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The Future Agricultures Consortium produces research in a variety of formats.Several key research series are available for download, circulation and citation.

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Latest articles

Jeremy Swift
January 22, 2010 / Pastoralism in crisis?

Stephen does us a wonderful service by putting arguments such as this cogently and forcefully. The TMP thesis is not wrong, and the conclusions it suggests are good pointers for new policies. But Stephen seems to be arguing that a fundamental tipping point has been reached. The evidence he arrays does not convince me.

Variability. Pastoralism is a livelihood system designed to cope with a high degree of variability. By compressing a long historical process characterised by variability, and appearing to make it linear, Stephan seems to be arguing that pastoralists face a historically defining moment (‘The End of Pastoralism’); “without a substantial change in attitudes and approach…there will be no recovery” p. 2). I see little evidence for that. At worst, the present crises, like previous ones, will leave a deeply divided pastoral system running well below its potential. Stephen is right to look for the way out of this, but it’s a manageable problem, not the crisis to end all crises.

Numbers: The argument is buttressed by lots of numbers which give it a fictitious precision. It is hard to have much confidence in most of them. Also, there are some complex, multi-factorial processes involved, from which it is difficult to be clear about outcomes. Examples (all pages numbered from emailed version):

p. 2, leg 1 of the argument: “pastoral human population is growing at 2.5% per year, net of emigration.” I know of no work which establishes such a conclusion with any confidence. Above all, the amount of immigration/emigration is highly variable depending on ecological and economic conditions. Population net of in/out migration diminishes substantially in a series of dry years, and expands again in wet years, although perhaps not to the same level as before. I think this is an important research topic, and some good policy conclusions might flow from it: eg help those who have been forced out of pastoralism by a particular crisis (and not just everybody) to adopt diverse livelihoods, or restock only those with a demonstrated commitment to pastoralism.

p. 3 leg 2 of argument. “pure pastoralists need 5-6 cattle units/person…” same reservation.

p. 3, leg 3 of argument. “limited by the amount of livestock feed available” Correct, but ‘livestock feed’ become ‘rangelands’ in the following sentence, and pasture in subsequent paras, which is not correct. Increased fodder production substitutes for pasture, a process ending in zero grazing systems.

p. 3, leg 6 “no known technologies for significantly increasing primary range” Yes, but there are known ways of increasing feed supplements, and altering the seasonal distribution of available natural feed (hay making, seasonal standing hay reserves). Given that the constraint is largely a seasonal, not an annual one, these could make a significant difference.

p.3, leg 8. ‘patches of rainfed cultivation have greater potential in agriculture than in pastoralism.’ Climate change may make such areas unfit for agriculture but still usable by pastoralists. So global warming may work in favour of pastoralists in this respect. (The implications of global warming for pastoralists is an important study, since they might be net gainers in Africa and central Asia. Is anyone doing it?)

p. 3, leg 9. market prospects: livestock exports from GHA to the Gulf are impaired at the moment by a single poorly justified quarantine restriction. If this can be lifted, export prospects are good. Further, rapid urbanisation coupled with the strong positive income elasticity of demand for livestock products suggests a likely rapid rise in demand for livestock products within Africa (the IFPRI argument).

p. 4, para 5. Here as elsewhere pastoralism is treated as the only activity. Households with 5-6 cattle per person would almost certainly get a significant part of their income from diversified economic activities. Ie the criterion of 80% of cash income from sale of livestock is probably an exaggeration.

p.4 last para. I am not sure how good the evidence is that improving pastoral terms o trade by converting livestock to cereals “has run its course”.

p. 5, Implications …
These are sensible conclusions. A sentence on p. 6 para 2, encapsulates the essential advice for donors, with which few would disagree. “what is afflicting pastoral GHA is not just a series of weather-induced independent crises requiring occasional emergency relief but a continuing structural (fundamental imbalance) problem.”
These conclusions have been argued by several observers (eg the UNDP 2003 ‘Pastoralism and Mobility in the Drylands’ paper, the conclusions of which were similar to Stephen’s and were widely accepted within the pastoral development community.) But the sensible conclusions of Stephen’s note are undermined by the exaggeratedly precise and pessimistic tone of the main section of the note, which risks being taken by those hostile to pastoralism to mean that pastoralism has no future. Either way we should be grateful to Stephen for putting this argument so provocatively.

Jeremy Swift
Independent Consultant, Wales

Ruchi Tripathi
January 22, 2010 / Small Farm / Big Farm

Small and large farms: definitions, trends and patterns – I’d like to make a contribution under this section of the debate and add another dimension to the debate.

Let me confess that I am on the side of Steve Wiggins in this debate – due to a number of well known reasons that I wont repeat, and am glad that last time round when this debate was being played out during consultations for DFID’s agriculture policy 2005, Michael Lipton won the argument – that support to smallholder farmers is vital for poverty and hunger eradication. 

I want to draw attention to a group of farmers who fall within the category of smallholder farmers but would most likely be missed out in this debate.  I am referring to half of the world’s hungry – marginal farming families – who Concern defines as ‘Farming yet hungry’.  These groups of farmers are often excluded because they fall between the categories of productive farmers and those living in rural areas facing absolute poverty.

The current food crisis has once again focused attention on food production, revived debates around re-investing in agricultural development and research.  One of the key questions is what and who should be focus of this renewed interest in agriculture be.
Concern strongly believes that if we are to address poverty, hunger and malnutrition we must focus on the largest group of hungry people in the world – marginal farming families.  Agricultural production will remain a key livelihoods activity for this group; they will also need to be supported through social protection, in addition to investments in provision of basic services and rural infrastructure.  By strengthening the livelihoods options and capacity of this ‘farming yet hungry’ group, we will be giving them the options to decide about their future.  There is a strong risk however, that in this debate between small Vs big, we forget to focus on this potentially viable group of farmers who need to be specifically targeted. 

For further information see literature research commissioned by Concern, http://www.concern.net/site-links/resources/index.php

Ruchi Tripathi, Head of UK Policy and Campaigns,
Concern Worldwide (UK)

Louise Shaxson
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

1.  I’m afraid I don’t understand the question, because you don’t set out anywhere what you really mean by ‘a policy framework’.  Is it a framework for analysing policy, or for developing policy?  The two are completely different: the former may have relevance from a research point of view, making it possible to test various solutions against a perceived framing of the problem.  However I wonder whether policy makers will really be able to engage with the answers. I presume that you hope to engage them with the results of the dialogue but this also isn’t very clear as I don’t know which policy makers you are aiming for: in DFID, WB, politicians, or mid level civil servants in Malawi?

2.  I think it’s crucial that your analysis of the problem sets out what the current policy goals are in relation to soil use/productivity etc.  If, as a policymaker, I am charged with delivering a set of goals, then having someone present evidence in a completely different framing is likely to make my life more, rather than less complicated. If I have to struggle to find the relevance of what is being said, I’ll be more likely to misuse the evidence.  (Not intentionally – but I’ll probably cherry pick the bits that I understand, not have time to work through the challenging parts, and come to rely on (e.g.) chapter 3 as a bit of a ‘crutch’ because it’s well written and seems to make sense.)

3.  So I really think you need to consider the questions the presumed audience will be asking: and policy makers will be asking them in terms of the policy goals that they are working towards.  Given that these change over time, often appear to conflict with one another, and are interpreted differently by different stakeholders, you can’t rely on a single set of answers, no matter how nuanced they are.  The answers must be conditional on the policy goals.

4.  Thus, the ‘design principles’ for effective policy cannot be debated in the abstract: they must relate to specified policy goals and the outcomes that are sought.  So if the specific policy goal we are working on is X and some related policy goals are Y and Z, and if the overarching policy goal for that Department is Q, then the evidence suggests that….  This makes it difficult to think about any of the issues raised in your bullet pointed section because I don’t know what policy goals we are dealing with.

5.  So I’d prefer to see your questions reframed somewhat, as in the italics below [your original questions in square brackets]…

  • Given that the national policy goal is X and the goal for that particular region is Y, how can we devise a national strategy which takes account of regional diversity?  [How can a strategy that operates at scale take account of the diversity of agro-ecological and socio-economic circumstances on the ground?]
  • Given that the policy goal is to increase agricultural incomes for the poorest quartile, by X% over the next Y years, and that we have evidence that an integrated soil fertility management approach is most appropriate, is inorganic fertiliser the most effective entry point?  [Is inorganic fertilizer the best initial ‘entry point’ for an integrated soil fertility management approach? If so, what should a programme look like, bearing in mind past failures? If not, what should be done first?]  NB, if the policy goal is about improving crop productivity across the board, then the answer to the question would be completely different.
  • Given the policy goal of reducing dependence on input subsidies by X% over Y years…[How can efficient use of fertilizer use be ensured, avoiding the danger of benefits being captured more by fertilizer manufacturers and traders than small scale farmers?] If it’s the Treasury who ‘own’ this goal rather than the Dept of Agriculture, then you’ll have some interesting discussions here. How might this goal conflict with a Dept of Ag goal on increasing crop productivity?  What if there’s also a Dept of Industry goal to improve the profitability of local businesses?  What structures will be put in place to ensure that the three Depts talk to each other?  (Not sure you can look to the UK for advice there… )
  • If the goal is to help the poorest X% increase productivity on rainfed soils, what is the best mix of incentives?  How can we monitor that mix to ensure it’s delivering against the goal?  If the evidence shows that we’re not reaching our target, can we change the mix of incentives without doing too much damage?  [Do subsidies have a role in ensuring input provision and, if so, what is meant by a ‘smart subsidy’? If not, what other incentives/investments make most sense?]  See above about who owns the policy goal for this.
  • What happens when there is no market – or when market mechanisms don’t reach certain places or people?  I can’t work with this one at all: it needs to be far more specific – e.g. if the goal is income growth in region X, is it worth focusing on improving crop productivity because the roads are lousy and transport costs are too high to effectively market the surplus?  Given that the delivery mechanisms in place look like this……. what is the most appropriate sequence of interventions (roads, water catchment systems, crop productivity…)?
  • What is the role for the state – in managing, supporting, coordinating, regulating, financing – and which parts of the state need support to make this happen?  You can’t answer this one unless you have a clear idea of what the policy goal is.
  • What type of policy processes are required to ensure pro-poor outcomes and avoid capture by elites, commercial interests and others?  What exactly do you mean by policy processes?  At what level?
  • What enabling conditions need to be in place (e.g. trade policy, infrastructure, investment)?  For what?
  • How should ‘success’ and ‘impact’ defined? Again, for what?  It’s about working through the individual policy goals, using existing and emerging evidence which is interpreted in light of what policy is trying to achieve for that particular issue at that particular time.

Louise Shaxson, Director
Delta Partnership
louise@deltapartnership.com

Andrew Dorward
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

Ian has provided an excellent summary of the issues: how do we chart a way forward?

Picking up on some of the points Ian has made, I would like to put forward five starting points which I suggest have wide but of course not universal validity:

  1. In most situations complementary use of both inorganic and organic fertilisers will be needed to promote soil health and fertility
  2. The critical issues for both organic and inorganic investments are profitability and affordability. Profitability involves soil fertility investments (of labour and working capital) yielding a return greater than their cost (allowing for seasonal interest rates and opportunity costs). Profitability depends upon farmgate input and output prices, input effectiveness (in terms of crop response), and risks (of price changes and low yields). Affordability depends upon farmgate input prices, opportunity costs of seasonal labour, working capital, and access to and costs of seasonal credit. Problems of both profitability and affordability of soil fertility investments are often compounded by inequity and insecurity in land tenure and in gender roles, rights and responsibilities.
  3. Soil fertility for the production of staple foods is of critical importance but also very challenging. Around 50% of African farmers are poor net buyers of food. Investments in soil fertility may be more profitable for these farmers than for surplus producers, as they value staple production at consumer purchase prices – but their soil fertility investments are critically constrained by major affordability constraints. Surplus producers may face lower affordability constraints than poor deficit producers, but since they earn lower farmgate sales prices, the profitability of soil fertility investments is lower, particularly in good years. Risks of low yields and bad years with high prices encourage low input subsistence production, but risks of low prices in good years discourage investments in high input surplus production. The result is large amounts of land and labour locked into low productivity staple cultivation. This reduces farm incomes, and this constrains demand for local non-staple products (livestock products, horticultural products) and for local non-farm goods and services.
  4. The need for large scale solutions to diverse problems suggests market mechanisms for matching supply to diverse demand. However affordability and profitability problems in staple food production lead to (and are maintained by) low level traps inhibiting the development of inorganic input markets (with low volumes and small transactions raising delivery costs, risks and margins), while supply of and demand for higher value local horticultural and animal products (which could otherwise boost agricultural productivity, input market development, and organic systems) is itself constrained by low staple productivity. Credit market failures are a critical feature of this, but microfinance initiatives are markedly absent from poor, low staple productivity rural areas.
  5. High food and fertiliser prices exacerbate these problems. Although high food prices should stimulate profitability of staple production, they also increase the affordability problems of the 50% of African farmers who are poor net food buyers, and depress demand by these people for non staple products and non-farm goods and services. High fertiliser prices lead to increased affordability problems for surplus producers as well.

Given these very difficult starting points, how can soil fertility investments, agricultural productivity, rural incomes and poverty reduction advance?

Historically large scale credit and input subsidies with output price stabilisation and heavy extension emphasis on high input packages underpinned both the Asian Green Revolution with its subsequent pro-poor growth  and dramatic increases in fertiliser use and maize yields in various countries in Africa in the 1970s and 80s. These gains were achieved at very significant cost and in Africa could not be sustained without continued donor support, which was not forthcoming. There has been widespread recent interest in the use of smart input subsidies, most notably in Malawi from 2005/6. Much can and must be learnt from the Malawi experience, which demonstrates both the potential for such subsidy programmes and their weaknesses – potential and weaknesses as regards both the technical aspects of soil, market and subsidy management and inherent political economy paradoxes.

Recent growth in fertiliser use on maize in Kenya has followed a very different path. Lack of government intervention in a dynamic fertiliser market supplying large and small scale cash crop producers and large scale maize producers (in a protected and relatively stable maize market) has attracted private sector investment (by both national and international firms) and fostered competition and economies of scale. This, with reduced road haulage costs, has both pushed down importer and distributor margins and (with judicious donor support) stimulated a network of small agrodealers selling small fertiliser packs in rural areas – to both cash crop and maize producers.

There are major questions about the wider applicability, strengths and weaknesses of different aspects of both these models: how can their complementary strengths be exploited, and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for their different elements’ success? The common challenge is how to foster stable conditions that promote increasing profitability and affordability for both farmer and private input supplier investments promoting soil fertility in both staple and cash crop production. This has to be linked to the need for rapid improvements in food security and incomes of poor rural people, and for more emphasis on complementary organic soil fertility investments.

Unfortunately high global food and fertiliser prices undermine both these models. In the first case they increase the costs of subsidies while at the same time reducing subsidies’ ability to drive wider growth and investment through lower food prices. In the second case lower cash crop profitability (from lower price increases in traditional export crops as compared with food and fertiliser prices) and higher fertiliser prices will increase affordability problems and depress growth in input demand – and hence depress input supplier investment incentives. How much is the increased relative attractiveness of complementary organic soil fertility investments and hence greater incentives for such investments a silver lining in these challenging conditions? These of course also face market, technical and political economy challenges.

Andrew Dorward, Professor
School of Oriental and African Studies, London
andrew.dorward@soas.ac.uk

References:

Minde, I., et al. (2008) Fertilizer Subsidies and Sustainable Agricultural Growth in Africa: Current Issues and Empirical Evidence from Malawi, Zambia, and Kenya

http://www.aec.msu.edu/fs2/responses/ReSAKSS_Fert_report_draft.pdf

School of Oriental and African Studies, et al. (2008) Evaluation of the 2006/7 Agricultural  Input Supply Programme, Malawi: Final Report. https://www.future-agricultures.org/pdf%20files/MalawiAISPFinalReport31March.pdf
Dorward, A.R. and C. Poulton (2008) The Global Fertiliser Crisis and Africa, https://www.future-agricultures.org/pdf%20files/brieffertilisercrisis.pdf
Poulton , C. and A. Dorward, (2008) Getting agricultural moving: role of the state in increasing staple food crop productivity with special reference to coordination, input subsidies, credit and price stabilisation, Paper prepared for AGRA Policy Workshop, Nairobi, Kenya, June 23–25, 2008.
Scoones, I. (2008) Policy frameworks for increasing soil fertility in Africa: debating the alternatives. https://www.future-agricultures.org/soilfertility_main.html

Adrian Cullis
January 22, 2010 / Pastoralism in crisis?

In responding to the debate, I draw on the framework of ‘drivers’, ‘consequences’ and ‘responses’ (used at the recent Livestock in a Changing Landscape consultation in Bangkok led by FAO et al).

Too many people, too few livestock: I think Sandford is correct to make the point that there are significant changes taking place in people/livestock ratios and as a result population is correctly identified as one of the primary ‘drivers’ of change in pastoral areas. I think however that Sandford’s paper would be more compelling if he identified other major ‘drivers’ of change that impact negatively on the growing imbalance in human/livestock ratios. I am of the view that land alienation to agriculture and historically wildlife conservation is a significant ‘driver’ of change. Whilst this is cited by Sandford, inadequate consideration is given to the fact that policy makers in the Horn of Africa could have legislated in favor of protecting rangeland, but not only was this not done but ‘encouragement’ has been given to agriculture (both irrigated and rainfed) and wildlife conservation at the expense of pastoralism with the result that total herd sizes are inevitably restricted (this trend is however worse amongst some pastoral communities than others). I think donor response/ emergency response is another ‘driver’ of change with the overriding emphasis on food aid (for example in the 2006 Horn of Africa drought an estimated 70% of the total drought relief budget was spent on food aid) as opposed to alternative livelihood support which would have better protected livestock assets (emergency animal health, supplementary feeding for livestock etc. – I attach a note on some of Save the Children/US’s recent drought interventions). The final additional ‘driver’ of change is the increasing demand for livestock products in Africa and the Middle East and therefore more secure as opposed to less insecure livestock markets. I agree with much of what Sandford writes regarding ‘consequences’: for example, the worsening human/livestock ratios. Thus I appreciate that smaller herd size has led to some former pastoralists being forced to diversify their livelihoods, including a substantial increase in the number of agro-pastoralists and also some dropping out of the livestock production altogether. Many of these ex-pastoralists survive in conditions of abject poverty on the edge of towns and trading centers eking out a living by collecting firewood, making charcoal, pottering, brewing beer etc. As a result of the downward spiral of herd size and hence viability, child nutrition is becoming an increasing cause of concern. I think increasing conflict could also be cited as a consequence of the changes, with pastoralists more fiercely competing for available resources specifically access to and control over rangeland and associated water resources. There are however more positive consequences including the opening up of increasing marketing opportunities in Africa and the Middle East as demonstrated by the recent offtake of droughted livestock in Ethiopia which were marketed to the Middle East (see attached draft Participatory Impact Assessment – PIA). There are a number of responses to these consequences. For example, contemporary pastoral livelihoods are, as cited by Devereux and Scoones, more diversified and integrated with the cash economy than formerly. Others have already left the rangelands far behind them and moved not only into IDP camps but also into other countries, some living successfully in Europe. As a result Sandford’s notions of ‘viability’ and ‘carrying capacity’ are rightly questioned. Involved in pastoral development with Save the Children in Ethiopia I am particularly interested in responses and offer the following thoughts: 1. Leg 4: The total livestock herd is not equitably distributed between households. However significant redistribution is not, in practice feasible … perhaps not but inadequate attention has in my view been given to support for customary livestock re-distribution systems. Whilst pastoralists (as with the majority global community) may be resistant to taxation, it may be that more could have been done to help pastoral communities better regulate the ‘break away’ of very wealthy herders. With this thought in mind Save the Children/US in Ethiopia has included a ‘local contribution’ in its restocking project (in one Somali community a local contribution of 25% of the livestock involved in the restocking was provided by wealthy clan members).
2. Leg 5: .. as a result of the expansion of cultivation and of wildlife conservation areas … whilst this may have been true in the past, I see increasing hope in the better integration of extensive livestock production and wildlife conservation and would cite the work of African Parks in South Omo, Ethiopia as an emerging positive case study, where AP staff are working with local authorities and NGOs in a community mapping initiative which it is planned will result in the more equitable sharing of natural resources and benefits from wildlife conservation. More pressure from enlightened conservationists would help speed the pace of progress
3. Leg 6: there are no known technologies for significantly increasing primary range production … this may be the case but in Ethiopia the ‘banning’ of fire has resulted in significant losses in rangeland productivity and an initiative is currently underway involving the US Forest Service to re-introduce fire as a modern rangeland management tool. This, if successful, will result in substantial increases in rangeland productivity. There are other initiatives underway in Ethiopia which suggest that greater recognition and support for customary natural management institutions can result in better land management and the safeguarding of drought reserves. However I agree with Sandford that more needs to be done (a donor reading this may like to contact Save the Children/US Ethiopia with a view to funding some very innovative work with customary pastoral natural resource management institutions!)
4. Leg 9: the market prospects are not very favorable for increasing the unit value of pastoralists’ livestock ….. as per the PIA attached I think there are real market prospects in particular if cross-border trade can be better facilitated and other disincentives removed. Note too should be taken of the fact that as a result of increasing export opportunities prices per kg of sheep and goat meat in Moyale have increased by as much as 25% within the last 12 months. Inevitably these will fluctuate but in my view Sandford is too negative about the livestock marketing opportunities.
5. Sandford’s implications of the thesis include policy reforms …. I think there is a huge amount more that could and should be done and donor support is absolutely critical in this regard, as suggested by Sandford in the area of land tenure reform. For example, Jeremy Swift has suggested for some time that pastoralists should be granted 49 year leases over rangelands that they have effectively managed for generations – amongst other things this may help reduce land alienation to both farmers and more aggressive pastoral communities. Others suggestions circulating at present include drought insurance; contingency planning (in this regard if the Government of Ethiopia had been able to implemented its 1993 disaster management policy in full, considerable additional resources would already be being channeled into livelihoods support for livestock keepers); and improved access to appropriate basic service delivery. The challenge here it seems to me, is as much policy reform as policy implementation. I appreciate that as Sandford suggests responses alone may no longer be enough, but I feel that those concerned about the future of people living in pastoral areas would do better to focus on positive action as encouraged by Devereux and Scoones than dwell on the crisis and despair. Adrian Cullis
Team Leader – Food and Livelihood Security Unit,
Save the Children/US, Ethiopia

Jeremy Keenan
January 22, 2010 / Small Farm / Big Farm

A colleague at Reading forwarded to me the contribution on big-small farms from Roy Keijzer, saying that I might find the reference to Mali interesting. I cannot contribute much to the main debate, as it is not my field. However, with reference to the Mail Niger inland Delta scheme to which Roy Keijzer refers, I can make the following comment: While his remarks about its present state of development etc may well be valid, its colonial history are interesting, in that it was developed originally by the French to counter the British cotton-growing Gezira scheme.

The Office du Niger scheme was probably one of the very worst forms of colonial development, at least as far as the local people were concerned. They were treated horrendously and suffered appallingly. The scheme was a large blot of shame on colonial development at that time. In fact, the Office du Niger project was one of the first classic social anthropological studies of the late Claude Meillassoux. Not surprisingly, the French did much to cover up his research and findings.

When dealing with such schemes/regions in their present day context, their previous exploitation (it was not development) should not be forgotten.
Jeremy Keenan, School of Oriental and African Studies

Roland Bunch
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

I was very surprised to find the comment that “biological soil fertility options” are problematic because they “require considerable labour and skill inputs, as well as large volumes of biomass,” and no mention whatsoever of “green manure/cover crops (gm/cc).”  The disconnect between people talking at the international level, and what is going on in the fields of resource-poor farmers in Latin America, Africa and Asia continues to be…well, frightening.

Green manure/cover crop systems do vary greatly around the world and around Africa, depending on climate, basic cropping systems, land tenure and dietary preferences, among other things.  Yet they are already widely practiced by resource-poor farmers, in Africa as well as the other continents.  I have personally stumbled across some 85 such systems spread across over 40 nations.  In one case I researched a single system that is practiced among perhaps 50,000 farmers from Honduras through Guatemala and Belize to Mexico.  Hundreds of thousands of farmers, if not millions, use similar systems in South America and Southeast Asia, and other hundreds of thousands in each of a dozen nations of Africa, at least.

Many gm/cc systems reduce farmers’ labour, because when the gm/cc is intercropped with cash or subsistence crops, they often control the weeds, thereby eliminating one or more of the farmers’ (usually women’s) weeding operations.  Thus, the assumption that these systems necessarily require added labour is just plain wrong.  It is true that improving soils dramatically (ie doubling or tripling low traditional levels of productivity) requires large amounts of biomass, but that this factor is listed as a problem of biological options is wrong because the gm/cc species produce that biomass in the field (often 40 to 70 t/ha, green weight), at very little cost.  In fact, in many, if not most, of the adopted gm/cc systems around the world, the beans, peas or other food or fodder produced by the gm/cc is much more valuable than the labour and costs occasioned by the practice.  That is, the net cost/value of the biomass produced for soil improvement (that biomass not going to either the market or the family table) is negative.

The skill inputs needed by the top agronomists in a country may be fairly large, but for any single farmer or village of farmers they are rarely much more than those required to use inorganic fertilizers efficiently.

To respond, then, to your question about inorganics being the best entry, my response is that, in the vast majority of cases, they are not the best.  If the soil still has enough natural fertility to grow weeds, farmers can grow green manure/cover crops along with their regular crops, as improved fallows, on “wastelands,” or in other niches that don’t have any opportunity cost.  Such a technology requires an investment of a few pennies to buy the original gm/cc seed, and within a year (or sometimes two) can make a major improvement in the farmers’ productivity, soil water retention, infiltration of water, crop root growth, resistance to termite damage, resistance to erosion, soil organic matter content, nitrogen content, etc.  Inorganic fertilizers may supplement the gm/cc (especially to provide replacement phosphorus, plus nitrogen when there are problems of synchronisation), but these applications would usually be in much smaller quantities than conventional agronomists would recommend.

Roland Bunch, former member
UN Millennium Project Task Force on Hunger
rolandbunchw@yahoo.com

Christian Bonte-Friedheim
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

Ian Scoone’s Paper makes interesting reading, but there are a number of open questions and issues – to be posed at the beginning of any campaign, and before starting Africa-wide (as the title suggests) such a large program.

The very first point is the (somewhat underlying ?) assumption for lay-persons that in every respect Africa has uniform or at least comparable (human and natural) conditions: – soils – soils’ nutrient content and (water) keeping capacity (large areas of very sandy soils) – climatic – rainfall – agricultural practices, preferred food and cash crops, human population and their food preferences, etc, etc. In effect there will (and must) be hundreds of different approaches and programs for the continent. (One important question relates to the importance of the soil “quality” in the national and international breeding programs).

My second – but most important point covers suitable national professionals, (made) available for or attracted to such rather long term agricultural research and development work in poor rural areas, and with uncertain results.

My third point relates to an issue whether the policy makers and other interested parties, especially in Africa, will not misinterpret research questions, issues, expected results and general adoption uncertainties with promises. Unfortunately many have been made before – few with lasting results.

What is (are) the major aim(s) of increasing soil fertility in Africa?

  • Higher and steadily increasing productivity (most likely land), but how about rural labour productivity (female above all) or both?
  • To overcome – or at least to acknowledge and take appropriate action – of differences in soil and water quality requirements – but also of all other production factors of different food crops (which), and cash crops (which), annuals as well as perennials.
  • To improve year-round nutrition and better nutritional standards for all population groups, also and especially in the rural areas, and for women and children.
  • To provide higher agriculture based incomes for the rural population.
  • To reduce imports of agricultural produce through better local supplies for the urban population.
  • To guarantee improving long term soil fertility levels for steadily increasing  (and not decreasing) agricultural production, raising the productivity of all inputs. The problem of increasing soil fertility under comparable natural conditions needs new approaches, and much more preparation of and with all involved, than still widely assumed. Furthermore any program needs at the beginning a first class selection of likely successes, keeping in mind (among others) soils, rainfall (total and distribution), temperature, the potential of different food and cash crops, their growing periods and length, water as well as plant nutrient requirements, in addition rural labour requirements, especially at peak times (women and/or men) in quality and quantity, etc. etc. In many cases (not only between countries, but between rural areas) the importance and timely availability of each factor differs.

Therefore: is there sufficient comparability of issues for all of Africa to start an Africa wide program? Does such program include sufficiently the human factor and involved people’s preferences and likely choices?

The question is:  Can we afford sizeable failures with a very large and necessarily very long term project, where many results will hardly be comparable between regions, countries?

The present situation in Africa and approaches for improvement

There are a very large number of food and cash crops with their own dependence and requirements on soil fertility, and other production factors, including traditional or improved or even new farming practices. Are we sure about the specific bottlenecks? So far machinery has not replaced human labour for most crops.

There are different demands for agricultural produce, keeping in mind traditions as well changing urban and rural preferences for food – as well as for cash and export crops.

How to start with improving such often tradition based situations? Select national leaders and professionals at all levels – people who are knowledgeable of and interested in solving many of the short term, but also some of the longer-term rural problems:  (poor ) often undernourished people in the rural areas, especially women, lack of education, little income – very often only seasonal -, but also problems with respect to soil fertility (specific nutrients), specific food crops, certain market crops, but also crop losses and crop waste..

For such a large and important attempt on any national basis the program planning, the management, the responsibility for success but also failures must rest first and foremost with nationals.

Start with many small programs, developed by nationals, including rural partners, exchange experiences, failures and results. Set timetables (don’t be open ended) – identify early-on potential and expected results. Exchange positive as well as negative experiences.

Conclusions and Recommendations

  • Do not start with an Africa-wide Program – start with this Program IN Africa. Learn and improve while implementing. There will be many, many years for widely acceptable results – and at the same time too many disappointments;
  • Select areas where success is most likely: because of natural conditions, farmers and their traditions, Government policies, and general interest;
  • For the rural areas and the poor farmers provide rural storage facilities to protect their produce and ensure food self-sufficiency all year long;
  • For cash crops assist in programs “cash for delivery”, and introduce more cash crops. (The rapid expansion of “khat” production in Eastern Africa and its possible effects on other cash and food crops is worth studying – for comparable application to other crops.

Remember: Nothing succeeds like success

Christian Bonte-Friedheim, Board Member
Syngenta: Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture
cbontefrie@aol.com

Abdi Abdullahi
January 22, 2010 / Pastoralism in crisis?

I have two general comments in response to the Sandford paper: 1. We need to ask whether food aid in pastoral areas is due to need or politics? Are some of the problems raised by the paper real or not? I think much food aid exists for political reasons rather than genuine need. Food given to pastoralists only covers an insignificant proportion of food needs of a pastoral family. Most food is generated through the pastoral economy.

We must ask why the response to droughts or floods is food aid, rather than interventions more focused on supporting pastoralists’ livelihoods. While in some cases food is needed, it is often provided in the form of wheat. What is the logic in transporting such resources from the US or Canada, while locally produced food could have been purchased at a much lower price? Such interventions distort and divert efforts to real pastoral development, adding to a misplaced pessimism. 2. Drought is part and parcel of pastoralists’ life. Risk is one thing they know well and have developed sound coping mechanisms to respond. If it was not for these coping mechanisms pastoralists and their animals would have long perished. The paper ignores the resilience of pastoral systems, and the way increasingly diversified livelihoods contribute.

Abdi Abdullahi
Pastoral Forum of Ethiopia

C. Devendra
January 22, 2010 / Small Farm / Big Farm

I have read with interest the ongoing exchange of emails concerning above, and cannot resist the opportunity to make a few comments.

Please permit me to present an Asian perspective.

1). Some of the comments made mainly from the ” North ” give the impression of poor understanding of what constitutes small farms. These probably stem from inadequate R and D efforts to appreciate the systems, infinite complexities needs and opportunities.

2). Even the very definition of what are small farms appears to be unclear if not poorly defined  – going from the references to small farms or smallholders in the developing countries to ” family farms ” in the ” North”. probably because of this and the overwhelming reference to globalisation, many in the industrialised countries have mentioned that these small farms are likely to disappear in the future. An important recently published  talked of  “current trends in structural change imply the likely and probably accelerating exit of smallholder livestock producers in developing and developed countries”. In Asia at any rate, this conclusion is  unacceptable.

3). A definition that has been used  in Asia is as follows: “Small farms have been defined as complex interrelationships between animals , crops and farming families , involving small land holdings and minimum resources of labour and capital , from which small farmers may or may not be able to derive a regular and adequate supply of food or an acceptable income and standard of living “.

4). In global terms, small farms in Asia account for an estimated 87 % of all farms below two hectares . Many of these are models of diversification and efficiency in NRM. While globalisation has undoubtedly have had effects- and there have been other crisis as well,  many if not most have survived and are self reliant because of the low input systems, minimum external inputs , and resilience. In animal production, these farms currently contribute significant amounts of milk, ruminant meats, draught power, duck meat and eggs.

5). Two related  issues that have not been addressed concern the links to poverty and type of small farms. Agric. growth in the past has significantly contributed to reducing poverty, but as ESCAP( 2008) has recently reported , waning agriculture has slowed the decline in poverty. Stimulating small farm productivity is thus important. Concerning type of farms in Asia, those in the irrigated areas are the richer due to benefits of the Green Revolution, while those
in the rainfed areas are poorer and were largely by-passed . For various reasons including poverty ,  future development needs to focus on the latter. Results from several countries in the region highlight increased production due to improved technology application.

6). Increasing the contribution from small farms in the future can benefit from increased investments in R and D on small farms ,  accelerated technology application and delivery systems, intensification and commercialisation, improved market access, rural infrastructure and cooperatives, backed by appropriate policy. Focusing on these and other issues  is urgent in the light of the food crisis. Many of these issues will also apply to other parts of the developing world.  Dr. Wiggins is correct in his assessment that given the right conditions, small farms can serve food production in the future.  

C. Devendra, International Livestock Research Institute

Andrew MacMillan and Amir Kassam
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

The overall debate question is: “…. What are the policy frameworks that really will increase soil fertility [in Africa] in ways that will boost production in a sustainable fashion, where the benefits of the interventions are widely distributed, meeting broader aims of equitable, board-based development?”

We suggest the following design principles as a basis for effective policy.

1. Distinguish between increasing national food production and achieving full household level food security.

  1. Raising national food output does not necessarily lead to improved household and individual food security and nutrition: it may, however, contribute to lower food prices and hence increase the amount and possibly quality of food that poor families can afford to buy
  2. If very small-scale farmers, who themselves are food insecure, increase their output, this is likely to improve their food security and nutrition
  3. If increased food production comes mainly from small-scale farmers rather than large-scale farmers, this is likely to contribute indirectly to greater food security in rural communities, because production systems are more labour-intensive and hence more people receive earnings (or, in some cases, payments in food) from food production related activities.
  4. In most situations, higher levels of productivity are attained on small-scale rather than large-scale farms, and hence, where land is scarce, strategies for expanding food output mainly by small-scale farmers are not only more equitable but also likely to be more successful in raising output.

2. There are very few situations in which full household food security can be attained simply by raising national food production: income redistribution measures, especially targeted cash transfers (or other social security programmes) must be part of the solution, even in rural areas.

3. In many areas of Africa, there is unused land with reasonable agricultural potential. As long as labour is amply available and there is easy access to land, growth in production by small farmers in these areas can continue to come from expanding the agricultural frontier, with limited use of external inputs.

4. In other regions, where rural population density is high, intensification offers the only route for expanding food output.

5. In most agricultural land use situations in Africa, avoiding reductions in soil organic matter (OM) content is essential if soils are to be cropped intensively on a sustainable basis. If OM levels are allowed to fall, there will be a progressive decline in soil fertility.

6. Where soils are not already seriously depleted in organic matter, using inorganic fertilizers and soil amendments (including lime) can help to increase vegetative material production and build up soil OM content, provided that crop residues are retained on the land and soils are not disturbed by tillage.

7. Inversion soil tillage, whether by hoe or plough, accelerates the decline in soil OM content and the biotic activity it supports, and destroys soil porosity, and is best avoided or restricted to crop “planting stations”.

8. Use of Conservation Agriculture (CA) principles and practices (minimal or no-till, soil cover with mulch and residues, and crop rotations, especially with legumes) results in an increase in soil OM and nitrogen levels and hence can do much to maintain soil health and fertility.

9. CA is the foundation for a greener revolution that can make intensive farming sustainable, cut energy use (whether human or fuel-derived energy) in food production, decrease agro-chemical contamination in the environment, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, minimize run-off and soil erosion, make a higher proportion of rainfall available for crop growth, and improve the quality and dependability of fresh water supplies.

10. But the CA requirement for retention of crop residues and use of cover crops is difficult to reconcile, especially in low-rainfall areas, with other demands for crop residues – livestock feed, fuel, brick-making. In these situations, CA systems need to incorporate components that provide for animal feed and fuel while at the same time enabling adequate soil surface residue cover.

11. Moreover, where no-till systems have to use herbicides for weed control, this will usually decrease their attractiveness to small-scale farmers who do not have access to herbicides or the equipment to apply them, or want to engage in organic farming.  Manual or non-chemical weed control can be difficult and time-consuming in the first years of practicing a CA system but, after a few years of good weed control and use of cover crops weed populations decline and become more manageable.

12. Best approaches to sustainable soil fertility improvement are likely to be location specific due to diverse agro-ecological and socioeconomic situations: “wholesaling” of standard solutions is unlikely to be feasible. However, mainstreaming of CA principles adapted to these diverse situations over time should form a policy goal for increasing soil fertility and enabling sustainable crop intensification.

13. In most situations, a shift to sustainable practices based on Conservation Agriculture principles requires fundamental changes in the ways in which farming is currently practiced and cannot be induced by top-down “message delivery” type extension services, though these may succeed in promoting greater use of fertilizers.

14. Instead, it is necessary to enable farmers to raise their level of understanding of the underlying causes of declining soil fertility and to engage them in testing CA-based options for improvement. The experiential learning methods practiced in Farmer Field Schools are very relevant to creating local capacities for moving towards more sustainable intensive farming systems with CA, adapted to local situations.

15. To the extent that farmer-facilitated and self-financing field school models are taken up, they have the advantage of imposing only limited demands on highly skilled staff and on recurrent budgets and hence can be scaled up rapidly without running into serious institutional, manpower and funding constraints.

16. Policies (e.g. subsidies) that promote fertilizer uptake or ploughing without linking these to the more complex changes in farming systems that may be needed to mainstream CA practices in Africa will undermine a shift towards sustainable soil fertility management and should therefore be avoided. In contrast, policies that compensate farmers for the enhanced provision of environmental services associated with the application of CA principles could accelerate a move towards more sustainable land use systems.

There is growing evidence of successful management of soil fertility for crop intensification on both large and small-scale farms using Conservation Agriculture practices in Africa from countries as diverse as Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Swaziland, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zimbabwe, covering a range of agro-ecological and socioeconomic conditions. The fact that Conservation Agriculture is now practised on almost 100 million hectares worldwide implies that the principles on which it is based are recognised by farmers as one major potential alternative for enhancing soil fertility and for sustainable agricultural intensification in Africa and internationally.

Andrew MacMillan, former Director
FAO Field Operations Division
andrew.macmillan@alice.it

Amir Kassam, Senior Agricultural Research Officer
CGIAR Interim Science Council Secretariat
kassamamir@aol.com

Ken Giller
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

  • What are the design principles for effective policy?
  • How can a strategy that operates at scale take account of the diversity of agro-ecological and socio-economic circumstances on the ground?

In southern Africa we were working actively through the SoilFertNet during the 1990s on targeting technologies, and came up with the term ‘best bet’ technologies to try to escape the idea of silver bullets that would work everywhere (see e.g. Waddington et al., 1998). When sitting in a discussion for the Africa Challenge Programme in Blantyre, Malawi, with Paul Mapfumo (UZ-SOFECSA) and John Pender (IFPRI) the suggestion came we should be thinking of ‘best-fit’ technologies (Giller et al., 2009). This was based on work through our NUANCES framework (Giller et al., 2006) that has extended this the idea of targeting to a (hierarchical) systematic analysis of fields, farmers and farming systems in terms of agroecologies, market access and infrastructure, education, resource endowments, local field variability etc to recognise the “socioecological niches” for technologies (Ojiem et al., 2006). John Pender referred to an IFPRI report that called for best fit approaches to information delivery services (Birner et al., 2006).

I think the idea of one policy or one approach is what we have to escape from – we need to move towards a ‘best fit’ policy approach – that can be tailored to the needs and opportunities of different regions. I believe our NUANCES methodology gives us a structured way of revealing the diversity and heterogeneity within farming systems and allows us to analyse trade-offs for technologies, and likely effects of policies in terms of their impact (e.g. Tittonell et al., 2008a; Tittonell et al., 2008b).

BUT – when we start to discuss these ideas, people at the policy end tend to be frightened off – they seem to want to treat Africa as a homogeneous ‘flat earth’ rather than the hugely diverse continent that it is… For me the most important design principle for effective policy is to recognise that – in the same way there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ technology, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy!

References
Birner, R., Davis, K., Pender, J., Nkonya, E., Ananajayasekeram, P., Ekboir, J., Mbabu, A., Spielman, D., Horna, D., Benin, S., Kisamba-Mugerwa, W., 2006. From “Best Practice” to “Best Fit”: A Framework for Designing and Analyzing Pluralistic Agricultural Advisory Services. IFPRI, Washington.
Giller, K.E., Rowe, E., de Ridder, N., van Keulen, H., 2006. Resource use dynamics and interactions in the tropics: Scaling up in space and time. Agric. Syst. 88, 8-27.
Giller, K.E., Vanlauwe, B., Mapfumo, P., Baijukya, F.P., Ojiem, J.O., Pender, J., Tittonell, P., 2009. Best-fits for diverse and heterogeneous farming systems in Africa: from fields to farms and farming systems. forthcoming.
Ojiem, J.O., de Ridder, N., Vanlauwe, B., Giller, K.E., 2006. Socio-ecological niche: A conceptual framework for integration of legumes in smallholder farming systems. Int. J. Agric. Sust. 4, 79-93.
Tittonell, P., Corbeels, M.C., van Wijk, M., Vanlauwe, B., Giller, K.E., 2008a. Combining organic and mineral fertilizers for integrated soil fertility management in smallholder farming systems of Kenya – explorations using the crop/soil model FIELD. Agron. J. doi: 10.2134agronj2007.0355.
Tittonell, P., van Wijk, M., Herrero, M., Rufino, M.C., de Ridder, N., Giller, K.E., 2008b. Inefficiencies and resource constraints – exploring the physical feasibility of options for the intensification of smallholder crop-livestock systems in Vihiga district, Kenya. Agric. Syst. in press.
Waddington, S.R., Gilbert, R., Giller, K.E., 1998. “Best Bet” technologies for increasing nutrient supply for maize on smallholder farms. In: Waddington, S.R., Murwira, H.K., Kumwenda, J.D.T., Hikwa, D., Tagwira, F. (Eds.), Soil Fertility Research for Maize-based Farming Systems in Malawi and Zimbabwe. SoilFertNet/CIMMYT-Zimbabwe, Harare, Zimbabwe, pp. 245-250.

[See additional contributions in Resources]

Ken Giller, University of Wageningen
Ken.Giller@wur.nl

Layne Coppock
January 22, 2010 / Pastoralism in crisis?

I have worked now for 25 years in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. I have been fortunate to be able to follow situations on the ground during much of this time. My role has included applied research, participatory research, outreach facilitation, and local capacity building.

The pastoral dynamics described by Stephen Sandford are already pretty well known by people who have carefully observed these systems over many years. In addition to recent efforts by the PARIMA project, previous work by ILCA in Kajiado Maasailand (ILCA Systems Study No. 4 of 1991) and on the Borana Plateau (ILCA Systems Study No. 5 of 1994) point to similar pastoral system trends.

Upon reviewing the arguments by Sandford and Devereaux/Scoones, I side with the more optimistic views of Devereaux/Scoones. As I look back over the large literature on livestock development, one comment stands out from a book by Hans Jahnke (1982). Jahnke essentially said that while the technical options for livestock development on Africa’s rangelands were slim at best, the scope for development of human potential among rangeland inhabitants was vast. The last few years working in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia have convinced me that this perspective is correct. Livestock development, after all, should be to the benefit of human beings—freeing them from hunger and marginalization. Many of us have made profound errors in our careers by focusing more on the technical aspects of livestock development while discounting the real goals of human development. So, one interesting question is, “Are there multiple pathways to improve the human condition in rangelands, besides just having a sole focus on the livestock component?” The livestock economy is crucial, for sure, but are there other “sustainable, small victories” to be achieved? One of the more interesting aspects I have observed of late is how many rangeland inhabitants can have their lives transformed by observing success of innovative peers, exposing them to new ways of thinking, and providing access to some basic education. In essence, helping people more effectively engage a changing world and have more choices about how they live day-to-day.

The example I have is the creation of 60 dynamic collective-action groups in southern Ethiopia (with over 2,000 members in total, 76% women) over the past five years. This process has been accelerated to a large extent by exposing the Ethiopians to peers from northern Kenya who have made remarkable achievements in a variety of self-help initiatives starting in the 1980s. Thousands have attended cross-border rallies in the past couple of years, and thousands have been trained in a variety of capacity-building efforts focused on micro-finance and entrepreneurial endeavors. People have learned to reconfigure their lives a bit and be a little more informed in terms of how they can better manage themselves and their families in a difficult and changing environment. People who were illiterate and incapable of making simple calculations with a pencil a few years ago now successfully manage small businesses, negotiate with exporters, market livestock, and handle large sums of money. Livelihood diversification happens and interesting local niches are discovered. Human capital, social capital, and financial capital are all being created. Details of this process are forthcoming.

It is therefore tempting to look at the big picture as Sandford has and see little other than calamity and chaos, but in terms of impacting individual lives a considerable scope exists for change, if for no other reason than the baseline condition can be so grim. I also believe there is a bias among some scholars who discount the value of education and capacity building among the rural poor. Pastoralists in particular are often viewed as “all knowing” and inherently capable of coping with considerable change if we just left them alone. My recent experiences tell me this is not true. Many pastoral women have told us that they never dreamed of anything different from the difficult lives they previously lead until they were inspired and awakened by innovative peers to do a few things differently.

Yes, Sandford and others are correct that the challenges are daunting. Several factors must properly line up if major progress is to be achieved and sustained, including improvements in markets and governance that lie far beyond the control of pastoralists and their advocates. But things will be worse if we stand by and do nothing. The larger environment for southern Ethiopia has a few favorable trends underway at the moment. For example, never have the export market opportunities been greater for Borana livestock than they are today. Never have there been greater incentives for pastoralists to improve livestock production practices to take advantage of new market opportunities. Never has the region held the positive attentions from policy makers than what occurs today. I have been impressed by the depth of knowledge that many policy makers posses about pastoralism and the need for multi-faceted, pastoral development approaches. The technical know-how and capacities of NGOs and GOs in southern Ethiopia have never been stronger than they are today. As one case in point, the Oromia Agricultural Research Institute (GO) is ready to embark on a major prescribed fire plan across the region to assist in reclaiming large areas of the Borana Plateau from bush encroachment. This is being done in partnership with local people, a departure from the old, “top-down” ways of doing business. These points illustrate why I have confidence in the value of building human capacity, at multiple levels, to promote pastoral development.

What are the greatest threats to such seemingly small elements of “progress?” Threats, of course, include things like population growth, resource restriction, and drought over the longer term and poor governance and local/regional conflicts in the shorter term. The major problems reported to us concerning the sustainability of collective-action groups are political and managerial, not environmental.

Layne Coppock
Department of Rangeland Resources, Utah State University

Policy frameworks for increasing soil fertility in Africa: debating the alternatives
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

Everyone is agreed that one of the central components of achieving an ‘African Green Revolution’ is to tackle the widespread soil fertility constraints in African agriculture. To this end, AGRA – the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa – has launched a major new ‘Soil Health’ programme aimed at 4.1 million farmers across Africa, with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation committing $198 million to the effort.

But what are the policy frameworks that really will increase soil fertility in ways that will boost production in a sustainable fashion; where the benefits of the interventions are widely distributed, meeting broader aims of equitable, broad-based development? Here there is much less precision and an urgent need for a concrete debate. For this reason, the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) has decided to invite a wide range of participants to debate some key issues around the way forward for policy, and associated institutional arrangements.

P. Phiri Marenya
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

Increasing Soil Fertility in Africa: Indispensable but Insufficient

Solving soil fertility management via increased fertilizer and organic inputs is an indispensable but insufficient element of agricultural and rural development in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).

From my recent research findings I find that suggest that biophysical factors, significantly affects the economic returns to fertilizer inputs. Some farmers cultivating more degraded soils may find it unprofitable to invest in soil nutrient inputs, not necessarily because the fertilizer/crop price ratio is too high or due to credit, information or risk constraints, or because of supply-side impediments, but because marginal yield response to fertilizer application is low on soils that have already undergone serious degradation, suggesting soil fertility mediated poverty traps. Thus using the ‘indispensable but insufficient’ as a key principle, it is possible to outline why taking a broader focus on the soil fertility problem stands a better chance of success. This broader approach will provide complementary (and sufficient) conditions to buttress these programs as part of a broader rural economy.

In this debate I am most interested in the bullet point that asks: What happens when there is no market – or when market mechanisms don’t reach certain places or people?. In my experience, I find that people involved in Agricultural development often look at the process of agricultural development as that of transforming low-productivity subsistence farms into ‘small-scale business firms’ producing and selling some agricultural product for own consumption, sale or both and at the end of the day generating incomes and profit.  I use the term ‘business firm’ because to achieve the kind of increases in the use of fertilizers and other labor intensive soil fertility investments these investments must provide adequate profit or financial returns for individual farmers and for society these investments must also be economically sensible especially where public resources are to be expended. How realistic is it to aim at turning millions of subsistence farmers into businesswomen and men?

The conditions which have made investments in soil fertility inputs (SFI) to become both financially and economically unremunerative (and hence the preponderance of subsistence modes of production) have well been documented which I broadly summarize as follows:

  • Lack of physical and market infrastructure which has stifled the development of commercial fertilizer supply networks.
  • The preponderance of low value agricultural enterprises creates high input-output price ratios making their use infeasible.
  • Lack of requisite financial capital (associated by missing credit markets) to invest in SFI even if such investments offer decent returns.

Therefore, the outcome in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are exactly as predicted by basic tenets of microeconomic theory. These conditions reflect rational responses of economic players in SSA’s agricultural sectors to unfavorable input-output prices for farmers and for potential fertilizer dealers, the resulting thin input markets make fertilizer merchandizing an unprofitable proposition at various levels, hence the low supply of fertilizers.

In order to develop key policy principles for soil fertility recapitalization we need therefore to look more keenly at rural household goals and incentives. This is because incentives should be at the heart of efforts to increase investments in SFI:

  • Is food self sufficiency an overriding incentive for all or just some households? Does food self sufficiency translate into adequate household incomes?
  • Are there rural households in SSA who can solely rely on agricultural markets for their food supply through earning income in rural and peri-urban labor markets or through production of non-staple commodities including livestock products?
  • What might the optimal balance between partly supplying own food and partly relying on agricultural markets for food look like?

Below I sketch three scenarios with attendant policy foci in a way that I believe will broaden the approach to solving soil fertility problems and rural development.

  • Households in areas with little or no reach to markets

In simple terms, these places are cut off from national markets by reason of lack of transport and communication infrastructure or their economic bases have no link to the broader national or regional economies.  In the former case, neither state nor non-government actors can do anything about low supply of fertilizers until there is infrastructure in place to enable commercial or publicly supported delivery.  Self provision of food in these environments may be high on the household’s agenda and should therefore be a legitimate concern for public policy.

In the latter case it is apparent that there is no realistic way of increasing food production without opening up these areas and linking them to the wider world. Will that require increased food production with attendant increases in the use of SFI? Will other natural resource based economic activities such as forestry, livestock production or fishing (which may require more natural resource management than external fertilizers) develop?

Key Policy Principle: If there are realistic chances of increasing the use of SFI excluding fertilizers (and that is a big ‘if’) then these may offer the best chance in the short term for improving soil fertility and food production. Focus on the natural resource management (NRM) aspects of SFI to promote local production of food and inter-household trade within the region may be the most feasible in the immediate term. The most important adjunct is to integrate these areas to national economies by bringing in infrastructure investments in order to allow the importation of food and exportation of niche products from these areas.

The process may lead to these areas joining category number 2 and eventually category 3 below with attendant policy focus.

  • Households in areas with some (moderate) market access.

Households in these regions have some rudimentary access to local labor and agricultural markets. These markets provide some employment opportunities but not sufficient to make them rely solely on labor incomes and agricultural markets for their food consumption. For these households, the greatest benefit will be adequate self-provision of (and perhaps even self sufficiency in) basic foodstuffs. If this can happen and these households are able to spare some labor for off-farm income generation there will be a significant dent on poverty.

Key Policy Principle: Focus on infrastructure investment and ‘Smart Subsidies’ until such a time that  these areas are fully integrated into the national and global economies leading to expansion of economic opportunities and less reliance on subsistence economic activities and more on employment in high-productivity agricultural production as well as in alternative sectors.

  • Households in areas with good (adequate) access to markets

These areas are on average likely to be situated in high potential agro-ecozones which is why infrastructure and markets have developed in these areas. These are also the same areas where input use are likely to be above national average even if not necessarily at par with international averages in similar areas outside SSA. Households in these regions may have greater off-farm employment opportunities and therefore can reasonably rely on local agricultural markets for their food supply. These areas also offer the greatest opportunity for expanding agro-dealer networks. These regions should receive as much attention in terms of fertilizer programs and policies as the low potential areas. Some may worry that such an approach may stretch public resources too much leading to perhaps ‘anti-poor’ outcomes. I disagree. If national policies lead to increased commercial food production in high potential areas and hence lower food prices, the greatest beneficiaries will be the poor households who rely on markets for their food production.  There will always be households for whom own production will be a better alternative. For these I have outlined key principles in category 1 and 2 above.

Key Policy Principle: The chief policy principle in these zones should be increased use of fertilizer to achieve productivity levels at par with international levels while ensuring environmental sustainability. Any macroeconomic policy lever which can be used to reduce fertilizer costs and increase its supply should be fully exploited.

Summary
A generic focus on soil fertility management will fail to generate the needed response from farmers or even achieve economic and equity goals unless there is adequate compartmentalization of the problem. It is apparent that there are households and regions where the most economical approach is to enable households use just enough fertilizers and other SFI to achieve a degree of household food self sufficiency and to sustain the soils for continued household food supply. These households generate extra incomes from labor markets. In these areas, public resources in the form of smart subsidies and other approaches may dominate fertilizer and SFI programming.  On the other end of the spectrum is a situation where households will need to increase the use of fertilizers and other SFI considerably for commercialized food and cash crop production. It will be easier to develop market based mechanisms for increased fertilizer supply in these areas.

In this contribution, I have tried to provide an archetypal scheme that can be used for separating out policy approaches suitable for different market circumstances. The key principle that should permeate the whole discussion is that the problem of soil fertility depletion is both a cause and a consequence of underdevelopment. It is possible that progress in non-agricultural sectors within rural areas can stimulate enough economic growth and linkages to agriculture and improve incentives for SFI use without resorting to subsidies to encourage increased use of SFI.

It has been recognized in the background document to this debate that increased use of SFI will not provide the same level of incentives for all households. It may be desirable heighten policy focus on market-based fertilizer (SFI) programs in areas with the greatest financial and economic returns. Other areas may require greater publicly-supported investments in NRM to accompany fertilizer programs. This is especially so if investments in NRM have been hampered by high labor and financial costs.

Agricultural development will require more than increased use of SFI, rather it will require investments in public goods needed for broad rural development. These investments will benefit all sectors of the rural economy providing the best incentives for investing in SFI and reversing soil fertility depletion because these SFI investments will now yield adequate returns by reason of increased and diversified demand for agricultural products. This in my view will provide the best chance for soil fertility recapitalization and agricultural development as part of the rural and national economies.

 

P. Phiri Marenya, Lecturer
Department of Agricultural Economics University of Nairobi
ppm3@cornell.edu

Joost Brouwer
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

At least in the semi-arid regions of Africa, if within-field soil variability is not taken into account, efforts to increase soil fertility will be less efficient and less likely to be adopted by farmers.  Most of these farmers already practice ‘precision agriculture’ and take short distance variability into consideration in their management. One can safely assume that they do so for good reason, given that their management systems have developed over many centuries.

Precision agriculture is also relevant for the introduction of modern technologies.  For example, the same principles are relevant to the efficient application of manure and the efficient application of compost and mineral fertiliser.

For the best solutions, farmer knowledge, extensionist knowledge and researcher knowledge of within-field soil variability need to be combined.  This will lead to an increase in the knowledge of each group regarding the variability-related possibilities and constraints of the other groups.  Increased farmer knowledge will lead to better and more efficient farmer management.  Increased researcher knowledge of soil variability will lead to better-targeted and more efficient soil fertility research.  If the minimum management area for farmers is part of a field, and researchers only analyse at the level of an entire field or experiment, then those researchers ignore information that is very relevant to the farmers.  They should look for variables at the plot level that help explain why, in any one year as well as over the years, different plots with the same treatment react differently.  They will find this useful for increasing their agro-ecological knowledge, for improving their scientific publications, and especially for more effective extension to the farmers.  Farmers prefer well differentiated advice to blanket advice that turns out not to work part of the time, or in sections of their fields.

For further information, many telling images and additional soil variability literature references, see the final reference in the background document to this internet discussion.  In this downloadable reference there is also information on how better knowledge of within-field soil variability can lead to increased yield security in times of unpredictable climate change.

[Also see publication in Resources]

Joost Brouwer
Brouwer Envir. & Agric. Consultancy, Bennekom
brouwereac@orange.nl

Eric Smaling
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

I commend Ian Scoones for his excellent brief historic account of African soil fertility-related research over the last 10-20 years.

I share a kind of ‘cross-roads’ feeling on Africa, now that food price rises have caused turmoil and protectionist reflexes by rice-exporting countries. The Indian Trade Minister, at the failed WTO talks last week in Geneva put it right: ‘every country should be allowed to strive at food self-sufficiency’.

There are limits to market liberalization for agriculture.  Next, protagonists of free markets have first sealed off their markets in order to develop their agricultural markets. EU and US still do this to a large extent.  If Africa does not step up its own production, it will face a worsening terms of trade on agriculture year after year.  The sale of natural resources to China will not change this. Development has taken off everywhere in the world with a strong agriculture sector.

Africa should be allowed to develop agriculture following a model such as the Common Agricultural Policy.  As a certain size is needed in terms of area and inhabitants, the economic regions such as ECOWAS and COMESA may be suitable units.  EU, AfDB and BMGatesFound can be instrumental in helping the areas to develop their agriculture. Actually, it would fit nicely in the European Development Fund. A demand-supply analysis is needed, and the selection of regions where intensification stands the best chance of success.  Fertilizer needs and distribution networks should ideally also be organized for the economic regions as a whole to benefit from economies of scale. Microdosing efforts should be promoted at a large scale to access resource-poor farmers, and subsidies on fertilizers should be allowed (using the Malawi case as an example). The abolishment of fertilizer subsidies and the virtual ban on parastatals in the 1980s/1990s was a big mistake, somehow admitted by the World Bank in their latest World Development Report. CIMMYT for example was doing a good job with NARS in developing maize hybrids, only to find their effors frustrated by structural adjustment policies.

There is momentum now to really act: but the question Ian rightly poses is: how to act?  In my view, the following investment pays off best, taking a region such as ECOWAS as an example:

  • SECTOR ANALYSIS: analyse food demand and supply for the region, map current and future population distribution; and link that to current and future agriculture areas; analyse necessary price levels to make increased production profitable
  • PRODUCERS: invest strongly in organizing producer organizations/cooperatives: get farmers trained, organized, connected (mobile phones, market information); what motivates them to increase production? are remittances important, making them less anxious to produce more?
  • PRODUCTS: focus on crops with a high response to fertilizers and manure; high-value crops and crops that see demand grow rapidly (e.g. soybean, oilpalm); particular attention for livestock (small ruminants)
  • POPULATION: partition the region into areas of higher and lower potential, proximity to consumers, and infrastructure density and development needs
  • FERTILIZERS: produce N fertilizer in the region, exploit natural P reserves, and do tests on micronutrient needs and deficiencies; recycle town wastes for compost in the peri-urban area
  • POVERTY: for some harsh areas, safety nets may be needed

Less specific for soil fertility, but important as well:

  • The region should be able to protect its market, at least for a number of strategic commodities
  • The region should work on lowering, streamlining, and even abolishing tariffs between member states
  • The countries should work harder on tax collection.

Eric Smaling,
Wageningen Agricultural University
Eric.Smaling@wur.nl

Samuel Gebreselassie
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

Policy Framework for Increase and Effective Use of Fertilizer in Ethiopia: Evidence from Recent Experiences and Debating the Problems

1. Background The Ethiopian government has worked hard to reverse the country’s terrible history associated with a series of famines that ashamed of Ethiopians periodically since the 1970s.

Hunger, however, has once again re-visited Ethiopia this year, threatened the live of millions of Ethiopians and become the major news headline across the globe. Why Ethiopia unable to feed its population and thus continuing to depend on foreign donations of food to sustain millions of its citizens? Why a minor shocks as the 2008 failure of belg rain brought a significant impact on national food availability and hunger.

Despite some recent rapid growth of higher-value export crops such as coffee, livestock, and horticulture products, agricultural growth in Ethiopia remains unsatisfactory especially measured in terms of improving productivity in the cereal sector. The poor performance of the agricultural sector is unparalleled with its old history of institutionalized agricultural research and extension system in Africa. The formal beginnings of public agricultural research and extension in Ethiopia can be traced to the establishment of agricultural education establishments in the late 1940s and 1950s. The Institute of Agricultural Research (IAR) was established in 1966 with the formal mandate to formulate national agricultural research policy guidelines and undertake crops and livestock research. A major agricultural extension work began with the initiation of several package projects in the late 1960s and 1970s. It was thought that concentrating resources on the most promising regions would yield better results than spreading resources thinly over a larger area. The package consisted of mainly improved seeds, fertilizer and chemicals (Mulat, 1999). Since then, with the support of a variety of international institutions and donors a variety of agricultural development policies were experimented and several agricultural development programs and countless projects were implemented.

Most of recent agricultural development strategies and programs in Ethiopia are centred on fertilizer promotion, along with the provision of improved seeds, credit and farm management practices. Does these fertilizer-centred strategies worked? What is Ethiopia’s recent experience and challenges for increased and effective use of fertilizers? This paper will try to highlight some critical issues and debates the problems the country faced in its effort of enhancing the use of fertilizer in the smallholder sector.

2. Ethiopia’s recent experience with its fertilizer promotion strategy

Some 62 percent of the Ethiopian population is estimated to live in the moisture-reliant highlands . A core goal of the Ethiopian government agricultural strategy (ADLI) in recent years (since mid 1990s) was to raise cereal yields especially in moisture-reliant areas through a centralized and aggressive extension-based push focusing on technological packages that combined credit, fertilizers, improved seeds and better management practices. Following this strategy, fertilizer use has increased significantly (Byerlee et al, 2007).

Along with the new strategy, with support from the World Bank, the Ethiopian government formed a project to support for fertilizer market development in Ethiopia (Ethiopia National Fertilizer Project, ENFP) in 1992/93 with the aim of increasing agricultural production and productivity with an emphasis on fertilizer demand and supply, soil fertility management, and fertilizer policy reform. Since then, national fertilizer consumption increased almost three-times.

National fertilizer consumption at the beginning of the 1970s (when it was first introduced) and 1980s was about 950 and 43,200 tons, respectively (Tenkir et al, 2002). It increased to 250,000 tons (21 kg/ha) in 1995 and then to 323,000 tons (32 kg/ha) of product in 2004/05 . This growth of total fertilizer consumption was more rapid (i.e. it has been positive) than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) over the same period, and the average use of fertilizer per hectare was almost double the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (Crawford, Jayne, and Kelly 2006, see Byerlee et al, 2007) . This rapid improvement is partly due to the decision of the Ethiopian government allowing farmers to buy fertilizer with 100 percent credit in 19995 (Alemenh, 2003).

Although the strong push for intensification has resulted in higher use of fertilizer, the figures for Ethiopia are still low when compared to those in other countries that have successfully intensified cereal production in the past, particularly in Asia. On average, fertilizer application rate was 110 and 101 Kilogram per hectare of arable and permanent cropland in South Asia in 1999 and 2002, respectively; and 251 kg/ha and 257 kg/ha in China and only 16 kg/ha and 14 kg/ha in Ethiopia during the same years (Byerlee et al, 2007).This leads to low level of land productivity. Despite the availability of proven technologies , a recent study reported that cereal yields in Ethiopia are less than a quarter of the yields achieved in Asia during the green revolution (MoFED and UNDP, 2007).

The state-led policy formulated to push seed-fertilizer technologies has helped to improve fertilizer use per hectare . Fertilizer consumption per hectare, albeit encouraging growth in recent years associated partly to the extremely low use in base year and partly to improved policy support, however, has increased only marginally and remains much below the level recommended by agricultural researchers or to the international standard especially to those Asian countries that have successfully experienced the green revolution.

Given the precarious food situation and acute land scarcity in the country, fertilizer, modern seed and improved water and farm management, are critically important for intensifying grain production and boosting food production in Ethiopia. Based on extensive data collected from millions of demonstrations carried out through PADETES (3.6 million in 1999 alone), Howard et al. (2003) indicated that the adoption of seed-fertilizer technologies could more than double cereal yields and would be profitable to farmers in moisture-reliant areas.

A study by Mulat et al (1997) also indicates that one ton of fertilizer can yield 3-7 tons of additional grain in high potential areas. In general, the role of fertilizer in improving the declining nutritional status and productivity of Ethiopia’s soil is widely recognized. Then what are the challenges to strengthen smallholder access to fertilizer in general and its wide, effective, profitable and sustainable use in particular. Why the massive, state-led policy and program formulated to boost the use of fertilizer (seed-fertilizer) has only brought a marginal improvement in its use (especially in terms of use per hectare of farm land) and unnoticed impact in terms of improving cereal productivity and food security.

A number of factors seem to account for the low level use of fertilizer, low technical efficiency in fertilizer use and poor performance of agricultural productivity in the face of significant efforts at intensification and use of modern inputs. A lot of studies (e.g. Byerlee et al, 2007, Habtemariam, 2004, Mulat, 1999) have identified a number of contributing factors. Below is a major points emerged from review of these studies.

2.1 Technical factors

One major factor appears to be low technical efficiency in the use of the principle modern input, fertilizer. A recent analysis indicated that farmers are only achieving on average 60 percent of their potential production, given current levels of input use (World Bank 2006a, see Byerlee et al, 2007). As a result, fertilizer use may be yielding negative returns to many farmers, thereby resulting in stagnation of further intensification and significant rates of dis-adoption. This may be associated to farmers’ suboptimal use of fertilizer and lack of complementary inputs. Farmers don’t often go along with the recommended practices (100 kg DAPS and 100 kg Urea for most crops except for teff and Urea which requires 50 kg of DAP and 200 kg of Urea) but follows practices they can afford (often half the recommended rate). As a highly specialized input, the efficient use of fertilizer generally requires complementary inputs (e.g. improved varieties), as well as higher levels of management. Farmers might not optimally mix the required ingredients.

As soil erosion and land degradation are major causes for low productivity and vulnerability of smallholders, chemical fertilizer should be augmented with soil conservation practices and use of organic fertilizers. This is especially important in view of increasing fertilizer price and need for foreign currency the country needs to import it (Ethiopia imports all of its fertilizer). It is widely recognized among experts and policy makers that the increasing application of fertilizer at the current price will not be affordable to many farmers and possibly the Government (Ethiopia struggles to get the foreign exchange required to import fertilizer), extension and research should accord a high priority to find an economically viable option that uses fertilizer in combination with other local available organic sources (Alemenh, 2003).

2.2 Policy related factors

Distortions in the land market, lack of effective policy on population and low level of non-farm employment

Sub-economic holdings operated by poverty-stricken farmers are not favorable for widespread dissemination of new agricultural technology. Apart from the population pressure, the land policy has significantly contributed to subeconomic holdings and tenure insecurity. The average farm size in Ethiopia has declined to just one ha due to the rapidly growing population. Over one-third (46%) of the rural holdings are less than 0.5 ha. Given the low level of productivity, nearly all produce is devoted to home consumption for households with smaller plots. There is little surplus for investment and for input purchase. Empirical studies have also shown that the probability of adopting fertilizer and improved seeds decreases with decline in farm size (Croppenstedt, et al., 1998; Mulat et al., 1998; Wolday, 1998, see Mulat, 1999).

Since the 1975 land reform which made all rural land public property, the possession of land plots has been conditional upon residence in the village. The transfer of land through long-term lease or sales as well as the possibility to use land as collateral that will help to generate money for investment on land has been forbidden. This coupled with lack of effective policy on population and low level of non-farm employment has overcrowded the rural sector. Increasing population in the rural areas was thus absorbed in agriculture through leveling down of holdings, rather than through alternative forms of employment.

Fertilizer trade – government policy, undeveloped market and lack of private sector participation

According Byerlee et al (2007), Ethiopian fertilizer market lacks the participation of the private sector especially in recent years. When fertilizer market was liberalized in early 1990s, the initial response of the private sector to market liberalization was rapid. By 1996, several private firms were importing fertilizer, and 67 private wholesalers and 2,300 retailers made up a significant share of the domestic market. However, since 1999 the private sector that had initially responded to the reforms has largely exited the fertilizer market. In the case of imports, the share of private firms operating in the market went from 33 percent in 1995 to zero in 1999.

The decline of the private sector in the retail market was more dramatic. While private sector retailers held a majority share of the market in the early 1990s, the public sector and cooperatives have become almost the sole distributors of fertilizer since early 2000. As of 2004, the public sector accounted for over 70 percent of distribution, with private dealers accounting for only 7 percent of sales nationwide (DSA, 2006, EEA/EEPRI 2006, see Byerlee et al, 2007). The public sector supply channels have also changed; whereas extension agents initially managed distribution, the responsibility was shifted to local input supply offices in more recent years.

Byerlee et al (2007) indicates that the current government policy is to target at least 80 percent of fertilizer sales through cooperatives, which are eventually intended to replace the public sector involvement in retail distribution of fertilizers. This process, as with the importation process, tends to favor those firms or organizations with access to capital markets and experience in navigating the regulatory and administrative systems at both the federal and regional levels.

Despite some positive effect of the public-cooperative monopoly in the fertilizer trade especially from short-term perspective; in sum, the current system in Ethiopia is inefficient and unsustainable in the long run, and that it severely hinders the development of sound input markets and financial institutions in rural areas. Byerlee et al (2007) assess the overall performance of the current system in terms of price competitiveness, services provided, and fiscal and other costs to the public sector.

Price competitiveness

At first glance, fertilizer prices in Ethiopia are competitive. The margin between domestic and international prices is higher in Ethiopia than in Asian and Latin American countries, but comparable to the margin in other African countries, including South Africa. A comparison of the price build-up of fertilizer from port to farm gate indicates that marketing margins in Ethiopia are somewhat lower than those in comparable African countries, and that costs may have decreased over time with improvements in transportation.

Another way to measure this is to compare prices in Ethiopia with prices in comparable countries that are deemed to have a relatively dynamic fertilizer industry. By this measure, prices in Ethiopia do not seem to be out of line, and are in fact often lower than those in Kenya, a country where fertilizer use by smallholders is growing rapidly (Ariga, Jayne, and Nyoro 2006, Heisey and Norton 2006, see Byerlee et al, 2007). In reality, however, these apparently low prices reflect the peculiarities of the Ethiopian fertilizer markets. For example, a part of the cost-build up in fertilizer delivery does not show up in retail prices because the bottom end of the supply chain is essentially subsidized, with extension agents and cooperatives assuming the retailing functions.

Despite sustainability and effectiveness of the public/cooperative dominance in fertilizer market, a reasonably high price associated to private sector might not hinder improved use of fertilizer. A review of the situation in Kenya where fertilizer use by smallholders growing much rapidly, for instance, reveals that a dynamic private sector can promote smallholder use of fertilizer even when prices are relatively high (Ariga, Jayne, and Nyoro 2006). Moreover, there are no solid evidence on the competitiveness of fertilizer price between the public and private sector in Ethiopia .

Quality and dependability of services

Fertilizer prices represent only one dimension of market performance. The ability to provide the right type of input of good quality to farmers in a timely manner is equally important. Based on a study by Byerlee et al, 2007, some problems that might affect the use of fertilizer or its profitability in Ethiopia are listed below.

  • Unlike neighboring countries, Ethiopia does not offer fertilizer in smaller packages or different formulations needed for non-cereal crops. The distribution system in Ethiopia is inflexible, providing only two types of fertilizer, both in 50 kg bags.
  • Moreover, numerous farmers in recent years (as many as half in some regions) have consistently reported late delivery of fertilizer. About 12 to 46 percent of farmers received fertilizer late, depending on the region. Many farmers also complained that bags were underweight, and 30 percent of farmers in two regions registered a negative response on quality.

    A study conducted in 2004 (Bonger et al, 2004) also reinforced these findings, reporting that half of farmers noted that the fertilizer arrived after planting, 32 percent reported underweight bags, 25 percent indicated poor quality, and almost 40 percent reported that their planting was delayed by fertilizer problems. Most recently, fertilizer quality problems had been reduced but delays in delivery were still common—25 percent or more of farmers complained of late delivery. Timely availability of fertilizer is critical in rainfed agriculture; fertilizer applied late causes it to be unprofitable, while delayed planting can incur even higher costs.

  • Beyond fiscal costs, there are also considerable but non-quantifiable implicit costs in the system, many of which are borne by the government through its input supply parastatal and administrative offices. These include the costs resulting from the “central planning” system of estimation of demand by extension agents at the local level and then aggregation at the national level as the basis for allocation import permits. This understandably results in substantial inefficiencies due to the lack of a market clearing mechanism. The indirect costs also include the storage costs and quality deterioration incurred because closing stocks have comprised 50 percent or more of total consumption in most years except in 2004 and 2005. Kenya, which has a fully private sector supply, has an inter-annual carryover average of less than 10 percent. Finally, the implicit costs include those resulting from damage done to extension-farmer relationships when and if extension agents participated to ensure fertilizer loan repayment.
  • Furthermore, fertilizer is tied to credit programs and fed by government targets for fertilizer consumption at the local, regional and national levels.
    • This may result in the promotion of fertilizer where it is not profitable, and could explain the negative returns to fertilizer noted above. It may also tend to create moral hazards among farmers with respect to careful use of credit, and may discourage the development of their skills in independent financial management.
    • In addition, input distribution tied to credit tends to limit the space available for the emergence of private sector retailers. Thus, those farmers with sufficient resources to purchase fertilizer for cash, often on more favorable terms than on credit, are unable to do so since there are very few private traders. This problem is compounded by the exit of private firms and the rise of party-affiliated companies and cooperatives—a situation that is widely perceived as reflecting the lack of a level playing field in the agricultural input sector.
    • Similarly, the guaranteed loan program with below-market interest rates creates an un-level playing field in the rural finance sector by undermining efforts to set up alternative institutions such as MFIs, branches of commercial banks, or independent financial cooperatives.
    • There are also high fiscal costs and fiscal risks associated with the guaranteed loan program. The write-off to loan guarantees amounted to Ethiopian birr (ETB) 84 million in 2001, but by 2005 liabilities had again accumulated to ETB 183 million (DSA 2006). Also in 2005, the Oromiya Region was obliged to pay out approximately ETB 84 million to the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia to honor its guarantees for the previous three-year time period. The guarantee thus becomes a subsidy that is not accounted for in government budgeting.

2.3 Institutional factors

The aforementioned problems that could hinder the extensive and efficient of fertilizer might be reflection of institutional weakness. Institutions working to improve the use and profitability of fertilizer use might face various problems like lack required financial and manpower resources. Weakness of these institutions in their internal administration and coordination among various institutions (extension, research and government) might also contribute. Following is a variety of problems related to institutional weaknesses that have hindered wide and more effective use of modern inputs in general and fertilizer in particular in the Ethiopian smallholder sector.

  • Adoption of conventional, top-down approach in agricultural extension that established a bureaucratic structure for the regular transmission of pre-determined technical messages from subject matter specialists to farmers. The hierarchical “culture” underlying the extension system does little to encourage and exploit the inherent resourcefulness of those who work closely with farmers and rural communities. Farming communities do not participate in extension planning, and the extension agents remain largely conveyors of technical messages, rather than active facilitators of community capacity building and providers of relevant information.
  • Low and unbalanced public investment between agricultural research and extension. Unlike many other developing countries, Ethiopia continues to invest heavily in its public sector-led agricultural extension system in order to implement the recent intensification program. But it drains resources that could be used else where more productively. Byerlee et al, 2007, for instance, reported that the public investment to the recent extension program, excluding the much larger expenditure on food security programs, amounted to over $50 million dollars annually or almost 2 percent of agricultural GDP in recent years. This was four to five times the investment in agricultural research.
  • Frequent restructuring of MoA – Since mid 1970s, MoA has undergone through at least ten major restructuring processes. It is worth mentioning here that evidences are difficult to find that would indicate that such restructuring measures were made based on commissioned studies evaluating previous organizational structures nor are there any measurable performance indicators suggested to monitor that the new structures would perform better. One could say that the organization of extension kept on changing because of leaders own intuitions, and not based on evaluation and assessment. This negatively affects continuity of programs and increases instability of staff which, in turn, affects the provision and sustainable use of modern inputs like fertilizer (Habtemariam, 2004).

In addition to institutional instability, weak financial and administrative capacity that lead to poor extension planning and monitoring system might have weaken the effectiveness of the extension system and indirectly, extensive, effective and sustainable use of fertilizer and other modern inputs among the small farmers (Habtemariam, 2004).

Conclusion

There is widely held view that poverty reduction in Ethiopia is impossible without significant growth in crop yields for major staples. Recent developments , however, depicts the enormous challenge the agricultural sector faced to satisfy national food requirement and help in reducing poverty. A recent study by Diao and Pratt (2007) shows that significant poverty reductions in Ethiopia could be achieved by prioritizing investment in improving cereals and other food staples productivity relative to both traditional and non-traditional export crops (see Byerlee et al, 2007).

The recent rapid growth of higher-value export crops especially cut flower (but to lesser degree other crops like coffee, livestock, and horticulture products) indicate the central role of government policy to improve agricultural production and productivity. Cheap and guaranteed access to farm land, financial resources and other incentives including duty free import of agricultural technologies and tax-holiday for investors help for rapid growth of the horticulture sector. To boost cereal production among other through extensive, effective and sustainable use of fertilizer, improved seeds and farm management practices, Ethiopian policy makers to reconsider their policy. The food sector needs a comparable but different kind of policy attention.

Any intervention to improve sustainable and effective use of fertilizer and other modern technologies should be holistic; systematic that could address a range factors discussed earlier. At the final analysis, productivity is a technical/technological problem but the intervention required to improve smallholders’ access to farm technologies and their efficient and sustainable use should not necessarily be implementing a technology-led extension program. If that is the case, Ethiopia’s over 4 decades experience should have made Ethiopian smallholders’ major users of modern farm technologies and alleviate the widespread structural food deficits and a chronic dependence on food aid.

Of course, technology required for enhancing productivity could be internationally available or generate domestically. Government policy and donors financial assistance to widely diffuse existing or new technologies (e.g. fertilizers and improved seeds) to areas with low productivity is only one aspect of the problem in a complex institutional, social and political environment. The exclusive concentration given to technology as a determinant of productivity in theory and the effectiveness of such a concentration in increasing productivity in practice in countries such as Ethiopia should be revisited. While technology is important, the whole social structure of the growth process needs to be considered to effect durable productivity enhancement and sustainable use of modern farm technologies like fertilizers and improved seeds.

It would be better, therefore, for Ethiopian policy makers and donors, to change their approach in dealing with the problem the country faced in promoting the use of fertilizer and its effective and sustainable use. Among others, they should refrain from making any specific recommendation (to improve farmers access to modern inputs such as fertilizer (e.g. subsidy)) before identifying and studying the whole gamut of factors that affect decisions by farmers, including the incentive structure, institutional configuration, governance and risk behaviour patterns.

References

Alemenh Dejene (2003). Integrated Natural Resources Management to Food Security. The Case for Community Based Approaches in Ethiopia. Environment and Natural Resources, Working Paper No. 16, FAO.

Byerlee, Derek; Spielman, David J; Dawit Alemu and Gauta Madhur (2007). Policies to Promote Cereal Intensification in Ethiopia: A Review of Evidence and Experience. IFPRI Discussion Paper 00707. June 2007.

Bonger, T., G. Ayele, and T. Kumsa. 2004. Agricultural extension, adoption and diffusion in Ethiopia. Research Report 1. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Development Research Institute.

CSA (2007). Report on Area and Production of crops. Agricultural Sample Survey 2006/2007. Private Peasant holdings, Meher season. Volume I. Statistical Bulletin 388. Addis Abeba, Ethiopia.

EEA (2002). Second Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy. Addis Abeba, Ethiopia.

UNOCHA (2002). Review and Consequences of Reduction in Agricultural Input Sales in 2002. A Situation Analysis, November 2002.

Jeanette Sutherland (2006). Fertilizer Toolkit: Ethiopia National Fertilizer Sector Project (1996 – 2002).

FAO/WFP (2008). Special Report: Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Ethiopia. (Phase One). January 2008).

Habtemariam Kassa (2004). Historical Developments and Current Challenges of Agricultural Extension with Particular Emphasis on Ethiopia. A Review Contributed to the EEA/EEPRI study on the Evaluation of PADETES.

Howard, J., E. Crawford, V. Kelly, M. Demeke, and J. J. Jeje. 2003. Promoting high-input maize technologies in Africa: The Sasakawa-Global 2000 experience in Ethiopia and Mozambique. Food Policy 28: 335–348.

MoFED and UNDP (2007). A Review of Ethiopia’s Economic Performance (1995 to 2005) and the Human Development Outcomes and Issues. Paper Presented at Consensus Building Workshop for National Human Development Report (NHDR), Ethiopia. Addis Abeba, Ethiopia.

Mulat Demeke (1999). Agricultural Technology, Economic Viability And Poverty Alleviation In Ethiopia. Paper Presented to the Agricultural Transformation Policy Workshop Nairobi, Kenya 27-30 June 1999

Tenkir Bonger, Eleni Gabre-Madhin and Suresh Babu (2002). Agricultural Technology Diffusion and Price Policy. Proceedings of a Policy Forum in Addis Abeba, March 25, 2002. Ethiopian Development Research Institute and International Food Policy Research Institute. 2020 Vision Network for East Africa, Report 1, June 2002.

Samuel Gebreselassie, Researcher
Ethiopian Economic Policy Research Institute (EEPRI)
sgebreselassie@eeaecon.org

Rob Tripp
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

First, the authors of the document should be congratulated for providing such a thoughtful and comprehensive summary of the issues.

The document describes a number of “models”, many of which have made some contribution, and it correctly points out that virtually all are being promoted to some extent at the present time.

In the face of limited success from past efforts we are asked, “Are things different now?” The document answers in the affirmative, but this can be debated. One thing that hasn’t changed is that a number of well-meaning development agencies, institutes, researchers, etc are still hoping to see a comprehensive plan fashioned from disparate interests and initiatives. Although some of the vocabulary inevitably changes, we are still lining up to march behind our chosen banner, be it “integrated soil fertility”, “innovation systems”, “smart subsidies” ,or whatever. And the fact that donors have large amounts of money they want (or in some cases are obliged) to spend may be a mixed blessing.

Surely part of the explanation for only modest success in the past is precisely that these have largely been special initiatives, introduced from outside. They usually pay little attention to the long-term capacities of the people meant to manage them or to the abilities of farming populations to have any influence over what their governments (or external agencies) provide. In addition, they usually bypass any examination of exactly what proportion of the African rural population has enough interest in, or income from, farming to elicit realistic commitment. Thus it might be argued that the specifics of a soil fertility plan should be postponed until there are coherent investments in developing more general policy capacity, political responsiveness, and rural organization. But donors are generally not set up to address these more basic issues, and the development industry has difficulty reaping rewards from long-term capacity building.

It is difficult to see how effective soil fertility policies will arise in the midst of more general inefficiencies in African agricultural economies. This is not meant to dismiss the questions asked at the end of the document about specific design principles related to soil fertility management. They are certainly relevant, but it is a challenge to see how they can be debated in the abstract. If we wish to avoid the disappointments of other failed programs and plans addressing African soil fertility management, it may be best for us to turn our attention inward, and to ask if our own development profession (as currently structured) can offer solutions, or is part of the problem. An integrated approach to soil fertility certainly makes sense, but is unlikely to be achieved as long as donors are not capable of an integrated approach to the development of basic national capacities. Without this, we may simply be entering another round of competition to collect rents from pilot projects and fruitless discussions about scaling up.

Rob Tripp, Research Associate
Overseas Development Institute
r.tripp@odi.org.uk

Willem A. Stoop
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

Major recent studies about the problems of African soils and consequently the low agricultural production have all recognised two generalised, yet paramount, problems:

  • Low to very low soil fertility levels as compared with the other major agricultural production areas in the world, caused by low active-clay and soil organic matter contents, resulting into low nutrient retention / buffering capacities, often in combination with multiple nutrient deficiencies and nutrient imbalances that are readily induced  and aggravated by prolonged use of mineral fertilizers of standardised nutrient compositions.
  • A large variability / diversity in soils over short distances (i.e. within farms and individual fields).

These two major problems cannot possibly be handled through standardised type technological solutions like seeds of so called improved varieties, agricultural chemicals (mineral fertilizers in particular) and increased availability of water. And yet these are the major aspects, that have been highlighted albeit unsuccessfully in the past through ambitious projects like T&V, SG 2000 and currently again through the “Millennium Villages Project” and “Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa”.

Currently the issue of soil health is being emphasized increasingly as a component of technological approaches like “conservation agriculture / no-till systems”, “integrated soil fertility management”, “the system of rice intensification (SRI)” among others. These are laudable developments, that contribute to viewing soils as dynamic and living systems in which the combination of organic matter and soil (micro)biology are crucial (at a par with the conventional physical and chemical soils’ parameters) in ensuring the long term sustainability of soil productivity and of agricultural production processes that rely upon it.

However, in spite of  the scientific rational / logic of the various integrated approaches, these remain surrounded by combinations of (scientific) controversies, originating from differing ideas about what types of paradigms to promote, unresolved research questions, including effectiveness and efficiency issues, as well as by practical constraints associated with field implementation of such approaches under diverse farming conditions. Therefore long term support for research (national and international), conducted by well-trained, and adequate numbers of scientists pursuing the soil fertility issues holistically instead of through short term silver bullet type responses, still remains a basic requirement for achieving progress.

Within the context of the major development campaigns / projects referred to above, also the introduction of integrated approaches as blueprints, are bound to encounter a mixed response from farmers, simply because the practical implications of points 1 and 2 above have not been thought through adequately. Obviously, any farmer and professional field agronomist / extension agent will be aware of these two problems and consequently of the limitations of the large scale approaches / technologies proposed by academics, (international) development experts and policymakers who are not exposed regularly to the practical field realities of farming. In short the ever increasing gap between “theory” and “reality”, and the corresponding “intertwining of scientific, commercial and political interests”, is likely to remain a serious stumbling block for improving African soils and their agricultural productivity.

Where do the preceding observations lead us in terms of policy frameworks in support of agricultural production by African nations? Firstly one has to face the fact that nearly all African governments have seriously neglected their respective agricultural sectors up to the point that it is unattractive for the average farmer to make any investment in his/her farm beyond what is required for the immediate survival of his/her family. Consequently there are no or highly inadequate emergency food buffers build up at national level to counter natural and other calamities. Secondly this situation is compounded by unfavourable international trade conditions (e.g. heavily subsidized production and dumping of excess production from the North; until recently, cheap rice imports from Asia and; etc.) which in the absence of adequate government trade / economic policies have undermined the domestic production capacity in most African countries.

Rectifying the situation will depend first and foremost on national governments getting their policies “right” in support for their respective agricultural sectors with regard to trade, infrastructural investments and adequate support for building and maintaining a stable agricultural technology R&D capacity based on a socially appropriate vision for rural development and agricultural production. In the absence of such national vision and policies, it is unlikely that external assistance programs and short term ad-hoc projects can contribute to sustainable improvements in soil systems and agriculture productivity, apart from providing poor “emergency aid”.

For national and international agricultural development interventions to be effective (i.e. to deal with the introductory points 1 and 2) they should be soundly and solidly anchored at local levels, in other words “bottom-up” and “participatory” approaches are a pre-condition. In addition, the implementing parties (i.e. farmers, research and development personnel) should be provided with considerable flexibility to test, adjust and adapt various practices and innovations to local conditions and needs, instead of being supervised strictly for achieving predetermined implementation targets for a standard recipe, and for writing meaningless journal articles. These conditions are, however, not self-evident since the average scientist and politician (irrespective of nationality) tends to operate in top-down, authoritarian fashions, often having been trained academically to believe that they know what is best.

In conclusion the points made by Prof. William Easterly1. become highly relevant in this debate, in particular that external (technical and financial) support to African countries should be piece-meal and should be built on / reinforce national capacities and initiatives that meet the dual requirements of being anchored at local levels, while being enhanced (rather than blocked) by national government policies.

1. Easterly, W., 2006. The White Men’s Burden. Penguin Publications, London.

Willem A. Stoop
Centre for Information on Low External Input and Sustainable Agriculture (ILEIA)
willem.stoop@planet.nl

Johan Helland
January 22, 2010 / Pastoralism in crisis?

A central proposition in studies of pastoralism is that pastoral systems have been successful through time because they have been able to adjust both the animal and human populations that they contain against the resources available. The mechanisms involved in this adjustment have varied: in eastern Africa military expansion has historically been important, but outright population crashes have also been documented. In western Africa and in the Middle East pastoralism is more closely integrated with sedentary agriculture and an urban-based trading economy. Barth’s classic study of the Basseri, for instance, shows how Basseri pastoralism sheds off both winners and losers to the encompassing society. One way of characterising contemporary pastoral systems is that they have lost this property, which has been central to the survival of pastoralism at the systemic level.

This view to a large extent depends on treating pastoralism as a clearly bounded system, where it was clear who belonged inside and outside the system. Up to the great Sahelian drought of 1973/74 the pastoral communities in eastern Africa were more or less left to their own devices. Since then the pastoral communities have been increasingly drawn into the orbit of the nation-states in the region, for better or for worse. Relations with the surrounding nation-states have not always been benign, but there have been benefits (often short-term, such a famine relief) as well as long-term costs. As the pastoral systems are opened up it has become increasingly difficult to determine who the pastoralists are. The classic definitions that pastoralists are those who derive 50% or 80% or all their income from animal production no longer seem to be very useful. All kinds of combinations, depending on the opportunities that have presented themselves in the rapidly changing contexts of pastoralism can now be found in the areas that used to contain autonomous pastoral production systems.

Perhaps the ‘pure pastoralist’ has never existed; – people living in the dry lowlands of eastern Africa have always have had to make use of whatever opportunities they can find. Detailed reading of the ethnography often reveals a far greater range and diversity of economic activity than what we initially assume. This is still these case, but perhaps now even more so. Raising livestock is becoming increasingly difficult and actually depending on livestock production for a living is a less and less realistic livelihood strategy. Livestock production is now but one of the many things that go on in the drylands and pastoralism as a way of life is quickly disappearing. If people can make a better, more secure, more stable, more predictable living from doing these other things, perhaps we should not even regret this change.

The problem is of course that people very often are not better off! It is possible to argue for the intrinsic value of pastoralism in terms of it being the only sensible way of exploiting the resources across vast tracts of land, in terms of it being a way of life that is fulfilling to many people. Pastoralism in these terms depends on a number of preconditions that have disappeared, or are in the process of disappearing, and it is now highly unlikely that they ever will be restored. The situation can very well be summed up, as Stephen Sandford does, as ‘too many people, too few cows’.

The pastoral way of life will probably never be fully restored, but the drylands can perhaps still offer a source of livelihood for a comparatively large number of people. It has always been difficult to determine exactly how many people can be accommodated, particularly if it is true that the pastoral systems can no longer shed off the excess. Arguments about the intrinsic value of pastoralism has led to policies attempting to reinsert ‘failed’ pastoralists back into the system (through restocking schemes etc), but these solutions have been short-term, at best. If pastoralism is to survive as an economically sensible and culturally valuable way of life, it can only do so by limiting the number of people who make a living from pastoral livestock production. That means that alternatives must be found for the population that in these terms becomes an excess population. The notion that we can best help pastoralism survive by concentrating on policy alternatives outside pastoralism, policies that will siphon people away from pastoralism is counterintuitive and difficult. But it seems to be the only way. The policy options of expanding opportunities and maximising social and economic mobility (with long-term investments in education in particular), as outlined by Devereaux and Scoones, should be fully supported. This is not a policy prescription for pastoral development as such, but for development in the drylands and the people who live in the drylands. Perhaps this shift in perspective is required.

Johan Helland
Senior Researcher, Chr. Michelsen Institute

Dr. Keith D Shepherd
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

In my view, any policy for improved soil fertility management must have the below ingredients to ensure efficiency and reliable learning.

  1. A systematic programme to properly diagnose soil fertility constraints and their associated risk factors spatially at different scales, using statistically valid sampling schemes. We have the technology to do this cost-effectively now. Participatory diagnosis by land users/communities is important but not a substitute for scientifically sound objective assessments. There is need for interaction among both types of systems.
  2. A systematic programme for testing soil fertility management options using standardized protocols and linked to the baseline above (no. 1) to provide evidence-based recommendations. Again this is required to complement and inform farmers testing strategies.
  3. Baselines and monitoring of soil fertility in soil management/development projects so impacts of interventions can be reliably assessed. Again no.1 above provides a method for doing this.

This evidence base is needed to inform decision making at all levels: individual farmers, communities, stockists, fertilizer/seed companies, land resource managers, national research and extension, government planning and finance ministries, donors, development agencies, etc. We have the technology to do this – we just need good design and systematic application. The types of systems I am describing are surveillance systems similar to those used in the public health sector – which indeed primarily guide public policy and practice.

Dr. Keith D Shepherd, Principal Soil Scientist
World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)
k.shepherd@cgiar.org

Wyn Richards
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

My few comments are based largely on my observation of agricultural practice in the developing world over the past 39 years , not on any great expertise in soil fertility. I refer particularly to the viable farming practices of NR dependent subsistence and subsistence-plus farmers as well as those who are more market oriented. I will not deal with land tenure issues although these certainly need to be addressed by policy makers as there is clearly a major influence on soil fertility emanating from the consequences of unfair land access; nor will I emphasise on the need for policy makers to address tree felling/forest clearing and its influence on soil degradation.  Rather I wish to deal with the lot of the literally hundreds of millions of farmers with access to 0.1 – 2 acres of land  – those who still practice slash and burn shifting cultivation to the more fortunate ones who own land that is ‘farmed’.

The first point I wish to emphasise is the need  for policy makers to be reminded that the most effective and resilient use of small parcels of land (and soil) is achieved through MIXED farming practices. Unfortunately, policy makers in the developing world have been over-influenced by land-use policies of large scale agriculture in the North/West where the whole marketing , economic and social structures are totally different to those in the South.

Unfortunately, there are a myriad examples where well-meaning but badly conceived approaches to land use in the South have created havoc among rural poor communities. For instance, in the 1970s, enticed by the lure of financial gain, the Kenya Govt convinced mixed (crop/livestock) farmers in the Machakos region to transform their small plots into maize-only  farms  in an attempt to create a maize bank for the country. Initially the ‘project’ was deemed to be successful judging by financial rewards for the farmers –  but ultimately the repeated mono-culture approach denuded the soil of tilth and fertility and the productivity declined precipitously . Furthermore, the incidence of kwashiorkor increased significantly during this time as the extra cash earned did not go to purchase the balanced diet required ( milk/meat, cabbage, beans etc) by growing children and which the mixed farm structure would have originally provided. There are many Machakos-like experiments  around the world; one only has to visit India to see the vast amount of land denuded by the mono-culture approach promoted by the Indian Govt of the past. The Green Revolution approach too has had its impact on soil fertility  as it has made too many demands of friable land.

My second point is related to the first –  but is regularly ignored. Successful small-scale farming is as much about social engagement with the community as it is  a means of sustenance and cash rewards. These social networks provide security, confidence to take risk and other forms of social capital that are often the drivers in poor societies. The terms efficiency and financial returns so appreciated in the North do not resonate so loudly in the small-farmer community. And, getting to the point, tradition and culture in the rural community has always been based on a mixed farming approach – the consequences of which has maintained and enriched soils for eons.

Wyn Richards
Natural Resources International Limited
w.richards@nrint.co.uk

Frank M. Place
January 22, 2010 / Soil Fertility

1.  The Soil Fertility Initiative.  I think it failed for several reasons.  First, it was top down led largely from the World Bank.  2.  It was even marginalized within the bank with really only one champion trying to move it forward, 3.  As far as I know there was never any new money for this – it became an approved use of World Bank country funds, but countries would have had to cut other programs, which as we know, is difficult to do in any country.  The new momentum is much broader based (institutionally) and has new money.

2.  Promoting wider adoption of soil fertility management practices.  What is written on the variability of soil constraints, even at micro scales, is very true.  It is further true that the uptake of any individual option or practice is very low with two possible exceptions:  (1) in some countries and for some higher value crops (mainly export crops) there has been high use of inputs including soil fertility management and (2) incorporation of animal manure or crop residues which are locally available by-products from other enterprises.

The overall lack of investment results from a combination of lack of incentives to invest in agriculture as a whole, lack of payoffs to the particular soil practices, or failing that, lack of credit or other resources to implement the practices.  All soil fertility management practices face some constraint in their implementation, be it cash/capital, labor, land area, irrigation/water, equipment, or other.  Because of that, their suitability to certain community and household conditions varies across the landscape, as do the soil constraints.  There is certainly no uniform technical solution, the there may be some consistent principles and approaches to follow.

So what to do?

1.  We do need better diagnoses of soil constraints because farmers truly can’t afford to be wrong about how to address their soils. They face high risks even when they are right.  Africa can’t afford too much sophistication in this, but it needs to advance from the current state of knowledge.

2.  Because of the general lack of profitability of smallholder agriculture, I just can’t see wide adoption of soil fertility practices unless there is significant public investment in the sector.  This needs to be in some of the areas mentioned – to help improve input markets, and to improve credit access by smallholder farmers.  The private sector cannot do these in Africa.  A real question is whether this is enough.  Well, it isn’t in the short run, for sure.  So I believe that smart subsidies are needed, not only for fertilizer, but to encourage the use of complementary soil fertility practices (e.g. to help support information dissemination or leguminous seed multiplication).  It seems clear from the examples we have had in recent years, that these types of investments can be very beneficial.  If they are not implemented, and agriculture production remains poor, many other costs emerge that do not enter into analysts’ equations (rising health needs, food aid, transactions costs associated with dual residence families, etc….).

3.  How to do that, what frameworks, investment strategies, partnerships, policies, institutions, etc, are needed?  Well that is not simple for sure and we do need some good ideas on that.  I am familiar with CAADP, TerrAfrica, AGRA, but haven’t really given thought to the bigger picture. Thus, I will hold off on commenting for now.

Frank M. Place, Economist
World Agroforestry Centre
f.place@cgiar.org

FAC_E-Debate-Contributions-Soil_Fertility
January 19, 2010 / E-debates

At least in the semi-arid regions of Africa, if within-field soil variability is not takeninto account, efforts to increase soil fertility will be less efficient and less likely tobe adopted by farmers. Most of these farmers already practice =precisionagriculture‘ and take short distance variability into consideration in theirmanagement. One can safely assume that they do so for good reason, given thattheir management systems have developed over many centuries.Precision agriculture is also relevant for the introduction of modern technologies.For example, the same principles are relevant to the efficient application ofmanure and the efficient application of compost and mineral fertiliser.For the best solutions, farmer knowledge, extensionist knowledge and researcherknowledge of within-field soil variability need to be combined.

Seasonality and Social Protection in Africa
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}Scial_Protection_in_AfricaThis Working Paper draws on nearly twenty years of research in several African countries,on the inter-related themes of food insecurity, seasonality, coping strategies, famine, form a land in formal safety nets, and social protection. The paper has three objectives:

  • to document and synthesise evidence on the nature and consequences of 1seasonality across rural Africa, highlighting the similarities and convergencesacross contexts;
  • to explore the various policy interventions that have been implemented in 2 response to seasonality, with particular reference to the emerging social protectionagenda;
  • to argue that current approaches to social protection are misconceived and 3inadequate for addressing the seasonal dimensions of rural vulnerability.

2 Seasonality and ‘coping’ in four African countries

2.1 Seasonality is an under-reported food and health crisis that impoverishes and kills Africansevery year; only its severity and duration vary across households and over time. In rain-fedfarming systems, where smallholders depend on a single rainy season for most of their staple food needs, the annual ‘hungry season’ or soudure can last from a few weeks to several months, depending on the extent of food production, self-sufficiency achieved in a given year.

The rhythm of rural life in much of Africa is entirely dictated by this inflexible seasonal calendar, but the relative success or failure of this way of life is determined by the unpredictable behaviour of the weather. The mechanism is straight forward, repetitive as the calendar, and relentless. Smallholders prepare their plots while waiting for the rains to start, then they plant their seeds, then they pray that the rains will be adequate and well.

Seasonality and High Food Prices: a Double Challenge
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}
1. Seasonal hunger is predictable, can be understood and there are tested solutions

2. What happens during seasonal hunger and what happens in famine differs only in severity – Sequencing of coping remains largely the same

3. Moreover the link between them is causal: a chain of shocks leads to the erosion of resilience of a whole community, turning the “normal” seasonal hunger into a major catastrophe.

  • Production failures
  • Reduction of off-farm employment opportunities
  • Hazards
  • Action or inaction in the corridors of power Seasonality: father of all famine
  • Famine can not be stopped unless seasonal hunger is stopped

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Building a common foundation for fighting seasonal hunger
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off} Community-based management of acutemalnutrition programs

  • Child growth promotion programs (maternal andchild nutrition, especially from pregnancy to age 3)
  • Seasonal employment programs
  • Social pensions for those unable to work

A “minimum essential package” for fighting seasonal hunger, How much would universalizing a minimum essential package cost annually?

Indicative, order-of-magnitude estimates…

– CMAM programs: £0.96 to £1.87 billion to treat world’s 19 million severely acutely malnourished children
– Child growth promotion: £3.82 to £7.44 billion for approximately 600 million preschool children living in poor countries
– Seasonal employment programs: £15 to £27 billion at 100 days/yearand £1/day wage transfer for an estimated 200 million extremely poor households, plus administrative etc. costs
– Social pensions: £6.03 to £12.21 billion at 50p/day to 30 million elderly in the poorest countries

Total cost of package: £25.81 – £48.52 billion

  • less than 0.1% of global GDP0.
  • 1% of UK GDP equals about 4p/day per person
  • less than 7% of annual military spending worldwide From Policy to Rights
  • The right to food

-Included in international covenants: International Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Convention on the Rights of the Child

-Primary objective of covenants is to guide the incorporation of rights into national law

-Enforcement of the right to food has the effect of converting discretionary policy into legal entitlements

-India example of how legal protection of the right to food can have practical impact…
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Future Agricultures in Kenya
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}By John Omiti

Future Agricultures-kenyaCross-country co-ordination issues
Commercialization – Gem Arwings Kodhek / Steve Wiggins

Social Protection – Lydia Ndirangu/ Stephen Devereux
Country co-ordination – John Omiti / John Thompson

Challenges of FAC Research – 1
Carry-over from Phase 1

– Fertiliser paper (Karuti/Atieno)

  • Lack of Country Advisory committee
  • Objections from some national members
  • Slow Disbursements of funds

– leads to slow implementation

– loss of good field assistants

Carry-over from Phase 1

– Fertiliser paper (Karuti/Atieno)

  • Lack of Country Advisory committee
  • Objections from some national members
  • Diminishing interest by some members
  • Cross-country co-ordination issues
  • Slow Disbursements of funds

– leads to slow implementation

– loss of good field assistants

Challenges of FAC Research – 2

  • Data problems Time series and Cross-sectional
  • Sharing mechanisms
  • 5. Exchange rate variations
  • £ vs. €£ vs. $
  • Slow or ineffective implementation
  • Future Research Themes
  • Kenya Vision 2030
  • High input cost Inappropriate land use practices
  • Limited application of agricultural technology and innovation
  • Weak farmer institutions
  • Poor livestock husbandry practice limited extension services
  • Over-dependence on rain-fed agriculture
  • Inadequate credit facilities
  • DfID (2008-2013)
  • New agriculture technologies
  • High value agriculture in areas of medium to high potential
  • Rural economic Risk, vulnerability and adaptation
  • Market Managing natural resources
  • Future Prospects Appear pretty good! Strong stakeholder interest Good research output coming thru! Cross-country work very promising for policy uptake/outcomes.{jcomments off}

Policy Process Theme Progress and Challenges in Year 1
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Didn’t get started until December

– Long delay in contracts (DFID contract, PP time allocation)
– Getting team together (methodology and detailed planning for MoA district study)

  • Main policy engagement: Tuesday fertiliser workshop
  • MoA study:
    – Secondary data collection started
    – Field work to begin next week
    – Draft reports by March 31st, workshops June
  • Draft review of SWAps in agriculture (Lidia)  

Vision

  • Integrating political economy, institutional and technocratic perspectives on how and why agricultural policies are made
    –Linking broad governance to agricultureStraddles Sustainable Agriculture and Governance themes of DFID Research Strategy

Role and Performance of Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development

  • Role in 21st century
  • What they actually do and why
  • How well they do this and how to improve it
  • –Including potential for stakeholder participation in planning and evaluation

  • Phase 1: 2 districts in each of Kenya and Malawi
  • This year: 2 more districts in Kenya, 1 in Malawi
  • – Chosen by both agro-ecology and politics

  • Year 2: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Ghan
  • – Action research component?

Relevance

  • Ministry capacity (regulator, coordinator, service provider?) fundamental to:
  • – efforts on commercialisation, technology adoption
    – CAADP objectives (10% budget target)

  • Extension debates:
    – AGRA stockist model, FIPS, NAADS
  • – Is there any future for public delivery?
    – “Mixed ecology” approach

    Relevance to DFID Research Strategy
    Little under Sust Ag, but Governance (Building Strong and Effective States) envisages research on:“… decentralisation and the role of local organisations and the private sector in delivering services. We will also examine the importance of a government’s financial management in the relationship between the state and the people. We will continue to examine the link between power, politics and the relationships between society and the state. We will ask how these shape development as well as contribute to holding the state to account to its actions.” [p33]

Growth & Social Protection
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}growth_and_social_protectionOUTPUTS  (1):   Working Paper series

WP01       Building Synergies between Social Protection and Smallholder Agricultural Policies
WP02       Agriculture and Social Protection in Malawi
WP03       Agriculture and Social Protection in Ethiopia
WP04       Agriculture and Social Protection in Ghana
WP05       Agriculture and Social Protection in Kenya
WP06       Social Protection for Agricultural Growth in Africa
WP07       Seasonality and Social Protection in Africa 

OUTPUTS  (2):   Briefing Paper series

FAC BP                    The Global Fertiliser Crisis and Africa
GSP BP01                Agriculture and Social Protection in Africa
GSP BP03                Agriculture and Social Protection in Malawi
GSP BP03                Agriculture and Social Protection in Ethiopia
GSP BP04                Agriculture and Social Protection in Ghana 

Agricultural Commercialisation
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}agricultural_commercialisationAim:

  • to examine relation of commercialisation of small farming
  • to levels of food security andother variations amongst households such as assets
  • to see how much intervention overcomes potential failures in factor & product marketsto observe early results

Method:

  • Study comparable communities of small and poor farmers subject to intervention to facilitate more commercialised production
  • Three areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi
  • Observe outset of intervention, return two or one year later
  • Combination of qualitative study +  small household surveys
  • Start of studies to be staggered: 08/09 Kenya; 09/10 Ethiopia, Malawi
  • But not possible to begin in Kenya during current year Plan for 09/10 & onwards

Policy frameworks for increasing soil fertility in Africa
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}soil_fertility_in_AfricaEveryone is agreed that one of the central components of achieving an „African Green Revolution. is totackle the widespread soil fertility constraints in African agriculture. To this end, AGRA – the Alliance fora Green Revolution in Africa – has launched a major new „Soil Health. programme aimed at 4.1 millionfarmers across Africa, with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation committing $198 million to the effort www.agra-alliance.org/section/work/soils).

The Abuja declaration, following on from the African Fertilizer Summit of 2006 set the scene for major investments in boosting fertilizer supplies www.africafertilizersummit.org/Abuja) Fertilizer Declaration in English.pdf). CAADP – the Comprehensive  African Agricultural Development Programme – has been active in supporting the follow up to the summit, particularly through its work on improving markets and trade www.triomedia.co.za/work/nepad/newsletters/2008/issue212_15Feb2008.html#toc1 ).

Other initiativesabound – the Millennium Villages programme (http://www.millenniumvillages.org/), Sasakawa-Global 2000 www.saa-tokyo.org/english/sg2000/), the activities of the Association for Better Land Husbandry,among many others. All see soil fertility as central, although the suggested solutions and policy.requirements are very different..But what are the policy frameworks that really will increase soil fertility in ways that will boost production. in a sustainable fashion; where the benefits of the interventions are widely distributed, meeting broader.aims of equitable, broad-based development? Here, there is much less precision and an urgent need for a concrete debate.

For this reason, the Future Agricultures Consortium has decided to invite a wide range of participants to debate some key issues around the way forward for policy, and associated institutional arrangements.

Agriculture and Social Protection in Malawi
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}Social_Protection_in_MalawiThis paper reviews social protection and agriculture policies in Malawi in order to explorethe links, synergies and conflicts that lie between them. It begins with brief backgroundinformation about Malawi, in terms of its economic and welfare indicators.

Particularemphasis is placed on understanding agricultural and social protection policies within thecontext of

(a) political issues and

(b) market and livelihood development.

This is followed witha review of agricultural and social protection policies, their interactions and their impacts onlivelihoods and welfare. Specific attention is given to evolving input subsidy policies whichare of particular relevance to this review. We conclude with a discussion of lessons that canbe learned from Malawian experience with agriculture and social protection.

Before examining specific agricultural and social protection policies in terms of their evolutionand outcomes, it is important to place these in context. We focus on three particular (andinter-related) aspects of context, the political context (as this affects the policy choices thatpoliticians make), the economic context (as this affects the policy demands, resources andhence options), and the agricultural and rural livelihood context (as this affects the policydemands and policy outcomes).

A broad historical understanding is critical in understandingthese contexts, and table 1 sets out major pertinent events since 1990/91. The Economic Context With more than 55% of its rural population in poverty and 24% ultra-poor in 2004/5(National Statistical Office, 2005, and GNI per capita of around 170 US$, Malawi is oneof the poorest countries in the world, as evidenced by a range of social and economic indicators. Many people in Malawi are characterized by high levels ofvulnerability, due to the fragility of their livelihoods, susceptibility to shocks, and largenumbers of non-poor people living just above the poverty line (Devereux et al., 2006).

Social Protection for Agricultural Growth in Africa
January 15, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Various explanations have been advanced for the persistent under-performance of agriculturein many African countries, where smallholder farming is still the dominant livelihood activity and the main source of employment, food and income. Some of the oldest argumentsremain the most compelling.

African farmers face harsh agro-ecologies and erratic weather,characterised by low soil fertility, recurrent droughts and/or floods, and increasingly unpredictable weather patterns associated with climate change. Vulnerability to shocks is compounded by infrastructure deficits (roads and transport networks, telecommunications,potable water and irrigation) that keep poor communities poor and vulnerable, as testifiedby the phenomenon observed during livelihood crises of steep food price gradients fromisolated rural villages to densely settled urban centres.

African farmers have also been inadequately protected against the forces of globalisation and adverse international terms oftrade – for instance, Western farmers and markets are heavily protected in ways that African farmers and markets are not. Finally, African agriculture has been the subject of numerous experiments – strategies,policies, programmes and projects – from ‘Integrated Rural Development Programmes’(IRDPs) in the 1960s to ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers’ (PRSPs) in the 1990s.

Perhaps the most significant intervention of the last half-century was agricultural liberalisation,promoted under the ‘structural adjustment’ reform umbrella during the 1980s and 1990s. Following inconclusive evidence on the impacts of these policy reform processes, the debatecontinues over whether agricultural liberalisation was a good idea badly implemented by‘refusenik’ African governments, or a bad idea doomed to fail, that was imposed on African governments against their better judgement and against the interests of their poor andvulnerable citizens, many of whom are small farmers.

This debate is relevant to our topic,since government interventions in agriculture (pre-liberalisation) were motivated by concerns to achieve household and national food security, both by supporting agricultural growth and by protecting farmers against agricultural risks and market failures.

CGIAR Reform and Relevance for FAC
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Wrap-up

  • All these activities should be about process – but still debate about how narrow/broad the focus should be on particular content
  • Climate change/environmental sustainability – needs to be there, but shouldn’t drive the agenda – how do changes in climate affect the way we think about innovation systems? What are the factors – environmental and other – that affect them?
  • Off the shelf technologies – not just about getting them into farmers’ hands – must address governance and policy issues – examining the social and political trajectories that technologies travel will inform these debates
  • Particular projects and their focus:
  1. a broader approach to livestock would be useful, but focus on pastoral issues makes most sense
  2. would hope this would provide a platform for interacting with CG, reg’l research orgs, NARS, NGO networks, etc.
  • Need a more elaborate process to develop broader strategy for FAC work in STI à develop fuller proposal for Consortium to review
  • Innovation systems perspective has been there for some time – big challenge of programmes like Research Into Use and CG Challenge Programmes is operationalisation and developing and sustaining ‘stakeholder innovation platforms’ – many unanswered questions à CIMMYT struggling with this too
  • Role of gov’t – Ministries of S&T struggling with developing innovation output indicators to demonstrate impacts. MSTs weak in coordination and resource mobilisation
  • Regulation key issue – PPPs – incentive structure for interaction very weak, incoherence in the system à whole governance structure needs to be examined in this area

Country Reports Ethiopia
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Ethiopia team has expanded to new thematic areas for FAC:

  1. Investing in agriculture and pastoralism and ‘future pastoralisms’ – understanding patterns of investment – rural/urban, agric/pastoral areas
  2. Climate change, environment and sustainable development – building on capacity on CC, understanding impact on Ethiopian agriculture
  3. Future farmers and pastoralists – a passion for us, coming out of original consultations with youth and children, one reason agriculture has stagnated is loss of youth – how to attract back to agriculture

Challenges

  • Phase I – FAC Ethiopia team made the best of limited policy space by continuous dialogue, non-threatening approach, and building social capital. This will continue in Phase II.
  • However, policy space is getting narrower due to a new law governing charities and societies. Will affect work across the board! Government has given all NGOs one year to wrap up programmes, must register all again in 2010 – may close many down.
  • Various working groups set up but difficult to get moving – 7 task groups to identify key issues/priorities, then bring to core group to develop common strategy – but question of incentives/expectations.
  • Untimely budget release to undertake fieldwork led to uncertainties.
  • With respect to Social Protection, the theme still has a very low profile in MoLSA – because of limited resources, urban focused, but we are trying to include this in consultations. Need to identify good institutions to maintain momentum.

Country Reports Kenya
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Activities

  • National Stakeholder workshop is being held in June this year.
  • Progress on the Commercialisations and Social Protection methodology.
  • Working to raise the visibility level of FAC at the national level.
  • People are interested and knowledgeable and many places (e.g. institutions, universities) are working on agriculture.
  • FAC has good institutional members (i.e. KIPPRA, Tegemeo) that are solid. As well, FAC has links with other partners (CIAT, ICRAF, etc.)
  • The success of the Fertiliser Workshop proves commitment and interest; even the private sector attended the workshop, which is a good sign.
  • FAC Kenya produces credible material (e.g. reporting to Dfid)
  • Cross-country work is very promising.
  • Work continues to be carried over from Phase I and work on fertiliser subsidies (Gem, Colin + Karuti + Rosemary) will be finished soon
  • Setting up the advisory group proved difficult. FAC had names last year – senior fellows in Ministries which were floated with other members but it was felt there was too much government. More names from CSOs – no names are not forthcoming. Committee was never constituted, as nominations could not be decided upon.
  • FAC is looking to Tegemeo to include as partner.
  • But these are informal collections – no formal mechanism to control membership. Things are being incrementally institutionalised but we’re a network with unclear formula for non-compliance.
  • This is a critical stage for us. In Kenya, July meeting was our attempt to come up with solutions – we sought names “advisors on future agricultures” but may be too strong. “advisory” is sensitive to government.
  • FAC should think about what it needs first – advocacy, advice, authority. Accountability – it’s a loose and organise organisation (FAC) growing organically – a typical network. Think carefully FAC needs the Ministry – otherwise FAC will end up so it can’t advise etc.
  • The “advisory group” is not really advocacy but a ‘critical friend’ that comments on our work.

Discussion

  • Setting up the advisory group proved difficult. FAC had names last year – senior fellows in Ministries which were floated with other members but it was felt there was too much government. More names from CSOs – no names are not forthcoming. Committee was never constituted, as nominations could not be decided upon.
  • FAC is looking to Tegemeo to include as partner.
  • But these are informal collections – no formal mechanism to control membership. Things are being incrementally institutionalised but we’re a network with unclear formula for non-compliance.
  • This is a critical stage for us. In Kenya, July meeting was our attempt to come up with solutions – we sought names “advisors on future agricultures” but may be too strong. “advisory” is sensitive to government.
  • FAC should think about what it needs first – advocacy, advice, authority. Accountability – it’s a loose and organise organisation (FAC) growing organically – a typical network. Think carefully FAC needs the Ministry – otherwise FAC will end up so it can’t advise etc.
  • The “advisory group” is not really advocacy but a ‘critical friend’ that comments on our work.

Country Reports Malawi
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Circumstances in Malawi are similar to those in Kenya: there is limited policy space. As well, there is an impending general election so after May 09 there should be more openings in Ministry of Agriculture that will want to talk about way forward.

Core team – Ephraim Chirwa, Blessings Chinsinga (Policy Processes), Andrew Dorward (GSP)

Progress

  • Advisory Group – preliminary consultations are done – key ministries still being approached, but change of PS/directors in MoAFS problematic – policy environmental sensitivity.
  • Ministry of Agriculture – most of civil society is interested in agriculture but they lack the analytical capacity to engage effectively with the Ministry. If the ministry is not interested in this group, should we continue planning? For us, the main challenge is engagement. Subsidy programme has become so political; nobody wants to talk about (not at least until May 19).
  • Theme of agricultural growth: many policy workshops in Malawi and within the region. Social protection process has stalled but has been retained on the basis that the ministry did not have active consultation. They are sitting back and wanting to restart the process but will wait until after the election. Not going to be an issue before the election.
  • Challenge MoAFS – General election in May 09. Will slow process. Official invitations will only be made after Ministry is on board as part of AG. May improve after the elections.
  • Also participated in farmer organisation study – touches on commercialisation
  • Agriculture growth and commercialisation – work in progress on seasonality – we should have a draft working paper by the end of the year.
  • We have engaged at various levels (including Andrew) for evaluation of Malawi input subsidy. Will help to inform results from first evaluation.
  • We have participated in regional and international workshops at the level of policy makers (e.g. Salzburg). Policy makers (SADC) were there and this was significant. Ministries of Ag form SADC countries also.
  • Jatorpha – marketing it as a commercial crop among smallholders. They want to do a baseline and monitor. It’s a five-year project. Sampling will look at adoption rates. Related to the Commercialisation theme, coffee etc. is not a crop for farmers. Japtropha is a different product with little experience about marketing this. We have been contracted to do the baseline but no funds mean we have not started.
  • Also participated in farmer organisation study – touches on commercialisation
  • Ag growth and commercialisation – work in progress on seasonality – we should have a draft working paper by the end of the year.
  • We have engaged at various levels (including Andrew) for evaluation of Malawi input subsidy. Will help to inform results from first evaluation.
  • We have participated in regional and international workshops at the level of policy makers (e.g. Salzburg). Policy makers (SADC) were there and this was significant. Ministries of Ag form SADC countries also.
  • Policy processes theme – problems like delay in funding changed plans. First phase we were in two districts, we propose to add a district in the north and bring all farmers together in workshop.

A New Deal for Food and Agriculture: Responding to uncertainty, building resilience
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Interlocking uncertainties: new challenges for food and agriculture

The interlocking food, fuel, financial and climate crises present major challenges fordevelopment. This is particularly so in Africa – and for the poor across the world. The bottom billion is now not only resource poor, but hungry too. The shocks of recent years are unprecedented: they interact in ways that create extreme poverty traps,   increasing the vulnerability of the poor – and especially women and children.

Such shocks are felt especially acutely in so-called fragile states where governance is weak and the potential for conflict is high. Already facing extreme risks and challenging livelihoods, poor people must now deal with deep, interacting and interlocking uncertainties. Increasingly the consequence of a complex, interconnected and globalised world, extreme volatility will remain a feature of the development landscape. Coping with and proofing against such risks and uncertainties must be the core challenge of any international development endeavour.

Addressing food insecurity and hunger lies at the heart of this. MDG1 has stated our global ambitions. But the recent combination of food, fuel and finance shocks, and the long term stress of climate change, has set us back. Even approaching the targets looks like a forlorn hope. But there are solutions to these challenges; although recent events put these into new perspective, adding a new urgency to the task.

The immediate effort, particularly in Africa – but also in large parts of Asia – must be effective relief and social protection measures to avoid the already hungry becoming hungrier. The ‘silent tsunami’ of global hunger is a real phenomenon, and it has not gone away with the reversal of the food and fuel price hikes of 2008. The financial crisis adds to the burden, as remittance flows dry up and economies slow down. A major effort to ensure a basic safety net is needed to offset the negative impacts of extreme price, production and market volatility that affect the poor.

Agriculture, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Ethiopia: Policy
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}Poverty_Reduction_in_Ethiopia“Agriculture is the mainstay of the Ethiopian Economy”. This statement has almost become acliché for development professionals in Ethiopia. Those who went to school 50 years ago,read it; and later on wrote about it. So has the present generation. The Report on the Ethiopian Economy, Volume IV (EEA/EEPRI, 2004/05:10) stated, for example:“…agriculture is the main stay of the Ethiopian economy and the most volatile sector….mainly due to its dependence on rain and the seasonal shocks that are frequently observed”.

As things stand, our children and grandchildren will be repeating this refrain for generations to come. Yet, the sector has been unable to realise its potential and contribute significantly to economic development. How can we change this? In the Ethiopian context, agriculture is proving to be the most complex sector to understand. On the one hand, it contributes the largest share to GDP, export trade and earnings, and employs 84% (PASDEP, 2006) of the population.

On the other hand, despite such socio-economic importance, the performance of the sector is very low due to many natural and man-made factors. As a result, Ethiopia is characterised by large food self-sufficiency gap atnational level and food insecurity at household level (EEA/EEPRI, 2004/05:145). Whereas in the Northern highlands, farmers struggle to make ends meet on completely degraded land, in the South and Southwestern part of the country, people live in extremepoverty in the midst of plenty – fertile land and relatively preserved environment.

Tocomplicate matters further, the country’s future is pinned on agriculture as demonstrated in a statement by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in 2000.

Intensification of Smallholder Agriculture in Ethiopia
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

The prevailing orthodoxy is to see the problem of smallholder agriculture in Ethiopia strictly as a technical and resource related problem. This view identifi es the low level of agricultural productivity as the key problem. In response, the government of Ethiopia has since the mid 1990s, implemented a high-profi le, national technologyled extension programme. But has this worked, and what are the limitations of such a strategy?

The Smallholder Intensification Programme

The Ethiopian government’s development strategy centres on ‘Agricultural Development Led Industrialization’. A ‘green revolution’-like intensifi cation of smallholder agriculture was seen as key. Policymakers assumed that signifi cant productivity growth could be easily achieved by improving farmers’ access to technologies which would narrow the yield gap. Researchers identified crop technology packages that could make a huge difference.

They indicated that maize yield, for instance, can be increased from current farmers’ yields of 1.6 tonnes/ha to 4.7 tonnes/ha, if farmers used the right type and amount of improved seed varieties, fertilizers and other recommended practices. The ‘Participatory Agricultural Demonstration Training Extension System’ (PADETES) thus aimed to attain yield improvements at a national level, based on the much touted experience of the Sasakawa Global 2000 programme.

The strategy was a technology-based, supply-driven intensifi cation which consisted of enhanced supply and promotion of improved seeds, fertilizers, onfarm demonstrations of improved farm practices and technologies,improved credit supply for the purchase of inputs and close follow up of farmers’ extension plots

Rethinking Agricultural Input Subsidies in Poor Rural Economies
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}Poor_Rural_EconomiesAgricultural input subsidies were a common element in agricultural development in poor rural economies in the 1960s and 70s, including successful green revolutions. Although subsidies have continued, to a greater and lesser extent, in some countries, conventional wisdom as well as dominant donor thinking in the 80s and 90s was that subsidies had been ineffective and inefficient policy instruments in Africa, which contributed to government overspending and fiscal and macroeconomic problems.

Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in agricultural input subsidies in Africa, together with the emergence of innovative subsidy-delivery systems. These developments, together with new insights into development processes, make it necessary to revisit the conventional wisdom on subsidies.

This should include an examination of the various development opportunities and constraints facing African farmers, a review of recent experience with input subsidies, and a thorough reexamination of the role played by agricultural input subsidies in the Asian green revolution.

Overview – Ian Scoones and John Thompson
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

When the Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) began, there was a different context in debates about agriculture. Policy research was being done, but not much. FAC was providing a space that was underrepresented at that time – not any longer. There are many things going on now and the policy environment is changing with more and new actors (e.g. ISTD, AGRA, CAADP, Millennium Villages, etc.) and urgent issues – food crisis, fertiliser crisis, more publications). And there are now bigger players and bigger debates around policy-focussed research. We need to continue to argue for our space at this table.

In the FAC phase II proposal, we described a broad mission: aims “to encourage dialogue and the sharing of good practice by policy makers and opinion formers in Africa on the role of agriculture in broad based growth”.

There are others that also cover similar territory (e.g. CAADP, AGRA IFPRI, etc.) – where do we fit? What do we do that’s different? How to insert FAC into more mainstream processes where we can challenge, critique, confront? What is our niche?

  • We are situated in the international scene – imbedded in particular areas conducting ‘real research’ in ‘real places’) and this speaks to broader debates and contributes to interesting insights.
  • We are a diverse partnership – multiple institutions, UK and Africa – membership – university, NGO consultants, disciplinary diversity (e.g. agriculture economists) so we don’t have a singular focus.
  • We commit ourselves to process-orientation (Policy Processes) multiple scenarios – constructing future agricultures – no definitive view about what should be but open to creating debate.
  • We are independent, flexible, etc. – values noted in external report. One of our selling points – particularly as the mainstream (right hand column).
  • We provide research that is not automatically available – we are able to challenge conventional wisdom. 

SEMINAR AGENDA University of Sussex Brighton, England
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}University_of_Sussex_Professor Jeremy Swift specialises in the development of pastoral economiesin Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. His particular interests include;

  • poverty,
  • famine,
  • land tenure and
  • pastoral governance.

Pastoral policy-making has lagged far behind other policy domains mainly because pastoralism has been widely misunderstood and ignored by policy makers.

Pastoralists’ own economic and social strategies have often been considered irrational, and in need of radical change. This opening session of the seminar will look at key aspects of pastoral policy and open the debate – to be explored in detail during the rest of the seminar – about what policies might be appropriate, feasible and effective.

Policy Processes – Colin Poulton
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Progress and Challenges

  • Didn’t get started until December
  1. Long delay in contracts (DFID contract, PP time allocation)
  2. Getting team together (methodology and detailed planning for MOA district study)
  • Main policy engagement Tuesday Fertiliser workshop
  • MoA study

  1. Secondary data collection started
  2. Fieldwork starting next week
  3. Draft by end of Year 1
  • Draft review of SWAps in Agriculture – Lidia C

Discussion

  • What would impact of CAADP target be on Mins of Ag and RD? à will they be overwhelmed by more money?
  • How can you focus on district offices only à how do you get to the ‘mixed ecology’? – in terms of delivery we’re talking about gov’t, CSO and priv sector/traders and how they work together; alternative access to services/extension – but focus is on Mins of ARD because they haven’t moved as far as the others / National-level discussions – need to think how to engage with Mins of Finance
  • Ethiopia? – Will come in Yr 2, after finishing most of the Kenya and Malawi work
  • Need to note study by IFPRI, EEAR and others on extent of national extension delivery – very relevant to FAC study à ask more political economy, institutional and governance issues on back of this
  • Lessons from Research Into Use? – DFID realised these governance issues – role of the state, political processes, etc – were missing link in regional and national work – now working to rectify this – inform FARA, ASARECA, etc. to link up with stakeholders they’re accountable to

The Future of Pastoralism in Ethiopia
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}Pastoralism_in_EthiopiaEthiopian representatives and leading international thinkers deliberate overthe state of pastoralism, making a new analysis of potential futures Understanding of Pastor Pastoralism alismEthiopia has Africa’ Africa’s largest livestock population. Over 60% of its land area iss semi-arid lowland, dominated by the livestock economy economy.

Today Ethiopia is looking day for a new and deeper understanding of its pastoralist regions and an accurate appreciation of their environmental and socio-economic trajectories. Ethiopians from the Federal and Regional governments and from traditional institutions met at the University of Sussex, Brighton, England in December 2006 to deliberate over the future for pastoralism in Ethiopia.

They discussed past and present pastoralist policies and policy processes and set out a policy objective that calls for ‘creating sustainable livelihoods and improved living conditions and reducing vulnerability vulnerability, risk and conflict in pastoral areas.’ They proposed to achieve, this through ‘enhanced socio-economic integration, recognition of pastoralists pastoralists’voice and maximising the potential of the pastoral economy economy.’

This report is drawn from evidence given by academic scholars in the fields ofeconomics, anthropology, environmental studies and political science, together with the deliberations of the Ethiopian team. It summarises the data and presents a fresh analysis of potential futures for pastoralists. It begins by setting out thefacts and figures in section one; putting forward evidence on influential longer-term factors that affect development in pastoralist regions.

The publication then looks toward the future, envisioning some of the choices pastoralists may make over the next 20 years. The analysis uses the research evidence to consider how the key influences on pastoralism may combine to shape the future. If market potential is high and environmental productivity is good, what is the most likely direction of development? Where are the benefitslikely to accrue and what risks do people face? Conversely, if markets are, inaccessible and population outstrips production from the natural environment,what would the likely outcomes then be? This combination of science and imagination produces a new new, more detailed and more realistic understanding, of the way pastoralism works and its future in Ethiopia.

Growth and Social Protection – Stephen Devereux
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Outputs

  • Working Papers Series – 7 papers based on secondary sources based on FAO / FAC work – intersection between seasonality, SP and smallholder ag, country cases (3 FAC countries + Ghana + overviews + seasonality)
  • FAC briefing papers – summarising longer working papers
  • ODI NR perspective – Malawi input subsidy team
  • Seasons of Hunger – Hunger Watch + FAC
  • All above signal new theme on seasonality, SP and smallholders – brought in Robert Chambers
  • Another book – Social Protection in Africa – Frank Ellis + Philip White – not FAC product

Discussion

A lot going on – impressive

  • Portfolio of activities – lesson on how to do things with such a strange budget profile
  • Seasonality – 20 years ago people were addressing; why did it get dropped off the agenda? How will this research put it back on the agenda and how will it be kept on? A: Reason for the conference will be to address that issue. Structural adjustment removed a whole set of buffers that smooth food pricing, etc. and ignored financial market failures (seasonal finance). Need to develop theory and get it back in undergraduate degree programmes. Bangladesh is a place where gov’t is addressing this.
  • Give list of possible research plans how will you select priorities? FAC team have own preferences – e.g., seasonality, SP and pastoral areas; 1-year cycle; etc. But some will be demand-driven. Will use time after Seasonality conference to discuss.
  • Scoping study on Climate Change Adaptation, Social Protection and Agriculture – IDS Climate Change team leading in SE Asia, soon E Africa
  • RiPPLE – Household studies in N Ethiopia – seasonal water availability and hh strategies

Pastoral Innovation Systems Perspectives from Ethiopia and Kenya
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

{jathumbnail off}Pastoral_Innovation_SystemsThe Future Agricultures Consortium (FAC) aims to encourage critical debate and policy dialogue on the future of agriculture in Africa. The Consortium is a partnership between research-based organisations in Africa and the UK, with work currently focusing on Ethiopia, Kenya and Malawi.Through stakeholder-led policy dialogues on future scenarios for agriculture, informed by field research, the Consortium aims to elaborate the practical and policy challenges of establishing and sustaining pro-poor agricultural growth in Africa, with a focus onEthiopia, Kenya and Malawi.Current work focuses on four core themes:

Policy processes: what political, organisational or budgetary processes promote or hinderpathways to pro-poor, agriculture-led growth? What role should different actors, includingMinistries of Agriculture, have in this?
Growth and social protection: what are the trade-offs and complementarities betweengrowth and social protection objectives?
Agricultural commercialisation: what types of commercialisation of agriculture bothpromote growth and reduce poverty? What institutional and market arrangements arerequired?Science, technology and innovation: how can agricultural technology be made to workfor the poor? How are technology trajectories linked to processes of agrarian/livelihoodchange?

Policy Dialogues and Scenarios
January 14, 2010 / Miscellaneous

Kenya perspective

  1. CAADP agenda, MDG agenda, Vision 2030 all circulating around same set of issues – difficult to isolate CAADP process from other strategies/processes
  2. Philosophical differences about bottom-up processes – decision makers often disagree about how to introduce participatory processes into NR and agric policy issues
  3. Kenya federalism is a very sensitive issue – ‘majimboism’ – serious tensions between those advocating regionalism/federalism and those promoting centralism à there are constituency funds/processes to influence policy processes
  4. Sensitivities over regional processes – Northern Lands strategy still in development; minister may not wish to discuss with neighbouring countries

Malawi perspective

  1. Can’t see place for a comprehensive consultation – already many – but by focusing on topics like ‘future farmers’ or ‘farmers’ organisations’ – this would be important for bringing up voices of key constituencies
  2. Process of this nature would be important for stimulating the decentralisation process, which has almost stopped – particularly important at the moment – opportunities for organising local people around issues of service delivery à open avenues for people for engaging with local government structures
  3. Africa Regional Dept – Afrobarometer – opinion surveys could get some quick results à Blessings – results may be out end of Mar for Malawi – could be useful information
  4. CAADP – having their 4th Platform Partnership meeting in Pretoria end of March – get in touch with focal points in FAC countries – organise event on future farmers and farmers’ organisations.