single largest beneficiary (Figure 5). In 2010, these countries accounted for 74 percent of resources spent in technical cooperation in Africa (Cabral and Weinstock 2010). But as noted above, the portfolio of partners is being diversified, mirroring the spreading of the diplomatic network and deepening of economic relations across the continent.^{xxiv}


Alongside technical cooperation, other modalities are being increasingly drawn on for South-South cooperation with Africa. Debt relief has either been granted or is in the process of being granted to several African countries (Cape Verde, Mozambique and Nigeria have already benefited from relief and Guinea Bissau, the Democratic republic of Congo, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia will follow), clearing the way for additional lending to be made available by the Brazilian banking system (Cabral 2011). Some of these loans are concessional and focused on development objectives, such as a new credit facility to support African farmers in buying agricultural machinery for productivity gains and food security (discussed in Section 3.5 below). Others appear to be primarily motivated by commercial objectives, such as most lending provided by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to countries like Angola, Nigeria and South Africa. BNDES is a key ally and resource for major Brazilian

corporations such as Vale (mining) and Odebrecht (construction and agribusiness), which are active in many African countries. Although BNDES is notoriously reluctant to release data on its international activities, its lending is cited as a key supporting factor in the push to 'internationalise' Brazilian corporations by government bodies such as the Industrial Development Agency (ABDI). Since leaving the presidency, Lula has spoken at BNDES-sponsored events designed to encourage Brazilian companies to increase their investments in Africa. In addition, smaller Brazilian firms which do not necessarily access BNDES credit lines (including service-sector SMEs, such as hairdressing chains) are increasingly venturing into African markets where larger corporations have already established a presence.^{xxvi} Overall, the momentum behind Brazilian FDI in Africa appears to be building, with a recent African Development Bank review article noting that 'following President Lula's strong diplomatic engagements with the continent, many Brazilian firms have been investing heavily in the mining sectors, agriculture, and infrastructure in Africa' (Barka 2011: 11).

3.2 Agriculture as a burgeoning field of cooperation in Africa


Agriculture tops the list of priority fields of Brazilian technical cooperation. Between 2003 and 2010, it

Figure 6a. Brazilian technical cooperation by sector supported worldwide, 2003-10



Source: ABC 2011.

Figure 6b. Brazilian technical cooperation by sector supported in Africa, 2003-10



Source: ABC 2011.

accounted for 22 percent of the country's technical cooperation portfolio worldwide. In Africa, the proportion of agriculture-related projects was even greater (at 26 percent, over the same period) – Figures 6a and 6b.

Despite the prominence of Lusophone countries in the agriculture cooperation portfolio, technical cooperation in agriculture has been expanding considerably across the continent. An event hosted by President Lula da Silva back in 2010 – *Diálogo Brasil-África*^{xxvii} – seems to have played an important part in promoting Brazil as a source of cutting-edge expertise on tropical agriculture for Africa (ABC 2010a). The event was an initiative of President Lula himself who, at the 2009 African Union Summit in Libya to which he was invited as a special guest, identified agriculture and food security as a key area of focus in Brazil-Africa cooperation relations. High-profile actors^{xxviii} were invited to Brasília to discuss opportunities for cooperation in the domains of agricultural development and food security.

The event seems to have served several purposes. One was to showcase areas of consolidated cooperation, such as Embrapa's renowned agricultural research and training and to stress the potential for furthering interaction. In his opening speech President Lula emphasised the crucial role played by Embrapa's research and development in

Brazilian agriculture, namely in transforming the supposedly barren cerrado, the central Brazilian savannah belt, and noted opportunities for transferring this experience into Africa as 'the African savannah has the same productive characteristics as the Brazilian cerrado'.^{xxix} He also announced the creation of a new Centre for Strategic Studies and Training on Tropical Agriculture (CECAT) within Embrapa, to improve the institution's capacity to respond in a more effective way to capacity building demands.

Another noticeable purpose concerned raising the profile of other Brazilian agricultural institutions (beyond Embrapa) and presenting their potential contribution to agricultural cooperation in Africa, especially with regards to family farming and technology dissemination. The profiles of the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) and the National Rural Learning Service (SENAR) were included alongside those of Embrapa and ABC in a booklet produced for the event to document Brazil's potential in agriculture and food security cooperation in Africa (ABC 2010a). Furthermore, in his opening speech, President Lula singled out two particular agricultural programmes which MDA has been implementing in Brazil – the More Food Programme and the Food Acquisition Programme (see Box 2) – which he claimed have contributed to strengthening local food production

systems, helping poor farmers to move beyond subsistence and addressing food insecurity, and could do the same in Africa. Referring to the More Food Programme, President Lula noted, that '[Brazil] has the capacity to create in Africa the same credit policies on offer for Brazilian farmers' and added that he would like to extend the same credit line granting Brazilian family farmers access to tractors into Latin America and African countries 'wanting to modernize their agriculture'.^{xxx} With regards to the Food Acquisition Programme, Lula emphasised that the programme has both strengthened family farming and helped developing regional markets (by ensuring 30 percent of food procured for school feeding programmes are sourced locally), and announced the intention to implement 10 similar pilot projects across Africa.^{xxxi}

Another apparent purpose behind the organisation of the Brazil-Africa Dialogue was to open new fronts for triangular cooperation – or perhaps, in a more cynical interpretation, to make inroads into the United Nations system as part as the struggle for influence in the multilateral sphere. The Food Acquisition Programme is being taken into Africa with support from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food

Programme (WFP), the two United Nations institutions invited to open the Brasília event alongside President Lula.^{xxxiii}

The event was followed by a surge in demand for Brazilian technical cooperation projects, perhaps greater than Brazil will be able to respond to. At the time of the event, 26 African countries^{xxxiv} hosted Brazilian technical cooperation projects, in either design or implementation stage (ABC 2010b), covering a range of agricultural issues, such as supporting production and value chain development, training extension agents, strengthening public sector institutions, supporting rural associations and cooperatives, developing sanitary and phytosanitary regulation, among others (ibid). Since then, the number of partner countries in Africa has increased to 38 (ABC 2011), with new project types and modalities introduced to work with either existing or new partners.^{xxxv} For example, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal and Kenya (the latter being a new partner for technical cooperation in agriculture) have been confirmed as beneficiaries of the Africa version of the More Food Programme, which entails the establishment of a credit line for African farmers to buy Brazilian agricultural machinery, combined with the supply of technical

Box 1. 'Family farming': the origins of a Brazilian agricultural development discourse

The concept of 'family farming' rose to prominence in Brazil in the context of political struggles over the future of Brazil's rural workers' movement, long divided between a focus on plantation workers' rights and on peasant agriculture. In the 1980s, the National Agricultural Workers' Federation (CONTAG) found itself being challenged for political leadership by two new forces: the rural wing of the Unified Workers' Centre (CUT), the driving force behind a new independent trade union movement that had arisen in opposition to the military dictatorship, and the Landless Rural Workers' Movement (MST), now Brazil's largest and best-known social movement organisation. As part of this dispute, CUT began to campaign for an 'Alternative Rural Development Project', a policy platform that would combine land reform with support for 'family farming', a concept that begun to displace 'small-scale production' and 'peasant agriculture' among the movement's NGO and academic allies (Favareto 2006: 39). This discourse was subsequently taken on board by CONTAG when it negotiated its accession to CUT in 1995, a shift that responded both to the growing ascendancy of the MST's more confrontational approach to the struggle of land reform and to the erosion of CONTAG's traditional support base among (waged) 'rural workers' by labour-displacing agrarian modernisation (ibid).

Also, during the latter part of the 1990s, a movement linked to the 'Socialist Democracy' wing of the Workers' Party began to establish 'family farming federations' in Southern Brazil. These also came to align themselves with CUT, and in 2005 they were formally incorporated into a CUT-affiliated National Federation of Workers in Family Farming (FETRAF), following a meeting in Brasília which was notable for its heavy presence of senior figures from the recently-elected Workers' Party-led government of Lula da Silva (ibid: 41). Before Lula took office, the movement's allies within government created the National Programme for Family Farming (PRONAF) as a vehicle for channelling credit and technical assistance to established peasant producers, expanding the coverage of an existing credit designed to cover resettled landless farmers, including those linked to the MST (Schneider et al. 2004). Under Lula, this gave rise to a broad raft of policies to promote 'family farming', underpinned by a coalition linking social movements, NGOs, academics and activist policymakers.

A 2006 law establishes criteria for defining 'family farming' as a type of agricultural production system.^{xxxiii} These include a requirement for a government-determined minimum proportion of total household income to be derived from the family farm, for family-based management of the land and sourcing of most labour within the household. Under the law, eligible farm size is limited to four 'fiscal modules', a unit of measurement that varies significantly by region, to take account of the much lower rural population densities and larger average farm sizes of the North and Centre-West regions (which correspond approximately to the Amazon and Cerrado biomes). This means that while a property in some areas close to major cities in Southern Brazil can be no more than 20 hectares, if it is to be classified as a 'family farm', in remote regions of the North it can cover as much as 320 hectares. The category of 'family farmers' thus includes many who would not be described as 'smallholders' in an African context.

Box 2. More Food Africa and Food Acquisition programmes: the rising stars of Brazil-Africa agricultural cooperation?

The More Food Africa Programme (*Programa Mais Alimentos África*) aims to increase agricultural productivity and food security in Africa by improving access to technology. This MDA-led programme adapts a similar programme implemented in Brazil, since 2008, as part of the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF). It consists of a credit facility to support the acquisition of farm machinery and equipment supplied by Brazilian manufacturers, which have been intensively involved with the design of the programme, including in negotiations over pricing. It is directed at 'family farming' or the African equivalent, with lending complemented by specialised technical assistance. The loan is provided on concessional terms, offering a 15 to 17 year repayment period, a 3 to 5 year grace period and an interest rate of 2 percent (or the Libor if this is lower). A total of \$640 million has been approved by the Brazilian Foreign Trade Chamber (CAMEX) for implementation of this programme in Africa in 2011-12. Credit lines have already been negotiated with Ghana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Senegal and Kenya.

The Food Acquisition Programme (*Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos*, or PAA) aims to address food insecurity and strengthen local food markets by procuring foodstuffs produced by small farmers, donating them to families facing food insecurity, supplying school feeding programmes and building up food stocks. The programme draws on a similar programme implemented in Brazil by the Ministry of Social Development (MDS) and MDA. The Brazilian government has committed \$2.4 million to support the programme's implementation in five African countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. FAO and WFP will assist implementation of this trilateral cooperation programme.

Sources: Interview with Head of International Cooperation at MDA and at Manager for Trilateral Cooperation Projects at ABC (October 2011) and web-based sources^{xxxvi}.

assistance. The latest additions to the list of partner countries include Ethiopia, Malawi and Niger, which, alongside Mozambique and Senegal, will pilot the Africa version of the Food Acquisition Programme.

3.3 Institutional players and arrangements for technical cooperation in agriculture

Embrapa as the face of Brazilian cooperation in agriculture

Embrapa is to a large extent the face of Brazilian cooperation in agriculture. It is a research corporation that was established in 1973 to promote technological development in agriculture and particularly to support the development of the cerrado, the vast tropical savannah of about 207 million hectares spreading across the central regions of Brazil, whose significant agricultural potential it helped to unlock (Martha Junior and Ferreira Filho 2012; Hosono and Hongo 2012) – see Box 3

Embrapa has over the years grown into a massive organisation, with a network of 47 specialised research and service provision units distributed throughout the country and specialized in products (maize and sorghum, soybean, etc.), ecological zones (cerrado, semi-arid, etc.), and themes (environment, satellite monitoring, etc.) (Martha Junior and Ferreira Filho 2012).^{xxxvii} With an impressive research capacity (8,200 employees including 2,600 researchers, 50 percent of whom have a PhD), Embrapa is today a world reference in tropical agriculture research and technology. It is claimed to have played a

key role in the 'miracle of the cerrado' (The Economist 2010b) and is set to take this experience into Africa.^{xxxviii}

Embrapa dominates the portfolio of cooperation projects as the source of expertise for agriculture-related issues, particularly in areas such as strengthening developing countries' research capacity and adapting Brazilian technology to these countries' agro-ecological conditions (ABC 2010b). For example, under Cotton 4, a flagship project in the agriculture portfolio initiated in 2006, Embrapa is working with research institutes of four West Africa countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali) to adapt Brazilian cotton's genetic material and improve productivity and quality of cotton production in those countries, as well as strengthening local research capacity (ABC undated).

Embrapa has its own international cooperation division, the International Relations Secretariat, responsible for managing and coordinating technical cooperation initiatives. This unit has about 50 staff distributed across three sub-divisions: technical cooperation, 'structural projects' (see below) and scientific cooperation. The latter is not concerned with cooperation for international development, but rather scientific exchanges (mostly with European and US institutions) with the aim of strengthening Brazilian scientific research.

Embrapa draws on several of its specialised research and service provision units for development cooperation in particular topics. Units whose presence seems most recurrent in technical cooperation projects include: Embrapa Horticultures, Embrapa Cerrados, Embrapa Tropical Agro-industry, Embrapa Meat Livestock and Embrapa Dairy Livestock.^{xxxix} But the range is increasing. In a single new project in one country – Pro-Savana in Mozambique (discussed in detailed below) – there are as many as 16 Embrapa units involved.^{xl}

Box 3. The agricultural transformation of the Brazilian cerrado

The cerrado belt is Brazil's most dynamic agricultural region, but its export-oriented agriculture boom is a relatively recent phenomenon. The region, known as 'Brazil Central', was long portrayed in Brazilian (and global) social imaginaries as a forbidding and mysterious land whose intractable vegetation (captured in the name of the region's largest state, Mato Grosso, which means 'dense bush') hid vast wealth – including, in some versions of the El Dorado myth, the 'City of Gold' itself. It has been the focus of sporadic attempts to unlock this wealth, from seventeenth century slaving expeditions and eighteenth century gold rushes to the 'March to the West' initiated by the dictator Getúlio Vargas in the 1940s and the construction of a new capital, Brasília, in the 1960s. However, none of these initiatives brought structural transformation, and central Brazil remained sparsely populated and relatively isolated from the rest of the country. The cerrado had long been considered unfit for agriculture due to extreme soil acidity and high levels of aluminium, but research in the 1940s and 50s changed the view of the cerrado as sterile land. The cerrado soil was found to be one of the oldest on earth and one that had been severely depleted of its nutrients. It was therefore an exhausted soil rather than a sterile one; with the right corrective measures, it could become productive again as annual rainfall in the region was relatively abundant and topography was favourable to mechanisation. Land-hungry migrants from southern Brazil struggled to unlock this potential, however, until soil correction techniques were perfected in the 1970s by the recently-created Brazilian agricultural research corporation (Embrapa), which was receiving support from the Japanese-funded Cerrado Development Programme (PRODECER). Soybean cultivation, originally brought to the cerrado by Japanese-Brazilian migrants from the Southern state of Paraná, began to take over from the cattle-ranching which had previously been the dominant form of commercially-oriented agricultural activity in the region. As the soya frontier pushed cattle-ranching further into the interior, savannah and forest conversion accelerated and with it the loss of biodiversity, as well as the (sometimes violent) displacement of the region's indigenous peoples and smallholders. Despite government efforts to promote small-scale farming in the region, urbanisation and land concentration have accelerated across the cerrado, which is now dominated by highly-mechanised large farms employing relatively few workers.

Source: Hosono and Hongo (2012) and Sawyer (2009).

Training courses for researchers and practitioners from partner countries are also an important component of Embrapa's contribution to development cooperation.^{xii} One-off courses are giving way to a more structured and strategic training programme coordinated by the recently established Centre for Strategic Studies and Training on Tropical Agriculture (CECAT). This includes training not only on technical agriculture subjects – from no-till planting to post-harvest – but also on agricultural economics, sociology, policy and institutions.^{xiii}

Embrapa's footprint in Africa has expanded over recent years, with a vigorous push from President Lula, who was enthusiastic about the research corporation's potential contribution to Africa's development. In 2006, Embrapa opened an office in Accra, Ghana^{xliii}, with the aim of facilitating engagement with African institutions on technical cooperation matters and providing support to headquarters in coordinating and monitoring the portfolio of projects in operation across the continent. However, in 2011 this office's remit was scaled down and it is currently responsible only for the coordination of projects located in Ghana.^{xliv} The reasons for this change of remit were not explicitly explained to the researchers but power struggles within the institution (particularly the headquarters' reluctance to deconcentrate responsibilities to the Africa office) were suggested. Embrapa's presence is now being strengthened elsewhere – particularly in Mozambique, where a growing portfolio of bilateral and trilateral cooperation initiatives includes the most ambitious of Embrapa's 'structural' projects, centred on collaboration with Mozambique's national agricultural research institution, IIAM. Although their remit is currently country-specific, Mozambique hosts a

team of Embrapa professionals that could become a hub for cooperation in Southern Africa.

An expanding range of players and agendas

Besides Embrapa, there are at least 22 other Brazilian institutions^{xlv} involved in technical cooperation in agriculture in Africa, covering a wide range of issues. As Embrapa's capacity to respond to burgeoning demand from developing countries is being stretched to the limit, it has looked for partnerships with or given way to other agricultural research institutions, including universities like the Federal University of Viçosa, as well as subnational agencies managed by Brazilian state governments (ABC 2010b).

As the topics in the agriculture cooperation portfolio with Africa diversify, so do the range of Brazilian players involved. MDA's presence in the portfolio is expanding, carrying with it the focus on 'family farming'^{xlvi} and food security and adding new conceptual (indeed ideological) and practical dimensions to the cooperation framework. In this context, the duality that, in grossly simplified terms, characterises domestic agricultural governance (Box 4) is likely to permeate development cooperation abroad, particularly in the absence of a clearly defined policy direction for cooperation in agriculture (see Section 3.4).

Other government institutions with a strong presence are the Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Enterprises (EMATER), providers of agricultural extension services at the state level, and the National Rural Learning

Box 4. Contradiction or complementarity? Brazil's two-headed agricultural development policy infrastructure

Since the late 1990s, Brazil has had not one but two federal government ministries with responsibility for developing the country's agriculture. MAPA, the Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply) describes itself as the 'ministry for agribusiness'. It advocates domestically for the interests of large-scale commercial farmers, and externally for a favourable trade regime for Brazilian agricultural commodity exports. It oversees Embrapa and a number of other key government agencies, including CONAB, the agency responsible for managing the national food reserves. MAPA has been instrumental in the promotion of the concept of 'agribusiness' as a discursive frame for drawing together the interests of groups pursuing different capital-intensive forms of commercial agriculture, from ranching to rice-growing, in defence of a supportive policy framework for their activities (Sawyer 2009: 89). It is supported in this by a powerful cross-party caucus within Congress, the bancadaruralista. One of the leading members of the bancadaruralista, Senator Kátia Abreu, heads the National Confederation of Agriculture (CNA), a government-accredited voice for farming interests with its own extensive network of service provision agencies. Senator Abreu has herself been actively engaged in promoting the expansion of Brazilian agribusiness to Africa.

MDA, the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (Ministry of Agrarian Development), describes itself as the 'ministry for family farming'. It oversees the land reform agency, INCRA, leads on the national 'Citizenship Territories' strategy for delivering integrated rural and social development in Brazil's poorest regions, and runs a number of programmes designed to ensure the provision of technical support and credit for 'family farmers'. The MDA was established as the successor to the Special Ministry for Land Reform, set up under the government of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso as an emergency response to the intensification of violent land conflicts. These conflicts often involved the MST. Under Lula's presidency the MST and its allies within the Workers' Party consolidated their hold over INCRA and successfully lobbied for increased flows of credit and technical support to land reform beneficiaries, particularly those belonging to the MST-affiliated Small Farmers' Movement (MPA). The MPA in turn formed an alliance with the national rural workers' union (CONTAG) and a coalition of NGOs and academics to promote the concept of family farming as an alternative to the capital-intensive large-scale commercial farming model that was becoming increasingly dominant in Brazilian agriculture. Representatives of this coalition hold some of the key posts within the MDA.^{xlvii}

In the policy domain, this penetration of two different ministries by distinct and often mutually antagonistic social and political forces has translated into a 'two-headed' structure polarised between the MDA and MAPA. Within Brazil (as discussed in section 4.2 below), entrenched political divisions have prevented the emergence of a policy framework directed at supporting the very significant contingent of producers who bridge the worlds of 'agribusiness' and 'family farming'. It is thus unsurprising that despite the opportunities for complementarity in directing Brazilian support for both smallholder and commercial agriculture in Africa, effective mechanisms capable of coordinating development cooperation activities across the two ministries have yet to emerge.

Service (SENAR), a parastatal linked to the CNA that is specialised in rural technical training. Some of these institutions have their own international cooperation units.

Besides governmental institutions, some NGOs and social movement organisations are being brought into the Brazilian cooperation framework. The General Secretariat of the Presidency (*Secretaria-Geral da Presidência da República*) has played an active role in engaging non-governmental players and Brazil's social movements. A project aiming to recover and preserve native seeds in Mozambique and South Africa, *Implantação de Bancos Comunitários de Sementes Crioulas em Áreas de Agricultura Familiar*, draws on the experience of two Brazilian social movement organisations in the field, the Women Farmers' Movement and the Popular Peasant Movement, alongside IBASE (the Brazilian Institute for Economic and Social Analysis), a well-respected social policy analysis and advocacy NGO. This initiative aims to connect Brazilian rural civil society and farmers' organisations with their equivalents in African countries, building on links already established through networks such as *Via Campesina*. As discussed

in Section 4.5 below, the engagement of the General Secretariat of the Presidency reflects the extension into international development cooperation of a particular Brazilian dynamic of state 'institutional hosting' of rural social movements that has intensified since the Workers' Party (PT) arrived in national office after Lula's election in 2002. This form of support involves the creation of institutionalised spaces for dialogue with even the most radically *contestatory* of movements, linked to the channelling of resources to movement leaders and allies and the incorporation into government policy of movement discourses and practices by sympathisers positioned inside the state (Cornwall et al. 2008; Gómez Bruera 2012).

Institutional arrangements for project selection, coordination and country engagement

The identification of cooperation opportunities typically emerges from diplomatic exchanges between Brazil and its partner countries, mediated by *Itamaraty* and country-level diplomatic representations. Country visits by the President of Brazil or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or reciprocal visits by partner countries to Brazil, often mark the beginning of such exchanges. These are followed by technical identification missions organised by ABC, usually comprised of the relevant specialised institutions from Brazil. The missions may have a specific thematic focus (as in the case of the identification mission to Mali in 2009/10, undertaken by EMATER-DF, MDA and ABC, for projects related to smallholder horticulture) or may have a broader focus, depending on how detailed discussions on the diplomatic front have been (ABC 2010b).

Although cooperation is claimed to be demand-driven, the specific focus of cooperation and selection of individual projects depends largely on the institutions taking part in the mission and the menu of options they carry with them. Interaction with the partner country for project identification is done exclusively at a government-to-government (and central administration) level. Special occurrences, such as the above-mentioned *Diálogo Brasil-África* event and international fora (for example Brazil's participation in the L'Aquila high-level conference on food security in 2009, where the idea for extending Brazil's cerrado transformation into Africa first arose^{xlix}), represent other channels for identifying cooperation opportunities.

ABC is responsible for overall coordination across Brazilian institutions, although this concerns essentially procedural matters (e.g. producing the cooperation agreement document – *Ajuste Complementar* – that operationalises the high-level cooperation agreement – *Acordo Básico* – and serves as the basis for developing the detailed project document) and administration (financing travel expenses and organising the logistics around the field mission). It is unclear whether there is any coordination on the substance of interventions, particularly in countries where different Brazilian institutions carry out development cooperation under the same thematic umbrella. A first move in this direction is taking place in Mozambique, following the arrival in July 2012 of a resident ABC agriculture sector coordinator, though much remains to be clarified on her precise remit and the extent of her technical (as opposed to logistical) coordination role in a context where Embrapa and MDA are simultaneously implementing agriculture-focused cooperation projects. Besides project identification and design, interaction with partner country institutions is mostly done within the framework of individual projects.

In-country structures for managing policy dialogue at the technical level are only starting to take shape and engagement with country processes has mainly happened via diplomatic channels. Embrapa is the only specialised institution in the agricultural domain with in-country representations. Besides the Accra office, it now has a general coordinator for Embrapa activities in Mozambique. It also has a few specialised researchers posted in partner countries with large research projects (e.g. Mozambique, Mali and Senegal). With the exception of the newly-created Mozambique agriculture cooperation post, ABC has no formal representation outside Brazil, although it has placed about ten workers, on short-term contracts, within Brazilian country embassies in a selection of strategic countries. These 'focal points' perform mainly a facilitator's role, aiding Brasília and the local embassies on operational matters concerning cooperation-related field visits of Brazilian government officials and experts (Cabral and Weinstock, 2010).^{li}

Recently, a contractor with a technical profile (GV Projetos, a branch of leading business school Fundação Getúlio Vargas) has been hired to coordinate the land use master plan component of ProSavana, a large cooperation programme aiming to replicate the Brazilian cerrado development experience and transform the Mozambican savannah into highly productive agricultural land (Box 5). This may set a precedent for the involvement of private-sector institutions (whether for-profit or NGO) in the management of large cooperation programmes. However, whether such involvement will in fact become the norm in Brazilian bilateral cooperation programmes remains to be seen: ProSavana is a triangular cooperation project between Brazil, Mozambique and Japan, and the involvement of GV Projetos seems to have resulted from the need to recruit a Brazilian organisation to act as a counterpart to the consultancy firm hired by JICA to work on the master plan component of the project. The question arising is how Fundação Getúlio Vargas' involvement in the technical cooperation component of ProSavana is related to its involvement in a parallel private initiative of mobilising foreign direct investment into the Nacala region (through the launch of the 'Nacala Fund'). This link could potentially indicate an increasing tendency towards the mingling of solidarity and commercial interests in Brazilian cooperation programmes. However, the Nacala Fund initiative has been driven by Roberto Rodrigues, a particularly entrepreneurial and energetic former Minister of Agriculture who now heads the agribusiness centre at Fundação Getúlio Vargas, and it is not clear whether it represents a broader precedent for future private-sector involvement in Brazilian cooperation programmes in the agriculture sector.^{lii}

3.4 The policy of 'no-policy'

There is no explicitly formulated policy for Brazilian cooperation in agriculture. Beyond the general guiding principles of Brazilian cooperation and the menu of Brazilian agricultural policy and research experiences from which partner countries may want to choose, there

Box 5. ProSavana: exporting the cerrado 'miracle' into Africa

ProSavana is the outcome of a triangular partnership between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. The partnership was initially established between Japan and Brazil at the L'Aquila G8 meeting in 2009, as part of the Global L'Aquila Food Security Initiative. Mozambique was subsequently identified as the third party and beneficiary of the arrangement. The programme, led by Embrapa on the Brazil side, aims to transform parts of the savannah spreading across the Nacala Corridor, in northern Mozambique, into highly productive agricultural land and address food security concerns. ProSavana will try to emulate the Brazilian cerrado transformation which received support from Japan in the 1980s and 1990s through a programme called PRODECER, responsible for turning Brazil into a world leading soya producer. ProSavana has three main components: (i) agricultural research, (ii) rural extension and (iii) local area development planning. The programme is claimed to envisage support for both commercial large-scale production systems and smallholder subsistence agriculture. Implementation started in 2011 and about \$13 million have been committed, by Brazil, Japan and the Mozambican government, for a period of about 5 years. An additional amount of resources will be provided by Japan to Mozambique (through a combination of grants and concessional loans) to support developing complementary infrastructures across the Nacala Corridor. The expected overall timeframe for the programme is at least 20 years.

Source: Cabral et al. 2012.

is no official line on what the policy objectives and approach are for cooperation in agriculture – or indeed any other sector or theme. The common justification for this gap is the 'demand-driven' and 'non-interference' attributes of cooperation, which are claimed to require entering cooperation agreements without pre-set agendas. The 'no-policy' policy could be interpreted, however, as the result of institutional segmentation of cooperation in general and, for the agriculture sector in particular, the fragmented nature of Brazil's agricultural governance (see Box 4 on previous page).

The fragmentation of the institutional map reflects to some extent the nature of Brazilian technical cooperation. As noted above, there are more than 20 such institutions actively involved in agriculture cooperation, with virtually no institutional direction or coordination on the content of interventions, as ABC's role is essentially confined to operational coordination, and Itamaraty is concerned with higher level diplomatic issues. What emerges is a cooperation framework that lacks a unified or coherent policy direction and in practice is shaped by the agendas, experiences and indeed imaginaries of the various institutions and individuals, from high level Presidential visions to the practices of those delivering technical cooperation on the ground. The unstructured institutional basis for engagement allows for diversity to emerge. In this context, the extent to which a dominant framing is emerging, shaped by a particular political economy of diplomacy and agriculture governance, is something that this research project is set to investigate.

3.5 Changes in the nature of cooperation in agriculture

Changes in the nature of Brazilian cooperation have been taking place, reflecting the increasing size of operations as well as accumulation of expertise. On the one hand, one-off small-scale technical cooperation projects are progressively giving way to larger projects, with a longer time horizon, focused on strengthening capacities of local institutions and with more explicit concern for impact and sustainability. Such projects are referred to as 'structural projects' (*projetos estruturantes*)

(ABC 2011). Cotton 4 (cf. Section 3.3) was the first of this kind.

The nature of technical cooperation is also expanding beyond simpler forms of assistance (such as training, study visits and workshops) by gradually focusing on the adaptation of successful Brazilian policies to the African context. This was already happening in other sectors, an example being *Bolsa Família*, a conditional cash transfer programme. In agriculture, the 2010 *Diálogo Brasil-África* event marked the beginning of this shift and introduced the adaptation of Brazilian agricultural policies into the technical cooperation portfolio. Examples of this include the More Food Africa Programme and the Food Acquisition Programme, which are already operational in several countries (cf. Box 2).

Furthermore, new modalities of cooperation are also being introduced alongside technical cooperation, as illustrated by More Food Africa, which combines conventional technical assistance in agriculture with a credit facility directed to African farmers for the acquisition of Brazilian agricultural machinery and equipment. This modality blending approach may be a reflection of the mixed motivations behind Brazilian cooperation, which appears to be increasingly showing signs of mingling solidarity-driven and business-driven agendas.

Finally, triangular cooperation is adding scale and visibility to Brazilian technical cooperation projects. As noted above, ProSavana, currently the largest project in the agriculture portfolio, is the product of a trilateral cooperation agreement between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. The Food Acquisition Programme is another example of a trilateral cooperation partnership, this time between Brazil, FAO and WFP and five African countries. The United States is also a key partner in trilateral cooperation with Africa in the agricultural domain.^{liii}

4. Emerging features of the Brazil-Africa encounter

This section builds on the material presented above to draw out some initial hypotheses for further exploration in subsequent stages of this research project.

4.1 Brazil's drivers: the confluence of altruistic and self-interested motivations

Development cooperation in Brazil is, first and foremost, an instrument of foreign policy (Ayllón Pino and Costa Leite 2010; Cabral and Weinstock 2010) and this is by definition the expression of geopolitical strategies that are bound to include a range of self-interested objectives (Lima and Hirst 2006). This is hardly different to any other country with an international development programme, although the degree to which countries are forthright about the link between charity and self-interest is somewhat variable. Brazil claims, however, that its cooperation approach is guided by the principle of 'solidarity diplomacy', which brings together elements of altruism (supporting those in need) and reciprocity (forging mutually beneficial partnerships) in a horizontal relationship between southern peers. Our proposed hypothesis is that the combination of altruistic and self-interested drives in Brazilian cooperation mirrors competing perspectives within Brazil with regards to international relations.

The narrative of solidarity fits well with the roots and mandate of the lead party of the ruling coalition – the Workers Party (PT) – whose foreign-policy intellectuals (led by international advisor Marco Aurélio Garcia, a founding member of the PT and a close ally and adviser of Presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff) were instrumental in giving initial impetus to Lula's policy of reaching out to Africa. It also fits with other less virtuous, even if equally legitimate, objectives concerning geopolitics and the quest for support, particularly from non-OECD countries, for greater clout in global politics in general and in the governance of international bodies in particular.^{lv} The pragmatic impulse responds to the drive of a growing economy like Brazil to secure access to raw materials, markets and profitable deals for its burgeoning businesses. Africa, with its generous resource endowments and relative political openness to engagement by a rising power with no apparent colonial baggage, represents an increasingly attractive destination for Brazilian traders and investors. As noted above, within a policy framework that is supportive of the 'internationalisation' of Brazilian corporations, several Brazilian multinationals are moving into different African countries where they have not hitherto had a significant presence, while others who were initially active in a single sector in any given country are establishing diversified portfolios within those countries – often including investments in agriculture.^{lv}

Such multiple motives are evident in agriculture cooperation where, on the one hand, there is an agenda focused on assisting countries that are seeking to achieve food sovereignty and to strengthen their smallholder agriculture (often promoted by PT-affiliated government officials with links to Brazilian social movements and their international networks, such as *Via Campesina*) and, on the other hand, commercial interests are shaping the nature of assistance. More Food Africa is an example of noticeable confluence of both types of motivations. The programme aims to address productivity and food insecurity constraints, including in newly resettled agricultural land in Zimbabwe that has been marginalised by traditional donors (Mukwereza 2013). Besides these development objectives, pursued within the partner country, the programme is also serving the interests of Brazilian industry. In fact, the programme has been described as an 'industrial policy' designed to ensure a 'steadily increasing demand' for the Brazilian farm machinery sector (Patriota and Pierri, 2013: 28). ProSavana is another example of confluence of interests in that alongside the technical cooperation component, focused on strengthening research and extension, the programme is also helping to steer private investment from Brazil (and Japan) via the recently launched Nacala Fund. This is expected to attract Brazilian (and Japanese) investors into the Nacala Corridor (the focus of major investments in transport infrastructure by Vale, the Brazilian mining giant) in what is expected to become a mutually beneficial arrangement.^{lvi}

With the ongoing shift towards larger-scale and more strategically-oriented initiatives, tensions between the different motivations are likely to become more apparent. ABC's insistence on the principle of demand-driven cooperation will become harder to square with the need to say no to ad hoc requests, as scarce resources are concentrated in a smaller number of strategic programmes. The discourse of ideological solidarity that animates the MDA's More Food Africa programme may be challenged by the reality of directing tied aid and the need to ensure that loans are repaid. The narrative of purely technical engagement that Embrapa has sustained in ProSavana will become harder to maintain once large numbers of Brazilian investors start arriving in the Nacala Corridor. The outcome of contestations over which motivations should be given precedence will inevitably reflect the relative power and influence of the different groups – whether diplomats, activists or investors – who have aligned themselves with them. This, in turn, will reflect wider political economy dynamics within Brazil as this historically inward-looking country adjusts to the broadening and deepening of its global engagements.

4.2 Narratives of agricultural development: dichotomy or pluralism?

As noted above, there is no explicit strategy for Brazilian agricultural cooperation, either in Africa or elsewhere. Brazil's cooperation policy for the sector is

what emerges from the sum of the various initiatives, programmes and projects being carried out by a range of institutions and people, generally guided by a broad code of conduct (emphasising principles such as demand-driven, no interference, etc.). Under such a piecemeal approach, contrasting narratives on agriculture development are likely to emerge, reflecting the competing visions of development held by the various Brazilian actors involved in agricultural cooperation. As discussed in Box 4, the contrast is, in simplified terms, between a model of agricultural development prioritising smallholder production systems and a model driven essentially by capital-intensive and large-scale commercial farming interests. The cooperation programmes spearheaded by the MDA is tightly associated with the former model, whereas most (though by no means all) of Embrapa's development cooperation activities tend to be associated with the latter. ProSavana, a programme led by Embrapa on the Brazilian side, has been criticised for putting forward a modernisation view of agriculture, which serves primarily the interests of large commercial farmers (UNAC 2012).

Such competing visions mirror Brazil's complex agrarian political economy. Whether they are a sign of a 'Gramscian struggle for hegemony'^{lvii} or of a 'pluralistic model'^{lviii} is a matter of interpretation. The former perspective seems to highlight dichotomy and inconsistencies between two conceptually and ideologically opposing models of development, reflected in agricultural policy at the national and international levels. The latter emphasises the pragmatic division of labour that characterises agricultural governance and that allowed the development of complementary policies supporting both family farming and agribusiness. It also emphasises the positive diversity of Brazil's agricultural landscape, where 'small, medium and large farmers work together in an environment conducive to innovation.'^{lix} In the words of President Lula: 'here in Brazil the government has to finance both agribusiness and family agriculture and we are proud to do this because we understand the importance both sectors have in Brazilian economy'^{lx}

As more Brazilian agricultural actors consolidate their presence in development cooperation initiatives in Africa, the differences in agricultural development approaches within the Brazilian cooperation portfolio are likely to become more visible. It remains to be seen whether this will simply result in parallel projects, whether it will lead to coordination challenges as different Brazilian actors compete for African policymakers' attention, or whether it will create opportunities for innovation in the development of hybrid approaches to supporting both commercialisation and smallholder agriculture within Africa's own complex rural realities. Much will depend on how the encounter with African counterparts will unfold.

4.3 Knowledge transmission: first-hand experience and the limits of the technocratic approach

As noted in Section 2.3, one distinctive attribute of Brazilian technical cooperation is the direct deployment of expertise without intermediaries. Brazilian institutions (governmental or not) typically make use of their own staff to transfer into partner countries the knowledge and policies with which they have been experimenting within Brazil. Brazilian 'development workers' have first-hand experience with the issues on which development cooperation projects focus. For example, in an on-going food security research project in Mozambique, called Pro Alimentos, researchers from specialist Embrapa centres in Brazil are working directly in the field (literally) with researchers from the Mozambican Agrarian Research Institute testing suitable horticulture varieties for the Maputo greenbelt.^{lxi} Likewise, staff from the MDA are working directly with their counterparts in several African countries to adapt Brazil's More Food programme to local conditions. Consultants are occasionally contracted, but most of the work is typically carried out directly by Brazilian technocrats. The advantages of such an approach are obvious, and in fact it is an aspect that recipients frequently praise about Brazilian cooperation.^{lxii} But there are some caveats that are worth bringing up for discussion.

While Brazilian 'development workers' are experts in their own trade, they are not, on the other hand, typically (though there are exceptions) well acquainted with Africa and the challenges of development in African contexts. The segmented nature of Brazil's cooperation programmes also means that they tend to operate as groups of single-sector specialists, without the opportunities for developing a broader understanding of local realities that can come from involving different disciplinary perspectives. Embrapa researchers may have the skills to become world-class authorities on African plant genetics and soil structures, but establishing successful and sustainable research programmes will require not only good crop science but also a good grasp of the functioning of local institutions and the political dynamics of development.

The idea that development can be achieved through technical fixes has a long history, punctuated by repeated failures in many fields, not least that of African agriculture. Brazilian imaginaries of agricultural development, shaped by experiences such as the transformation of the cerrado, are dominated by a powerful optimism about the power of technological modernisation that sometimes borders on techno-utopianism (Shankland et al. 2012). To date, Brazilian cooperation reveals signs of a technocratic approach to development that focuses on technology modernisation and assumes African countries can emulate Brazil's successes through a combination of technical solutions that Brazilian world-class researchers and civil servants can readily deploy.

This begs the question of whether past mistakes in attempting to transfer technology while ignoring local context and political constraints are likely to be repeated by Brazil. The rapid expansion of Brazil's presence in international development cooperation has outstripped the capacity of its still-nascent 'aid industry', and the emphasis on direct sharing of Brazilian experiences has led it to neglect the development of the skills base necessary to ensure the successful adaptation of these experiences to other contexts. At the same time, the short-term nature of most engagements and the rapid rotation of the staff involved have hampered the development of institutional memory and communities of practice among those engaged in cooperation. The country's official presence in partner countries – which, with few exceptions, is almost exclusively confined to diplomatic representation – remains insufficient to generate an in-depth understanding of the local context. Agencies like ABC and Embrapa are only now starting to create posts at country level for a more continuous tracking of interventions, but it remains to be seen whether those occupying such posts will have either the profile or the remit to build a solid understanding of local culture, institutions and processes.

4.4 Affinities as discourse

Historical and cultural affinities are often claimed to provide a particularly favourable underpinning for cooperation between Brazil and African countries. The affinities discourse was particularly strong in Lula's administration. For example, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, noted that: 'Brazil and Africa are connected by inseparable historical, cultural and demographic bonds' (ABC 2010a: 93). Recently, at a BNDES-sponsored event on investing in Africa, former President Lula put the Brazil-Africa relationship in the following terms: 'We are natural partners, we are old friends, we will always be brothers. (...) Gone is the time when the Atlantic separated us. It brings us together into a single border. We are neighbours that bathe in the same waters.'^{lxiii}

But despite historical bonds and the agroecological similarities that make exchanges with some African countries easier, the much-claimed affinities between Brazil and Africa are largely rhetorical. On the one hand, differences between Brazil and most African countries, whether economic, political or sociological, are not trivial. Brazil has almost a century of experience with channelling the proceeds from agricultural commodity export booms into industrial and service-sector development and fostering the growth of an indigenous bourgeoisie, an experience denied to Africa by the continent's much later decolonisation. Africa has also had fewer opportunities to innovate at scale, given its fragmentation into smaller polities than 'continental' Brazil.

Brazil's longstanding ties with some countries (notably Angola) arise from a Portuguese colonial past in which Brazil and Africa were at opposite ends of the Atlantic slave trade, a trade that continued for more than half a

century after Brazilian independence (de Alencastro 2007). Many intellectuals of the Brazilian left draw analogies between resistance to the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964-85 and the roughly contemporaneous anti-colonial struggles in Africa, and the *Itamaraty* corps includes a strong contingent of diplomats whose worldview was forged during the golden age of anti-colonial solidarity (Dávila 2011). Yet the struggles in Brazil and Africa were very different in nature, as were the political systems that arose from Brazilian democratisation and African decolonisation.

On the other hand, gaps in knowledge about the other side of the partnership remain deep across the Atlantic. On the African side, the myth of Brazil's successful agricultural transformation seems strong and a particular model of agricultural development fills the dominant imaginary of prosperity, with insufficient understanding of the social and environmental costs associated with that model (FAC 2010).^{lxiv} African elites attracted by the opportunities for profitable association with Brazilian agribusiness have few incentives to question this myth. In general, the main experience of Brazilian agricultural development that African policymakers and practitioners have is the version presented to them during courses and study tours; the more critical perspectives developed by the growing numbers of African students at Brazilian universities have as yet found few opportunities to engage with the official narratives.^{lxv}

On the Brazil side, the scope for developing a more nuanced understanding of African realities is constrained by several factors. One is how recent and limited the physical presence of Brazilian cooperation on African soil still is. While some projects are now beginning to incorporate socioeconomic scoping studies, understanding of local institutions and processes remains limited by the near-total absence of social, political and development policy analysts from the country representations of Brazilian cooperation institutions (where such representations exist), or indeed from the field missions sent from Brazil. Furthermore, there is a limited pool of expertise on which to draw, given that Brazilian academic research and teaching on contemporary African politics and society is still limited. Cross-disciplinary and less stereotyped and romanticised research about Africa is starting to emerge, but remains severely underdeveloped (Zamparoni 2007).

Another factor to consider is the limited influence of Brazilian afro-descendants, the social group with, arguably, the closest cultural kinship with the continent (or at least parts of it), in formal Brazilian institutions. The potential role of afro-descendants as brokers in the Brazil-Africa knowledge encounter remains poorly explored. At the elite level black Brazilians remain largely absent from the diplomatic corps and the upper ranks of Brazilian technocrats, as well as from prestigious scientific institutions such as Embrapa. There have been some attempts to increase the share of Afro-descendants entering higher education, including the Affirmative Action Programme of the Rio Branco Institute, the prestigious training college for Brazilian diplomats (World

Bank and IPEA 2011), but it will take time for such measures to permeate Brazilian politics and cooperation policy, and there is of course no guarantee that they will make Brazilian institutions better equipped to relate to a highly diverse and dynamic continent. At the popular level, groups such as the rural *Quilombola* communities who claim descent from escaped slaves are idealised as custodians of historically authentic Afro-Brazilian identity while simultaneously being marginalised from official development cooperation with Africa.^{lxvi}

Meanwhile, the Brazilian public's perceptions of the continent continue to be shaped by representations in the media and the education system that mix idealised 'Mama África' narratives of Afro-Brazilian history with negative stereotypical representations of contemporary Africa. In one study carried out among school-age children in the Recôncavo region of Bahia State, which has one of Brazil's largest concentrations of people of African descent, the four groups of images most frequently-cited as being linked to the idea of 'Africa' were 'Hunger and Poverty', 'Black People', 'AIDS and Disasters' and 'Candomblé, Samba and Capoeira' – the latter referring to forms of Brazilian spirituality, music and martial arts that are popularly associated with the cultural legacy of African slaves (Oliva 2009: 79).

4.5 The role of civil society and the challenge of reproducing Brazil's state-society dynamics

Brazilian cooperation is largely about transferring homemade research and policies to developing countries through cooperation projects managed under government-to-government arrangements. It has been argued, however, that it disregards the influence of state-society dynamics in the trajectory of Brazil's public policies. Civil society and social movements played a major part, it is claimed, in pushing for policies to address the constraints facing family farming and this cannot be disregarded in the transfer of such policies into Africa (Campolina 2011; 2012). Analysts espousing this argument question a development cooperation model confined to government-to-government relations, and call for greater participation of Brazilian civil society.

Signs of growing awareness of the role that non-state actors can play in development cooperation are starting to appear. The *Secretaria Geral da Presidência da República* has been actively engaging Brazilian social movements in government-led development cooperation. There are specific projects being implemented with the active involvement of community-based organisations, such as the already mentioned native seeds recovery initiative in Mozambique and South Africa. Given the degree of penetration of institutions that are now playing a growing role in Brazil-Africa agricultural development cooperation, including the *Secretaria Geral* and the MDA, by rural social movements and their allies, this trend is likely to grow.

At the policy level, there have also been efforts to institutionalise a civil society forum for the community of Lusophone countries, the CPLP, to promote civil society dialogue across member countries.^{lxvii} Furthermore, Brazilian civil society is itself becoming more informed, organised and vocal around the subject of international development. Networks of development policy wonks and practitioners are taking shape to foster public debate on development cooperation and strengthen analysis and lesson learning on the topic.^{lxviii}

It remains to be seen how significant the engagement of Brazilian civil society with development cooperation processes will become in the coming years, and whether it will influence the course of cooperation policies and practices. Within Brazil, there is much scope for civil society to create a demand for accountability and results, and also to argue for the content of cooperation policies to reflect the lessons learned in Brazil about the social and environmental consequences of the country's development model. Recent demands for the creation of an institutionalised space for state-civil society dialogue on international development cooperation are at least partly intended to address such concerns.

It is less clear what role Brazilian civil society would play in engaging directly in South-South cooperation. As a result of the reorientation of North-South development funding away from Brazil towards Africa, policy-oriented Brazilian NGOs are suffering a financial squeeze, which provides an incentive for them to become engaged as contractors in the delivery of cooperation programmes. This is likely to complicate their efforts to hold government to account on the content of development cooperation policy. Within Brazil, the most influential civil society groups are those with historic links to social movements, and they have generally managed to maintain a critical distance in their policy engagements even as the process of 'institutional hosting' within structures such as the MDA brings them politically closer to government and as their dependence on state funding grows (Cornwall et al. 2008; Gómez Bruera 2012). However, there is no guarantee that this critical distance will be maintained in the international arena, in the absence of the highly-mobilised Brazilian grassroots constituencies who play a key role in resisting the cooptation of civil society representatives by the state.

Some Brazilian NGOs and social movement organisations – including those linked to the land reform, sexuality rights and feminist movements – are already engaging with African civil society groups through exchanges sponsored by international NGOs and networks such as Via Campesina, as well as official cooperation channels such as those provided by the General Secretariat of the Presidency. These engagements are underpinned by a particular Brazilian understanding of the role of civil society, which combines a critical posture with a premise of symbolic equality (Brazilian social accountability institutions usually provide for equal numbers of state and civil society representatives) and an assumption that the state is permeable to development policies and practices originating in civil society. This begs

the question as to whether the state-society dynamics experienced in Brazil are transferable to African contexts where civil society groups tend to be much more beholden to international donor agencies and much less able to engage the state on anything like equal terms. Incipient efforts to export Brazilian social accountability innovations and policy dialogue fora that were originally co-constructed by civil society groups and left-wing political parties also raise the issue of how far they are replicable through formal cooperation processes or whether, to be effective and sustainable, they have to emerge spontaneously and play by the rules of local culture and politics – which are themselves experiencing increasingly rapid change in many African contexts, but not necessarily in directions that exactly reflect Brazil's experience.

5. Conclusion: new paradigms?

The central questions under investigation are whether Brazilian cooperation in agriculture represents a different approach to supporting the development of African agriculture, relative to other sources of development assistance (a new cooperation paradigm), and whether it provides an alternative and enhanced model for how this sector should be developed in the African context (a new agricultural development paradigm). It would be premature, at this initial stage of the research project, to provide conclusive answers to these overarching questions, as in-depth fieldwork in countries on the receiving end of Brazilian cooperation is required before well-grounded conclusions can be reached. Nevertheless, drawing on the initial research undertaken, some preliminary remarks are worth making to help stimulate the debate and take the research agenda forward.

Middleman-free cooperation?

One distinctive feature noted is the direct deployment in Brazilian cooperation activities of professionals who have first-hand experience of the technical solutions that projects aim to communicate. In agriculture, these are potentially very relevant solutions, given that Brazil hosts world-leading expertise on tropical agriculture (and this is not exclusive to Embrapa). For these solutions to be effective and sustainable, however, the adaptation element needs to be built in. This is not only about adjusting successful Brazilian varieties to local soils, climate and pests. It is also about understanding local governance and decision-making processes more broadly – for example, having a good grasp of how agricultural research is managed and how its outputs are absorbed by producers, and ultimately consumers. What factors will shape whether rural communities in Mozambique actually incorporate orange-fleshed sweet potato or yellow maize into their food habits, even when instructed on the superior nutritional value of such varieties? The capacity to adapt fully to local contexts

and needs will be the test of the added value of Brazil's lean (broker-free) mode of cooperation.

In fact, this feature of direct cooperation may already be starting to change as larger cooperation programmes get off the ground and create a need for middle-management and outsourcing solutions. As noted above, a precedent may have been set by the fact that Fundação Getúlio Vargas Projetos, the consultancy arm of a Brazilian business school, has been contracted to manage a component of ProSavana in Mozambique.

Is 'mutual advantage' good news for African agriculture?

The horizontal character of Brazilian cooperation is a pervasive feature of official discourse, and claimed to distinguish Brazil's approach from the vertical nature of traditional development assistance. But in reality, Brazil's economic, institutional, scientific or diplomatic stature constitutes a hard match for most African countries. The obvious discrepancies undermine the supposed equality of the South-South partnership.

For all the emphasis placed by some Brazilian actors on the potential of the 'mutual benefit' element of the philosophy of South-South cooperation to alter the foundational principles of development cooperation more broadly, Brazil has recently been taking a more cautious approach. While Lula da Silva insisted that cooperation with Africa was driven by altruistic motivations and a sense of responsibility towards the continent, President Dilma Rousseff is revealing a more pragmatic attitude – and since leaving the presidency Lula himself has become increasingly associated with efforts to encourage Brazilian private investment in Africa.

The use of international development cooperation as a vehicle for business transactions may have benefits for African agriculture, where the private sector has failed to fill the gap left by the dismantling of public services by the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s. However, Brazil's own experience suggests that these benefits will be unequally distributed. It is worth noting that Brazil is not alone in seeking economic advantage through cooperation – donors as diverse as the United States and China are quite blunt about the intermingling of solidarity and self-interest – but the strength of its solidarity rhetoric leaves it more exposed to accusations of hypocrisy, now that initiatives such as the Nacala Fundare beginning to reveal the extent of Brazilian business interests in African agriculture.

A holistic approach to agricultural development?

One potentially distinctive contribution of Brazilian cooperation in agriculture draws on the country's particular model of agricultural governance, which, as discussed above, can be interpreted either as

dichotomous or as pluralistic. The question that emerges then is how African agriculture can best benefit from this (these) model(s)? And this leads in turn to a set of subsidiary questions. Will the policy void and contrasting visions of development give rise to inconsistencies in country practices that can compromise the outcomes of Brazilian development interventions? Or does the variety of strategies on offer make Brazilian cooperation more amenable to recipient countries' taking ownership and guiding selective adaptation to local contexts?

More specifically, will the coexistence of 'family farming' and agribusiness models in Brazilian agricultural development cooperation help to address the long-running debates on small-versus-large production systems in Africa in a holistic way – or will it, instead, help to replicate a particular dualistic agrarian structure and thereby accentuate inequalities of power and access in African agrarian systems?

It appears that with the emphasis of Brazilian agricultural development cooperation in Africa currently placed so strongly on productivity and technological modernisation, alternative framings from within Brazil's own agrarian and social policy debates have been left behind as the country makes its leap into Africa. This suggests that the arrival of Brazilian cooperation on the scene may not reinforce the narratives of pro-poor development and bottom-up participation that have dominated western development discourse, despite these narratives' affinities with other strands of Brazilian policy and practice. Nevertheless, Brazilian actors associated with these alternative framings – from the MST to the Agroecology movement – are beginning to mobilise, questioning dominant development cooperation models within Brazil and reaching out to build alliances with civil society groups in Africa.

Ultimately, the outcomes of Brazil's emergence as a major force in African agriculture will be shaped not only by the contestations among Brazilian actors over which agricultural development model to privilege, but above all by the ways in which African governments, farmers, entrepreneurs and civil society activists absorb and shape the application of the model(s) on offer. The many questions raised in this paper confirm the need for further investigation of both the political economy of Brazil's approach to agricultural development cooperation and the emerging interface between this approach and the complex realities of African agriculture. The next stage of the research will look into country experiences in detail, to test the hypotheses raised by this first exploratory exercise and to examine the dynamics of the knowledge encounters that are now taking shape in the agricultural sectors of several different African countries for evidence on how these potential new paradigms are playing out in practice.

End Notes

ⁱ The term 'traditional donor' is used to refer to the group of donors comprising the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, sometimes also called 'DAC donors'. This term contrasts with that of 'non-traditional' or 'non-DAC' donors, typically referring to countries with emerging economies and more recent histories of development assistance. For a discussion on these concepts see Manning (2006).

ⁱⁱ Details on the programme can be found in the Future Agricultures Consortium website: <http://www.future-agricultures.org/research/brics>.

ⁱⁱⁱ The list of people interviewed is provided in Annex 1.

^{iv} The event, titled "The role of South-South Cooperation in Agricultural Development in Africa - opportunities and challenges", was hosted on 17 May 2012 by the International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth and was co-organised with the Future Agricultures Consortium and the Department for International Development, with support from UN Women, ArticulaçãoSul and Cirad: <http://www.future-agricultures.org/events/south-south-cooperation>.

^v See separate FAC report (Cabral et al. 2012) for more detail on the Mozambique scoping study.

^{vi} Sources are IPEA (2010) for the lower figure and The Economist (2010a) for the higher figure.

^{vii} Lula's first visit to Africa, in 2003, was marked by speeches emphasising Brazil's commitment to "pay its historic debt to the continent" (see http://veja.abril.com.br/121103/p_052.html). In 2005, Lula marked a visit to Senegal by making a formal apology for Brazil's role in the slave trade, while also emphasising Brazil's desire to strengthen its diplomatic and economic engagement with Africa (see <http://www.valor.com.br/arquivo/456691/lula-pede-perdao-para-reforcar-opcao-pela-africa>).

^{viii} Interview with ABC official, March 2012.

^{ix} Interview with Embrapa official, CECAT, May 2012.

^x See, for example, <http://www.valor.com.br/arquivo/388309/ministro-diz-que-acordos-com-africa-serao-bons-tambem-para-o-brasil>.

^{xi} Cabral et al. (2013) discuss this point in detail, in relation to Brazil's development cooperation in health.

^{xii} For details on these modalities of cooperation and a discussion on the scope of Brazilian cooperation see Cabral (2011).

^{xiii} For a discussion of Brazil's engagement with this modality see Cabral and Weinstock (2010).

^{xiv} From 17 million Brazilian Reais (USD 10 million) in 2008, to 52 million Brazilian Reais (USD 30 million) in 2010 (Cabral and Weinstock 2010).

^{xv} Interviews with Embrapa, MDA and IPEA, October 2011.

^{xvi} Interview with Fiocruz project manager, February 2013.

^{xvii} See <http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/noticia/2012-10-01/presidente-da-embrapa-anuncia-saida-do-cargo>.

- ^{xviii} See Cabral et al. (2013) for a fuller discussion of this role in the context of Brazilian agricultural development cooperation in Mozambique.
- ^{xix} For details on these institutions' roles see Cabral (2011).
- ^{xx} Personal communication with former head of MDIC's Secretariat for International Trade.
- ^{xxi} 'Dilma revê estratégia para a África', Valor Econômico, 08/11/2011 edition.
- ^{xxii} Discussion with key informants in IDS-Cebrap-Articulação SUL "State of the Debate" workshop, Brasília, October 2012.
- ^{xxiii} These are: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and S. Tomé and Príncipe.
- ^{xxiv} Neither Zimbabwe nor Ethiopia, countries which alongside Mozambique and Ghana are part of our selection of countries for detailed analysis in a subsequent stage, feature high in terms of Brazilian development cooperation. But there are several initiatives underway and the importance of these two countries in Brazil's portfolio may increase in the near future. Perhaps a sign of this is the recent visit of former president Lula da Silva and Brazilian FAO General Diretor, José Graziano, to Ethiopia.
- ^{xxv} See http://www.pdp.gov.br/Relatorios%20de%20Programas/Africa1_com.pdf.
- ^{xxvi} Lizbeth Navas-Alemán, personal communication of preliminary research findings, November 2012.
- ^{xxvii} The 'Diálogo Brasil-África em Segurança Alimentar, Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural' ("Brazil-Africa Dialogue on Food Security, the Fight Against Hunger and Rural Development") was held on 10-12 May 2010 in Brazil's capital, Brasília.
- ^{xxviii} Including ministers of agriculture from several African countries, the Brazilian Minister of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply, the Brazilian Ministry of Agrarian Development, the President of Embrapa, the General Director of FAO, the Executive Director of WFP, the Director of FAO for the Africa Region, alongside representatives of the African Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations, the World Bank, various Brazilian government institutions, the private sector and non-governmental organisations.
- ^{xxix} President Lula's opening speech at the 'Diálogo Brasil-África em Segurança Alimentar, Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural'. Available on <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgN4qtLLqGk> (minutes 33-34).
- ^{xxx} Ibid (minutes 41-42).
- ^{xxxi} Ibid (minutes 43-44).
- ^{xxxii} Law No. 11326, 24 July 2006.
- ^{xxxiii} 'Africa: Brazil to Fund Food Purchasing in Five Countries', posted on 22 February 2012 by The African Press Organization. Accessible at: <http://africabusiness.com/2012/02/22/brazil-to-fund-food-purchasing-in-five-african-countries-agreement-signed-with-fao-and-wfp/>.
- ^{xxxiv} These countries were: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, S. Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- ^{xxxv} The issue of new project modalities is developed further in Section 3.5.
- ^{xxxvi} http://www.mda.gov.br/portal/noticias/item?item_id=9348266; <http://www.mds.gov.br/saladeimprensa/noticias-1/2012/07/experiencia-do-programa-de-aquisicao-de-alimentos-vai-a-cinco-paises-africanos>.
- ^{xxxvii} See also: http://www.embrapa.br/english/embrapa/unidades_de_pesquisa.
- ^{xxxviii} Cf. endnotexxiii.
- ^{xxxix} Interview with Embrapa, 13/10/2011.
- ^{xl} Interview with JICA office in Brasília, 10/10/2011.
- ^{xli} These courses usually comprise an overview of Brazilian agriculture and agricultural research as well as a selection of specialised applied techniques, such as livestock and fodder management, seed production and preservation, soya cultivation and water conservation (ABC 2010a).
- ^{xlii} One recent course designed for participants from a range of different African countries was entitled "Agriculture as a Driver of Economic and Social Development" and covered subjects ranging from land use planning, agricultural research strategy and macro policy frameworks to cooperatives, "social value chains" and the role of women in farmers' organisations (Source: interview with Embrapa CECAT researcher, 12/10/2011).
- ^{xliiii} The decision to locate the Embrapa office in Accra was taken in 2006. A study on the best location had been done in 2005 and this recommended Nairobi as the preferred choice out of four options (the other were Pretoria, Accra and Dakar) – the Nairobi option was then put aside because of political instability at the time. The strong contenders were then Accra or Dakar, but the former was selected due to the immediate response by the Government of Ghana, which offered a venue to locate the office (CSRI – under the Ministry of Science and Research of Ghana), where other international agricultural research institutions were already lodged (IFPRI and other from the CGIAR system). Source: interview with Embrapa, Ghana office, 26/03/2012.
- ^{xliv} Interview with Embrapa, Ghana office, 26/03/2012.
- ^{xlv} The full list included in ABC's 2010 catalogue of technical cooperation in Africa is provided in annex.
- ^{xlvi} See Box 1 above for a discussion of the concept of family farming.
- ^{xlvii} For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the MST and the MDA, see Gómez Bruera 2012.
- ^{xlviii} The most active EMATER in the cooperation portfolio is the one located in the Federal District of Brasília: EMATER-DF (<http://www.emater.df.gov.br/>).

^{xlix} Cabral et al. (2012).

ⁱ ABC Maputo interview, 02/08/12.

ⁱⁱ In 2010, countries with ABC staff working within the local embassy were: Cape Verde, Angola, Mali, Kenya, East Timor, Mozambique, S. Tome and Principe and Guinea-Bissau.

ⁱⁱⁱ Source: key informant interviews, Maputo and Lichinga August 2012 and São Paulo October 2012.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ For example, there are currently two trilateral cooperation arrangements between Brazil, the US and Mozambique – one aiming to strengthen institutional capacity of Mozambique's public agricultural research institute, the other aiming to improve food security through a pilot research project on horticulture in Maputo's green belt.

^{lv} A quest that achieved a notable success with the election as head of the FAO of José Graziano da Silva, a former food security minister and the originator of Lula's "Zero Hunger" platform, in which offers of Embrapa support played a key role in securing the backing of a number of African countries (Source: interview with senior Brazilian policymaker, 15.11.11).

^{lv} The recent ventures of infrastructure giant Odebrecht into commercial agriculture in Angola – a country in which it has had a presence since the 1980s – are the most notable example of the latter dynamic.

^{lvi} 'Mozambique: Agreement On Nacala Fund', AllAfrica, 6th July 2012: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201207061132.html>.

^{lvii} Interview with Head of International Development at MDA (October 2011).

^{lviii} Interview with Embrapa representative in Mozambique (July 2012).

^{lix} Ibid.

^{lx} President Lula's opening speech at the 'Diálogo Brasil-África em Segurança Alimentar, Combate à Fome e Desenvolvimento Rural'. Available on <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rgN4qtLLqGk> (minutes 39-40).

^{lxi} See upcoming FAC study on Brazilian agricultural cooperation in Mozambique.

^{lxii} See for example Russo et al. (2011) about Brazilian cooperation in health.

^{lxiii} 'Somos parceiros naturais, somos amigos de longa data, somos irmão para sempre. (...) Foi-se o tempo em que o Atlântico nos separava. Ele nos une numa mesma fronteira. Somos vizinhos que nos banhamos nas mesmas águas.' Source: <http://www.institutolula.org/em-seminario-no-rio-lula-elogia-iniciativa-africana-de-fomento-do-crescimento/#.UPZ64x1g9Ao>.

^{lxiv} A point made by several speakers at the May 2012 FAC/IPC-IG/DFID seminar on South-South Cooperation in Brasília.

^{lxv} Renato Athias, pers. comm. 13.07.12.

^{lxvi} One exception being the seed banks knowledge-sharing programme sponsored by the General Secretariat of the

Presidency (described in Section 3.3), through which representatives of the Quilombola Women's Movement have participated in some exchanges with Mozambique and South Africa.

^{lxvii} The CPLP comprises the five Portuguese-speaking African countries, Brazil, East Timor and Portugal.

^{lxviii} Articulação SUL is one example of this trend: <http://www.cebrap.org.br/v2/areas/view/35>.

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Annex 1: List of people interviewed		
Institution	Name	Position
ABC	Marco Farani	Director
	Marcio Corrêa	Advisor
	Pedro Veloso	Portfolio Coordinator for Francophone Africa (including Cotton 4 project)
	Alexandre Silveira	Portfolio Coordinator for Anglophone Africa
	Paulo Lima	Portfolio Coordinator for Lusophone Africa
	Frederico Paiva	Project Analyst and Coordinator for ProSavana
	Cecília Malagute	Manager for Trilateral Cooperation Projects (including Food Acquisition Programme)
	Thais Braga	Project Analyst
	André Capella	Project Analyst
ActionAid Brazil	Adriano Campolina	Director
Articulação Sul	Bianca Suyama	Coordinator
	Iara Costa Leite	Researcher
Department for International Development of the United Kingdom	Mike Ellis	First Secretary
	Dan Bradley	Global Partnerships Adviser
Catholic University	Rodrigo de Campos	Researcher
Embrapa	Antonio Carlos do Prado	Coordinator for Technical Cooperation
	Zander Navarro	Researcher at CECAT
	Leovegildo Matos	Regional Resident Representative, Embrapa-Ghana
	Edson Guiducci	Embrapa Hortaliças
	José Bellini Leite	Embrapa Moçambique
International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth, UNDP	Leisa Perch	Rural and Sustainable Development, Team Coordinator
	Darana Souza	Rural and Sustainable Development, Programme Officer
IPEA	Fernanda Lira Goes	Planning and Research Officer
JICA	Nobuyuki Kimura	Project Coordinator
	Jusimeire Mourão	Consultant on Triangular Cooperation
Ministry of Agrarian Development	Francesco Pierri	Head of International Cooperation
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock	Célio Porto	Head of International Relations and Agribusiness
University of Brasília	Alcides Costa Vaz	Professor of International Relations
World Bank	Boris Utria	Country Operations Adviser and Head of Office

Annex 2: Inventory of Brazilian institutions involved in technical cooperation with Africa in agriculture

	Institutions	Countries
1	Embrapa	Various
2	Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário (MDA)	Various
3	Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem Rural (SENAR)	Various
4	Associação Brasileira de das Entidades Estaduais de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (ASBRAER)	
5	Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento (MAPA)	Angola
6	Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (EMATER) - DF	Various
7	Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (EMATER) – Minas Gerais	Botswana
8	Empresa de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural (EMATER) – Rondônia	Equatorial Guinea
9	Instituto Brasileiro do Algodão	Cotton 4 countries
10	Comissão Executiva do Plano da Lavoura Cacaueira (CEPLAC)	Cameroon
11	Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco	Argelia
12	Companhia de Desenvolvimento do Vale de São Francisco	Argelia
13	Universidade Federal de Viçosa	Argelia
14	UNESP – Departamento de Aquicultura em Jaboticabal, S.P.	Cameroon
15	Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCAR)	Zambia
16	Universidade Católica de Petrópolis (UCP)	Zambia
17	Empresa Baiana de Desenvolvimento Agrícola (EBDA)	Gabon
18	Secretaria de Estado de Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento – DF	Senegal
19	Serviço Nacional de Aprendizagem do Corporativismo	Botswana
20	Ministério da Educação – Secretaria de Educação Profissional e Tecnológica	Guiné-Bissau
21	Movimento Camponês Popular	SouthAfrica, Mozambique
22	Movimento das Mulheres Camponesas	SouthAfrica, Mozambique
23	Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas	SouthAfrica, Mozambique

Source: ABC (2010b) and authors' research.

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